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THE  
GREVILLE MEMOIRS  
(THIRD PART)

VOL. I.



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*THE GREVILLE MEMOIRS*

(THIRD PART)

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A JOURNAL OF THE REIGN  
OF  
QUEEN VICTORIA

FROM 1852 TO 1860

BY THE LATE

CHARLES C. F. GREVILLE, Esq.

CLERK OF THE COUNCIL

IN TWO VOLUMES—VOL. I.

LONDON  
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1887



# PREFACE

OF THE EDITOR

TO THE THIRD PART OF THIS JOURNAL.

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It appears to be unnecessary and inexpedient to delay the publication of the last portion of these papers, which contain some record of the events occurring between the year 1852 and the close of the year 1860, a period already remote from the present time, and relating almost exclusively to men of the last generation. I have little to add to the notices prefixed by me to the two preceding portions of this work, but I am grateful for the length of days which has enabled me to complete the task confided to me by Mr. Greville three and twenty years ago, and to leave behind me a record of that delightful company to which I was bound by the closest ties of intimacy and friendship. On looking back upon the first half of the present century, I believe that we were too unconscious of the exceptional privileges we enjoyed, and that we did not sufficiently appreciate the remarkable gifts of the statesmen, the orators, the historians, the poets, and the wits who shed an incomparable lustre on the politics, the literature, and the social intercourse of those

years. Of these personages some traces are to be found in the preceding volumes and in these pages.

Nor am I less grateful for the reception this publication has met with from the world, which has far surpassed the modest expectations of the author, and has at last conveyed to the reader a just estimate of the integrity and ability with which these Journals were written. They bear evident marks of the changes which are wrought in a man's character and judgements by the experience of life and the course of years ; and they fall naturally into the three periods or divisions of Mr. Greville's life which I was led from other causes to adopt. In the first part he appears as a man of fashion and of pleasure, plunged, as was not inconsistent with his age and his social position, in the dissipation and the amusements of the day ; but he was beginning to get tired of them. In the second part he enters with all the energy of which he was capable, though shackled by his official position, upon the great political struggles of the time—the earnest advocate of peace, of moderation, of justice, and of liberal principles—regarding with a discriminating eye and with some severity of judgement the actions of men swayed by motives of ambition and vanity, from which he was himself free. This was the most active period of his life. But years advanced, and with age the infirmities from which he had always suffered withdrew him more and more from society, and deprived him of many of those sources of intelligence which had been so freely opened to him. Hence it is possible that the volumes

now published contain less of novelty and original information than the preceding portions of the work. But on the other hand, the events recorded in them are of a more momentous character—the re-establishment of the French Empire, the Imperial Court, the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny, and the Italian War, are more interesting than the rise or fall of a Ministry ; and it is curious to note precisely the effect produced at the time on the mind of a contemporary observer. No one was more conscious of the incompleteness of these Journals, and of a certain roughness, due to the impromptu character of a manuscript hastily written down, and rarely corrected, than the author of them. He was more disposed to underrate their merit, as appears from his concluding remarks, than to exaggerate their importance. But the public have judged of them more favourably ; and if he entertained a hope that he might contribute some pages to the record of his times and the literature of his country, that hope was not altogether vain.

HENRY REEVE.

*January 1837.*



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*October 22nd, 1852.*—As usual a long interval, for since the Duke's death I have had nothing to write about. The distribution of his offices and honours has not given satisfaction. The appointment of Fitzroy Somerset would have been more popular than that of Hardinge to the command of the army, especially with the army; but I have no doubt the Court insisted on having Hardinge, who is a great favourite there.

Matters in politics remain much as they were. There has been a constant interchange of letters between Lord John

Russell and his leading friends and adherents, and conversations and correspondence between these and Palmerston, the result of the whole being a hopeless state of discord and disagreement in the Liberal party, so complete that there appears no possibility of all the scattered elements of opposition being combined into harmonious action, the consequence of which can hardly fail to be the continuance in office of the present Government. The state of things may be thus summed up: Lord John Russell declares he will take no office but that of Premier, considering any other a degradation; but he says he does not want office, and if a Liberal Government can be formed under anybody else he will give it his best support. He resents greatly the expressed sentiments of those who would put him by and choose another Prime Minister, and this resentment his belongings foster as much as they can. Palmerston professes *personal* regard for Lord John, but declares he will never again serve *under* him, though he would *with* him, and his great object has been to induce Lord Lansdowne to consent to put himself at the head of a Government (if this falls) under whom he would be willing to serve, and he would consent to Lord John's leading the House of Commons as heretofore. This he communicated to the Duke of Bedford in conversation at Bocket, and he afterwards wrote a detailed account of that conversation to Lansdowne himself, which was an invitation to him to act the part he wished to allot to him. Lord Lansdowne wrote him an answer in which he positively declined to put himself at the head of a Government, stating various reasons why he could not, and his conviction that John Russell was the only man who could be at the head of one hereafter. With regard to other opinions, Graham is heart and soul with Lord John, and decidedly in favour of his supremacy. The Whig party are divided, some still adhering to him; others, resenting his conduct in the past Session and distrusting his prudence, are anxious for another chief, but without having much considered how another is to be found, nor the consequences of deposing him. The Radicals are in an un-

settled and undecided state, neither entirely favourable nor entirely hostile to Lord John; the Peelites are pretty unanimously against him, and not overmuch disposed to join with the Whig party, being still more or less deluded with the hope and belief that they may form a Government themselves. Graham has always maintained (and, as I thought, with great probability) that it would end in Palmerston's joining Derby, and at this moment such an arrangement seems exceedingly likely to happen. There were two or three articles not long ago in the 'Morning Post' (his own paper), which tended that way. I have just been for two days to Broadlands, where I had a good deal of talk with him and with Lady Palmerston, and I came away with the conviction that it would end in his joining this Government. He admitted it to be a possible contingency, but said he could not come in *alone*, and only in the event of a remodelling of the Cabinet and a sweep of many of the incapables now in it. Sidney Herbert, who was there, told me he had talked to him in the same tone, and spoke of eight seats being vacated in the Cabinet, and as if he expected that nobody should *certainly* remain there but Derby, Disraeli, and the Chancellor. It is evident from this that it depends on Derby himself to have him, and if he frames measures and announces principles such as would enable Palmerston with credit and consistency to join him, and if he will throw over a sufficient number of his present crew, he may so strengthen his Government as to make it secure for some time. It may, however, be a matter of considerable difficulty to turn out a great many colleagues, and not less so for Palmerston to find people to bring in with him; for though he is very popular, and can excite any amount of cheering in the House of Commons, he has no political adherents whatever, and if Derby was to place seats in the Cabinet at his disposal he has nobody to put into them, unless he could prevail on Gladstone and Herbert to go with him, which does not seem probable.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [A list of the members of Lord Derby's Administration will be found in the third volume of the Second Part of this Journal, p. 451.]



*November 3rd.*—Since writing the above, circumstances have occurred which may have an important influence on future political events. John Russell, whether moved by his own reflexions or the advice or opinions of others I know not, has entirely changed his mind and become more reasonable, moderate, and pliable than he has hitherto shown himself. He has announced that if it should hereafter be found practicable to form a Liberal Government under Lord Lansdowne, he will not object to serve under him, only reserving to himself to judge of the expediency of attempting such an arrangement, as well as of the Government that may be formed. The letter in which he announced this to Lord Lansdowne was certainly very creditable to him, and evinced great magnanimity. He desired that it might be made known to Palmerston, which was done by Lord Lansdowne, and Palmerston replied with great satisfaction, saying, ‘for the first time he now saw daylight in public affairs.’ Lord Lansdowne was himself gratified at Lord John’s conduct to him, but he said that it would expose him to fresh importunities on the part of Palmerston, and he seems by no means more disposed than he was before to take the burden on himself, while he is conscious that it will be more difficult for him to refuse. He has been suffering very much, and is certainly physically unequal to the task, and *le cas échéant* he will no doubt try to make his escape; but, from what I hear of him, I do not think he will be inexorable if it is made clear to him that there is no other way of forming a Liberal Government, and especially if Lord John himself urges him to undertake it.

The other important matter is a correspondence, or rather a letter from Cobden to a friend of his, in which he expresses himself in very hostile terms towards John Russell and Graham likewise, abuses the Whig Government, and announces his determination to fight for Radical measures, and especially the Ballot. This letter was sent to Lord Yarborough, by him to the Duke of Bedford, and by the Duke to Lord John. He wrote a reply, or, more properly, a comment on it, which was intended to be, and I conclude

was, sent to Cobden ; a very good letter, I am told, in which he vindicated his own Government, and declared his unalterable resolution to oppose the Ballot, which he said was with him a question of principle, on which he never would give way. The result of all this is a complete separation between Lord John and Cobden, and therefore between the Whigs and the Radicals. What the ultimate consequences of this may be it is difficult to foresee, but the immediate one will probably be the continuation of Derby in office. Lord John is going to have a parliamentary dinner before the meeting, which many of his friends think he had better have left alone. He wrote to Graham and invited him to it. Graham declined, and said he should not come up to the meeting. To this Lord John responded that he might do as he pleased about dining, but he assured him that his absence at the opening of the Session would give great umbrage to the party and be injurious to himself. Graham replied that he would come up, but he has expressed to some of his correspondents his disapproval of the dinner. Charles Villiers agrees with him about it, and so do I, but the Johnians are very indignant with Graham, and consider his conduct very base, though I do not exactly see why.

The question of national defence occupies everybody's mind, but it seems very doubtful if any important measures will be taken. The Chancellor told Senior that the Government were quite satisfied with Louis Napoleon's pacific assurances, and saw no danger. It is not clear that John Russell partakes of the general alarm, and whether he will be disposed (as many wish that he should) to convey to Lord Derby an intimation that he will support any measure he may propose for the defence of the country, nor is it certain that Derby would feel any reliance on such assurances after what passed when he came into office. On that occasion Derby called on Lord John (who had just advised the Queen to send for him) and said on leaving him, 'I suppose you are not going to attack me and turn me out again,' which Lord John assured him he had no thoughts of, and directly after he convoked his Chesham Place meeting, which was

certainly not very consistent with his previous conduct, nor with his engagement to Derby.

*London, November 11th, 1852.*—I passed two days at The Grove with John Russell the end of last and beginning of this week, when he was in excellent health and spirits, and in a very reasonable composed state of mind. There were Wilson, Panizzi, George Lewis, and the Duke of Bedford; very little talk about politics, except in a general way. Lord John has been engaged in literary pursuits, as the executor of Moore and the depositary of Fox's papers, and he is about to bring out two volumes of Moore and one of Fox, but in neither is there to be much of his own composition; he has merely arranged the materials in each.

There has been great curiosity about the Queen's Speech, and a hundred reports of difficulties in composing it, and of dissensions in the Cabinet with regard to the manner in which the great question should be dealt with. As I know nothing certain on the subject, I will spare myself the trouble of putting down the rumours, which may turn out to be groundless or misrepresented. A great fuss has been made about keeping the Speech secret. They refused to communicate it to the newspapers, and strict orders were given at the Treasury to allow nobody whatever to see it. Derby, however, wrote to Lord John that as he had always sent it to him, he should do the same, and accordingly Lord John received it, and read it at his dinner, but those present were bound on honour not to communicate the contents of it. Lord John and his friends have been all along determined, if possible, to avoid proposing an amendment.

There was a Peelite gathering at a dinner at Hayward's the day before yesterday, at which Gladstone, Sidney Herbert, Newcastle, Francis Charteris, Sir John Young, and others were present; and Hayward told me they were all united, resolved to act together, and likewise averse to an amendment if possible; but from the manner in which they have dealt with Free Trade, it is very doubtful whether Cobden at least, if not Gladstone, will not insist on

moving an amendment. A very few hours will decide this point.<sup>1</sup>

*November 12th.*—The question of Protection or Free Trade, virtually settled long ago, was formally settled last night, Derby having announced in terms the most clear and unequivocal his final and complete abandonment of Protection, and his determination to adhere to, and honestly to administer, the present system. His speech was received in silence on both sides. There has not yet been time to ascertain the effect of this announcement on the various parties and individuals interested by it.

*November 16th.*—I went yesterday to the lying in state of the Duke of Wellington; it was fine and well done, but too gaudy and theatrical, though this is unavoidable. Afterwards to St. Paul's to see it lit up. The effect was very good, but it was like a great rout; all London was there strolling and staring about in the midst of a thousand workmen going on with their business all the same, and all the fine ladies scrambling over vast masses of timber, or ducking to avoid the great beams that were constantly sweeping along. These public funerals are very disgusting *med sententiâ*. On Saturday several people were killed and wounded at Chelsea; yesterday everything was orderly and well conducted, and I heard of no accidents.

Charles Villiers' motion, after much consultation and debate, whether it should be brought on or not, is settled in the affirmative, and was concocted by the Peelites at a meeting at Aberdeen's, Graham present. Nothing could be more moderate, so moderate that it appeared next to impossible the Government could oppose it. Yesterday morning there was a Ministerialist meeting in Downing Street, when Derby harangued his followers.

*November 21st.*—I saw the Duke's funeral from Devonshire House. Rather a fine sight, and all well done, except the car, which was tawdry, cumbrous, and vulgar. It was contrived by a German artist attached to the School of

<sup>1</sup> [The new Parliament was opened by the Queen in person on November 11.]

Design, and under Prince Albert's direction—no proof of his good taste. The whole ceremony within St. Paul's and without went off admirably, and without mistakes, mishaps, or accidents; but as all the newspapers overflow with the details I may very well omit them here.

Now that this great ceremony is over, we have leisure to turn our thoughts to political matters. I have already said that Villiers proposed a mild resolution which was drawn up by Graham at Aberdeen's house, and agreed to by the Peelites.<sup>1</sup> Then came Derby's meeting, where he informed his followers that he must reserve to himself entire liberty of dealing with Villiers' resolution as he thought best, but if he contested it, and was beaten, he should not resign. He then requested that if anyone had any objection to make, or remarks to offer, on his proposed course, they would make them then and there, and not find fault afterwards. They all cheered, and nobody said a word; in fact they were all consenting to his abandonment of Protection, many not at all liking it, but none recalcitrant. After this meeting there was a reconsideration of Villiers' resolution. Cobden and his friends complained that it was too milk and water, and required that it should be made stronger. After much discussion Villiers consented to alter it, and it was eventually put on the table of the House in its present more stringent form. Lord John Russell was against the alteration, and Gladstone and the Peelites still more so; but Charles Villiers thought he could not do otherwise than defer to Cobden, after having prevailed on the latter to consent to no amendment being moved on the Address. There is good reason to believe that the Government would have swallowed the first resolution, but they could not make up their minds to take the second; and accordingly Disraeli

<sup>1</sup> [On November 23, Mr. Charles Villiers moved Resolutions in the House of Commons, declaring the adherence of Parliament to the principles of Free Trade and approving the Repeal of the Corn Laws. Mr. Disraeli moved an amendment, not directly adverse. But this amendment was withdrawn in favour of one more skilfully drawn by Lord Palmerston. On this occasion Lord Palmerston rendered an essential service to Lord Derby's Government.]

announced an amendment in the shape of another resolution, and the battle will be fought on the two, Dizzy's just as strongly affirming the principle of Free Trade as the other, but it omits the declaration that the measure of '46 was 'wise and *just*.' At this moment nobody has the least idea what the division will be, nor how many of the most conspicuous men will vote, nor what the Government will do if they are beaten. Moderate men on the Liberal side regret that the original resolution was changed, deprecate the pitched battle, and above all dread that the Government may resign if they are beaten, which would cause the greatest confusion, nothing being ready for forming a government on the Liberal side, and the Government would go out with the advantage of saying that they were prepared with all sorts of good measures which the factious conduct of their opponents would not let them produce. Things have not been well managed, and I expect the result of all these proceedings will be damaging to the Liberal interest, and rather advantageous to Lord Derby.

An incident occurred the other night in the House of Commons, which exposed Disraeli to much ridicule and severe criticism. He pronounced a pompous funeral oration on the Duke of Wellington, and the next day the 'Globe' showed that half of it was taken word for word from a panegyric of Thiers on Marshal Gouvion de St. Cyr. Disraeli has been unmercifully pelted ever since, and well deserves it for such a piece of folly and bad taste. His excuse is, that he was struck by the passage, wrote it down, and, when he referred to it recently, forgot what it was, and thought it was his own composition. But this poor apology does not save him. Derby spoke very well on the same subject a few nights after in the House of Lords, complimenting the authorities, the people, and foreign nations, particularly France. It is creditable to Louis Napoleon to have ordered Walewski to attend the funeral.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [Count Walewski, then French Ambassador in London, expressed some reluctance to attend the funeral of the conqueror of Napoleon I., upon which Baron Brunnov said to him, 'If this ceremony were intended to bring the

On Saturday night, about twelve o'clock, Miss Mary Berry died after a few weeks' illness, without suffering, and in possession of her faculties, the machine worn out, for she was in her 90th year.<sup>1</sup> As she was born nearly a century ago, and was the contemporary of my grandfathers and grandmothers, she was already a very old woman when I first became acquainted with her, and it was not till a later period, about twenty years ago, that I began to live in an intimacy with her which continued uninterrupted to the last. My knowledge of her early life is necessarily only traditional. She must have been exceedingly goodlooking, for I can remember her with a fine commanding figure and a very handsome face, full of expression and intelligence. It is well known that she was the object of Horace Walpole's octogenarian attachment, and it has been generally believed that he was anxious to marry her for the sake of bestowing upon her a title and a jointure, which advantages her disinterested and independent spirit would not allow her to accept. She continued nevertheless to make the charm and consolation of his latter days, and at his death she became his literary executrix, in which capacity she edited *Madame du Deffand's* letters. She always preserved a great veneration for the memory of Lord Orford, and has often talked to me about him. I gathered from what she said that she never was herself quite sure whether he wished to marry her, but inclined to believe that she might have been his wife had she chosen it. She seems to have been very early initiated into the best and most refined society, was a constant inmate of Devonshire House and an intimate friend of the Duchess, a friend-

Duke to life again, I can conceive your reluctance to appear at it; but as it is only to bury him, I don't see you have anything to complain of.]

<sup>1</sup> [Miss Mary Berry was born at Kirkbridge, in Yorkshire, on March 16, 1763; her sister Agnes, who was her inseparable companion for eighty-eight years, fourteen months later. Her father, Robert Berry, was the nephew of a Scotch merchant named Ferguson, who purchased the estate of Raith, in Fifeshire. William Berry, the brother of Robert, and uncle of these ladies, succeeded to this property, and took the name of Ferguson. The Miss Berrys first made the acquaintance of Horace Walpole in 1788, when he was seventy years of age, and they became the objects of his devoted attachment and regard. See 'National Biography,' vol. iv. p. 397.]

ship which descended to her children, all of whom treated Miss Berry to the last with unceasing marks of attention, respect, and affection. She had been very carefully educated, and was full of literary tastes and general information, so that her conversation was always spirited, agreeable, and instructive; her published works, without exhibiting a high order of genius, have considerable merit, and her 'Social Life in England and France' and 'The Life of Rachel, Lady Russell,' will always be read with pleasure, and are entitled to a permanent place in English literature; but her greatest merit was her amiable and benevolent disposition, which secured to her a very large circle of attached friends, who were drawn to her as much by affectionate regard as by the attraction of her vigorous understanding and the vivacity and variety of her conversational powers. For a great many years the Misses Berry were amongst the social celebrities of London, and their house was the continual resort of the most distinguished people of both sexes in politics, literature, and fashion. She ranked amongst her friends and associates all the most remarkable literary men of the day, and there certainly was no house at which so many persons of such various qualities and attainments, but all more or less distinguished, could be found assembled. She continued her usual course of life, and to gather her friends about her, till within a few weeks of her death, and at last she sank by gradual exhaustion, without pain or suffering, and with the happy consciousness of the affectionate solicitude and care of the friends who had cheered and comforted the last declining years of her existence. To those friends her loss is irreparable, and besides the private and individual bereavement it is impossible not to be affected by the melancholy consideration that her death has deprived the world of the sole survivor of a once brilliant generation, who in her person was a link between the present age and one fertile in great intellectual powers, to which our memories turn with never failing curiosity and interest.

*December 4th.*—Last week the House of Commons was occupied with the 'Resolutions,' the whole history of which



was given by Graham, and which need not be repeated here.<sup>1</sup> The divisions were pretty much what were expected, and the only interesting consideration is the effect produced, and the influence of the debate on the state of parties. Palmerston is highly glorified by his small clique, and rather smiled on by the Tories, but he has given great offence to both Whigs and Radicals, and removed himself further than ever from a coalition with John Russell and the Liberal party. Lord John himself, who made a very good speech, rather gained reputation by his behaviour throughout the transaction, and is on better terms both with Cobden, Bright, and his own party, than he has been for some time past. Disraeli made a very imprudent speech, which disgusted many of his own adherents, and exposed him to vigorous attacks and a tremendous castigation on the part of his opponents, by Bernal Osborne in the coarser, and Sidney Herbert in more polished style. The Protectionists generally cut a very poor figure, and had nothing to say for themselves. 'If people wish for *humiliation*,' said Sidney Herbert, 'let them look at the benches opposite.' But all the dirt they had to eat, and all the mortification they had to endure, did not prevent the Derbyites from presenting a compact determined phalanx of about three hundred men, all resolved to support the Government, and to vote through thick and thin, without reference to their past or present opinions. The Ministerial papers and satellites toss their caps up and proclaim a great victory, but it is difficult to discover in what the victory consists. It certainly shows that they are strong and devoted if not united.

After the division there was a good deal of speculation rife as to Palmerston's joining the Government, which his friends insist he will not do. I am disposed to think he will. Since that we have had Beresford's affair in the House of Commons, and Clanricarde's folly in the Lords.

<sup>1</sup> [After three nights' debate, the Resolutions moved by Mr. Villiers were negatived by 256 to 236, and the motion adroitly substituted for them by Lord Palmerston in favour of 'unrestricted competition' was carried by 468 against 53, being accepted by the Government.]

Cockburn produced a strong *primâ facie* case against Beresford, and the committee has been appointed on his case, and proceeds to business on Monday.<sup>1</sup> Clanricarde chose *de son chef* to propose a resolution like that of the Commons, which Derby refused to take and offered another in its place, which Clanricarde has accepted. He gave Derby the opportunity he wanted of setting himself right with his own party, who, albeit resolved to support him, are smarting severely under his complete abandonment of Protection, and the necessity to which they are reduced of swallowing the nauseous Free Trade pill. He will make the dose more palatable by soothing their wounded pride. Clanricarde went to Lord Lansdowne and told him what he proposed to do. Lansdowne objected, but Clanricarde said he did it individually and would take all the responsibility on himself, on which Lansdowne very unwisely ceased to object. His purpose is to take no responsibility on himself.

*December 6th.*—Ever since the termination of the ‘Resolutions’ debate the world has been in a state of intense curiosity to hear the Budget, so long announced, and of which such magnificent things were predicted. The secret was so well kept that nobody knew anything about it, and not one of the hundred guesses and conjectures turned out to be correct. At length on Friday night Disraeli produced his measure in a House crowded to suffocation with members and strangers. He spoke for five and a half hours, much too diffusely, spinning out what he might have said in half the time. The Budget has been on the whole tolerably well received, and may, I think, be considered successful, though it is open to criticism, and parts of it will be fiercely attacked, and he will very likely be obliged to change some parts of it. But though favourably received on the whole, it by no means answers to the extravagant expectations that were raised, or proves so entirely satisfactory to all parties and all interests as Disraeli rather imprudently gave out that it would be. The people who regard it with the least

<sup>1</sup> [This related to proceedings with reference to the recent election at Derby.]

favour are those who will be obliged to give it the most unqualified support, the ex-Protectionists, for the relief or compensation to the landed interest is very far from commensurate with their expectations. It is certainly of a Free Trade character altogether, which does not make it the more palatable to them. He threw over the West Indians, and (Pakington, their advocate, sitting beside him) declared they had no claim to any relief beyond that which he tendered them, viz. the power of refining sugar in bond—a drop of water to one dying of thirst. I think it will go down, and make the Government safe. This I have all along thought they would be, and every day seems to confirm this opinion. They have got from three hundred to three hundred and fifteen men in the House of Commons who, though dissatisfied and disappointed, are nevertheless determined to swallow everything and support them through thick and thin, and they have to encounter an opposition, the scattered fractions of which are scarcely more numerous, but which is in a state of the greatest confusion and disunion, and without any prospect of concord amongst them.

The Duke of Bedford came to me yesterday, and told me he had never been so disheartened about politics in his life, or so hopeless of any good result for his party, in which he saw nothing but disagreement and all sorts of pretensions and jealousies incompatible with any common cause, and Aberdeen, whom I met at dinner yesterday, is of much the same opinion. The principal object of interest and curiosity seems now to be whether Palmerston will join them or not. On this the most opposite opinions and reports prevail. Just now it is said that he has resolved not. At all events, if he does, he will have to go alone, for he can take nobody with him, as it certainly is his object to do. But it does not appear now as if there was the least chance of Gladstone or Sidney Herbert joining him. The Duke of Bedford told me that both Derby and Palmerston were in better odour at Windsor than they were, and that the Queen and Prince approve of Pam's move about the Resolutions, and think he did good service. Aberdeen also thinks that though the Whigs

and Radicals are angry with Lord Palmerston, and that his proceeding was unwarrantable, he stands in a better position in the country, and has gained credit and influence by what he did. Abroad, where nobody understands our affairs, he is supposed to have played a very great part, and to have given indubitable proof of great political power.

*December 9th.*—Within these few days the Budget, which was not ill received at first, has excited a strong opposition, and to-morrow there is to be a pitched battle and grand trial of strength between the Government and Opposition upon it, and there is much difference of opinion as to the result. The Government have put forth that they mean to resign if beaten upon it. Derby and Disraeli were both remarkably well received at the Lord Mayor's dinner the night before last, and this is an additional proof that, in spite of all their disreputable conduct, they are not unpopular, and I believe, if the country were polled, they would as soon have these people for Ministers as any others. Nobody knows what part Palmerston is going to take.

*December 18th.*—The last few days have been entirely occupied by the interest of the Budget debate and speculations as to the result. We received the account of the division at Panshanger yesterday morning, not without astonishment; for although the opinion had latterly been gaining ground that the Government would be beaten, nobody expected such a majority against them.<sup>1</sup> Up to the last they were confident of winning. The debate was all against them, and only exhibited their weakness in the House of Commons. It was closed by two very fine speeches from Disraeli and Gladstone, very different in their style, but not unequal in their merits.

*Panshanger, December 19th.*—I went to town yesterday morning to hear what was going on. Lord Derby returned from Osborne in the middle of the day, and the Queen had sent for Lords Lansdowne and Aberdeen. She had been

<sup>1</sup> [The division on the Budget took place on December 16 after five nights' debate, the numbers being—for the Government, 286; against, 305; adverse majority, 19.]

gracious to Derby, and pressed him to stay on, if it were only for a short time. I saw Talbot, and from the few words he let drop I gathered that they have already resolved to keep together, and to enter on a course of bitter and determined opposition. Not that he said this, of course, but he intimated that he had no idea of any new Government that might be formed being able to go on even for a short time, and that they would very speedily be let in again. The language of the Carlton corresponds with this, and I have no doubt they will be as virulent and as mischievous as they can. It remains to be seen, if a good Government is formed, whether some will not be more moderate, and disposed to give the new Cabinet a fair trial.

Clarendon writes me word that the meeting at Woburn between John Russell, Aberdeen, Newcastle, and himself has been altogether satisfactory, everybody ready to give and take, and anxious to promote the common cause, without any selfish views or prejudices. Newcastle is particularly reasonable, disclaiming any hostility to John Russell, and only objecting to his being at present the nominal head of the Government, because there is rightly or wrongly a prejudice against him, which would prevent some Liberals and some Peelites joining the Government if he was placed in that position; but he contemplates his ultimately resuming that post, and he (Newcastle) is ready to do anything in office or out. There is no disposition to take in Cobden and Bright, but they would not object to Molesworth.

I went over to Bocket just now, and found the Palmerstons there. He is not pleased at the turn matters have taken, would have liked the Government to go on at all events some time longer, and is disgusted at the thought of Aberdeen being at the head of the next Ministry. This is likewise obnoxious to the Whigs at Brooks's, and there will be no small difficulty in bringing them to consent to it, if Lansdowne refuses. Beauvale said if Palmerston had not been laid up, and prevented going to the House of Commons, he thinks this catastrophe would not have happened, for Palmerston meant to have done in a friendly way what

Charles Wood did in an unfriendly one, and advised Disraeli to postpone and remake his Budget, and this advice so tendered he thinks Dizzy would have taken, and then the issue would have been changed and deferred till after the recess. But I don't believe this fine scheme would have taken effect, or that Dizzy would or could have adopted such a course. Beauvale says he is pretty sure Palmerston will not take office under Aberdeen's Premiership; on the other hand, Aberdeen has no objection to him, and will invite Palmerston, if the task devolves upon him. Ellice fancies Lansdowne will decline, and that Aberdeen will fail, and that it will end in Derby coming back, reinforced by Palmerston and some Peelites. The difficulties are certainly enormous, but by some means or other I think a Government will be formed. The exclusions will be very painful, and must be enormous. Lord Derby met Granville and others at the station on Friday, and he said he calculated the new Cabinet could not consist of less than thirty-two men, and many then left out. It will be a fine time to test the amount of patriotism and unselfishness that can be found in the political world.

*London, December 21st.*—I came to town yesterday morning, and heard that the day before (Sunday) a very hostile feeling towards Aberdeen had been prevailing at Brooks's, but no doubt was entertained that the Government would be formed. In the afternoon Clarendon came to me on his way to the House of Lords, and told me all that had passed up to that time. On receiving the Queen's summons, a meeting took place between Lansdowne and Aberdeen at Lansdowne House, at which each did his best to persuade the other to accept the commission to form a Government. Lansdowne pleaded absolute physical inability, and his friends seem to be quite satisfied that he really could not undertake it. Accordingly Aberdeen gave way, and departed for Osborne on a reiterated summons, and, after telling the Queen all that had passed between Lansdowne and himself, undertook the task. Nothing could be more cordial all this time than the relations between himself

and John Russell; but as soon as it became known that Aberdeen was to form the new Government, certain friends of John Russell set to work to persuade him that it would be derogatory to his character to have any concern in it, and entreated him to refuse his concurrence. These were David Dundas and Romilly, and there may have been others. This advice was probably the more readily listened to, because it corresponded with his original view of the matter and his own natural disposition, and it produced so much effect that yesterday morning he went to Lansdowne and told him that he had resolved to have nothing to do with the new Government. Lansdowne was thunderstruck, and employed every argument he could think of to change this resolution. It so happened that he had written to Macaulay and asked him to call on him to talk matters over, and Macaulay was announced while Lord John was still there. Lansdowne told him the subject of their discussion, and the case was put before Macaulay with all its pros and cons for his opinion. He heard all Lansdowne and Lord John had to say, and then delivered his opinion in a very eloquent speech, strongly recommending Lord John to go on with Aberdeen, and saying that, at such a crisis as this, the refusal of his aid, which was indispensable for the success of the attempt, would be little short of treason. Lord John went away evidently shaken, but without pronouncing any final decision. Clarendon then called at Lansdowne House, and heard these particulars, and Lansdowne entreated him to go and see Lord John and try his influence over him. Clarendon had the day before given him his opinion in writing to the same effect as Macaulay. He went, saw him, and repeated all he had before written. Lord John took it very well, and, when he left him, said, 'I suppose it will be as you wish,' and when I saw Clarendon he seemed reassured, and tolerably confident that this great peril of the whole concern being thus shipwrecked *in limine* had passed away. After the House of Lords where I heard Derby's strange and inexcusable speech, we again discussed the matter, when he said Lord John had raised another difficulty, for he said he

would not take the Foreign Office, alleging, not without truth, that it was impossible for him or any man to perform the duties of so laborious an office and lead the House of Commons. Lord John also signified to Clarendon that he should insist on *his* being in the Cabinet, which Clarendon entreated him not to require. Newcastle, who was there, suggested that Lord John might take the Foreign Office for a time, and if he found the two duties incompatible, he might give it up, and Clarendon seemed to think this might be done, and at all events he means to persuade Lord John (as no doubt he will) to make up his mind to take it, for his not doing so would certainly be very inconvenient. Should Lord John prove obstinate in this respect, I have no doubt Clarendon will himself be put there.

We talked about the Great Seal, and Senior had been with Lord Lansdowne, who appears to incline very much to getting Lord St. Leonard's<sup>1</sup> to stay if he will, but Senior thinks he will not; certainly not, unless with the concurrence of his present colleagues, which it is doubtful if Derby in his present frame of mind would give. The Chancellor was at Derby's meeting in the morning, which looks like a resolution to go out with them. It will be a good thing if he will remain, but it will do good to the new Government to invite him, whether he accepts or refuses. We talked of Brougham, but Clarendon, though anxious to have Brougham in as President of the Council, thinks he would not do for the woolsack, and that it will be better to have Cranworth if Lord St. Leonards will not stay. There is a great difficulty in respect to the retiring pension. There can only be four, and Sugden's will make up the number, so that a fresh Chancellor could have none except at the death of

<sup>1</sup> [Sir Edward Burtenshaw Sugden was one of the most eminent equity lawyers of the day, distinguished as an advocate in the Court of Chancery and by his important legal writings. He was twice Lord Chancellor of Ireland under the two Administrations of Sir Robert Peel, and he received the Great Seal of England on the formation of Lord Derby's Administration in 1852, with a peerage under the title of Baron St. Leonards. But he owed his celebrity and his promotion to his eminence as a lawyer, far more than to his activity as a politician.]



one of the others. The worst part of the foregoing story is, that Lord John will not join cordially and heartily, and it is impossible to say, during the difficult adjustment of details, what objections he may not raise and what embarrassments he may not cause.

There was a meeting at Lord Derby's yesterday morning, at which he told his friends he would continue to lead them, and he recommended a moderation, in which he probably was not sincere, and which they will not care to observe. Lord Delawarr got up and thanked him. Nothing can be more rabid than the party and the ex-ministers, and they are evidently bent on vengeance and a furious opposition. I fell in with Lord Drumlanrig and Ousely Higgins yesterday morning, one a moderate Derbyite (always Free Trader), the other an Irish Brigadier. Drumlanrig told me he knew of several adherents of Derby who were resolved to give the new Government fair play, and would not rush into opposition, and Ousely Higgins said he thought the Irish would be all right, especially if, as the report ran, Granville was sent to Ireland; but there is no counting on the Irish Brigade, whose object it is to embarrass every Government. If they could be friendly to any, it would, however, be one composed of Aberdeen, Graham, and Gladstone, the opponents of the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill.

*December 22nd.*—On going to The Grove yesterday afternoon, I found a letter Clarendon had received from Lansdowne in bad spirits enough. He had seen Aberdeen, who had received no answer from John Russell, and Aberdeen was prepared, if he did not get his acceptance the next morning, to give the thing up. Lansdowne was greatly alarmed and far from confident Lord John would agree, at all events, that he would not take the Foreign Office, in which case Lansdowne said he (Clarendon) must take it. Nothing could look worse. This morning Clarendon received a letter from Aberdeen announcing that Lord John had agreed to lead the House of Commons, either without an office or with a nominal one, and asking Clarendon to take the Foreign Office. We came up to town together, he

meaning to accept unless he can prevail on Lord John to take it, if it be only for a time, and he is gone to see what he can do with him. He told me last night that when he was at Woburn last week, the Duke informed him that he had had a confidential communication from Stockmar, asking for his advice, whom the Queen should send for if the Government was beaten and if Derby resigned. He had just received this letter, and had not answered it, and consulted Clarendon what he should say. Clarendon advised him to recommend Lansdowne and Aberdeen, and he wrote to that effect. The very morning after the division, just as they were going hunting, the hounds meeting at the Torr, a Queen's messenger arrived with another letter, requesting he would communicate more fully his sentiments at the present crisis. The messenger was ordered to keep himself secret, and not to let his mission transpire. The Duke, under Clarendon's advice, wrote a long letter back, setting forth in detail all that had, not long ago, passed about Palmerston and Lansdowne, and his notions of the difficulties and exigencies of the present time. He said that it was evident Lord John could not make a Government, and that he was himself conscious of it.

*December 23rd.*—It appears that on Tuesday (21st) Aberdeen went to Palmerston, who received him very civilly, even cordially, talked of old times, and reminded him that they had been acquainted for sixty years (since they were at Harrow together), and had lived together in the course of their political lives more than most men. Aberdeen offered him the Admiralty, saying he considered it in existing circumstances the most important office, and the one in which he could render the greatest service to the country, but if he for any reason objected to that office, he begged him to say what other office he would have. Palmerston replied that he had no hostile feeling towards him, but they had for so many years been in strong opposition to each other, that the public would never understand his taking office in Aberdeen's Government, and he was too old to expose himself to such misconceptions. And so they parted, on ostensibly

very friendly terms, which will probably not prevent Palmerston's joining Derby and going into furious opposition. In the course of the day yesterday both Clarendon and Lansdowne called on Palmerston, and he expressed great satisfaction at Clarendon's appointment to the Foreign Office.

In the afternoon I called on Lady Clanricarde, who gave me to understand that Clanricarde was likely to become a personage of considerable influence and power (and therefore worth having), inasmuch as the Irish Band had made overtures to him, and signified their desire to act under his guidance. She said this was not the first overture he had received of the kind from the same quarter; that for various reasons he had declined the others, but she thought at the present time he might very well listen to it; that they were very anxious to be led by a gentleman, and a man of consideration and station in the world. All this, to which I attach very little credit, was no doubt said to me in order to be repeated, and that it might impress on Aberdeen and his friends and colleagues the importance of securing Clanricarde's services and co-operation; and I am the more confirmed in this by receiving a note from the Marchioness in the evening, begging I would not repeat what she had told me.

There was nothing new yesterday in the purlieus of Whiggism, but I think somewhat more of acquiescence, and a disposition to regard this combination as inevitable. The Derbyites quite frenzied, and prepared to go any lengths. Lonsdale told me the party were delighted with Derby's intemperate speech in the House of Lords, which seems to have been rehearsed at his own meeting the same morning; and the other day twenty ruffians of the Carlton Club gave a dinner there to Beresford, to celebrate what they consider his acquittal! After dinner, when they got drunk, they went upstairs, and finding Gladstone alone in the drawing-room, some of them proposed to throw him out of the window. This they did not quite dare to do, but contented themselves with giving some insulting message or order to the waiter, and then went away.

*Hatchford, Friday, 24th.*—The great event of yesterday was Palmerston's accession to the Government. Lord Lansdowne had called on him the day before, and had, I suspect, little difficulty in persuading him to change his determination and join the new Cabinet. He said he would place himself in Lord Lansdowne's hands, and yesterday morning I heard as a secret, though it was speedily published, that he had agreed to take the Home Office. The next thing was Lord John's consent to take the Foreign Office. This he was persuaded to do by Clarendon, who engaged to help him in the work, and relieve him by taking it himself the moment Lord John should find himself unequal to it, and on these conditions he consented. It was settled that Gladstone should be Chancellor of the Exchequer, but Delane went to Aberdeen last night for the purpose of getting him to change this arrangement on the ground of the difficulty there would be about the Income Tax. \*

The important part of forming the Cabinet is now done, and nothing remains but the allotment of the places. It will be wonderfully strong in point of ability, and in this respect exhibit a marked contrast with the last; but its very excellence in this respect may prove a source of weakness, and eventually of disunion. The late Cabinet had two paramount chiefs, and all the rest nonentities, and the nominal head was also a real and predominant head. In the present Cabinet are five or six first-rate men of equal or nearly equal pretensions, none of them likely to acknowledge the superiority or defer to the opinions of any other, and every one of these five or six considering himself abler and more important than their Premier. They are all at present on very good terms and perfectly satisfied with each other; but this satisfaction does not extend beyond the Cabinet itself; murmurings and grumbings are already very loud. The Whigs have never looked with much benignity on this coalition, and they are now furious at the unequal and, as they think, unfair distribution of places. These complaints are not without reason, nor will it make matters better that John Russell has had no communication

with his old friends and adherents, nor made any struggle, as it is believed, to provide for them, although his adhesion is so indispensable that he might have made any terms and conditions he chose. Then the Radicals, to judge from their press, are exceedingly sulky and suspicious, and more likely to oppose than to support the new Government. The Irish also seem disposed to assume a menacing and half hostile attitude, and, having contributed to overthrow the last Government, are very likely (according to the policy chalked out for them after the election) to take an early opportunity of aiding the Derbyites to turn out this. Thus hampered with difficulties and beset with dangers, it is impossible to feel easy about their prospects. If, however, they set to work vigorously to frame good measures and remove practical and crying evils, they may excite a feeling in their favour in the country, and may attract support enough from different quarters in the House of Commons to go on, but I much fear that it will at best be a perturbed and doubtful existence. Such seems the necessary condition of every Government nowadays, and unfortunately there is a considerable party which rejoices in such a state of things, and only desires to aggravate the mischief, because they think its continuance and the instability of every Government will be most conducive to the ends and objects which they aim at.

*London, December 28th.*—The remonstrances against Gladstone's being Chancellor of the Exchequer were unavailing, but he says he is not tied up by anything he said about the Income Tax. This will nevertheless be a great difficulty, for Graham and Wood, though not perhaps so much committed as Gladstone, are both against the alteration, which the public voice undoubtedly demands. Last night the new Ministers took their places on the Treasury bench, and the Tories moved over to the opposite side. Aberdeen made his statement, which was fair enough and not ill received, but it was ill delivered, and he omitted to say all he might and ought to have said about Lord Lansdowne, nor did he say enough about John Russell. He said, on the other hand,

more than enough about foreign policy, and gave Derby a good opportunity of attacking that part of his speech. Derby was more moderate and temperate than on the first night, and made a pretty good speech. He was wrong in dilating so much on what had passed in the House of Commons, and he made very little of the case of combination; he was severe on Graham and his speech at his election at Carlisle, and Graham heard it all. Nobody else said a word.

The Government is now complete, except some of the minor appointments and the Household. It has not been a smooth and easy business by any means, and there is anything but contentment, cordiality, and zeal in the confederated party. The Whigs are excessively dissatisfied with the share of places allotted to them, and complain that every Peelite without exception has been provided for, while half the Whigs are excluded. Though they exaggerate the case, there is a good deal of justice in their complaints, and they have a right to murmur against Aberdeen for not doing more for them, and John Russell for not insisting on a larger share of patronage for his friends.<sup>1</sup> Clarendon told me last night that the Peelites have behaved very ill, and have grasped at everything, and he mentioned some very flagrant cases, in which, after the distribution had been settled between Aberdeen and John Russell, Newcastle and Sidney Herbert, for they appear to have been the most active in the matter, persuaded Aberdeen to alter it and bestow or offer offices intended for Whigs to Peelites and in some instances to Derbyites who had been Peelites. Clarendon has been all along very anxious to get Brougham into the Cabinet as President of the Council, and he proposed it both to Lord John and Aberdeen, and the latter acquiesced, and Clarendon thought it was going to be arranged that Granville should be President of the Board of Trade, and Brougham President of Council; but Newcastle

<sup>1</sup> [It was, however, Lord John who prevented Mr. Cardwell, the President of the Board of Trade, from having a seat in the Cabinet, on the ground that there were already too many Peelites in it.]

and Sidney Herbert not only upset this plan, but proposed that Ellenborough should be President of Council, and then, when he was objected to, Harrowby. They also wanted that Jersey should remain Master of the Horse, Jonathan Peel go again to the Ordnance, and Chandos continue a Lord of the Treasury. With what object they wished for these appointments I have not an idea, but the very notion of them is an insult to the Whigs, and will be resented accordingly.

Lord Lansdowne seems to have taken little or no part in all this. He hooked Palmerston, and, having rendered this great service, he probably thought he had done enough. The Whigs at Brooks's are very angry, and Bessborough told me that he thought his party so ill used, that he had implored Lord John to withdraw even now rather than be a party to such injustice. Lord John seems to have been very supine, and while the Peelites were all activity, and intent on getting all they could, he let matters take their course, and abstained from exercising the influence in behalf of his own followers which his position and the indispensability of his co-operation enabled him to do. This puts them out of humour with him as much as with Aberdeen and his friends.

We had a great reunion here (at Lord Granville's) last night, with half the Cabinet at dinner or in the evening. I told Graham what the feelings of the Whigs were. He said they had a very large and important share, the Chancellors of England and of Ireland, etc., and he defended some of the appointments and consequent exclusions on special grounds. They have made Monsell, an Irish Catholic convert, Clerk of the Ordnance, together with some other Irish Catholic appointments, and he said that these were necessary in order to reconquer in Ireland what had been lost by the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, and that it was of more consequence to conciliate that large part of the Empire than to provide for the Ansons and the Pagets; and on the same ground he justified the appointment of St. Germans instead of Lord Carlisle as Lord Lieutenant. All this may be very

true, but the Whigs to be left out to make room for these substitutes will not be convinced or pacified by the political expediency which Graham sets forth, nor will such appointments be at all popular here. If, however, they really should be the means of rallying the Irish Brigade to the support of the Government, it may be patronage well bestowed. But this makes it a disagreeable start, and may be hereafter productive of serious consequences. Nothing can be more shortsighted, as well as unfair, than the conduct of the Peelites in trying to thrust their own people instead of Whigs into the offices, for they can only hope to keep their places at all by the zealous support of the whole Whig force, themselves bringing next to nothing in point of numbers, and to encounter such a numerous and compact Opposition will require the zealous co-operation of all who wish well to the Liberal cause, and who are against Derby. Newcastle talked to me last night about Aberdeen's speech, acknowledged its deficiencies, and said he had told Aberdeen what he thought of it. Aberdeen acknowledged it all, said he was so unaccustomed to make such statements, that he had forgotten or overlooked it, and wished he could have spoken it again to repair the omission. They all seem *at present* very harmonious in their intercourse.

After dinner last night John Russell and Charles Wood went off to meet Aberdeen, for the purpose, I believe, of settling some of the arrangements not yet fixed. Clarendon told me that Charles Wood had been of use in stimulating John Russell to interfere and prevent some of the proposed changes which the Peelites wished Aberdeen to make in the list as originally settled between him and Lord John, and it is very well that he did. It is impossible not to see that Lord John himself, though now willing to co-operate and do his best, has never been hearty in the cause, nor entirely satisfied with his own position; and this has probably made him more lukewarm, and deterred him from taking a more active and decided part in the formation of the Government. We are just going down to Windsor, the old Government to give up seals, wands, etc., the new to be



sworn in. They go by different railways, that they may not meet. It is singular that I have never attended a Council during the nine months Lord Derby was in office, not once; consequently there are several of his Cabinet whom I do not know by sight—Pakington, Walpole, and Henley. With my friends I resume my functions.

*December 29th.*—I went down to the Council yesterday at Windsor with the *ins*, and we saw nothing of the *outs*, who went by another train and railway. Palmerston was there, looking very ill indeed. They all seem on very cordial terms. Graham told me he had had a very friendly conversation with Palmerston, and was greatly rejoiced at being again united to his old colleague. He acknowledged that it was a great mistake in Aberdeen to have offered the Mastership of the Horse to Lord Jersey. Aberdeen has now proposed the Lord Steward's place to Carlisle, which he will probably not take, and possibly be offended at the offer. I suppose Aberdeen has been subjected to pressure from various quarters, but might have made a better selection and distribution than he has done.

*January 5th, 1853.*—The elections are all going on well, except Gladstone's, who appears in great jeopardy. Nothing could exceed the disgraceful conduct of his opponents, lying, tricking, and shuffling, as might be expected from such a party. The best thing that could happen for Gladstone would be to be beaten, if it were not for the triumph it would be to the blackguards who have got up the contest; for the representation of Oxford is always an embarrassment to a statesman, and Peel's losing his election there in 1829 was the most fortunate event possible for him. The only speech of the new Ministers calling for special notice is Palmerston's at Tiverton, which appears to me to conceal an *arrière-pensée*. He spoke in civil, even complimentary, terms of the Derby Government, so much so, that if any break-up or break-down should occur in this, and Lord Derby return to office, there appears no reason why Palmerston should not form a fresh coalition with him; and it looks very much as if he was keeping this contingency in view, and putting

himself in such an attitude as should enable him with some plausibility to join the camp of such a restoration.

The Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen's Administration consisted of the following Ministers:—

Earl of Aberdeen . . . .	First Lord of the Treasury
Lord Cranworth . . . .	Lord Chancellor
Earl Granville . . . .	Lord President of the Council
The Duke of Argyll . . . .	Lord Privy Seal
Mr. Gladstone . . . .	Chancellor of the Exchequer
Viscount Palmerston . . . .	Home Secretary of State
The Duke of Newcastle . . . .	Secretary for Colonies and War
Lord John Russell (and later the Earl of Clarendon) . . . .	Foreign Secretary
Sir James Graham . . . .	First Lord of the Admiralty
Mr. Sidney Herbert . . . .	Secretary at War
Sir Charles Wood . . . .	President of the Indian Board
Sir William Molesworth . . . .	First Commissioner of Works
The Marquis of Lansdowne without office.	

## CHAPTER II.

A Royal Commission on Reform—M. de Flahault on the Emperor Napoleon—Lord John's Blunder—Disraeli's Negotiation with the Irish Members—Lord Beauvale's Death—Lady Beauvale's Grief—Napoleon III. and Mdlle. de Montijo—Parliament meets—The Emperor's Marriage—Disraeli's Attack on Sir C. Wood—Dislike of Mr. Disraeli—Lord John Russell leaves the Foreign Office—Lord Stanley's Liberal Votes—Disraeli's Opinion of his Colleagues—The Government in Smooth Water—England unpopular abroad—Massimo d'Azeglio—The Austrians in Italy—The Bishop of Lincoln—The Duke of Bedford's Papers—Lord Palmerston leads the House—Social Amenities—Rancour of Northern Powers against England—Friendly Resolution of the Emperor Napoleon III.—Difficulties at Home—The India Bill—The Eastern Question—The Czar's Proposals—Russian Assurances—The Royal Family.

*Bowood, January 12th, 1853.*—I came here on Monday to meet the Cannings, Harcourt,<sup>1</sup> and Lady Waldegrave, the Bessboroughs, Elphinstone, Senior, and the family. Senior talked to me about the Government and Reform, and the danger of their splitting on the latter question and propounded a scheme he has for obviating this danger. He wants to have a Royal Commission to enquire into the practice of bribery at elections and the means of preventing it, or, if possible, to have an enquiry of a more extensive and comprehensive character into the state of the representation and the working of the Reform Bill. We talked it over, and I told him I thought this would not be a bad expedient. He had already spoken to Lord Lansdowne about it, who seemed not averse to the idea, and promised to talk to Lord John Russell on the subject. Senior, when he went away, begged me to talk to Lord Lansdowne also, which I attempted to do, but without success, for he seemed quite indisposed to enter upon it.

*Beaudesert, January 19th.*—To town on Saturday and here

<sup>1</sup> [George Granville Harcourt, Esq., M.P., eldest son of the Archbishop of York, and third husband of Frances, Countess of Waldegrave.]

on Monday, with the Flahaults, Bessboroughs, Ansons, my brothers and the family. Lord Anglesey and M. de Flahault talk over their campaigns, and compare notes on the events of Sir John Moore's retreat and other military operations, in which they have served in opposing armies. Flahault was aide-de-camp to Marshal Berthier till the middle of the Russian campaign, when he became aide-de-camp to Napoleon, whom he never quitted again till the end of his career. His accounts of what he has seen and known are curious and interesting. He says that one of the Emperor's greatest mistakes and the causes of his misfortunes was his habit of ordering everything, down to the minutest arrangement, himself, and leaving so little to the discretion and responsibility of his generals and others that they became mere machines, and were incapable of acting, or afraid to act, on their own judgements. On several occasions great calamities were the consequence of this unfortunate habit of Napoleon's.

*London, January 24th.*—The Duke of Bedford called here this morning. I had not seen him for an age; he was just come from Windsor with a budget of matter, which as usual he was in such a hurry that he had not time to tell me. I got a part of it, however. I began by asking him how he had left them all at Windsor, to which he replied that the state of things was not very satisfactory. The Queen disapproved Lord John's arrangement for giving up the seals of the Foreign Office on a given day (the 15th February) which had not been previously explained to her Majesty, as it ought to have been. She said that she should make no objection if any good reason could be assigned for what was proposed, either of a public or a private nature, any reason connected with his health or with the transaction of business, but she thought, and she is right, that fixing beforehand a particular day, without any special necessity occurring, is very unreasonable and absurd. Then they are all very angry with Lord John for an exceeding piece of folly of his, in announcing to the Foreign Ministers, the day he received them, that he was only to be at the Foreign Office for a few

weeks. This, as the Duke said, was a most unwise and improper communication, particularly as it was made without any concert with Aberdeen, and without his knowledge, and, in fact, blurted out with the same sort of levity that was apparent in the Durham letter and the Reform announcement, with both of which he has been so bitterly reproached, and which have proved so inconvenient that it might have been thought he would not fall again into similar scrapes. The Foreign Ministers themselves were exceedingly astonished, and not a little annoyed. Brunnow said it was a complete mockery, and they all felt that it was unsatisfactory to be put in relation with a Foreign Secretary who was only to be there for a few weeks.

The Queen is delighted to have got rid of the late Ministers. She felt, as everybody else does, that their Government was disgraced by its shuffling and prevarication, and she said that Harcourt's pamphlet (which was all true) was sufficient to show what they were.<sup>1</sup> As she is very honourable and true herself, it was natural she should disapprove their conduct.

Yesterday Delane called on me, and gave me an account of a curious conversation he had had with Disraeli. Disraeli asked him to call on him, which he did, when they talked over recent events and the fall of the late Government, very frankly, it would seem, on Disraeli's part. He acknowledged that he had been bitterly mortified. When Delane asked him, 'now it was all over,' what made him produce such a Budget, he said, if he had not been thwarted and disappointed, he should have carried it by the aid of the Irish Brigade whom he had *engaged* for that purpose. Just before the debate, one of them came to him and said, if he would agree to refer Sharman Crawford's Tenant Right Bill to the Select Committee with the Government Bill, they would all vote with him. He thought this too good a bargain to miss, and he closed with his friend on those terms, told Walpole

<sup>1</sup> [Mr. William Harcourt published a pamphlet at this time on 'The Morality of Public Men,' in which he censured with great severity the conduct of the late Ministers.]

what he had arranged, desired him to carry out the bargain, and the thing was done. No sooner was the announcement made than Lord Naas and Sir Joseph Napier<sup>1</sup> (who had never been informed) came in a great fury to Disraeli and Walpole, complained of the way they had been treated, and threatened to resign. With great difficulty he pacified or rather silenced them, and he was in hopes the storm had blown over, but the next day he found Naas and Napier had gone to Lord Derby with their complaints, and he now found the latter full of wrath and indignation likewise; for Lord Roden, who had heard something of this compromise (i.e. of the Tenant Right Bill being referred to Committee), announced his intention of asking Lord Derby a question in the House of Lords. Added to this, as soon as the news reached Dublin, Lord Eglinton and Blackburne testified the same resentment as Naas and Napier had done, and threatened to resign likewise. All this produced a prodigious flare up. Disraeli represented that it was his business to make the Budget succeed by such means as he could, that the votes of the Brigade would decide it either way, and that he had made a very good bargain, as he had pledged himself to nothing more, and never had any intention of giving any *suite* to what had been done, so that it could not signify. He did not succeed in appeasing Lord Derby, who, a night or two after in the Lords, repudiated all participation in what had been done, and attacked the Irishmen very bitterly. Disraeli heard this speech, and saw at once that it would be fatal to the Budget and to them, as it proved, for the whole Brigade voted in a body against the Government, and gave a majority to the other side. He seemed in pretty good spirits as to the future, though without for the present any definite purpose. He thinks the bulk of the party will keep together. Delane asked him what he would have done with such a Budget if he had carried it.

<sup>1</sup> [Lord Naas was Chief Secretary for Ireland, and Sir Joseph Napier Attorney-General for Ireland, in Lord Derby's Administration of 1852. Lord Eglinton was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and the Right Hon. Francis Blackburne Irish Lord Chancellor.]

He said they should have remodelled their Government, Palmerston and Gladstone would have joined them (*Gladstone* after the debate and their duel !); during the intervening two or three months the Budget would have been discussed in the country, what was liked retained, what was unpopular altered, and in the end they should have produced a very good Budget which the country would have taken gladly. He never seems to have given a thought to any consideration of political morality, honesty, or truth, in all that he said. The moral of the whole is, that let what will happen it will be very difficult to bring Lord Derby and Disraeli together again. They must regard each other with real, if not avowed, distrust and dislike. Disraeli said that Derby's position in life and his fortune were so different from his, that their several courses must be influenced accordingly. It is easy to conceive how Lord Derby, embarked (no matter how or why) in such a contest, should strain every nerve to succeed and fight it out; but the thing once broken up, he would not be very likely to place himself again in such a situation, and to encounter the endless difficulties, dangers, and mortifications attendant upon the lead of such a party, and above all the necessity of trusting entirely to such a colleague as Disraeli in the House of Commons without one other man of a grain of capacity besides. As it is, he will probably betake himself to the enjoyment of his pleasures and pursuits, till he is recalled to political life by some fresh excitement and interest that time and circumstances may throw in his way; but let what will happen, I doubt his encountering again the troubles and trammels of office.<sup>1</sup>

*January 30th.*—Yesterday morning Frederic Lamb, Lord Beauvale and Melbourne, with whom both titles cease, died at Bocket after a short but severe attack of influenza, fever, and gout. He was in his seventy-first year. Lady Palmerston thus

<sup>1</sup> [A singularly unfortunate prediction! The alliance of Lord Derby and Mr. Disraeli remained unbroken, and continued long enough to enable them (after a second failure) to bring the Conservative party back to power.]

becomes a rich heiress. He was not so remarkable a man in character as his brother William, less peculiar and eccentric, more like other people, with much less of literary acquirement, less caustic humour and pungent wit, but he had a vigorous understanding, great quickness, a good deal of general information, he was likewise well versed in business and public affairs, and a very sensible and intelligent converser and correspondent. He took a deep and lively interest in politics to the last moment of his life, was insatiably curious about all that was going on, and was much confided in and consulted by many people of very different parties and opinions. He never was in Parliament, but engaged all his life in a diplomatic career, for which he was very well fitted, having been extremely handsome in his youth, and always very clever, agreeable, and adroit. He consequently ran it with great success, and was in high estimation at Vienna, where his brother-in-law, Palmerston, sent him as Ambassador. He was always much addicted to gallantry, and had endless liaisons with women, most of whom continued to be his friends long after they had ceased to be his mistresses, much to the credit of all parties. After having led a very free and dissolute life, he had the good fortune at sixty years old, and with a broken and enfeebled constitution, to settle (as it is called), by marrying a charming girl of twenty, the daughter of the Prussian Minister at Vienna, Count Maltzahn. This Adine, who was content to unite her May to his December, was to him a perfect angel, devoting her youthful energies to sustain and cheer his valetudinarian existence with a cheerful unselfishness, which he repaid by a grateful and tender affection, having an air at once marital and paternal. She never cared to go anywhere, gave up all commerce with the world and all its amusements and pleasures, contenting herself with such society as it suited him to gather about them, his old friends and some new ones, to whom she did the honours with infinite grace and cordiality, and who all regarded her with great admiration and respect. In such social intercourse, in political gossip, and in her untiring attentions, his last years glided away, not without



enjoyment. He and his brother William had always been on very intimate terms, and William highly prized his advice and opinions; but as Frederic was at heart a Tory, and had a horror of Radicalism in every shape, he was not seldom disgusted with the conduct of the Whig Government, and used sorely to perplex and mortify William by his free and severe strictures on him and his colleagues. He nominally belonged to the Liberal party, but in reality he was strongly Conservative, and he always dreaded the progress of democracy, though less disturbed than he would otherwise have been by reflecting that no material alteration could possibly overtake him. His most intimate friends abroad were the Metternichs and Madame de Lieven, and his notions of foreign policy were extremely congenial to theirs. Here, his connexions all lying with people of the Liberal side, he had nothing to do with the Tories, for most of whom he entertained great contempt. Brougham, Ellice, and myself were the men he was most intimate with. He was very fond of his sister, but never much liked Palmerston, and was bitterly opposed to his policy when he was at the Foreign Office, which was a very sore subject between himself and them, and for a long time, and on many occasions, embittered or interrupted their intercourse; but as he was naturally affectionate, had a very good temper, and loved an easy life, such clouds were always soon dispersed, and no permanent estrangement ever took place. He was largely endowed with social merits and virtues, without having or affecting any claim to those of a higher or moral character. I have no doubt he was much more amiable as an old man than he ever had been when he was a young one; and though the death of one so retired from the world can make little or no sensation in it, except as being the last of a remarkable family, he will be sincerely regretted, and his loss will be sensibly felt by the few who enjoyed the intimacy of his declining years.

*February 8th.*—Yesterday I went to see the unhappy Lady Beauvale, and, apart from the sorrow of witnessing so much bodily and mental suffering, it is really a singular and

extraordinary case. Here is a woman thirty-two years old, and therefore in the prime of life, who has lost a husband of seventy-one deprived of the use of his limbs, and whom she had nursed for ten years, the period of their union, with the probable or possible fatal termination of his frequent attacks of gout constantly before her eyes, and she is not merely plunged in great grief at the loss she has sustained, but in a blank and hopeless despair, which in its moral and physical effects seriously menaces her own existence. She is calm, reasonable and docile, talks of him and his illness without any excitement, and is ready to do everything that her friends advise; but she is earnestly desirous to die, considers her sole business on earth as finished, and talks as if the prolongation of her own life could only be an unmitigated evil and intolerable burden, and that no ray of hope was left for her of any possibility of happiness or even peace and ease for the future. She is in fact brokenhearted, and that for a man old enough to be her grandfather and a martyr to disease and infirmity; but to her he was everything; she had consecrated her life to the preservation of his, and she kept his vital flame alive with the unwearied watching of a Vestal priestess. She had made him an object and an idol round which all the feelings and even passion of an affectionate heart had entwined themselves, till at last she had merged her very existence in his, and only lived in, with, and for him. She saw and felt that he enjoyed life, and she made it her object to promote and prolong this enjoyment. 'Why,' she says, 'could I not save him now, as I saved him heretofore?' and not having been able to do so, she regards her own life as utterly useless and unnecessary, and only hopes to be relieved of it that she may (as she believes and expects) be enabled to join him in some other world.<sup>1</sup>

*February 9th.*—Yesterday Clarendon told me a curious thing about the Emperor Napoleon and his marriage, which came in a roundabout way, but which no doubt is true. Madame de Montijo's most intimate friend is the Marchioness

<sup>1</sup> [She lived, however, and married Lord Forester, *en secondes nocces*, in 1856.]

of Santa Cruz, and to her she wrote an account of what had passed about her daughter's marriage and the Emperor's proposal to her. When he offered her marriage, she expressed her sense of the greatness of the position to which he proposed to raise her. He replied, 'It is only fair that I should set before you the whole truth, and let you know that if the position is very high, it is also perhaps very dangerous and insecure.' He then represented to her in detail all the dangers with which he was environed, his unpopularity with the higher classes, the *malveillance* of the Great Powers, the possibility of his being any day assassinated at her side, his popularity indeed with the masses, but the fleeting character of their favour, but above all the existence of a good deal of disaffection and hostility in the army, the most serious thing of all. If this latter danger, he said, were to become more formidable, he knew very well how to avert it by a war; and though his earnest desire was to maintain peace, if no other means of self-preservation should remain, he should not shrink from that, which would at once rally the whole army to one common feeling. All this he told her with entire frankness, and without concealing the perils of his position, or his sense of them, and it is one of the most creditable traits I have ever heard of him. It was, of course, calculated to engage and attach any woman of high spirit and generosity, and it seems to have had that effect upon her. It is, however, curious in many ways; it reveals a sense of danger that is not apparently suspected, and his consciousness of it; and it shows how, in spite of a sincere wish to maintain peace, he may be driven to make war as a means of self-preservation, and therefore how entirely necessary it is that we should be on our guard, and not relax our defensive preparations. I was sure from the conversations I had with M. de Flahault at Beaudesert, that he feels the Emperor's situation to be one of insecurity and hazard. He said that it remained to be seen whether it was possible that a Government could be maintained permanently in France on the principle of the total suppression of civil and political liberty, which had the support

of the masses, but which was abhorred and opposed by all the elevated and educated classes. The limbs of the body politic are with the Emperor, and the head against him.

*February 11th.*—Parliament met again last night. Lord Derby threw off in the Lords by asking Lord Aberdeen what the Government meant to do, which Aberdeen awkwardly and foolishly enough declined to give any answer to. The scene was rather ridiculous, and not creditable, I think, to Aberdeen. He is unfortunately a very bad speaker at all times, and, what is worse in a Prime Minister, has no readiness whatever. Lord Lansdowne would have made a very pretty and dexterous flourish, and answered the question. Lord John did announce in the House of Commons what the Government mean to do and not to do, but they say he did it ill, and it was very flat, not a *brilliant* throw-off at all.

*February 16th.*—Yesterday Cowley arrived from Paris. He called on me, and gave me an account of the state of things there and some curious details about the Emperor's marriage and his abortive matrimonial projects. He confirms the account of Louis Napoleon's position set forth in Madame de Montijo's letter. The effect of his marriage has been very damaging everywhere, and the French people were not at all pleased at his calling himself a 'parvenu,' which mortified their vanity, inasmuch as they did not like to appear as having thrown themselves at the feet of a parvenu. For some time before the marriage was declared, Cowley, from what he saw and the information he received, began to suspect it would take place, and reported it to John Russell. Just about this time Walewski went to Paris, and when Cowley saw him he told him so. Walewski expressed the greatest surprise as well as mortification, and imparted to Cowley that a negotiation had been and still was going on for the Emperor's marriage with the Princess Adelaide of Hohenlohe, the Queen's niece, at that time and still with the Queen in England. This was begun by Lord Malmesbury, and the Emperor had regularly proposed to her through her father. A very civil answer had been sent by the

Prince, in which he said that he would not dispose of his daughter's hand without her consent, and that he had referred the proposal to her, and she should decide for herself. The Queen had behaved very well, and had abstained from giving any advice or expressing any opinion on the subject. They were then expecting the young Princess's decision. This being the case, Cowley advised Walewski to exert his influence to stop the demonstrations that were going on between the Emperor and Mlle. di Montijo, which might seriously interfere with this plan. The next day Walewski told Cowley that he had seen the Emperor, who took him by both hands, and said, 'Mon cher, je suis pris,' and then told him he had resolved to marry Mlle. de Montijo. However, on Walewski representing the state of the other affair, he agreed to wait for the Princess Adelaide's answer, but said, if it was unfavourable, he would conclude the other affair, but if the Princess accepted him he would marry her. The day following the answer came: very civil, but declining on the ground of her youth and inexperience, and not feeling equal to such a position. The same day the Emperor proposed to the Empress. Cowley says he is evidently much changed since his marriage, and that he is conscious of his unpopularity and the additional insecurity in which it has involved his position.

*February 19th.*—Lord Cowley told me something more about the marriage. He saw the Queen on Thursday (17th), who told him all about it. The first step was taken by Morny, who wrote to Malmesbury, and requested him to propose it, stating that the Emperor's principal object in it was to 'resserrer les liens entre les deux pays.' Malmesbury accordingly wrote to the Queen on the subject. She was annoyed, justly considering that the proposal, with the reason given, placed her in a very awkward situation, and that it ought not to have been mentioned to her at all. The result was what has been already stated, but with this difference, that the Queen set her face against the match, although the girl, if left to herself, would have accepted the offer. However, nobody knows this, and they are very anxious these

details should not transpire. The two accounts I have given of this transaction seem to me to afford a good illustration of the uncertainty of the best authenticated historical statements. Nothing could appear more to be relied on than the accuracy of Cowley's first account to me, and if I had not seen him again, or if he had not imparted to me his conversation with the Queen, that account would have stood uncorrected, and an inaccurate version of the story would have been preserved, and might hereafter have been made public, and, unless corrected by some other contemporaneous narrative, would probably have been taken as true. The matter in itself is not very important, but such errors unquestionably are liable to occur in matters of greater moment, and actually do occur, fully justifying the apocryphal character which has been ascribed to almost every historical work.<sup>1</sup>

The Queen seems to be intensely curious about the Court of France and all details connected with it, and on the other hand Louis Napoleon has been equally curious about the etiquette observed in the English Court, and desirous of assimilating his to ours, which in great measure he appears to have done.

Last night there was the first field day in the House of Commons, Disraeli having made an elaborate and bitter attack on the Government, but especially on Charles Wood and Graham, under the pretence of asking questions respecting our foreign relations, and more particularly with France.<sup>2</sup> His speech was very long, in most parts very tiresome, but with a good deal of ability, and a liberal infusion of that sarcastic vituperation which is his great forte, and which always amuses the House of Commons more or less. It was,

<sup>1</sup> [Further details with reference to the marriage of the Emperor will be found in Lord Malmesbury's *Memoirs*, vol. i. pp. 374 and 378, which confirm Mr. Greville's narrative.]

<sup>2</sup> [Sir Charles Wood, President of the Board of Control, made a speech to his constituents at Halifax on February 3, in which he commented in severe language on the despotic character of the Imperial Government of France. The speech was thought to be unbecoming in the mouth of a Cabinet minister, and Sir Charles apologised for it. But Mr. Disraeli made it the subject of a fierce attack in the House of Commons.]

however, a speech of devilish malignity, quite reckless and shamelessly profligate; for the whole scope of it was, if possible, to envenom any bad feeling that may possibly exist between France and England, and, by the most exaggerated representations of the offence given by two of the Ministers to the French Government and nation, to exasperate the latter, and to make it a point of honour with them to resent it, even to the extent of a quarrel with us. Happily its factious violence was so great as to disgust even the people on his own side, and the French Government is too really desirous of peace and harmony to pay any attention to the rant of a disappointed adventurer, whose motives and object are quite transparent.

*February 20th.*—Disraeli's speech on Friday night was evidently a political blunder, which has injured him in the general opinion, and disgusted his own party. It is asserted that he communicated his intention to his followers, who disapproved of it, but he nevertheless persisted. The speech itself was too long; it was dull and full of useless truisms in the first part, but clever and brilliant in the last; and his personalities were very smart and well aimed; but there was not a particle of truth and sincerity in it; it was a mere vituperation and factious display, calculated to do mischief if it produced any effect at all, and quite unbecoming a man who had just been a Minister of the Crown and leader of the House of Commons, and who ought to have been animated by higher motives and more patriotic views. This was what the more sensible men of the party felt, and Tom Baring, the most sensible and respectable of the Derbyites, and the man of the greatest weight amongst them, told me himself that he was so much disgusted that he was on the point of getting up to disavow him, and it is much to be regretted, as I told him, that such a rebuke was not administered from such a quarter. It does not look as if the connexion between Disraeli and the party could go on long. Their dread and distrust of him and his contempt of them render it difficult if not impossible. Pakington is already talked of as their leader, and some think Disraeli wants to

shake them off and trade on his own bottom, trusting to his great abilities to make his way to political power with somebody and on some principles, about neither of which he would be very nice. Tom Baring said to me last night, 'Can't you make room for him in this Coalition Government?' I said, 'Why, will you give him to us?' 'Oh, yes,' he said, 'you shall have him with pleasure.'

Lord John Russell has taken leave of the Foreign Office, and has had an interview with the Queen and Prince, satisfactory to both. She has been all along considerably annoyed at the arrangement made about his taking the Foreign Office only to quit it, and his leading the House of Commons without any office, which she fancies is unconstitutional, and the arrangement was announced in the newspapers without any proper communication to her. The consequence has been some little soreness on both sides, but this has now been all removed by explanations and amicable communication. The Queen attacked him on the constitutional ground, but here *elle l'a pris par son fort*, and he easily bowled over this objection.<sup>1</sup> Then she expressed her fear lest it should be drawn into a precedent, which might be inconvenient in other cases, to which he replied that he thought there was little fear of anybody wishing to follow the precedent of a man taking upon himself a vast amount of labour without any pay at all. Then she said that a man independent of office might consider himself independent of the Crown also, and postpone its interests to popular requirements; which he answered by saying that he did not think any Minister, as it was, thought very much of the Crown as contradistinguished from the people, and that he was not less likely to take such a part as she apprehended by holding an office of 5,000*l.* a year, from which a vote of the House of Commons could at any moment expel him.

<sup>1</sup> [The objection taken by Her Majesty was to Lord John Russell's proposal that he should retain his seat in the Cabinet and the leadership of the House of Commons without holding any special office in the Government. But in fact, as a Privy Councillor of the Crown, a Minister, with or without office, is under precisely the same obligations to the Sovereign and to Parliament.]



He appears to have satisfied them both, and to be satisfied himself, which is still more important.

*February 25th.*—The Jew question and the Maynooth question have been got over in the House of Commons without much debate, but by small majorities. The most remarkable incident was young Stanley<sup>1</sup> voting with the majority in both questions, and speaking on Maynooth, and well. As he is pretty sure to act a conspicuous part, it is good to see him taking a wise and liberal line. Disraeli voted for the Jews, but did not speak, which was very base of him. Last night I met Tomline at dinner, who is a friend of his, and told me a great deal about him. He has a good opinion of him, that is, that he has a good disposition, but his personal position perverts him in great measure. He says he dislikes and despises Derby, thinks him a good 'Saxon' speaker and nothing more, has a great contempt for his party, particularly for Pakington, whom they seem to think of setting up as leader in his place. The man in the House of Commons whom he most fears as an opponent is Gladstone. He has the highest opinion of his ability, and he respects Graham as a statesman. Tomline told me that his system of attacking the late Sir Robert Peel was settled after this manner. When the great schism took place, three of the seceders went to Disraeli (Miles, Tyrrel, and a third whom I have forgotten), and proposed to him to attack and vilify Peel regularly, but with discretion; not to fatigue and disgust the House, to make a speech against him about once a fortnight or so, and promised if he would that a constant and regular attendance of a certain number of men should be there to cheer and support him, remarking that nobody was ever efficient in the House of Commons without this support certain.<sup>2</sup> He desired twenty

<sup>1</sup> [The present Earl of Derby, who succeeded his father as fifteenth Earl in 1869. He entered public life as Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1852.]

<sup>2</sup> [This anecdote is related on the authority of Mr. Tomline as stated in the text. It was mentioned in the lifetime of Lord Beaconsfield, and in justice to him it must be said that he altogether denied the truth of the story.]

minutes to consider of this offer, and finally accepted it. We have seen the result, a curious beginning of an important political career. Now they dread and hate him, for they know in his heart he has no sympathy with them, and that he has no truth or sincerity in his conduct or speeches, and would throw them over if he thought it his interest.

*March 1st.*—The Government seem upon the whole to be going on prosperously. They have at present no difficulty in the House of Commons, where there is no disposition to oppose their measures, and an appearance of moderation generally, which promises an easy Session. John Russell has spoken well, and seems to have recovered a great share of the popularity he had lost. Aberdeen has done very well in the House of Lords, his answers to various ‘questions’ having been discreet, temperate, and judicious; in short, up to this time the horizon is tolerably clear. On the other hand the divisions have presented meagre majorities, and the Government have no *power* in the House of Commons, and live on the goodwill or forbearance of the several fractions of which it is composed. John Russell is in his heart not satisfied with his present position, and not animated with any spirit of zeal or cordiality, though he is sure to act honestly and fairly the part he has undertaken. There is still a good deal of lurking discontent and resentment on the part of those who were left out, and of the Whig party generally, who are only half reconciled to following the banner of a Peelite premier; of the malcontents the principal are Carlisle and Clanricarde, who are both in different ways very sore; Normanby is dissatisfied, Labouchere, Seymour, and George Grey not pleased, but except Clanricarde none have shown any disposition to withhold their support from the Government, or even to carp at them. Aberdeen seems to have no notion of being anything but a *real* Prime Minister. He means to exercise a large influence in the management of foreign affairs, which he considers to be the peculiar, if not exclusive, province of himself and Clarendon. Palmerston does not interfere with them at all, but he must do so, if any important questions arise for the Cabinet to decide, and then

it is very likely some dissension will be the consequence. There are four ex-Secretaries for foreign affairs in this Cabinet, all of whom will naturally take part in any discussion of moment. Argyll began rather unluckily, running his head indiscreetly against Ellenborough on an Indian petition. He is burning with impatience to distinguish himself, and broke out too soon, and out of season ; but he was not unconscious of his error, and it will probably be of use to him to have met with a little check at his outset, and teach him to be more discreet. He spoke again last night, and very well, on the Clergy reserves, when there was a brilliant passage of arms in the Lords, in which Lord Derby and the Bishops of Exeter and Oxford distinguished themselves.

News came by telegraph last night that the dispute between Turkey and Austria is settled, which will relieve us from a great difficulty. If it had gone on, we should have had a difficult part to play, and unluckily the good understanding that was reviving between us and Vienna has all been upset by the late attempt on the Emperor's life,<sup>1</sup> which has thrown the Austrians into a ferment, and renewed all their bitter resentment against us for harbouring Kossuth and Mazzini, to whom they attribute both the *émeute* at Milan and the assassination at Vienna severally. They are no doubt right about Mazzini and wrong about Kossuth, but fortunately for us the first is not in England and has been abroad for some time, and it will probably be impossible to bring any evidence against Kossuth to connect him with the Hungarian assassin. But these troubles and attempts, the origin of which is attributed to men residing here, and, though neglected by the Government, more or less objects of popular favour and sympathy, render all relations of amity impossible between our Government and theirs, and the disunion is aggravated by our absurd meddling with such cases as the Madiai and Murray at Florence and at Rome, which

<sup>1</sup> [The Emperor of Austria was stabbed in the neck on February 18, by Joseph Libeny, on the ramparts of Vienna, fortunately without serious consequences. The assassin had not the remotest connexion with anyone in this country.]

are no concern of ours, and which our Government does in compliance with Protestant bigotry. What makes our conduct the more absurd is that we do more harm than good to the objects of our interest, for no Government can, with any regard to its own dignity and independence, yield to our dictation and impertinent interference. The Grand Duke of Tuscany said that the Madiai would have been let out of prison long ago but for our interference. John Russell's published letter on this subject, which was very palatable to the public, was as objectionable as possible, and quite as insolent and presumptuous as any Palmerston used to write.

Last night the Marquis Massimo d'Azeglio came here. He was Prime Minister in Piedmont till replaced by Count Cavour, and is come to join his nephew, who is Minister here. He is a tall, thin, dignified looking man, with very pleasing manners. He gave us a shocking account of the conduct of the Austrians at Milan in consequence of the recent outbreak. Their tyranny and cruelty have been more like the deeds in the middle ages than those in our own time; wantonly putting people to death without trial or even the slightest semblance of guilt, plundering and confiscating, and in every respect acting in a manner equally barbarous and impolitic. They have thrown away a good opportunity of improving their own moral status in Italy, and completely played the game of their enemies by increasing the national hatred against them tenfold. If ever France finds it her interest to go to war,<sup>1</sup> Italy will be her mark, for she will now find the whole population in her favour, and would be joined by Sardinia, who would be too happy to revenge her former reverses with French aid; nor would it be possible for this country to support Austria in a war to secure that Italian dominion which she has so monstrously abused.

*March 3rd.*—Lord Aberdeen has gained great credit by making Mr. Jackson, Rector of St. James's, Bishop of Lincoln. He is a man without political patronage or connexion, and with no recommendation but his extraordinary merit both as a parish priest and a preacher. Such an appoint-

<sup>1</sup> [Remarkable prediction, verified in 1859.]

ment is creditable, wise, and popular, and will strengthen the Government by conciliating the moderate and sincere friends of the Church.

The Duke of Bedford writes to me about his papers and voluminous correspondence, which he has been thinking of overhauling and arranging, but he shrinks from such a laborious task. He says : ‘ With respect to my political correspondence, it has been unusually interesting and remarkable. I came so early into public life, have been so mixed up with everything, have known the political chief of my own party so intimately, and of the Tory party also to a limited extent, that there is no great affair of my own time I have not been well acquainted with.’ This is very true, and his correspondence, whenever it sees the light, will be more interesting, and contribute more historical information, than that of any other man who has been engaged in public life. The papers of Peel and of the Duke of Wellington may be more important, but I doubt their’s being more interesting, because the Duke of Bedford’s will be of a more miscellaneous and comprehensive character; and though his abilities are not of a very high order, his judgement is sound, his mind is unprejudiced and candid, and he is a sincere worshipper of truth.

For the last few days John Russell has been kept away from the House of Commons by the death of the Dowager Duchess of Bedford, when Palmerston has been acting as leader, taking that post as naturally and undoubtedly belonging to him, and his right to it being entirely acquiesced in by his colleagues of both camps. They say that he has given great satisfaction to the House, where he is regarded with the same favour and inclination as heretofore, and *personally* much more acceptable than Lord John. Cobden dined with John Russell the other day, and, what is more remarkable, Bessborough told me he met Roden at dinner the other day at the Castle at Dublin, St. Germans and he on very goodhumoured terms. These are striking examples of the compatibility of the strongest political difference with social amenities. Cobden, however, is not in regular oppo-

sition to the Government, but in great measure a supporter.

*March 10th.*—I met M. de Flahault last night, just returned from Paris. He said that he found there a rancour and violence against us amongst the Austrians, and Russians and Prussians no less, quite inconceivable. He talked to them all and represented to them the absurdity of their suppositions and exigencies, but without the slightest effect; he found the Emperor, however, in a very different frame of mind, understanding perfectly the position of the English Government, and completely determined to maintain his alliance with us, and not to yield to the tempting cajolery of the Continental Powers, who want him to make common cause with them against us. Such is their madness and their passion, and such the necessity, real or fancied, in which they are placed by the revolutionary fire which is still smouldering everywhere, and their own detestable misgovernment (at least that of Austria, which the others abet), that they are ready to cooperate with France in coercing and weakening us, and to sacrifice all the great and traditional policy of Europe, in order to wage war against the stronghold and only asylum of constitutional principles and government.

Flahault said that the Emperor has had an opportunity of placing himself in the first year of his reign in a situation which was the great object of his uncle's life, and which he never could attain. He might have been at the head of a European league against us, for these powers have signified to him their willingness to follow him in such a crusade, the Emperor of Russia and he being on the best terms, and a cordial interchange of letters having taken place between them. But Napoleon has had the wisdom and the magnanimity to resist the bait, to decline these overtures, and to resolve on adherence to England. Flahault said that he had had an audience, at which he frankly and freely told the Emperor his own opinion, not being without apprehension that it would be unpalatable to him, and not coincident with his own views. While he was talking to him, he saw him smile, which he interpreted into a sentiment that he (Flahault)

was too *English* for him in his language and opinions, and he said so. The Emperor said, 'I smiled because you so exactly expressed my own opinions,' and then he told him that he took exactly the same view of what his true policy was that Flahault himself did. Flahault suggested to him that, in spite of the civilities shown him by the Northern Powers, they did not, and never would, consider him as one of themselves, and they only wanted to make him the instrument of their policy or their vengeance; and he reminded him that while England had at once recognised him, they were not only in no hurry to do so, but if England had not recognised him as she did, he would not have been recognised by any one of those Powers to this day, all which he acknowledged to be true.

The prevailing feeling against England which Flahault found at Paris has been proved on innumerable occasions. Clarendon is well aware of it, and does his best, but with very little success, to bring the foreign Ministers and others to reason. Madame de Lieven writes to me in this strain, and even liberal and intelligent foreigners like Alfred Potocki, who has been accused of being a rebel in Austria, writes that we ought to expel the refugees. At Vienna the people are persuaded that there is some indirect and undefinable participation on the part of the British Government in the insurrectionary and homicidal acts of Milan and Vienna, and they have got a story that the assassin Libeny had a letter of Palmerston's in his shoe. Unreasonable as all this is, we ought to make great allowance for their excited feelings, for they have a case against us of a cumulative character. It goes back a long way, and embraces many objects and details, and is principally attributable to Palmerston, partly to his doings, and perhaps more to his sayings. They cannot forget that he has long been the implacable enemy of Austria, that he advised her renunciation of her Italian dominions, and that he and his agents have always sympathised with, and sometimes aided and abetted most of the revolutionary movements that have taken place. Then there was the Haynau affair, and the

lukewarmness and indifference which the Government of that day, and Palmerston particularly, exhibited about it; then the reception of Kossuth, the public meetings and his speeches, together with the speeches at them of Cobden and others of which no notice was ever taken, and finally the transaction about Palmerston's receiving Kossuth and his famous answer to the addresses presented to him from Finsbury and Islington. All these things satisfy the foreign Governments that we are not only politically but nationally their enemies, and that we harbour their rebellious subjects out of hatred to them, and that we regard with sympathy and a secret satisfaction the plots which they concoct in safety here and go forth to execute abroad. And when they are told that our laws afford these people an asylum, which no Government has the power to deny them, and that Parliament and public opinion will not consent to arm the Government with the powers of restraint or coercion they do not possess, they only explode the more loudly in denunciations against that free and constitutional system which is not only a perpetual reproach, but, as they think, a source of continual danger to their own. So much for foreign affairs.

At home, while the political sky is still serene enough, there are some rocks ahead, and I think the Government in peril from more than one cause. First and foremost there is the Indian question. There is something ominous in the conjunction between a Coalition Government and an India Bill, and if they don't take care, they will get into a scrape.<sup>1</sup> The Opposition is broken and disorganised, and at present there is no disposition on the part of the extreme Liberals to join in any strong measures against the Government; but this is a question on which all the scattered fractions might be made easily to combine, and there are already symptoms of a possible combination *ad hoc* in the Indian Committee of

<sup>1</sup> [The Charter of the East India Company being about to expire, Sir Charles Wood, the President of the Board of Control, introduced in an elaborate speech a Bill for the future government of India by the Company, which changed the constitution and limited the patronage of the Court of Directors. The Bill was finally passed on July 28.]



the House of Commons. Lowe is very much dissatisfied with Charles Wood, and with the intentions of Government, and even talks of resigning; and the 'Times' is going into furious opposition on the Indian question, and is already attacking the Government for their supposed intentions. This, therefore, is assuming a serious aspect. There is besides the Budget and the difficulty of the Income Tax, and these two questions are enough to put them in great perplexity.

*March 19th.*—The question of Indian government and the renewal of the Charter is every day increasing in importance and attracting more and more of public attention. It is a matter of great difficulty for the Government to deal with. They are threatened by enemies, and pressed by friends and half friends, who want them to postpone any measure for another year or two years. They, on the contrary, stand pledged, and think they ought to propose something this year. It presents a field on which the various fractions of hostility and semi-hostility to the Government may meet and combine, and perhaps place them in great difficulty. The Committees are going on taking evidence with the knowledge that the Government will probably not wait for their several reports before proceeding to legislation. Granville has got the management of the Government measures in the House of Lords, and is working very hard at Indian affairs. Yesterday I met at dinner at Ellice's two able men just arrived from India for the purpose of giving evidence, a Mr. Halliday and a Mr. Marchmont. They are for maintaining the present system, but with many reforms and alterations; they spoke highly of Lord Dalhousie as a man of business.

*March 24th.*—As I never see Clarendon now, who is entirely absorbed in the duties of his office, he engaged me to go and dine with him alone yesterday, that we might have a talk about all that is going on, and he told me a great deal of one sort or another. I learnt the state of our relations with France and Russia in reference to the Turkish business, and he gave me to read a very curious and interesting despatch (addressed to John Russell) from Seymour,

giving an account of a long conversation he had had with the Emperor Nicholas about Turkey and her prospects and condition, and his own intentions and opinions, which were amicable towards us, and very wise and moderate in themselves, contemplating the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, disclaiming in the strongest terms any design of occupying Constantinople—more than that, declaring that he would not do it—but supposing the event to happen, not thinking the solution of the problem so difficult as it is generally regarded. He threw out that he should have no objection, if a partition was ever to take place, that we should appropriate Egypt and Candia to ourselves. He seems to have talked very frankly, and he said one curious thing, which was that Russia was not without a revolutionary substratum, which was only less apparent and less menacing than in other parts because he possessed greater means of repression, but nevertheless that the seeds were there. It is lucky Dundas is a prudent man, and refused to carry his fleet up to the vicinity of the Dardanelles at Rose's invitation, or mischief might have ensued. As it is, we disapprove of Rose's proceedings and have approved Dundas's, at the same time ordering him not to move without express orders from home, and moreover Clarendon refused to give Stratford Canning any discretionary authority to send for the fleet (though it was afterwards given), which he had asked to be entrusted with. Clarendon is much dissatisfied with the conduct of the French Government, who were in a great hurry to send off their fleet, and they sent orders to sail on the mere report of what Rose had done, and without waiting to learn the result of his application to the Admiral; and they did this, although they knew the despatches were on the road, and that a very few hours would put them in possession of the actual state of the case. Moreover, Cowley moved heaven and earth to induce Drouyn de Lhuys to withdraw the order to sail, but without effect. They persisted in it, after they knew we were not going to stir, and Cowley could not see the Emperor, who he says was evidently avoiding any communication with him. Still

very friendly language continues to pass between us, and our Government are inclined to attribute this unwise proceeding to the vanity of the French, their passion for doing something, and above all the inexperience and want of *savoir faire* in high matters of diplomacy of the Emperor and his ministers. There is not one amongst them who is fit to handle such delicate and important questions, the Emperor, who governs everything by his own will, less than any; and Drouyn de Lhuys, who has been for many years engaged more or less in the Foreign Office, is a very poor and inefficient minister.

Clarendon told me he had seen Brunnow, and after recapitulating to him all the various causes for alarm, resting on facts or on rumours, especially with regard to Russia and her intentions, he said that our Government had received the word of honour of the Emperor that he had no sinister or hostile intentions, and disclaimed those that had been imputed to him, and that on his word they relied with such implicit confidence that he had not the slightest fear of disquietude. Brunnow was exceedingly pleased, and said that was the way to treat the Emperor, who would be excessively gratified, nothing being dearer to him than the confidence and good opinion of this country, and he said he would send off a courier the next day, and Clarendon should dictate his despatch. The instructions given to Menschikoff have been enormously exaggerated, the most serious and offensive parts that have been stated (the nomination of the Greek Patriarch, &c.) being totally false.<sup>1</sup> I asked what they were, and he said nothing but

<sup>1</sup> [Whilst these pacific assurances were given in London, Prince Menschikoff arrived in Constantinople on March 2, and commenced that arrogant and aggressive policy which led in the course of the year to hostilities between Russia and the Porte. It has, however, only recently transpired, by the publication of Lord Malmesbury's *Memoirs* (vol. i. p. 402), that when the Emperor Nicholas came to England in 1844, he, Sir Robert Peel, then Prime Minister, the Duke of Wellington, and Lord Aberdeen, then Foreign Secretary, drew up and signed a Memorandum, the spirit and scope of which was to support Russia in her legitimate protection of the Greek religion and the holy shrines, and to do so without consulting France. To obtain this agreement was doubtless the object of the Emperor's journey. It bore his

a string of conditions about shrines and other ecclesiastical trifles. Walewski seems to have done well here, condemning the conduct of his own Government, and not concealing from them his own opinion, and entirely going along with us. It was on Saturday night that the courier arrived with Rose's and Dundas's despatches, and a few of the Cabinet met on Sunday at the Admiralty to talk the matter over. Clarendon sent for John Russell from Richmond, and he thought it advisable to summon Palmerston to this conciliabule, to keep him in good humour, which it had the effect of doing. There were himself, Palmerston, John Russell, Aberdeen, and Graham. He had written to Lord John on Saturday night, and sent him the despatches; he got an answer from him, full of very wild talk of strong measures to be taken, and a fleet sent to the Baltic to make peremptory demands on the Emperor of Russia. This, however, he took no notice of, and did not say one word to Aberdeen about it, quietly letting it drop, and accordingly he heard no more about it, nobody, he said, but me, knowing what Lord John had proposed. I asked him what were Palmerston's views. He replied that he did not say much, and acquiesced in his and Aberdeen's prudent and reserved intentions, but he could see, from a few words that casually escaped him, that he would have been ready to join in more stringent and violent measures if they had been proposed. His hatred of Russia is not extinguished, but as it was, there was no expressed difference of opinion, and a general agreement. He said he had had a prejudice against Gladstone, but he now liked him very much, and Granville had already told me the same thing.

own personal signature. The existence of this Memorandum was a profound secret known only to the Queen and to those Ministers who held in succession the seals of the Foreign Department, each of whom transmitted it privately to his successor. Lord Malmesbury received the document from Lord Granville, and on leaving office in 1853 handed it to Lord John Russell. This fact, hitherto unknown, throws an entirely new light on the causes of the Crimean War. The Emperor of Russia naturally relied on the support of the very ministers who had signed the agreement and were again in power, whilst Lord Aberdeen was conscious of having entered into an engagement wholly at variance with the course of policy into which he was reluctantly driven.—H. R.]

Aberdeen likes his post and enjoys the consciousness of having done very well in it. He is extremely liberal, but of a wise and well-reasoned liberality. As it has turned out, he is far fitter for the post he occupies than Lansdowne would have been, both morally and physically.

The Queen is devoted to this Government, and expressed to Aberdeen the liveliest apprehension lest they should get themselves into some scrape with the India Bill, and entreated he would run no risks in it. Aberdeen, in announcing this one day to the Cabinet, said that the best thing for them to do was to bring forward a measure of so liberal and popular a character as to make any serious opposition impossible. Clarendon agreed in this, and I told him that this had long been my own idea, and that what they ought to do was to throw open the civil and military appointments to competition, and to grant appointments after examination to qualified candidates, just as degrees are given at the universities. We passed the whole evening together, talking over all matters of interest, and he told me everything he knew himself.

*April 4th.*—I went to Althorp last week, and returned for a Council on Friday. After it Graham and I stayed behind, when he talked about the Government and their prospects, which he thought pretty good; they were going on in great harmony, and the greater, he thought, because they had originally had such diversities of opinion. This led to a disposition to mutual concession, and feelings of delicacy towards each other. The Queen is extremely attached to Aberdeen, more than to any minister she had ever had. Lord John's position anomalous and unsatisfactory, and always a question whether he would not become disgusted and back out. Graham said that Clarendon was doing admirably—better than he had anticipated.

Lady Lyttelton, whom I met at Althorp, told me a great deal about the Queen and her children; nothing particularly interesting. She said the Queen was very fond of them, but severe in her manner, and a strict disciplinarian in her family. She described the Prince of Wales to be extremely

shy and timid, with very good principles, and particularly an exact observer of truth ; the Princess Royal is remarkably intelligent. I wrote this because it will hereafter be curious to see how the boy grows up, and what sort of performance follows this promise, though I shall not live to see it. She spoke in very high terms of the Queen herself, of the Prince, and of the simplicity and happiness of her private and domestic life.

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## CHAPTER III.

Weakness of the Government — Gladstone's Budget — A Conversation with Disraeli—Suicidal Conduct of the Tories—Their Irritation—A Charge against Mr. Gladstone defeated—The Stafford Committee—Harmony of the Government—Electoral Corruption—Impending War—Success of the Government—Macaulay's Speech on the Judges' Exclusion Bill—Erroneous Predictions from Paris—Unsettled Policy as to the War—Lord John's Anti-Catholic Speech—The English and French Fleets sail for the Dardanelles—Conduct of Austria—Russia means War—Attacks by the Opposition—Explanations desired—Attempted Mediation—Lord Aberdeen's Confidence shaken—Divisions of Opinion—Terms of Accommodation—Lord Palmerston's Views—Prospect of Peace—Division in the Lords on the Succession Duties Bill—Friendly Relations of Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon—Fears of War—Hopes of Peace—Lord Palmerston and Mr. Cobden—Rejection of the Vienna Note—Lord Palmerston courted by the Tories—Lord John Russell's Position—The Duke of Bedford's Part in the last Crisis—Dangers at Constantinople—Lord Stratford's Influence—Suspected Intrigue of France with Russia—Lord Palmerston goes to Balmoral—Sir James Graham's View—Lord Stratford's Conduct—Importance of the Vienna Note—A Cabinet summoned.

*London, April 21st, 1853.*—I have had such a bad fit of gout in my hand, that I have been unable for some time past to write at all, though there has been plenty to write about. The Government has been sustaining defeats in the House of Commons on detached questions of taxation, much to their annoyance and embarrassment, and which were more serious from the inference to be drawn from them than for their intrinsic importance. They were caused by the meddling and absurd crotchets of some of their friends, and the malignity and unprincipled conduct of their enemies: the first bringing forward motions for reduction of certain items, merely to gratify clients or constituents, and the Tories joining with the Radicals in voting for things which they opposed when they were themselves in office, reckless

of consistency or of consequences. But the whole affair was unpleasant, as it displayed strikingly how little authority the Government has over the House of Commons, and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of carrying on the service of the country.

These little battles were, however, of little moment compared with the great event of Gladstone's Budget, which came off on Monday night. He had kept his secret so well, that nobody had the least idea what it was to be, only it oozed out that the Income Tax was not to be differentiated. He spoke for five hours, and by universal consent it was one of the grandest displays and most able financial statement that ever was heard in the House of Commons; a great scheme, boldly, skilfully, and honestly devised, disdaining popular clamour and pressure from without, and the execution of it absolute perfection. Even those who do not admire the Budget, or who are injured by it, admit the merit of the performance. It has raised Gladstone to a great political elevation, and, what is of far greater consequence than the measure itself, has given the country assurance of a *man* equal to great political necessities, and fit to lead parties and direct governments.

*April 22nd.*—I met Gladstone last night, and had the pleasure of congratulating him and his wife, which I did with great sincerity, for his success is a public benefit. They have been overwhelmed with compliments and congratulations. Prince Albert and the Queen both wrote to him, and John Russell, who is spitefully reported to have been jealous, has, on the contrary, shown the warmest interest and satisfaction in his success. The only one of his colleagues who may have been mortified is Charles Wood, who must have compared Gladstone's triumph with his own failures. From all one can see at present, it promises certain success, though many parts of the Budget are cavilled at. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to find any common ground on which Radicals or Irish can join the Derbyites to overthrow it, and the sanguine expectations which the latter have been entertaining for some time, of putting the Government into some



inextricable fix, have given way to perplexity and despondency; and they evidently do not know what to do, nor how to give effect to their rancour and spite. Lord Derby had a great meeting not many days ago, at which he recommended union, and cheered them on in opposition, of course for form's sake, talking of *moderation* and *principles*, neither of which he cares a fig for. Mischief and confusion, vengeance against the coalition, and taking the chance of what may happen next, are all that he and Disraeli are bent upon. I met the latter worthy in the street just before the Budget, a day or two previous. He asked me what I thought of the state of affairs, and I told him I thought it very unpleasant, and it seemed next to impossible to carry on the Government at all, everybody running riot in the House of Commons, and following his own fancies and crotchets; nor did I see how it could be otherwise in the present state of parties and the country; that since Peel's administration, which was a strong Government, there had been and apparently there could be none. The present Government was not strong, and they were perpetually defeated, on minor points indeed, but in a way that showed they had no power to work through Parliament. I said of course they would dissolve if this continued, but that Gladstone's Budget might make a difference one way or the other. Disraeli scouted the idea of a dissolution, by which, he said, they would certainly gain nothing. Why, he asked, did not the Peelites join us again, as they might have done, and got as good terms as they have now, and then there would have been a strong Government again? As I don't want to quarrel with anybody, I restrained what it was on my lips to say—'You could not possibly expect them to join you'—but I did tell him that, even if the present Government could not maintain itself, of all impossible things the most impossible was the restoration of his Government *tale quale*, to which he made no reply. To be sure, the Protectionist seceders from Peel have now drunk the cup of mortification, disgrace, and disaster to the very dregs. They are a factious and (as I hope) impotent Opposition, under the unprincipled guid-

ance of men, who, clever and plausible though they be, are totally destitute of wisdom, sincerity, and truth. They have not only lost all the Protection for the maintenance of which they made such struggles and sacrifices, but they have likewise brought upon themselves the still heavier blow to the landed interest which is going to be inflicted in the shape of the legacy duty. Had they possessed more foresight, and been less violent and unreasonable, this would not have happened to them; for if Peel's original Government had held together, and they had been content to accept his guidance, no Budget would have contained this measure. Schemes might have been devised to lighten their burdens, or to increase the compensations they really have obtained in other ways; but, be this as it may, they would certainly have been saved from this direct impost, which I doubt if Peel himself ever contemplated, but which he would certainly have spared them if they had not deserted him, nor would his successors have departed from his policy in this respect. But from first to last their conduct has been suicidal in every respect.

*May 3rd.*—The Government is going on very flourishingly. A capital division in the House of Lords on the Canada Clergy Reserves Bill,<sup>1</sup> on which occasion there was a scene between Derby and Clarendon, in which both were, to my mind, in the wrong. The whole affair appears in all the newspapers, but what does not appear is the rather absurd termination of it, when, after much excitement and strong language interchanged, the belligerents ended by drinking each other's healths in water across the table. The victory in the Lords has been followed up by one still more important in the House of Commons on the Income Tax, which was carried by 71, a great many of the Opposition voting with Government, much to the disgust of their friends. These divisions have filled the Derbyites with rage and despair, and nothing can exceed their depression and their abuse of the Budget and its authors. What vexes and provokes them so much is the

<sup>1</sup> [This was a Bill abolishing the title of the Protestant Clergy to certain portions of waste lands in the Colony.]

ascendency and triumph of the Peelites. They could endure it in the Whigs, but their hatred of the name and party of Peel is inextinguishable.

*May 15th.*—At Newmarket last week, during which the Budget was making its way very successfully through the House of Commons, where Gladstone has it all his own way. The Speaker told me he was doing his business there admirably well. While I was at Newmarket came out the strange story of Gladstone and the attempt to extort money from him before the police magistrate.<sup>1</sup> It created for the moment great surprise, curiosity, and interest, but has almost entirely passed away already, not having been taken up politically, and there being a general disposition to believe his story and to give him credit for having had no improper motive or purpose. Nevertheless it is a very strange affair, and has not yet been satisfactorily explained. It is creditable in these days of political rancour and bitterness that no malignant attempt has been made to vilify him by his opponents or by the hostile part of the press. On the contrary, the editor of the 'Morning Herald' wrote him a very handsome letter in his own name and in that of the proprietor, assuring him of their confidence in his purity and innocence, and that nothing would induce them to put anything offensive to him in the paper, and they had purposely inserted the police report in an obscure part of the paper. It is very fortunate for Gladstone that he was not intimidated and tempted to give the man money, but had the courage to face the world's suspicions and meet the charge in so public a manner.

The Stafford Committee has at length closed its proceedings, after exposures of the most disgraceful kind, which are enormously damaging not only to Augustus Stafford himself but to Lord Derby and his Government. The Duke of Northumberland comes clear out of it as to corruption, but cuts a wretched and ridiculous figure, having failed to

<sup>1</sup> [An attempt had been made to extort money from Mr. Gladstone on a spurious charge, which he met by instantly giving the delinquent into custody and meeting the case at a police office.]

perform the duties or to exercise the authority of a First Lord while he was at the Admiralty. Disraeli's evidence was nothing but an attempt to shirk the question and involve it in a confusion of characteristic verbiage which only excited ridicule. This affair has done great harm to them as a party, and served to make them more odious and contemptible than they were before.<sup>1</sup> They are now irretrievably defeated, and though they may give much trouble and throw difficulties and obstructions in the way of the Government, it is all they can do. Every day adds to the strength and consistency of the Government, both from their gaining favour and acquiring influence in the country, and from the ruin in which the Tory party is involved, and the total impossibility of their rallying again so as to form another Government. This latter consideration has already produced the adhesion of some moderate and sensible men who take a dispassionate view of affairs and who wish for a strong and efficient Government, and it will produce still greater effects of the same kind.

*May 22nd.*—I met in a train a day or two ago Graham and the Speaker, not having seen Graham for a long time. Since my friends have been in office I have hardly ever set eyes on them or had any communication with them. Graham seemed in excellent spirits about their political state and prospects, all owing to Gladstone and the complete success of his Budget. The long and numerous Cabinets, which were attributed by the 'Times' to disunion, were occupied in minute consideration of the Budget, which was there fully discussed, and Gladstone spoke in the Cabinet one day for three hours, rehearsing his speech in the House of Commons, though not quite at such length. Graham again said Clarendon was doing admirably. Palmerston he thinks much changed and more feeble, his energy much less, and his best days gone by. He thinks Lord John's position

<sup>1</sup> [Charges of misconduct in the department of the Admiralty were brought against Mr. Augustus Stafford, who had held office under the late Government. They were investigated by a Select Committee of the House of Commons.]

without office an unfortunate one, and regrets he did not stay at the Foreign Office or take another ; he thinks his influence impaired by having none. He talked of a future Head, as Aberdeen is always ready to retire at any moment, but it is very difficult to find anyone to succeed him. I suggested Gladstone. He shook his head and said it would not do ; and he was for John Russell, but owned there were difficulties there too. He considered Derby and the Tories irretrievably ruined, their characters so damaged by Stafford's Committee and other things ; he spoke of the grand mistakes Derby had made. Gladstone's object certainly was for a long time to be at the head of the Conservative party in the House of Commons, and to join with Derby, who might in fact have had all the Peelites if he would have chosen to ally himself with them instead of with Disraeli ; thus the latter had been the cause of the ruin of the party. Graham thought that Derby had committed himself to Disraeli in George Bentinck's lifetime in some way that prevented his shaking him off, as it would have been his interest to do. The Peelites would have united with Derby, but would have nothing to do with Disraeli. Bad as the cases were that had come forth at the election committees, that of Liverpool was worse than any of them, and would create a great scandal. Forbes Mackenzie could not face it, and would probably retire ; but it is doubtful if this would prevent an enquiry and exposure, and when boundless corruption appeared at such a place as Liverpool, with its numerous constituency, it was a blow to the representative system itself, and showed the futility of attempts to destroy bribery and improper influence.

*May 30th.*—Great alarm the last two or three days at an approaching rupture between Russia and Turkey, as, if it takes place, nobody can pretend to say what the consequences may be. Vast indignation of course against the Emperor of Russia, who certainly appears to have departed from the moderate professions which he made to Seymour a short time ago, and the assurances that were given to us and France. But Clarendon, whom I saw yesterday, is rather disposed to give him credit for more moderate and pacific intentions

than his conduct seems to warrant. He says that he is persuaded the Emperor has no idea of the view that is taken of his proceedings here, and that he thinks he is requiring no more than he is entitled to ; and it is only the other day that Nesselrode congratulated Seymour on the prospect of everything being satisfactorily settled, having no doubt of the Turks accepting the last proposals made to them, a copy of which Nesselrode showed him. Still, though matters look very black, Clarendon is not without hopes of war being averted and some means found of patching up the affair, the Emperor having promised that he will in no case resort to *ulterior measures* without giving us notice of his intention. The difficulty for him now is to recede with honour, as it would be to advance without danger. He has once before receded after to a certain degree committing himself, and he may not choose to do so a second time. Then he is naturally provoked with the French, who are in fact the real cause of this by their intrigues and extortions about the holy places ; and we suspect that he is, besides this, provoked at the Montenegrin affair having been settled by Austria without his having a finger in that pie. All these considerations combined make great confusion and difficulty. Brunnow is in mortal agony, dreading above all things the possibility of his having to leave this country.

The Government continues to go on very well ; the Opposition got up a debate on the legacy duties in the House of Lords the other night, which only served to prove how entirely Derby's influence has declined even there. They had thought themselves sure of beating the Government, but not only were they defeated, but accident alone (people shut out and absent) prevented their being defeated by a considerable majority. The Cabinet is going on in the greatest harmony, and the men who were strangers up to the time of its formation have taken to each other prodigiously. Aberdeen unfortunately wants the qualities which made Lord Lansdowne so good a leader, and is rather deficient in tact and temper in the House of Lords as he used to be formerly, when he attacked Lord Grey's Government and

Palmerston's administration of foreign affairs always with too much asperity ; but in spite of these defects he has not done ill even there, and in the Cabinet he is both liked and respected, being honest, straightforward, and firm, very fair, candid, and unassuming. Granville tells me that of the whole Cabinet he thinks Aberdeen has the most pluck, Gladstone a great deal, and Graham the one who has the least. He speaks very well of Molesworth, sensible, courageous, and conciliatory, but quite independent and plain spoken in his opinions.

*June 1st.*—John Russell made an imprudent speech the night before last on the Irish Church, giving great offence to the Irish and the Catholics. He could not help, as leader of the Government, opposing a proposition having for its object the destruction of the Irish Church, but he might have done it with more tact and discretion, and not in a way to elicit the cheers of the Tories. The Tail will pay him off for this whenever they can. *Quantum mutatus ab illo*, who broke up a Government for the sake of an appropriation clause.

Last night Macaulay reappeared in the House of Commons, and in a speech of extraordinary power and eloquence threw out the Judges' Exclusion Bill.<sup>1</sup> It was the first time he had spoken, and though his physical strength is impaired he showed that his mental powers are undiminished.

Senior called on me a day or two ago, just returned from Paris, where he has been living and conversing with all the notabilities (principally of the Liberal party), and he tells me there is but one opinion amongst them, that this Empire cannot last, and they only differ as to the time it may last. Most of them think it will be short. Thiers gives it only a year, Duchâtel alone thinks it will go on for some years. The unpopularity of Louis Napoleon increases and his dis-

<sup>1</sup> [A Bill was before Parliament which would have excluded the Master of the Rolls from the House of Commons, he being the only Judge who could sit there. The Judge of the Admiralty Court had already been excluded. Macaulay opposed the Bill with such force and eloquence that he changed the opinion of the House, and defeated the measure. An unusual occurrence.]

credit likewise, and as soon as the unpopularity shall extend to the army, it will be all over with him. The Opposition which has sprung up, which has increased rapidly and will increase still more in the Corps Législatif, is deemed to be very important and significant, and they think it will be impossible for him to go on with such a body so constituted and disposed, and he will have to decide upon suffering the embarrassment it will cause him, or having recourse to a *coup d'état*, a measure which would be hazardous. There are no fresh adhesions to the Court beyond the half dozen men of rank or name who have already joined it, and who are hated and despised for having done so. While such is the opinion of the people of mark at Paris, they are nevertheless sensible of the danger which would accompany a counter revolution, and of the uncertainty of what might follow, what influences might prevail, and what form of government be adopted; but they seem generally to think that while in the first instance there would be a succession of provisional arrangements and fleeting transitory governments, it would end in the restoration of the monarchy under Henri V., but that this would not take place by the acceptance and triumph of any divine hereditary right, but must be adopted by the nation and ratified by a national vote.

*June 5th.*—I saw Clarendon on Friday morning for a few minutes; he takes a very gloomy view of the Russo-Turkish question, and is greatly disgusted at having been deceived by the Emperor; he says he is harassed to death with the whole affair, and with the multiplicity of business he has besides; he has a difficult task to perform, taking a middle position in the Cabinet between the opposite opinions of those who are for more stringent measures and those who, like himself, are for patience and moderation. Palmerston, in whom his ancient Russian antipathies are revived, is for vigour, and as in former times 'leading John Russell by the nose,' Clarendon and Aberdeen for moderation; but he is beset by different opinions and written suggestions and proposals, and all this worries him exceed-



ingly. I asked him how the Court was, and he said very reasonable, their opinions being influenced of course by Aberdeen.

He talked with great disgust of John Russell's speech on the Irish Church, how unfair it was as well as unwise, and how reckless of the damage it caused to the Government, and the embarrassing and awkward situation in which he thereby placed many of their supporters. These are the general sentiments with regard to that speech, which was neither more nor less than speaking the Durham letter over again, and, considering what that famous letter cost him, he might have been expected to steer clear of such a scrape. But he is more than ever the creature of impulse and of temper, and he seems to have lost a great deal of his tact and discretion, and certainly he is no longer fit to be either head of a Government or leader of the House of Commons, and perhaps the latter position in such a Government as this suits him still less than the former would. When I came to town yesterday morning I found that several of the Irish Roman Catholic members of the Government, occupying subordinate offices (Messrs. Keogh, Monsell, and Sadleir), had resigned in consequence of Lord John Russell's speech, but an hour afterwards I learnt that they had been induced to remain by an assurance from Lord Aberdeen that Lord John did not express the sentiments of the Government on this subject.

Charles Wood brought on the India Bill on Friday night in a speech of unexampled prolixity and dulness. There is not yet time to ascertain how the plan is likely to be received, but I suspect it will meet with a great deal of opposition, although, as it is more favourable to the existing interests than was expected, it will very likely pass, as, if Leadenhall Street was to go further, it would certainly fare worse.

*St. Leonards, June 7th.*—I am here for Ascot, a lovely place and divine weather. The affair with the Irish has ended as harmlessly as anything so awkward could do. Mr. G. H. Moore asked some rather impertinent questions in the House of

Commons on Monday, which Lord John answered in an easy, nonchalant, jesting manner. The House laughed, nobody said anything, and there it ended, but the Brigade will probably seek opportunities of showing their teeth and of revenging themselves on Lord John. It has been rather mortifying for him, but he has taken it very quietly, and Aberdeen's letter to Monsell was shown to him and received his assent. The French are behaving very well about the Eastern question, and I begin to think that it will in the end blow over, as diplomacy will probably hit upon some expedient for enabling the Emperor of Russia to do what his real interests evidently point out.

*June 13th.*—I came back from Ascot on Friday, having met Clarendon on Thursday on the course, who gave me an account of the state of affairs. On Saturday I met Walewski at dinner, and had much talk with him, and yesterday I saw Clarendon again. The great event has been the sailing of our fleet from Malta to join the French fleet at the mouth of the Dardanelles, to the unspeakable satisfaction of the French Government, who desire nothing so much as to exhibit to all Europe an *entente cordiale* with us; and Walewski said to me that, however the affair might end, this great advantage they had at all events obtained.<sup>1</sup> The Emperor of Russia will be deeply mortified when he hears of this junction; for besides that it will effectually bar the approach of his fleet to Constantinople, if he ever contemplated it, there is nothing he dislikes and dreads so much as the intimate union of France and England. His Majesty is now so greatly excited that nothing can stop him, and he told Seymour the other day that he would spend his last rouble and his last soldier rather than give way. Still he professes that he aims at no more than a temporary occupation of the Principalities, and renounces all purpose of conquest. The Russian army will therefore certainly march in, and it will be the business of the other

<sup>1</sup> [Orders were sent to Admiral Dundas on June 2 to sail for the Dardanelles, and the fleet proceeded to Besika Bay, together with the French fleet.]

Governments to restrain the Turks and prevent a collision, which Walewski thinks they can certainly do.

Austria holds the same language that we do, but will not act. Clarendon sent for Count Colloredo on Saturday (who never hears from Buol), and set before him in detail all the dangers with which Austria is menaced by the possibility of war breaking out in the East, and above all by that of France being brought into the field in hostility with Austria. In such a case the French would be quite unscrupulous, and excite all the revolutionary spirit, which, though now repressed, is thickly scattered over every part of the Austrian Empire, from Milan to Hungary. Colloredo acknowledged the truth of the representation, and promised to report textually to Buol what Clarendon said.

All now depends on the Emperor Nicholas himself. If he adheres to his determination not to advance beyond the Principalities, time will be afforded for negotiations, and some expedient may be found for enabling him to recede without discredit, and without danger to his own *prestige* at home. The French and English feel alike on this point, and are conscious that the Emperor has gone too far to recede. He is pushed on by an ardent and fanatical party in Russia, and is not entirely his own master. Both Governments are therefore willing to make allowance for the exigencies of his position, and to assist him to the uttermost of their power in getting honourably out of the scrape into which he has plunged himself and all Europe.

*June 22nd.*—The Opposition papers (especially the ‘Morning Herald’ and the ‘Press,’ Disraeli’s new journal) have been making the most violent attacks on Aberdeen and Clarendon, calling for their impeachment on the ground of their conduct in this Eastern quarrel, particularly charging them with having been cognisant of and approved of Menschikoff’s demands, which have occasioned all the hubbub. At last it was thought necessary to make a statement in reply, which was done by the ‘Times’ on Thursday last. The article was a good one, but contained an inaccuracy, about which Brunnow wrote a long but friendly letter of complaint.

to Clarendon. The day after this, another article was inserted to set the matter right, with which Brunnow was quite satisfied; but the explanations of the 'Times' failed to stem the torrent of abuse, and the Tory papers only repeated their misrepresentations with greater impudence and malignity than before. It was thought necessary a stop should be put to this, and it was proposed to Clarendon to let discussions come on in both Houses, moved by Layard in the Commons, and Clanricarde in the Lords, which would afford an opportunity for the only effectual contradiction, Ministerial statements in Parliament. Last night I met him at the Palace, when we talked the matter over. He is still of opinion that it is essential to delay the explanations and put off all discussion till the matter is decided one way or another. He thinks so in reference to the case itself, leaving out of consideration the convenience of the Government; he thinks that any discussion in the House of Commons will elicit a disposition for peace *à tout prix*, which would seriously embarrass affairs, and only confirm Russia in the course she is pursuing. I do not think so, but his opinions are founded on what he hears Cobden has said, and on the *animus* of the peace party. He told me again what a task his is in the Cabinet, standing between and mediating between Aberdeen and Palmerston, whose ancient and habitual ideas of foreign policy are brought by this business into antagonism, and he says the difficulty is made greater by Aberdeen's unfortunate manner, who cannot avoid some of that sneering tone in discussion which so seriously affects his popularity in the House of Lords. He is therefore obliged to take a great deal upon himself, in order to prevent any collision between Palmerston and Aberdeen. It appears that Palmerston proposed on Saturday last that the entrance of the Russians into the Principalities should be considered a *casus belli*, in which, however, he was overruled and gave way. The Cabinet did not come to a vote upon it, but the general sentiment went with Aberdeen and Clarendon, and against Palmerston. He seems to have given way with a good grace, and hitherto

nothing has occurred of a disagreeable character; on the contrary, both Clarendon and Granville tell me Palmerston has behaved very well. Clarendon thinks (and in this I concur) that the country would never forgive the Government for going to war, unless they could show that it was absolutely necessary and that they had exhausted every means of bringing about a pacific solution of the question, and nobody here would care one straw about the Russian occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia.

That all means have not been exhausted is clear from this fact. The Austrians, who are more interested than anybody, have moved heaven and earth to effect a settlement, and the Emperor of Russia has himself asked for their '*bons offices*' for that end. They have entreated the Turks on the one hand to strike out some *mezzo termine* compatible with their dignity and with their previous refusals of Menschikoff's terms, promising that they will urge its acceptance on the Emperor with all their force, and on the other hand they have implored the Emperor to delay the occupation of the Principalities, so that by temporising, mediation, and a joint action and a judicious employment of diplomatic resources and astuteness, it is still possible some mode may be hit upon of terminating the quarrel.

*July 9th.*—For the last fortnight or three weeks little has occurred which is worth noting. The Eastern Question drags on, as it is likely to do. Aberdeen, who ten days ago spoke very confidently of its being settled, now takes a more desponding view, and the confidence he has hitherto reposed in the Emperor of Russia is greatly shaken. Clarendon has long thought the prospect very gloomy, but they are still endeavouring to bring about an accommodation. The question resolves itself into this: what are the real wishes and views of the Emperor? If his present conduct is the execution of a long prepared purpose, and he thinks the time favourable for the destruction of Turkey, no efforts will be availing, and he will listen to no proposals that we can possibly make. If, on the contrary, he is conscious that he has got into a dilemma, and he wishes to extricate himself

from it by any means not dishonourable to himself, and such as would not degrade him in the eyes of his own subjects, then, no doubt, diplomatic astuteness will sooner or later hit upon some expedient by which the quarrel may be adjusted. Which of these alternatives is the true one, time alone can show. Meanwhile the expense to which the Turks are put in the wretched state of their finances will prove ruinous to them, and, end how it may, the fall of the Turkish dominion has been accelerated by what has already taken place. There has been a great deal of discussion about bringing on debates on the Eastern Question in both Houses, but all the leading men of all parties have deprecated discussion, and it was finally determined last night that none should take place. Disraeli alone, who cares for nothing but making mischief, tried to bring it on, but in the House of Lords Derby took a different and more becoming course, and recommended Clanricarde to give it up. Disraeli urged Layard to persevere. Granville told me yesterday that while he lamented that Aberdeen was not a more judicious and conciliating leader in the House of Lords, and was so inferior in this respect to Lord Lansdowne, he liked him very much, thought he was a very good Prime Minister, and, above all, anything but deficient in political courage, in which respect he was by no means inferior to Palmerston himself.

The Government have been going on well enough on the whole. Their immense majority on the India Bill was matter of general surprise, and showed the wretched tactics of Disraeli, as well as his small influence over his party, for he could not get one hundred of the Tories to go with him. A few small holes have been made in Gladstone's Budget, but nothing of consequence. Tom Baring, however, told me he thought Gladstone had made some great mistakes, and that Graham would have been a better Chancellor of the Exchequer; but this I much doubt. Popularity is very necessary to a Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Graham would never have been so persuasive with the House as Gladstone.

*July 12th.*—The ‘Times’ newspaper, always famous for its versatility and inconsistency, has lately produced articles on the Eastern Question on the same day of the most opposite characters, one warlike and firm, the next vehemently pacific by some other hand. This is of small importance, but it is indicative of the difference which exists in the Cabinet on the subject, and the explanation of the inconsistency of the ‘Times’ is to be found in the double influence which acts on the paper. All along Palmerston has been urging a vigorous policy, and wished to employ more peremptory language and stronger measures towards Russia, while Aberdeen has been very reluctant to do as much as we have done, and would have been well content to advise Turkey to accept the last ultimatum of Russia, and so terminate what he considers a senseless and mischievous quarrel. Clarendon has had to steer between these two extremes, and while moderating the ardour of Palmerston, to stimulate Aberdeen, and persuade him to adopt a course congenial to public opinion in this country, which, however inclined to peace and abhorrent of war, is not at all disposed to connive at the aggrandisement of Russia, or to submit to the insolent dictation of the Emperor. The majority of the Cabinet have supported Clarendon, and approximate more nearly to the pacific policy of Aberdeen than to the stringent measures of Palmerston. When the two articles appeared in the ‘Times,’ to which I particularly allude, Clarendon approved of the first, and found great fault with the other, while Aberdeen wrote to Delane and expressed his strong approbation of the second, and his conviction that the public would sooner or later take the views therein set forth. Clarendon tells me that he has no doubt Aberdeen has on many occasions held language in various quarters that was not prudent under the circumstances, and was calculated to give erroneous impressions as to the intentions of the Government, and he thinks that the Emperor himself has been misled by what he may have heard both of the disposition and sentiments of the Prime Minister, and of the determination of the House of Commons and the

country at large to abstain from war in every case except one in which our own honour and interests were *directly* concerned.

I had a long talk with Clarendon on Sunday, when he told me that the chances of peace were a little better than they had been, inasmuch as there seemed to be a disposition at St. Petersburg to treat, and the Austrian Government was now in earnest bringing to bear all their influence on the Emperor to accept reasonable terms of accommodation. Colloredo brought him the copy of a despatch to St. Petersburg, which he said was excellent, very frank and free in its tone. Austria seems more fully sensible of the danger to herself of any war, which would inevitably let loose the revolutionary element all over the world. Clarendon has drawn up the project of a Convention which embraces all the *professed* objects of the Emperor, and which the Turks may agree to; he sent it to Paris, whence Drouyn de Lhuys has returned it, with the full concurrence and assent of the French Government, and it went to Petersburg yesterday. The reception of this proposal will determine the question of peace or war.

*July 14th.*—G—— said to me this morning that Palmerston is beginning to stir up matters afresh. I saw him yesterday morning at Holland House in close confabulation with Walewski, with whom I have no doubt he interchanged warlike sentiments, and complained of the lukewarmness of Aberdeen and Clarendon. It is evident that he is *at work*, and probably, according to his ancient custom, in some underhand way in the press. His flatterers tell him that a majority of the House of Commons would support *him* and a warlike policy, and though he may wish to believe this, and perhaps does, he will hardly go the length of trying to break up this Cabinet, with the desperate hope of making another Government himself, based on the policy of going to war. Certain newspapers are always asserting that the Cabinet is divided and in dissension, and at the same time accusing it of timidity and weakness, urging strong measures, and asserting that, if we had employed such long ago, Russia



would have been frightened, and never have proceeded to such lengths. But the Government are resolved, and wisely, to avoid war as long as they can, and if driven on to it, to be able to show the country that they had exhausted all means of preserving peace.

*July 18th.*—At last there appears a probability of this Turkish question being amicably settled. On Saturday I was told that despatches were just come from Sir Hamilton Seymour of a more favourable character, and representing the Imperial Government as much more disposed to treat, with a real disposition to bring the negotiations to a successful issue. My informant added that Palmerston predicted that none of the projects and proposals which have emanated from the different Courts would be accepted at Petersburg, which he thought they all would. Yesterday I saw Clarendon, and found matters even in a still more promising state. After the Cabinet Walewski went to him, and communicated to him very important news (of a later date than Seymour's letters) from St. Petersburg, which to my mind is decisive of the question of peace. It appears that both France and Austria have been concocting notes and projects of a pacific tendency to be offered to the Emperor. There have been several of these, some framed at Constantinople, others at Paris. A short time ago the French Government prepared one, which it submitted to ours; Clarendon thought it would not answer, and told them so. They asked whether he had any objection to their sending it off to St. Petersburg and Vienna and making the experiment. He replied, none whatever, and though he did not think it would succeed, he should rejoice if it did, as, provided the affair could be settled, it did not matter how. In the meantime he drew up his own project of a Convention, which went to Paris, and received the cordial approbation of the Emperor; and this document is now on its way to Petersburg. In the meantime the French project was sent there, Castelbajac took it to Nesselrode, who read it very attentively, and said that he liked it very much, but that he could give no positive answer till he had submitted it to the Emperor. The same afternoon

he saw the French minister again, and told him that he had laid the project before the Emperor Nicholas, and that His Majesty was not only satisfied, but grateful for it, 'non seulement satisfait, mais reconnaissant,' and that the only reason he did not at once close with it was that his ally, the Emperor of Austria, had also submitted a proposal, and he did not like to take another from another Court exclusively without previous communication with him. Clarendon thinks that his proposal will be still more agreeable to the Emperor than the French one, and that he will probably end in taking it; nor will there be any difficulty in this, because our's is so fully concurred in by France as to be in fact her's as much as our's.

*July 31st.*—Having been at Goodwood the last week, I have not troubled myself with politics, either home or foreign, nor have any events occurred to excite interest. The most important matter here has been the division in the House of Lords on Monday last on the Succession Duties Bill, on which the Opposition were signally defeated. For a long time the Government were very doubtful of obtaining a majority, but their whippers-in were more sanguine at last. Great exertions were made on both sides, the Derbyites whipped up all the men they could lay their hands on, and the Government fetched their ministers from Paris and Brussels, and the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. The majority was greater than either side expected, and Derby and his crew were exceedingly disconcerted, and Derby himself much out of humour. When Bessborough went over to him after the division, and said 'Lord Aberdeen wants to know if you will object to the Bill being read a third time on Thursday next,' he pettishly replied, 'The Bill may go to the devil for all I care; I shall take no further trouble about it.'

*August 1st.*—I saw Clarendon as usual yesterday (Sunday), when he read to me a letter from Sir Hamilton Seymour, giving an account of his delivering to Nesselrode the Convention which Clarendon sent over, as well as reading to him Clarendon's private letter, which was a stinging one, but very good. Nesselrode said of all the projects he liked

that the best, and if it was tendered to them *from Vienna*, he thought it might do as the basis of an arrangement, but he could give no positive answer till he had submitted it to the Emperor. At the Cabinet on Saturday Clarendon read Seymour's letter, when his colleagues begged they might see the private letter of his which was alluded to, and he produced and read that likewise. It was generally approved of, but the next day Palmerston wrote a note to Clarendon, in which he expressed the warmest approbation of his note, and added that he had only refrained from saying all he thought of it at the Cabinet lest *his* approval might make others think it was too strong. He added that he rejoiced that the management of our foreign affairs was in such able hands, and that, in fact, he (Clarendon) could do and say what Palmerston himself could not have done. It was a very handsome letter, very satisfactory both to Clarendon personally and as showing that there is no disagreement on the Eastern Question in the Cabinet, or at least between Palmerston and Clarendon, which is the essential point. Their union and friendship are remarkable when we recollect their past antagonism and Palmerston's jealousy of Clarendon, and the persuasion of both himself and Lady Palmerston that Clarendon was always waiting to trip up his heels and get his place. All these jealousies and suspicions were, however, dissipated when Clarendon refused the Foreign Office last year, since which time they have been the best of friends, and Palmerston was quite satisfied at his having the Foreign Office. With regard to the chances of a pacific settlement, the assurances from St. Petersburg are all very favourable, but the acts of the Russian generals in the Principalities are quite inconsistent with them, and between these conflicting manifestations Clarendon is in no small doubt and apprehension as to the result.

*London, August 8th.*—Ever since last Monday, when Clarendon made a speech in the House of Lords on which a bad interpretation was put in reference to the question of peace or war, there has been a sort of panic, and the public mind, which refused at first to admit the possibility of war,

suddenly rushed to the opposite conclusion, and everybody became persuaded that war was inevitable. The consequence was a great fall in the funds, and the depreciation of every sort of security. So matters remained till the end of the week. On Saturday afternoon I met Walewski, who told me he had that day received a letter from Castelbajac (the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg), informing him that the Emperor had signified his willingness to accept the proposal which was then expected from Vienna, and last night fresh news came that the proposal had arrived, and he had said he would take it, if the Turks would send an ambassador with it, exactly as it had been submitted to him. This I heard late last night, and Granville considered it conclusive of an immediate settlement. But this morning I went to Clarendon and found him not so sure, and not regarding the pacific solution as so indubitable; there still remain some important matters of detail to be settled, though certainly the affair wears a much more favourable aspect, and there is every reason to hope it will all end well. But while this proposal was concocted at Vienna, the Cabinet here (last Saturday week) made some small verbal alterations in it, so that ultimately it will not be presented for the Emperor's formal acceptance word for word the same, and if he wants a pretext to back out of his present engagement, he can therein find one, as he only agreed to take it if it was word for word the same. Then it has not yet been submitted to the Turks, and it is by no means sure they may not make difficulties, or that Stratford Canning may not raise obstacles instead of using all his influence to procure their agreement, so that Clarendon does not consider that we are *out of the wood*, though he expects on the whole that it will end well. If it does it will be the triumph of diplomacy, and a signal proof of the wisdom of moderation and patience. Granville says it will be principally owing to Aberdeen, who has been very staunch and bold in defying public clamour, abuse, and taunts, and in resisting the wishes and advice of Palmerston, who would have adopted a more stringent and uncompromising course.

*August 9th.*—At Court yesterday Aberdeen was quite confident of the settlement of the Eastern affair, and Brunnow, who was there with the Duchess of Leuchtenberg to see the Queen, very smiling. Clanricarde interrupted Clarendon in the House of Lords, and made a violent speech. Clarendon answered very well, without committing himself. The Government are in high spirits at the prospect of winding up this prosperous Session with the settlement of the Eastern Question: nothing else is wanting to their success.

*August 11th.*—I saw Clarendon yesterday. Nothing new, but he said he fully expected Stratford Canning would play some trick at Constantinople, and throw obstacles in the way of settlement. This seems to me hardly possible, unless he behaves foolishly as well as dishonestly, and it can hardly be believed that his temper and Russian antipathies will betray him into such extravagant conduct. It is, however, impossible to consider the affair as ‘*settled*.’

Yesterday all the world went to the great naval review at Portsmouth, except myself. It appears to have been a fine but tedious sight, for Granville set off at 5.30 A.M., and only got back at one in the morning.

*August 27th.*—Since the 11th I have been absent from town, at Grimstone for York races, then at Hatchford, and since that gouty. While at York the Session closed with *éclat* by a speech of Palmerston’s in his most flashy and successful style. John Russell gave a night at last for the discussion of the Turkish question, and made a sort of explanation, which was tame, meagre, and unsatisfactory. After some speeches expressive of disappointment and disapprobation, Cobden made an oration in favour of peace at any price, and this drew up Palmerston, who fell upon him with great vigour and success. The discussion would have ended languidly and ill for the Government but for this brilliant improvisation, which carried the House entirely with it. It was not, however, if analysed and calmly considered, of much use to the Government as to their foreign policy, for it was only an answer to Cobden, and Palmerston did not say one word in defence of the policy which has been adopted,

nor identify himself with it, as he might as well have done. Though there was nothing in it positively indicative of dissent and dissatisfaction, any one might not unfairly draw the inference that, if Palmerston had had his own way, he would have taken a more stringent and less patient course. However, nothing has been made of this, and on the whole his speech did good, because it closed the discussion handsomely, and left the impression of Palmerston's having cast his lot for good and all with his present colleagues, as is really the case.

The Session ended with a very flourishing and prosperous speech from the Throne, and nothing was wanting to the complete success of the Government but the settlement of the Turkish question, which, however, seems destined to be delayed some time longer; for the Turks have refused to accept the Vienna note, except with some modifications, though these are said to be so immaterial that we hope the Emperor will not object to them. But all this is vexatious, because it reopens the whole question, causes delay and uncertainty, and keeps the world in suspense and apprehension. Granville told me that what had occurred showed how much more sagacious Aberdeen had been as to this affair than Palmerston, the former having always maintained that there would be no difficulty with the Emperor, but if any arose it would be from the Turks; whereas Palmerston was always sure the Turks would make none, but that the Emperor would refuse all arrangements.

*August 28th.*—It seems the Turks, after a delay of ten days from receiving the proposition, sent it back to Vienna, asking for some not important alterations; but immediately afterwards they required a stipulation for the evacuation of the Principalities, and guarantees that they should not be occupied again. It is very improbable that the Emperor will listen to such conditions. Nesselrode has all along told Seymour that they (the Russians) mean in fulfilment of their pledges to evacuate the Principalities, as soon as they have got the required satisfaction, but that it must not be made a condition, and entreated him to abstain from any demand

which might give an air of compulsion to the act, much in the same way as we have told Nesselrode he must not attempt to make any stipulation about the withdrawal of our fleet. Clarendon thinks that the Emperor is certain to reject the Turkish terms, and that the Turks are very capable of declaring war thereupon; for in their last communication they said that they were prepared for 'toutes les éventualités,' and he suspects that Stratford has not *bonâ fide* striven to induce them to accept the proffered terms. Their rejection is the more unreasonable because the proposal is a hash-up of Menschikoff's original Note, and that which the Turks proposed in lieu of it, but in which the Turkish element preponderates, so that not only are their honour and dignity consulted, but in refusing they recede from their own original proposal.

The Queen is gone to Ireland, and Lord Granville with her, who is afterwards to attend her to Balmoral. This is new, because hitherto she has always had with her either the Premier or a Secretary of State. Granville is to be relieved when circumstances admit, but at present there is no other arrangement feasible. Aberdeen and Clarendon are both kept in town till the question is settled. Newcastle got leave to go to Clumber for his boys' holidays, and Her Majesty does not desire to have the Home Secretary.

But Charles Villiers told me last night that Lord Palmerston's influence and popularity in the House of Commons are greater than ever, and if this Government should be broken up by internal dissension, he would have no difficulty in forming another, and gathering round him a party to support him. This is what the Tories are anxiously looking to, desiring no better than to serve under him, and flattering themselves that in his heart he personally dislikes his colleagues, and in political matters agrees with themselves. They pay him every sort of court, never attack him, and not only defer to him on all occasions, but make all the difference they can between him and the rest of the Government; nor does he discourage or reject these civilities, though he does not invite them, or say or do anything in-

consistent with his present position, but he probably thinks the disposition towards him of that large political party enhances his value to his own friends and increases his power, besides affording to him a good alternative in case anything should happen to break up the present Government or separate him from it.

*September 2nd.*—For the last week the settlement of this tedious Turkish question has appeared more remote than ever, and Clarendon was almost in despair when I saw him a few days ago, and the more so because he suspected that Lord Stratford was at the bottom of the difficulties raised by the Divan. However, according to the last accounts it would seem that Stratford was not to blame, and had done what he could to get the Turks to comply with the terms of the Conference. At this moment the affair wears rather a better aspect, and my own belief is that it will be settled. It is a great bore that it drags on in this way, creating alarm and uncertainty, shaking the funds, and affecting commerce.

The Duke of Bedford, of whom I have seen nothing for a long time, called on me a few days ago, and talked over the present state of affairs, and the position of Lord John Russell. He said Lord John was now quite satisfied with it, and rejoiced at his own comparative freedom, and his immunity from the constant attacks of which he used to be the object; and he is now conscious that, by the part he has acted in waiving his own pretensions, he has not only not degraded himself, but has greatly raised himself in public estimation and acquired much credit and popularity, besides rendering the country a great service. He is very well with his colleagues, and gratified at the deference shown him, and the consideration he enjoys in the House of Commons. There, however, I know from other sources, all the popularity is engrossed by Palmerston and by Gladstone, and Lord John has foolishly suffered Palmerston to take his place as leader very often, because he chose to stay away at Richmond, and not come near the House.

The Duke took this opportunity of telling me what is



now a very old story, but which he said he thought he had never told me before, and I am not sure whether he did or not. It was what happened to him at the time of the formation of this Government last year, of which he was evidently very proud. Just before the Derby Government broke down, and before that reunion at Woburn of which so much was said, the Prince gave him to understand that they should look to him for advice if anything occurred, which they were every day expecting. The Duke was at Woburn, and one morning when the hounds met there and half the county was at breakfast in the great hall, word was brought him that a messenger had come from Osborne with a letter for him. He found it was a letter from the Prince, in which he informed him that this was despatched by a safe and trustworthy hand, and nobody was to know of its being sent; that the Derby Government was at an end, and the Queen and Prince were anxious for his opinion on the state of affairs, the dispositions of public men, and what course they had better take. The Duke had recently been in personal communication with all the leaders, with Aberdeen and Lord John, Newcastle, Clarendon, Lansdowne, Palmerston, and others, and he was therefore apprised of all their sentiments and in a condition to give very full information to the Court. He sat himself down and with the greatest rapidity (his horse at the door to go hunting) wrote four or five sheets of paper containing the amplest details of the sentiments and views of these different statesmen, and ended by advising that the Queen should send for Lords Lansdowne and Aberdeen—as she did. Lord John had already told him he did not wish to be sent for. After this of course he could not resent the advice the Duke gave; and happily Lord John was firm in resisting the advice of some of those about him, and acted on the dictates of his own conscientious judgement and the sound advice of his friends.

*September 3rd.*—I dined last night *tête-à-tête* with Clarendon and heard all the details of the state of the Turkish question, and read the interesting correspondence of Cowley, with his accounts of his conversations with the Emperor,

and many other things. Clarendon is very uneasy because he thinks the Emperor Nicholas' pride will not let him accept the Note as modified by *the Turks*, though he would have accepted the same Note if it had been presented originally by the Conference. This is one danger. The next is one at Constantinople, where there is a strong bigoted violent party for war, disposed to dethrone the Sultan and replace him by his brother. This brother (of whom I never heard before) is a man of more energy than the Sultan, and is connected with the fanatical party. The Sultan himself is enervated by early debauchery and continual drunkenness, and therefore in great danger should he by any unpopular measures provoke an outbreak from the violent faction. Clarendon thinks that Stratford has encouraged the resistance of the Divan to the proposals of the Conference, and that he might have persuaded the Turks to accept the terms if he had chosen to do so and set about it in a proper manner; but Clarendon says that he has lived there so long, and is animated with such a personal hatred of the Emperor, that he is full of the Turkish spirit; and this and his temper together have made him take a part directly contrary to the wishes and instructions of his Government. He thinks he wishes to be recalled that he may make a grievance of it, and come home to do all the mischief he can. Westmorland wrote word the other day that Stratford's language was very hostile to his Government and the Ministers of all the other Powers at Constantinople, thought he had actually resigned, and reported the fact to Vienna.

The most important question now pending is what to do with the fleets. They cannot remain much longer in Besika Bay, and must either retire to Vourla or enter the Dardanelles. The Emperor Napoleon wishes they should enter the Dardanelles, but only a little way, and not go on to Constantinople; and Clarendon takes the same view, proposing a *mezzo termine*. The Emperor professes an earnest desire for a peaceful solution, and the strongest determination to act in concert with England to the end, and his views seem very sensible and proper. But, notwithstanding this disposi-

tion, in which he probably is sincere, there is reason to believe that he is all the time keeping up a sort of secret and underhand communication with Russia, and the evidence of this is rather curious. It appears that he has recently written a letter to the Duchess of Hamilton, in which he says that he believes the Russians will not evacuate the Principalities, and that he does not care if they stay there. This letter the Duchess showed to Brunnow, and he imparted it to Aberdeen, who told Clarendon, but none of the other Ministers know anything of it. Clarendon wrote word of this to Cowley, and told him to make what use of it he thought fit. In the first instance he said something to Drouyn de Lhuys of the Emperor's entertaining views different from our's, which Drouyn repeated to the Emperor, who spoke to Cowley about it, and protested that he had no separate or different objects, when Cowley, without mentioning names, told him what he had heard of his having written. The Emperor made an evasive answer to this, but gave many assurances of his determination to act with us heartily and sincerely. This incident seems to have made a great impression both on Cowley and Clarendon, particularly as both know something more. Cowley says he knows that the Emperor has a private correspondence with Castelbajac, of which Drouyn de Lhuys is ignorant, and Seymour writes to Clarendon that he has observed for some time past a great lukewarmness on the part of the French Minister in pressing the Russian Government, and an evident leaning to them. As the Duchess of Hamilton has no intimacy with Brunnow, it appears very extraordinary that she should communicate to him a letter of the Emperor's, and such a letter, which would be a great indiscretion unless he had secretly desired her to do so; and all these circumstances taken together look very like a little intrigue between the Emperor and the Russian Court, which would also be very consistent with his secret, false, and clandestine mode of conducting his affairs. It is probable enough that he may wish to keep on good terms with Russia and at the same time maintain his intimate connexion with England. That he is bent on avoiding

war there can be no doubt, and for very good reasons, for France is threatened with a scarcity, and he is above all things bent on keeping the people supplied with food at low prices; and for this object the French Government is straining every nerve and prepared to make any amount of pecuniary sacrifice; but the necessity for this, which absorbs all their means, renders it at the same time particularly desirable to maintain peace in Europe.

There never was a case so involved in difficulties and complications of different sorts, all the particulars of which I heard last night; but the affair is so tangled, that it is impossible to weave it into an intelligible and consistent narrative, and I can only jot down fragments, which may hereafter serve to explain circumstances connected with the *dénouement*, whenever it takes place. John Russell and Palmerston are both come to town, so that a little Cabinet will discuss this matter. Palmerston is extremely reasonable, does not take the part of the Turks, but on the contrary blames them severely for making difficulties he thinks absurd and useless, but is still for not letting them be crushed. He is on the best terms with Clarendon, and goes along with him very cordially in his policy on this question. Both Palmerston and Lord John seem to agree with Clarendon on the question of the disposal of the fleet better than Aberdeen, who is always for trusting the Emperor, maintaining peace, and would be quite contented to send the fleet to Vourla or Tenedos, and would see with regret the more energetic course of entering the Dardanelles. However, there is no chance of any material difference on this score, and I have no doubt, if the question is not settled before the end of the month, the fleets will anchor within the Straits and there remain.

I was glad to find that the Queen has consented to let Palmerston take his turn at Balmoral, and Aberdeen has informed him that he is to go there. It was done by Aberdeen speaking to the Prince at Osborne, who said he thought there would be no difficulty. The Queen acquiesced with the good sense she generally shows on such occasions, being

always open to reason, and ready to consent to whatever can be proved to her to be right or expedient.

*September 4th.*—I went to Winchester yesterday, and fell in with Graham in the train, so we went together and had a great deal of talk, mostly on the Eastern Question. He thinks the Emperor of Russia will not accept the Turkish alterations, and he is very hot against Stratford, to whom he attributes all the difficulties. He has heard that Stratford has held language hostile to the Government, and he is inclined to think not only that he has acted treacherously towards his employers, but that proofs of his treachery might be obtained, and he is all for getting the evidence if possible, and acting upon it at once, by recalling him; he thinks the proofs might be obtained through the Turkish Ministers, and if they can be, he would not stop to enquire who might be displeased, or what the effect might be, but do it at once. He acknowledges, however, that it would not do to act on surmises or reports, and that nothing but clear proofs of Stratford's misconduct, such as will satisfy Parliament, would render such a step justifiable or safe. With regard to the fleets, he says there is no reason why they should not remain in Besika Bay, and it is a mistake to suppose they could not, and he is very decidedly against their entering the Dardanelles in any case, because it would be contrary to treaty and afford the Emperor of Russia a just *casus belli*; and he maintains that his having (contrary to treaties and international rights) occupied the Principalities affords no reason why we should infringe them in another direction. When this question comes to be discussed, his voice will evidently be for not entering the Dardanelles, though he acknowledges that we cannot retreat while the Russians remain where they are. He talked a great deal about Palmerston, of whom he has some distrust, and fancied he has been in communication with Stratford, and that he would concur with him in his proceedings, and he expressed great satisfaction when I told him that Palmerston and Clarendon were on the most cordial and confidential terms, and that the former entirely disapproved of the conduct of the Turks

(which is that of Stratford) in regard to the Note. He thinks Palmerston looks to being Prime Minister, if anything happened to Aberdeen, but that neither he nor John Russell could hold the office, as neither would consent to the elevation of the other. On the whole, he inclines to the opinion that Palmerston has made up his mind to go on with this Government and his present colleagues, that he means to act fairly and honestly with and by them, and has no *arrière pensée* towards the Tories, though he is not sorry to have them always looking to him, and paying him, as they do, excessive court. It ensures him great support and an easy life in the House of Commons, where, however, he says Palmerston has done very little this year, and he does not seem much impressed with the idea of his having gained very considerably there, or obtained a better position than he had before.

*September 8th.*—I saw Clarendon on Sunday. There is nothing new, but he said he would lay two to one the Emperor does not accept the modified Note; it will be a contest between his pride and his interest, for his army is in such a state of disease and distress that he is in no condition to make war; on the other hand, he cannot without extreme humiliation accept the Turkish Note. What will happen, if he refuses, nobody can possibly divine. The four Ministers met to discuss the matter, and were very harmonious; Palmerston not at all for violent measures, and Clarendon said he himself was the most warlike of the four. I told him of my journey with Graham and all that he had said. He replied that he knew Graham was very violent against Stratford, but that it would be impossible to make out any case against him, as he certainly had read to the Turkish Minister all his (Clarendon's) despatches and instructions, and he gave the most positive assurances, which it would be difficult to gainsay, that he had done everything in his power to induce the Turkish Government to give way to the advice of the Conference, and whatever his secret wishes and opinions might be, there was no official evidence to be had that he had failed in doing his duty fairly by his

own Government; therefore it would be out of the question to recall him.

*September 20th.*—At Doncaster all last week; I found Clarendon yesterday very much alarmed at the prospect in the East. He thinks it will be impossible to restrain the Turkish war party; he told me that the Conference at Vienna had imparted their Note to the Turkish Ambassador there, and both he and his dragoman had expressed their entire approbation of it. They had considered this to afford a strong presumption that it would not be unpalatable at Constantinople, but it was not sent there because this would have occasioned so much delay, and it was desirable to get the Russians out of the Principalities as speedily as possible. The Russian generals had actually received orders to prepare for the evacuation, which the Emperor would have commanded the instant he heard that the Turks were willing to send the Vienna Note. The Emperor Napoleon has again given the strongest assurances of his determination in no case whatever to separate his policy from ours, his resolution to adhere to the English alliance, and to maintain peace *à tout prix*, which he frankly owns to be indispensably necessary to the interests of his country. The Austrians are already beginning to hang back from taking any decided part in opposition to Russia, and while still ready to join in making every exertion to maintain peace, they are evidently determined if war breaks out to take no part against Russia, and this disposition is sure to be improved by the interview which is about to take place between the Emperors of Russia and Austria.

*September 26th.*—I have been at Hatchford all last week. I saw Clarendon on Thursday before I went there, and heard that two ships of each fleet were gone up the Dardanelles,<sup>1</sup> and that the rest would probably soon follow, as the French were now urging that measure. He was then going to Aberdeen to propose calling the Cabinet together, the state

<sup>1</sup> [The British vessels were steamers, the 'Retribution' and another. There was at that time only one line-of-battle ship in each fleet having steam power; all the other vessels of the line were sailing ships.]

of affairs becoming more critical every hour, and apparently no chance of averting war. The prospect was not the brighter from the probability of a good deal of difference of opinion when they do meet. He showed me a letter from Palmerston, in which he spoke very coolly of such a contingency as war with Russia and Austria, and with his usual confidence and flippancy of the great blows that might be inflicted on both Powers, particularly alluding to the possible expulsion of the Austrians from Italy, an object of which he has probably never lost sight. Meanwhile the violence and scurrility of the press here exceeds all belief. Day after day the Radical and Tory papers, animated by very different sentiments and motives, pour forth the most virulent abuse of the Emperor of Russia, of Austria, and of this Government, especially of Aberdeen.

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## CHAPTER IV.

The Conference at Olmütz—The Turks declare War—Lord Palmerston's Views—Lord Palmerston lauded by the Radicals and the Tories—Failure of the Pacific Policy—Lord Aberdeen desires to resign—Lord John to be Prime Minister—Obstacles to Lord John's Pretensions—Danger of breaking up the Government—Lord John's Wilfulness and Unpopularity—Alliance of the Northern Powers defeated by Manteuffel—Conflict of the two Policies—Meeting of Parliament discussed—French Refugees in Belgium—General Baraguay d'Hilliers sent to Constantinople—Mr. Reeve returns from the East—Lord John's Reform Bill—The Emperor of Russia writes to the Queen—Sir James Graham's Views on Reform, &c.—Opponents of the Reform Scheme—Abortive Attempts at Negotiation—The Four Powers agree to a Protocol—Lord Palmerston threatens to secede—Lord Palmerston resigns on the Reform Scheme—Lord Palmerston opposed to Reform—Effects of Lord Palmerston's Resignation—Conciliatory Overtures—Lord Lansdowne's Position—Lord Aberdeen's Account—Lady Palmerston makes up the Dispute—Lord Palmerston withdraws his Resignation—Baraguay d'Hilliers refuses to enter the Black Sea—War resolved on—Review of the Transaction.

*October 4th.*—I went to The Grove on Saturday, and spent great part of the afternoon on Sunday reading the Eastern Question despatches, printed in a Blue Book to be laid by-and-by before Parliament. On Sunday came Westmorland's account of his interviews with the Emperor of Russia and Nesselrode at Olmütz, which sounded very satisfactory, for the Emperor was very gracious and pacific, and Nesselrode in his name disclaimed in the most positive terms any intention of aggrandising himself at the expense of Turkey or of claiming any protectorate, or asserting any claims inconsistent with the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan, and moreover signified his willingness to make a declaration to that effect in such form and manner as might be hereafter agreed upon. All this was very well, and served to confirm the notion that, if some sensible men,

really desirous of settling the question, could be brought together, the accomplishment would not be difficult; but the distance which separates the negotiating parties from each other, and the necessity of circulating every proposition through so many remote capitals, and the consequent loss of time, have rendered all conferences and pacific projects unavailing.

Yesterday morning a messenger arrived, bringing the telegraphic despatch from Vienna, which announced the determination of the Turks to go to war, and that a grand Council was to be assembled to decide on the declaration, news which precluded all hope of adjustment;<sup>1</sup> and yesterday afternoon the further account of the decision of the Council was received. Such of the Ministers as are in town met in the afternoon, and it was decided that all the rest should be summoned, and a Cabinet held on Friday next.

It will be no easy matter to determine what part we shall take, and how far we shall mix ourselves up in the quarrel as belligerents. It will be very fortunate if the Cabinet should be unanimous on this question. Palmerston has hitherto acted very frankly and cordially with Clarendon, but the old instincts are still strong in him, and they are all likely to urge him to recommend strong measures and an active interference. Granville told me last night he thought Palmerston was not at all displeased at the decision of the Turks, and as he still clings to the idea that Turkey is powerful and full of energy, and he is quite indifferent to the danger to which Austria may be exposed, and would rejoice at her being plunged in fresh difficulties and threatened with fresh rebellions and revolutions, he will rather rejoice than not at the breaking out of hostilities. He will not dare to avow his real propensities, but he will cloak them under other pretences and pretexts, and give effect to them as much as

<sup>1</sup> [The declaration of the Turkish Council or Divan, held on October 3, was to the effect that, if the Principalities were not evacuated in fifteen days, a state of war would ensue. To this the Emperor of Russia responded on October 18 by a formal declaration of war. War being declared, the Straits were opened, and, at the request of the Sultan, the allied fleets entered the Dardanelles on October 22.]

he can. He has been speechifying in Scotland, where, though he spoke very handsomely of Clarendon, he did not say one word in defence of Aberdeen, or anything calculated to put an end to the notion and repeated assertions that he and Aberdeen had been at variance on the Eastern Question. I find Aberdeen feels this omission very much, and it would certainly have been more generous, as well as more just, if he had taken the opportunity of correcting the popular error as to Aberdeen, after having been reaping a great harvest of popularity at his expense.

Palmerston's position is curious. He is certainly very popular, and there is a high idea of his diplomatic skill and vigour. He is lauded to the skies by all the Radicals who are the admirers of Kossuth and Mazzini, who want to renew the scenes and attempts of 1848, and who fancy that, if Palmerston were at the head of the Government, he would play into their hands. On the other hand, he is equally an object of the flattery and praise of the Tories, who cannot get over their being succeeded by a Peelite Prime Minister, and they cling to the belief that there can be no real cordiality, and must be complete difference of opinion, between Aberdeen and Palmerston, and they look forward to the prospect of their disunion to break up this odious Government, and a return to office with Palmerston at their head. These are the political chimeras with which their brains are filled, and which make them take (for very different reasons) the same part as the Radicals on the Eastern Question. My own conviction is that both parties reckon without their host. Palmerston is sixty-nine years old, and it is too late for him to look out for fresh political combinations and other connexions, nor would any object of ambition repay him for the dissolution of all his personal and social ties. He will, therefore, go on as he does now, accepting such popularity as is offered him as a means of enhancing his own importance in this Cabinet; and, in the event of any accident happening to it, of making his own pretensions available.

*October 6th.*—Delane was sent for by Lord Aberdeen the night before last, when they had a long conversation on the

state of affairs, and Aberdeen told him that he was resolved to be no party to a war with Russia on such grounds as the present, and he was prepared to resign rather than incur such responsibility. This was the marrow of what he said, and very important, because not unlikely to lead to some difference in the Cabinet, and possibly to its dissolution.

*October 7th.*—Clanricarde called here yesterday morning; he is very strong against the Government and their policy, and maintains that if we had joined France and sent the fleet up when she did, the Emperor of Russia would then have receded, as his obstinacy was entirely caused by his conviction that France and England would never remain united, and that nothing would induce the latter to make war on Russia. He said this idea had been confirmed by the language of Aberdeen, who had continually spoken of his determination to avoid war to Brunnov and others, and in his letters to Madame de Lieven—*la paix à tout prix*. Clanricarde, however, himself said he would not declare war against Russia, and we might defend Turkey without going that length. I went and told Clarendon all he had said (in greater detail), and he owned that it was more than probable that Aberdeen had held some such language as was attributed to him; indeed, he had more than once had occasion to remonstrate with him upon it. Clarendon was very uneasy at the prospect of the discussion about to take place, and contemplates as extremely probable the breaking-up of the Government on the question of war. Palmerston has been very reserved, but always on the same friendly terms with his colleagues, and Clarendon in particular; but Lady Palmerston as usual talks *à qui veut l'entendre* of the misconduct of the whole affair, and affirms that, if Palmerston had had the management of it, all would have been settled long ago. As matters have turned out, it is impossible not to regret that we were perhaps too moderate and patient at first; for as the course we have adopted has not been successful, it seems unfortunate we did not try another, which might have been more so. But this is judging *après coup*, and nothing is so easy as to affirm that, if something

had been done, which was not done, success would have attended it.

*October 8th.*—The Cabinet went off very well yesterday, no serious difference of opinion about anything, and a good concurrence both as to what had been done and what ought to be done hereafter. Lord Aberdeen is well pleased.

*Newmarket, October 12th.*—This morning I met the Duke of Bedford on the heath, who told me he wanted very much to speak to me about certain communications he had received which made him extremely uneasy, and full of apprehension of coming difficulties, threatening the very existence of the Government. It seems that a short time ago Lord Aberdeen imparted to John Russell his wish to resign, and to place the Government in his hands. He said that he had only taken his present post because his doing so was indispensable to the formation of the Government, and had always contemplated Lord John's eventually succeeding him, and he thought the time was now come when he might very properly do so. He did not anticipate any insurmountable opposition in any quarter, and he should himself speak to Gladstone about it, who was the most important person to be consulted, and he was in fact only prevented doing so, as he had intended, by not being able to go to Scotland, where he had expected to meet Gladstone. Whether Aberdeen had spoken to Gladstone since his return to London, the Duke of Bedford did not know. No steps appear to have been taken with regard to Palmerston, nor does it appear that any progress was made in accomplishing this change. The Queen had been apprised of Aberdeen's intentions. Such was the state of things when a short time ago the Duke received a letter from Lord John, in which he said that matters could not go on as they were, and that there must be some changes; and that very soon he could no longer act without being primarily responsible for the policy of the Government—in other words, without resuming his post of Prime Minister. This is all the Duke knows, as Lord John entered into no explanations or details, and he is in total ignorance of the grounds of his brusque determination, and

of what can have occurred to produce it. He sees, however, all the difficulties and embarrassments that in consequence of it are looming in the distance, and how very possible it is that the Government may be broken up. All this we very fully discussed, but without either of us being able to guess what it all means, or what the result will be of Lord John's putting his intentions into execution.

*October 16th.*—I came to town yesterday morning, and in the afternoon went to the Foreign Office, and saw Clarendon, to whom I imparted what the Duke of Bedford had told me. He said he knew it all, Aberdeen having told him what had passed between John Russell and himself; but having made Clarendon give his word of honour that he would not say a word of it to anybody, so he said, 'I would not mention it even to you, to whom I tell everything.' He then, however, went into the whole question, and told me what had passed, which did not exactly agree with the Duke's story. According to Clarendon, Lord John went to Lord Aberdeen before Parliament was up, and told him he could not consent to go on in his present position, to which Aberdeen replied, 'Very well, you only meet my own wishes, and you know I always told you that I should be at any time ready to resign my place to you.'

Nothing more seems to have taken place at that time, nor till lately, when Lord John went again to Aberdeen, and repeated his determination not to go on; but this time the communication does not seem to have been received by Aberdeen with the same ready acquiescence in the proposed change, and some plain speaking took place between them. I infer, but as Clarendon did not expressly say so I put it dubiously, that Aberdeen had spoken to Gladstone and ascertained that he would by no means agree to the substitution of John Russell, and should go with Aberdeen if he retired. At all events, while Aberdeen told him that he was prepared, if he wished it, to broach the matter to his colleagues, he intimated to him that it was evident he wanted to turn him out, and put himself in his place, but that he (Aberdeen) could not agree to retire at this moment, and before Parlia-

ment met, and that Lord John had better well consider the step he was about to take, as it would in all probability break up the Government, and asked him if he was prepared to encounter the odium of doing so, more especially as he must remember that he had only consented to form this Government on Lord John's own assurance to him that he was himself unable to form one. He asked him if he was secure of Palmerston's concurrence in the change he proposed, and he replied that he did not expect to find any difficulty in that quarter. This was the substance of what passed between them, Aberdeen being evidently a good deal nettled, and thinking Lord John is behaving very ill. This is Clarendon's opinion also, and he thinks, if Lord John persists, the Government will be inevitably broken up, for a considerable part of the Cabinet will certainly not consent to have Lord John again placed at the head of the Government. Clarendon does not believe a word of Palmerston's being a party to it, and he knows that both Gladstone and Newcastle would resign. Graham he is not sure of, but inclines to think he would retire with Aberdeen, especially if Aberdeen has any compulsion or ill-usage to complain of. For the moment, however, this storm has blown over, as Lord John has signified to Aberdeen that he does not mean to press the matter again for the present. The Queen, when it was mentioned to her, was anything but approving of or consenting to the change.

In all this matter there is little doubt that Lord John has been instigated by his connexions, and they none of them, Lord John himself included, have sense enough to see that the course he is adopting is quite suicidal, and would be not less fatal to his own reputation and popularity than to the Government he belongs to. He failed as Prime Minister, and no credit attended his Administration, and no regret his fall. The popularity he lost, he in good measure regained by his conduct on the formation of this Government, when he waived his own pretensions, and for the public good consented, after having held the first place, to accept the second; but the world does not know how reluctantly and

grudgingly he did this, and how sorely his pride and vanity suffered on that occasion. The position he occupied of leader of the House of Commons without an office was anomalous, and many thought it objectionable, but he himself insisted on it, and it proved successful. The House of Commons not only accepted it, but were pleased to see a man so eminent eschewing office with its functions and emoluments, and gratuitously devoting himself to the service and the business of Parliament. He became popular again in the House, and would have been more so if he had not chosen to quit the Treasury Bench early every afternoon, and go down to Richmond, leaving Palmerston to do his work, and ingratiate himself with the House. Aberdeen reminded Lord John that this position, which he now found intolerable, was one he had chosen to make for himself; that he had not only declared he could not form a Government, but that every office had been at his disposal, and he had been invited to take the greatest offices, or, if he preferred it, any smaller one, but that he had insisted on holding none. Aberdeen is quite right not to resign now, or before Parliament meets, where he must appear as Minister to defend his own policy.

I expect that Lord John will not renew his demands for some time, if at all; but if he does, this is what will probably take place. The Government will be broken up, Lord John will try to form one and will fail, and the Government will again be constituted minus Lord John. Nobody would, I think, go out with him. This is supposing (which I think certain) that Palmerston would not make common cause with him, but prefer to remain with the rest. There would then remain the great difficulty of the lead of the House of Commons and the part Palmerston would play; but, dangerous as it would be, it would probably be found necessary to trust him with the lead, most distasteful though it would be both to Aberdeen and to the Queen.

*October 18th.*—The Emperor of Russia moved heaven and earth to bring about a new Holy Alliance between himself, Austria, and Prussia, in which he would have succeeded if



it had not been for the wisdom and firmness of Manteuffel,<sup>1</sup> who was proof against all his seductions. Austria consented, but only on condition that Prussia did likewise. The King of Prussia would have given way with his characteristic weakness, but Manteuffel would not hear of it, and contrived to keep his master straight. In an interview of two hours between the Emperor and Manteuffel *tête-à-tête*, the Emperor employed all the means he could think of to prevail on the Prussian Minister, but all in vain; he refused positively to allow Prussia to depart from her neutrality. This had the effect of keeping Austria neutral also, and that of making the Emperor more inclined to peace; but the Turkish declaration of war and peremptory summons to him to quit the Principalities leave him no alternative but that of taking up the gauntlet thus thrown down.

*November 2nd.*—All last week at Newmarket, during which nothing of moment occurred but the renewed attempts at negotiation, and the consent of the Turks to defer the commencement of hostilities. I saw Clarendon the day before yesterday, who told me how matters stood, and showed me a despatch just received from Vienna with a copy of a very moderate and pacific Note from Nesselrode to Buol, showing that there is every disposition at St. Petersburg to patch matters up. Clarendon told me that he was heartily sick of the whole question, in which the double trouble and difficulty were cast upon him of reconciling the Russians and the Turks and of preserving agreement in the Cabinet, where Aberdeen was always opposing measures of hostility towards Russia, and Palmerston for pushing them forward. He said he steered between the two, and that he and John Russell were more nearly agreed than any of the others; he told me at the same time a characteristic trait of Palmerston. The Turks having determined to plunge into war against the advice of their protectors, especially against our's, and it

<sup>1</sup> [Count Manteuffel was the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the leading member of the Prussian Cabinet. He was accused of sacrificing Prussian interests to those of Austria at the Conference of Olmütz; but in fact he succeeded in defeating what would have been a very formidable confederacy of the German Powers with Russia.]

having been made known to us that the Sultan and his Ministers were not disinclined to be guided by us, but that they were themselves overruled and driven to this extreme course by the Grand Council, it became necessary in Clarendon's opinion to notify to the Turkish Government that, since they had thought fit to take their own independent course, we should reserve to ourselves the right of acting according to our own discretion, and not consider ourselves bound to be dragged into a war at the heels of the Grand Council, which is an assembly of ruffians and fanatics, by whom it would be utterly inconsistent with the dignity of our Crown that our policy should be governed and influenced. It seems too that this is a point on which the Queen feels very strongly, and is exceedingly anxious that the honour and dignity of the Crown should not be compromised. Accordingly Clarendon drew up a despatch to this effect, to which the Cabinet acceded, and Palmerston also, though with some reluctance. However, he not only saw the proposed despatch, but he made some alteration in it with his own hand, thereby of course subscribing to it. Just after this Clarendon went to Windsor, and submitted the despatch to the Queen and the Prince; they objected to it that it was not strong enough in their sense, but Clarendon prevailed upon them to waive their objections, and, as it had been agreed to in the Cabinet, to let it go. But before it was gone Clarendon received a letter from Palmerston, strongly objecting to the despatch altogether, and desiring Clarendon to inform Lord Aberdeen that he would be no party to such a communication. This was extremely embarrassing. Clarendon spoke to Aberdeen, and afterwards (at Aberdeen's suggestion) informed the Queen what had occurred. Her Majesty said, 'I advise you not to attach much importance to this communication. I know Lord Palmerston from much experience, and it is probably only an attempt to bully, which, if you take no notice of it, you will hear no more of.' The result justified the Queen's sagacity, for Clarendon sent off the despatch, and at the same time wrote word to Palmerston that he had done so, giving him sundry reasons why he

could not do otherwise, to which he received in reply a very good-humoured letter, merely saying that, as it was gone, it was useless to say any more about it, and probably it would do no harm.

There has been talk abroad and discussion in the Cabinet about the meeting of Parliament. Lord John and Lord Aberdeen both wished Parliament to meet, the first because he is always hankering after the House of Commons, the latter because he wished Parliament to decide on the question of peace or war, so that in the one alternative his hands might be strengthened, or in the other he might have a pretext for resigning. But both Clarendon and Palmerston were much against it, and now that there is a fresh prospect of peace, it is rendered more unnecessary and undesirable.

King Leopold is here, still uneasy (though less than he was) upon the subject of his *démêlés* with the Emperor of the French. The cause of them is the libellous publications of the French refugees in Belgium. They compose the most outrageous attacks of a personal nature on him and the Empress, which they have printed in Belgium, and get these papers smuggled into France, and disseminated amongst the lower classes, and particularly the troops. This naturally gives the Emperor great offence, and Leopold would afford him redress if he could; but the Constitution was made by journalists, and the unrestrained liberty of the press is so interwoven with the Constitution, that the Legislature itself has no power to deal with the case, nor any power short of a Constituent Assembly. All this Leopold has submitted to his powerful neighbour, and their relations seem to be more amicable; for very civil letters have passed between the two monarchs, through the Prince de Chimay, whom Leopold sent to compliment the Emperor when he went lately to Lille.

*November 10th.*—All attempts at settling the Eastern Question by *Notes* have been rudely interrupted by the actual commencement of hostilities. Meanwhile the *Notes* sped their way, but at Vienna it was deemed no longer possible to settle it in this manner, but that there must now

be a regular treaty of peace, the terms of which the Allies might prescribe, and there is now a question of having a Congress or Conference here, to carry on the affair. It is, however, difficult to make out what the French are at, and, with all our intimacy, we must keep on our guard against all contingencies on the part of our Imperial neighbour. Nobody knows what is his real motive for sending Baraguay d'Hilliers to Constantinople. Francis Baring, when I told him of this appointment, said it could be only for the purpose of quarrelling, for he was the most violent of men, and was certain to quarrel with whomsoever he had to deal. If this be so, his quarrelling with Lord Stratford is inevitable, and it is by no means improbable that Louis Napoleon is tired of playing second fiddle to us, and sends this General there for the express purpose of counteracting our superior influence, and, by the tender of military counsel and aid, to substitute his own for ours.

Reeve is just returned from the East, having spent some time at Constantinople, and he came home by Vienna. Lord Stratford treated him with great kindness and hospitality, and talked to him very openly. He says that Stratford exercised a great but not unlimited influence and control over the Turkish Government, and of course is very jealous of the influence he possesses; for example, he boasted to Reeve that he had carried a great point, and had procured the appointment of the candidate he favoured as Greek Patriarch, an interference which, if it had been made by the Emperor of Russia, whose concern it is much more than our's, would have excited in us great indignation. Such an exercise of influence and in such a matter, of which the Russians are well aware, is calculated to exasperate them, and it is not unnatural that the Emperor should feel that, if any foreign influence is to prevail in Turkey, he has a better right than any other Power to establish his own. Reeve has a very poor opinion of the power, resources, and political condition of Turkey, and does not doubt the military success of the Russians. He says that the corruption is enormous—everybody bribes or is bribed. The Greek Patriarch whom

Stratford got appointed had to pay large sums to Redschiid Pasha and his son. The whole State is rotten to the core.

*November 12th.*—This morning John Russell breaks ground on the Reform plan, by referring his scheme to a Committee of the Cabinet, which is to meet at his house, consisting, besides himself, of Granville, Newcastle, Graham, Charles Wood, and Palmerston. I am afraid he will propose a lower franchise, probably 5*l.*, in spite of many warnings and the signs of the times, which are very grave and alarming—nothing but strikes and deep-rooted discontent on the part of the working classes. I am in correspondence with Ellesmere on the subject, and have sent his letters to John Russell, who does not appear disposed to admit the force of his reasoning against lowering the franchise. This Committee will probably be on the whole favourable to a democratic measure, Lord John from old prejudices and obstinacy, Graham from timidity, Newcastle because he has espoused Liberal principles; Granville will be inclined to go with Lord John, and Palmerston alone is likely to stand out against a democratic scheme, unless Charles Wood should go with him, of whose opinions on the question of Reform I know nothing. Aberdeen is himself a Reformer, but I hear he is resolved not to consent to a 5*l.* franchise. I confess to great misgivings about this project in the present state of the country, and dread the further progress of democratic power. The success of the great Reform Bill and the experiences of twenty years without any of the apprehensions of the anti-Reformers having been realised, are now in my opinion sources of danger, as they create an opinion that progress, as it is called, is not only necessary, but perfectly safe. It consoles me for growing old that I shall not live to see the confusion in which this well-ordered State is likely to be involved, the period of peril and suffering it will have to go through, and the reaction, which will restore order and tranquillity at the expense of that temperate and rational freedom, which we alone of all the nations of the earth are in possession of. I see no reason why, if we choose recklessly, and without any cause, to cast away the good we

enjoy, we should be exempted from paying the penalty which our folly and wickedness would so richly deserve. The above question in all its ramifications is infinitely more important than the Russian and Turkish quarrel, but there is no saying how the former may be indirectly and consequentially affected through the latter by means of the political differences which may arise out of it. Everything now looks black in the political horizon, and the war which has begun between the principals can hardly fail to extend itself sooner or later to the collateral parties.

*November 15th.*—Yesterday morning having met Clarendon on the railway, he from Windsor, I from Hillingdon, I got into the carriage and went home with him. He told me all he had to tell, of what he had to go through with the conflicting proposals of Palmerston and Aberdeen in the Cabinet: the latter as averse as ever to any strong measures, and always full of consideration for the Emperor; the former anxious for war, and with the same confidence and rashness which were so conspicuous in him during the Syrian question, insisting that nothing will be so easy as to defeat Russia, and he now goes the length of urging that none of the old treaties between her and the Porte should be renewed. All this *jactance*, however, does not go much beyond words, for he evinces no disposition to separate from his colleagues or to insist on any course which the majority of the Cabinet object to.

The Emperor of Russia has taken the unusual step of writing an autograph letter to the Queen. Brunnow, who was rather puzzled, took the letter to Aberdeen, and asked what he was to do with it. Aberdeen told him to take it to Clarendon, who sent it to the Queen. She sent it to him to read, and he suggested certain heads of an answer, but did not communicate the letter, nor the fact of its having been received, to any one but Aberdeen. The Queen wrote an answer in French, and he says a very good one.

Cowley has sent him an account of a conversation he lately had with the Emperor Napoleon, in which he said that the condition of France and the rise in the price of pro-

visions, so deeply affecting the working classes, made him more than ever bent upon preserving peace, and he proposed that the Powers should be invited to concur with England and France in drawing up a scheme of pacification and arrangement, which should be tendered to the belligerents, and whichever should refuse to accept it should be treated as an enemy. Clarendon said that there were many objections to this plan, but he seemed to believe in the sincerity of the Emperor's desire for peace, in spite of the opposite presumption afforded by Baraguay d'Hilliers' mission, and its accompaniment of French officers. He attributes that mission to the wounded vanity of France, and the determination of the Government to send some man who shall dispute the influence of Stratford, and assert that of France. The character of Stratford had been fully explained to Baraguay d'Hilliers, and he went, ostensibly at least, with instructions and an intention to act with him in harmony, but this the character of the two ambassadors will probably render quite impossible.

The Queen told Clarendon an anecdote of Palmerston, showing how exclusively absorbed he is with *foreign* politics. Her Majesty has been much interested in and alarmed at the strikes and troubles in the North, and asked Palmerston for details about them, when she found he knew nothing at all. One morning, after previous enquiries, she said to him, 'Pray, Lord Palmerston, have you any news?' To which he replied, 'No, Madam, I have heard nothing; but it seems certain *the Turks have crossed the Danube*.'

In the afternoon I called on Graham at the Admiralty, and had a long talk with him about the Government and its prospects, and the disposition and intentions of John Russell and of Palmerston. He is, contrary to custom, very cheerful and sanguine on these points; he was apprised of all that Lord John has said and done, but except on one occasion, just about the time of the prorogation, has had no communication with Lord John himself on the subject. He is now satisfied that Lord John has abandoned his designs, and has made up his mind to go on as he is, and he infers this from his frank and friendly conduct about the Reform

Bill, which he has not kept to himself, but submitted to a Committee for the purpose of bringing it before all his colleagues in a very good spirit, and quite willing to have Palmerston on this Committee, from whom the greatest opposition was to be expected. Graham said their first meeting had gone off very pleasantly, and Palmerston had urged much less objection than he had expected; he thinks therefore, that his own reflexions and his knowledge of the difficulties which would oppose themselves to his purpose have determined Lord John to acquiesce in his present position, nor is he afraid of Palmerston separating himself from this Cabinet, thinking that at his age he will not speculate so deeply for the chance of greater power and a higher place, to be purchased at the certain sacrifice of all his social relations and personal connexions, and he therefore expects Palmerston will conform to the general sentiments and decisions of his colleagues, both as to foreign policy and to Reform. Graham said he approved entirely of Lord John's scheme, and thought his proposed measure good and safe.

*November 27th.*—Council at Windsor on Friday 25th. The Queen was afflicted by the Queen of Portugal's death, though they never saw each other but once when they were children. I heard the particulars of the Reform Bill, which (if there is to be one at all) seems as little mischievous as can be. It seems to have encountered little or no opposition in the Cabinet, and Lord John considers it as having been accepted and settled there. Lord Lansdowne has not pronounced himself positively; but though, no doubt, he dislikes it exceedingly, they think he will not retire upon it, and up to the present time he has indicated no such intention. Graham, who is always frightened, told me on Friday he was very uneasy lest Lansdowne should decline to be a party to it.

Palmerston has written a letter to Lord John, strong in the beginning, denouncing the measure as unnecessary and unwise, and complaining of his having originally committed his colleagues to it, by declaring his own opinion without any previous consultation and concert with them. Then,



after criticising the Bill (ably, as I am told), he ends by announcing that he shall consent to it. He sent copies of this letter to Aberdeen and to Lansdowne.

I brought Clarendon from the station to Downing Street, when he told me that he had begun some fresh attempts at renewing negotiations. The proposal of the Emperor Napoleon to force terms on the two parties would not do, but he had sent a proposal of some sort (I could not exactly make out what), which, contrary to his expectation, Buol had agreed to; but he did not seem very sanguine about any result from this beginning. He said nothing could exceed the difficulties of the case, nor the embarrassments of his own position. The Turks are now indisposed to agree to anything, or to make any concessions whatever, and of course the Emperor of Russia neither will nor can make peace and withdraw, without some plausible satisfaction. Then at home the difficulty is just as great between Palmerston, who is all for going ahead, and wants nothing less than war with Russia, and Aberdeen, who is in the other extreme—objecting to everything, and proposing nothing. John Russell is very reasonable, and agrees almost entirely with Clarendon; but whenever he thinks he is going to be outbid by Palmerston, is disposed to urge some violent measures also. He said he had a regular scene with Aberdeen the other day. After this Note (or whatever it was) had been discussed and agreed to in the Cabinet, and all settled, Aberdeen came into his room, and began finding fault with it, and raising all sorts of objections, when Clarendon, out of all patience, broke out: ‘Really, this is too bad. You come now, after it has all been settled in the Cabinet where you let it pass, and make all sorts of objections. And this is the way you do about everything; you object to all that is proposed, and you never suggest anything yourself. What is it you want? Will you say what you would have done?’ He declares he said all this with the greatest vivacity, being really exasperated. Aberdeen had nothing to say, and knocked under. The truth seems to be that the attacks upon him in the newspapers (though they don’t know it)

are pretty well justified, and very little exaggerated; nor is the idea of Palmerston's real inclination much mistaken. They have by accident very nearly hit upon the truth. Aberdeen, it seems, objects particularly to have any Conference *here*, and if there is to be anything of the kind, it seems likely to take place at Vienna, where, however, somebody would be sent to assist, if not to supersede, Westmorland.

*December 10th.*—The Protocol just signed at Vienna brings the four Powers together again, and Austria not only signed it with alacrity, but Buol told Westmorland, if the Emperor of Russia was found unmanageable, ‘*Nous irons avec vous jusqu’au bout.*’ The Turks are now desired to say on what terms they will make peace, and I expect they will reply that they will not make peace at all till the Principalities are evacuated. It seems very doubtful whether this fresh opening will lead to any result between two Powers so impracticable as the belligerents.

The Duke of Bedford has been endeavouring to persuade Lord John to reconsider the franchise in his Reform Bill, and Lord John tells him not to be afraid of its going too low, and that there is more chance of its appearing too niggardly. Aberdeen said it was not yet settled. Meanwhile, the Bill is drawn and privately printed. Lord John considers it to have been accepted by the Cabinet, and that he is sure of the acquiescence of the two principal dissentients—Lansdowne and Palmerston. The former went out of town, only saying that he hoped the landed interest would have its due share of influence. Palmerston's letter I have already mentioned; but the other day Lady Palmerston held forth to the Duke against the Bill, and said that it was not settled at all, but was still under the consideration of the Cabinet; from which he infers that Palmerston is still making or prepared to make objections and difficulties. Between Reform and the Eastern Question, I think this Government would infallibly be broken up but from the impossibility of another being formed. I am still persuaded Palmerston will not try a new combination, and break with all his old friends and associates for the purpose

of putting himself at the head of some fresh but unformed combination. Great as his ambition is, he will not sacrifice so much to it, and risk so much as this would oblige him to do.

*December 12th.*—I begin to think that I am after all mistaken as to Palmerston's intentions, and that his ambition will drive him to sacrifice everything and risk everything, in spite of his age and of all the difficulties he will have to encounter. I have said what passed between the Duke of Bedford and Lady Palmerston about Reform. This morning the Duke of Bedford came here, and told me he had called on Clarendon on Saturday, when he said to Clarendon that he was very uneasy about Palmerston, and thought he was meditating something, though he did not know exactly what he was at. Clarendon interrupted him—'Certainly, he is meditating breaking up the Government; in fact, he told me so.' At this moment it was announced that two or three foreign Ministers were waiting to see him, when he abruptly broke off the conference, and they parted. I said, 'Depend upon it, what Clarendon alluded to was not the Reform Bill, but the Eastern Question; and it is on that that Palmerston is making a stir.' The Duke said he thought so too; indeed, he was sure of it, because Clarendon did not trouble himself about Reform, and he had already told him more than once what excessive trouble and annoyance he had had between the widely opposite views and opinions of Aberdeen and Palmerston, and that he had only been able to go on at all from the agreement between Lord John and himself. However, Lord John is to see Aberdeen this morning, and his brother afterwards; and before the day is over we shall learn something more of this disagreeable matter. My belief is that the differences between Aberdeen and Palmerston have arrived at a height which threatens a break up, and that, with reference to this occurring, Palmerston is also going back on the Reform question; that if he does separate from the Government, he may reserve to himself to work *both* questions. But I refrain from further speculations, as in a few hours they will be resolved into certainty of some sort.

*Panshanger, December 14th.*—It turned out that Palmerston had *struck* on account of Reform, and not (ostensibly, at least) about foreign affairs. John Russell was indignant, and inveighed to his brother against Palmerston in terms of great bitterness, saying he was absolutely faithless, and no reliance to be placed on him. Of this fact these pages contain repeated proofs, but I own I am amazed at his making this flare up on the question of Reform. But his whole conduct is inexplicable, and there is no making out what he is at. The news of the Turkish disaster in the Black Sea is believed, but Government will do nothing about it till they receive authentic intelligence and detailed accounts of the occurrence.<sup>1</sup> So Clarendon told Reeve on Monday, but he is disposed to take a decisive part if it all turns out to be true; and yesterday Delane had a long conversation with Aberdeen, who owned that if the Russians (as they suppose) attacked a convoy of transports at anchor, it is a very strong case, and he thought war much more probable than it was a few days ago, and he did not speak as if he was determined in no case to declare it. This does not surprise me, in spite of his previous tone; for he has gone so far that he may be compelled in common consistency to go farther.

*London, December 17th.*—Yesterday morning the news of Palmerston's resignation was made public. It took everybody by surprise, few having been aware that he objected to the Reform measure in contemplation. I received the intelligence at Panshanger, and as soon as I got to town went to Clarendon to hear all about it. He had been quite prepared for it, Palmerston having told him that he could not take this Bill. Clarendon says Palmerston behaved perfectly well, and in a very straightforward way from first to last. When he was invited to join the Government, he told

<sup>1</sup> [The Russian fleet in the Black Sea attacked and destroyed the Turkish squadron in the harbour of Sinope on November 30. This decisive event, which was at variance with the previous declarations of the Emperor of Russia, compelled the British and French Governments to order their fleets to enter the Black Sea and occupy it. The Russian fleet withdrew within the harbours of Sebastopol.]

Aberdeen and Lansdowne that he was afraid the Reform Bill would bring about another separation between them. When the time arrived for discussing the Bill, and John Russell proposed to him to be on the Committee, he said that he accepted, because, although he saw no necessity for any Reform Bill, and he entirely disapproved of John Russell's having committed himself to such a measure, he would not (as matters stood) absolutely object to any measure whatever, but would join the Committee, discuss it, state all his objections, and endeavour to procure such alterations in it as might enable him to accept it. Finding himself unable to do this with the Committee, he still waited till the measure had been brought before the whole Cabinet; and when he found that his objections were unavailing, and that the majority of his colleagues were resolved to take Lord John's scheme, nothing was left for him but to retire. He said he might have consented to a smaller measure of disfranchisement, and the appropriation of the disposable seats to the counties, but to the enlarged *town* representation, and especially to the proposed franchise, he could not agree; and moreover he said he was not prepared, *at his time of life*, to encounter endless debates in the House of Commons on such a measure. The first time, Clarendon said, he had ever heard him acknowledge that he had *a time of life*. Clarendon showed me a very friendly letter Palmerston had written to him, expressing regret at leaving them, and saying he (Clarendon) had a very difficult task before him, and, 'as the Irishman said, I wish yer Honner well through it.' He has never hinted even at any dissatisfaction as to foreign affairs as forming a part of his grounds for resigning.

Clarendon said he thought it would ere long be the means of breaking up the Government, and I thought so too; but, on reflecting more deliberately upon the matter, I am disposed to take a different view of the political probability, and of the part which Palmerston will play. As I have been so constantly opposed to him, and have both entertained and expressed so bad an opinion of him on a great many occasions, I feel the more both bound and inclined to do justice

to his conduct upon this one, in which, so far as I am informed, he really has been irreproachable. The first thing which seems to have suggested itself to everybody is that he has resigned with the intention of putting himself at the head of the opponents of Reform, of joining the Derbyite party, and ultimately coming into office with Derby, or forming, if possible, a Government of his own. I doubt all this, and judge of his future conduct by his past. If he had been actuated by selfish and separate objects of ambition, and really contemplated transferring himself from the Whig to the Tory party, or setting up an independent standard, instead of breaking with this Cabinet on the question of Reform, he would certainly have done so upon the Turkish war, as he easily could. He would then have gone out amidst shouts of applause; he would have put the Government into an immense difficulty, and he would have reserved to himself to take whatever course he thought fit about Reform. He has acted much more honestly, but less cunningly for his own interest, supposing that he has the views and projects that are attributed to him. Lord Lansdowne is placed in great embarrassment, for he agrees entirely with Palmerston; and if he acts consistently on his own convictions, he will retire too—that is, cease to form a part of the Cabinet. Clarendon expects he will do so.

*Hatchford, December 21st.*—On Monday when I came to town from Goodwood, where I went on Sunday, I found a letter from Lady Palmerston, very friendly indeed. She said her son William had told her what I had said to him about Palmerston and his resignation, which had gratified her. She then went on to explain why he had resigned, and why at this moment instead of waiting longer; she said he would have accepted a Reform Bill, but wanted Lord John's to be altered, had proposed alterations, and written to Aberdeen to urge them, and upon Aberdeen's reply that his suggestions could not be taken, he had no alternative but to resign, and he had thought it fairer to the Government to do so at once, and give them time to make their arrangements, than to put it off till the last moment, when Parlia-

ment was on the point of meeting. I confess I think he was right in so doing, and I was greatly provoked with the 'Times' for attacking him, twitting and sneering at him, and finding fault with him for his desertion; so provoked that I wrote a letter to the 'Times,' which appeared on Tuesday, with my opinion thereupon.

On Tuesday morning I was surprised at receiving a letter from Lord Lansdowne, entreating I would tell him what was said, and what was the state of public opinion about Palmerston's resignation, giving me to understand that he was as yet undecided what course he should adopt, and should not decide at all events till he had seen the Queen next Friday; he also said that he had been greatly surprised at this happening '*so soon*, whatever might have been the case later, having occurred (marvellous to say) before there had been any decision taken by the Government as such on the whole matter, or any ground for me at least to think that issue would be joined upon it without that apparently essential preliminary.' I wrote to him in reply all I had heard of the reports and notions floating about, and said I hoped his determination would eventually be not to withdraw, and I sent him Lady Palmerston's letter to me, which I said seemed to me somewhat at variance with his statement, in as much as Palmerston evidently considered that the matter was settled. I don't understand, however, why he wrote to Aberdeen, if the question was still before the Cabinet, and not yet definitively settled. Assuming Lord Lansdowne's statement to have been correct, Palmerston ought to have disputed the matter in the Cabinet, and if overruled there, he might have resigned, and not till then.

Delane went to Aberdeen, and asked him for his version of the affair, when he said at once he had no hesitation in saying that the Eastern Question was the cause and the sole cause of Palmerston's resignation; that he had all along been opposing what was done, and might have resigned upon it any time for months past, and that but for that question he would have swallowed the Reform Bill. Delane observed, if this was true, Palmerston had acted a very high-

mind and disinterested part. It has been imprudent of the Government papers to insist so strenuously that Palmerston resigned solely on account of Reform, and that there was no difference on foreign policy, because this elicited a violent article in the 'Morning Post,' insisting in turn that the Eastern Question was the real cause of his retirement, and everybody will believe that this was inserted or dictated by himself. It is strange to find myself the advocate and apologist of Palmerston, when the preceding pages are brimful of censure of his acts and bad opinion of his character; but, whatever prejudices I may have or have had against him, they never shall prevent my saying what I believe to be true, and doing him ample justice, when I think that he is acting honourably, fairly, and conscientiously. This letter of Lord Lansdowne's has a little shaken my convictions, but still I am struck with the fact of his having refrained from resigning on the Eastern Question, when by so doing he might have damaged the Government immensely, and obtained for himself increased popularity and considerable power if these were his objects.

*London, December 22nd.*—I went to town this morning, called on Lady Palmerston, found her in good spirits and humour, and vastly pleased at all the testimonies of approbation and admiration he has received. She exclaimed with exultation, 'He is always in the right in everything he does,' a position I could not confirm, and which I did not care to dispute. We then talked of the present crisis, when to my no small amazement she said that she saw no reason now why it should not be made up, and he should not remain, that he left the Government with regret, liked his office, and had no wish to quit his colleagues, but could not consent to such a measure as Lord John had proposed. She then recapitulated what she wrote to me, and complained of Aberdeen's having replied to Palmerston's note in such a style of peremptory refusal; if he had only expressed regret at the difference, and proposed a fresh reference to the Cabinet, it might have been avoided. Still, she thought if they were disposed to be reasonable it was possible to repair



the breach. Palmerston had never had any answer to his letter of resignation, no notice had been taken of it, nor had the Queen's acceptance of his resignation ever been conveyed to him. She talked with bitterness of the articles in the 'Times,' and of his resignation having been so hastily published, and said he had all along been very much dissatisfied with the conduct of the Eastern Question, and convinced that, if his advice had been taken at first, we should not be in our present dilemma and embarrassing position, and he had only consented to stay in the Government, when overruled in his suggestions, because he thought he could nevertheless effect some good by remaining, and tender essential aid to Clarendon. I expressed the strongest desire that the matter might be patched up, and entreated her to try and bring it about. Palmerston was gone out, so I did not see him.

I then went to the Office, and directly wrote to Graham, who was at the Cabinet, begging him to see me, and telling him I had reason to believe Palmerston was not disinclined to stay. Meanwhile Bessborough called on me, and told me all the reports from Marylebone and other parts of the metropolis, as well as the country; all represented Palmerston's popularity to be immense, great enthusiasm about the Eastern Question, and profound indifference about Reform; and he said there was a report that Palmerston was not unlikely to stay in, and that it was of the greatest importance that he should. He also said that Hayter declared there was no chance whatever of their carrying the Reform Bill in the House of Commons, especially if Palmerston headed the opposition to it.

He was hardly gone when Graham came to me. I told him all that had passed between Lady Palmerston and me, and entreated him to see if something could not be done. He said he himself should be too happy to bring it about if possible, and he had no personal ground of complaint, but he did not know how Lord John might be disposed, particularly as Palmerston in one of his letters had spoken in very uncourteous terms of him and Aberdeen. He said it was wonderful how Palmerston, quite unlike most men,

was often intemperate with his pen, while he was always very guarded in his language. In reply to some of the things Lady Palmerston had said, he told me that the difficulty was that Palmerston's objections went to the *principle* of the measure, and though the details might still be open to discussion, it was impossible they could concede the principles of the measure without dishonour, and this was not to be thought of. That with regard to fresh reference to the Cabinet, Palmerston had stated all his objections to the Cabinet, when they had been considered and overruled, therefore another reference to the *Cabinet* would have been useless. He asked me if Palmerston was prepared to give up his objections. I said I presumed not, but he must understand that I did not know what he was prepared to concede or require, only what I had repeated, that he was not disinclined still to remain if the matter admitted of adjustment. He said the office was still open, and that the Cabinet then going on was not about filling it up, but entirely on the Eastern Question. After a good deal of talk we parted, he promising to see what could be done to bring about a compromise and reconciliation.

I then wrote to Lord Lansdowne telling him what had passed, and suggested that, as he is to see the Queen tomorrow, he should invoke her assistance to settle this affair, and so the matter stands. I am satisfied that at this moment Palmerston would prefer staying where he is to anything else, present or prospective, and he does not wish to embark in fresh combinations; but it is impossible to say what he may not do under fresh circumstances, and if he is exposed to all the attractions of excessive flattery and the means of obtaining great power. If this Government should be overthrown, I see no other man who could form one. Derby is in such a deplorable state of health that I do not think he could possibly undertake it, and though Palmerston's difficulties would be great, they would not be insurmountable, and the very necessity of having a Government, and the impossibility of any other man forming one, would give him great facilities, and draw a great many people from various

parties to enlist under him. It is, therefore, of immense importance that there should be a compromise now, for I am strongly of opinion that if there is not the Government will not be able to go on. What I fear is that, if a negotiation should be begun, the parties will not come to terms, and neither be disposed to make sufficient concessions. Lady Palmerston hinted at Aberdeen's going out, which she said he had always professed his readiness to do, but I gave her to understand that if he did, Lord John would insist on taking his place, which would not, I apprehend, be more palatable to Palmerston than the present arrangement.

*December 24th.*—I went to town this morning to hear what was going on. I found Granville who told me there was a negotiation on foot, conducted by Newcastle, who had been to Palmerston yesterday and discussed the matter. Palmerston was to give his answer at twelve to-day; Granville did not think any concessions about Reform were to be made to him, and nothing more than an agreement that the whole question should be reconsidered. He was to write a letter, saying there had been 'a misunderstanding,' said he was evidently dying to remain, full of interest in foreign politics, and could not bear to be out the way of knowing and having a concern in all that is going on, and probably by no means insensible to the difficulties of another position, that of being the leader of an Opposition, and still more to the having to form and carry on a Government should that Opposition be successful. All this I think exceedingly probable. I then went to Clarendon, where I learnt that Palmerston had given his answer, and that he meant to stay. He had written a letter, not exactly such a one as they could have wished, but which must do; and though it was not yet formally settled, it had gone so far that it could not fail now. Both Clarendon and Granville told me John Russell had behaved admirably, which I was glad to hear. Granville thinks Palmerston has no *rancune* against Aberdeen, but a good deal against John Russell. Granville said I had made a bad selection in writing to Graham on Thursday about Palmerston's staying in, as of all the

Cabinet he was the man most against him, and most opposed to his return; but Clarendon said for that very reason he was very glad I had addressed myself to Graham, and that I had since written him a strong letter, as I did yesterday, setting forth as forcibly as I could the expediency of a reconciliation and the danger of Palmerston's separating himself from them, and the infallible consequences thereof.

Walewski has been making a great flare up about the article in the 'Times,' stating that Dundas wanted to pursue the Russian fleet after Sinope, and that Baraguay d'Hilliers put his veto on the operation. Clarendon assured him the statement was inserted without his privity, and he had nothing to do with it. Walewski then asked him to authorise a formal contradiction in the 'Globe,' or to let it be officially contradicted in the 'Moniteur.' Clarendon declined the first, and advised against the latter course. I offered to speak to Delane about contradicting it in the 'Times,' which I afterwards did. He said the fact was true, and he had received it from various quarters, and it was useless to contradict it; but there was no reason the 'Moniteur' should not do so if they liked, so I sent him to Clarendon to talk it over and settle what was to be done to smooth the ruffled plumage of the French.

On Thursday at the Cabinet the resolution was taken which amounts to war. The French sent a proposal that the fleets should go into the Black Sea, repel any Russian aggression, and force any Russian ships of war they met with to go back to Sebastopol, using force in case of resistance. We assented to this proposal, and orders were sent accordingly. This must produce hostilities of some sort, and renders war inevitable. It is curious that this stringent measure should have been adopted during Palmerston's absence, and that he had no hand in it. It will no doubt render the reconciliation more agreeable to him. This incident of his resignation and return, which has made such a hubbub not only here but all over Europe for several days, is certainly extraordinary, and will hardly be intelligible, especially as it will hereafter appear that he has withdrawn

his resignation with hardly any, or perhaps no, conditions. On looking dispassionately at it, it seems to me Palmerston and Aberdeen have both been somewhat to blame. Lord Lansdowne left town ten days or a fortnight ago, with a distinct understanding, as he affirms, that the question of the Reform Bill was not to be definitively settled till after Christmas, and though he was aware of Palmerston's objections, he had no idea he would take any decisive step till then. A few days after he was gone to Bowood, Palmerston wrote to Aberdeen, a most unnecessary and ill-judged act. Aberdeen—instead of referring in his answer to the above-named understanding, and giving no other answer, replies that he has consulted John Russell and Granville, who think that nothing can be proposed that will remove his objections, and that he agrees with them, on which Palmerston sends in his resignation in a letter described to be brief and peremptory in its tone. All these letters were wrong, and none of them ought to have been written. I see they (his colleagues or some of them) think Palmerston never had really any intention of quitting his post, but *more suo* tried to bully a little, not without hopes that he might frighten them into some concessions on the Reform Bill, and meaning, if he failed, to knock under, as he has so often done upon other occasions. I am much inclined to suspect there is a great deal of truth in this hypothesis, being struck by Lady Palmerston's mildness and abstinence from violence and abuse, and the evident anxiety of both of them for a reconciliation, and again by the very easy terms on which he has been induced to stay. There has been no exaction or dictation on his part, but, so far as appears at present, something very like a surrender.

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## CHAPTER V.

Lord Palmerston's Return—The Czar's Designs—Uncertain Prospects—A Dinner of Lawyers—Preparations for War—The Reform Scheme modified—Russian Preparations for War—Entry of the Black Sea—Intrigues of France with Russia—Attacks on Prince Albert—Virulence of the Press—Attitude of Russia—Reluctance on both sides to engage in War—Prince Albert's Participation in Affairs of State—Opening of Parliament—Vindication of Prince Albert—Offer of Marriage of Prince Napoleon to Princess Mary of Cambridge—Publication of the Queen's Speech—The Hesitation of Austria—Justification of the War—The Blue Books—Popularity of the War—Last Efforts for Peace—The Emperor Napoleon's Letter—Lord John's Reform Bill—Difficulties arising—The Greeks—Objections to the Reform Bill—Postponement of the Reform Bill.

*Bowood, December 26th.*—I came here to-day through town, where I saw *en passant* Granville and Clarendon; received a letter this morning from Graham, telling me everything was arranged and Palmerston would stay, which of course I knew long before. Clarendon thought Newcastle had managed it exceedingly well, inasmuch as by this mixture of conciliation and firmness he had got Palmerston to write and withdraw his resignation, without any conditions; indeed, Clarendon considers that Palmerston has virtually acceded to all the provisions of Lord John's Bill to which he had objected. Whether his actions correspond with this idea we shall see hereafter. The letter he has written they say is 'artful and cunning,' but Aberdeen does not appear dissatisfied with it; and as it is a considerable concession in him to write any letter at all, they are right not to quarrel about the expressions. On the whole, I am now of opinion that Palmerston will be damaged by this proceeding. Nothing could justify his resignation at such a crisis but a case of urgent necessity, and if he really

was urged to it by such a necessity, he clearly could not be justified in recalling his resignation five or six days afterwards, finding himself exactly in the same situation as he was in before it. It seems to me that he is certainly on the horns of this dilemma, that he was either wrong in resigning or wrong in returning. I told Lord Lansdowne so, but he did not say much in reply; and I find the language of this place is all favourable to Lord Palmerston, which I presume to be from their sympathising in his objections to Reform; and they throw most of the blame on Aberdeen for writing to him the letter he did, in which no doubt he erred. However, they are all very glad it is made up, and justly think that the less that is said about it hereafter the better. I think now that some steps had been taken towards a reconciliation even before the Thursday when Lady Palmerston spoke to me, and the Queen knew on Thursday that the reconciliation was highly probable; for she wrote to Lord Lansdowne that evening, and told him he need not come to Windsor on Friday, which letter he received just as he was going to set off. The Tories and the Radicals are equally puzzled, perplexed, and disgusted, and do not know what to say. They accordingly solace themselves with such inventions and falsehoods as it suits their several purposes to circulate.

Clarendon received a letter from Cowley while I was with him, in which he said he sent him a paper tending to show that the Emperor of Russia was bent upon the destruction of Turkey, and prepared to run every risk, and encounter any enemy, in the pursuit of that object. This is, I think, very likely; and what is equally likely that, *per damna per caedes*, and with much danger and damage to himself, he will accomplish the ruin of the Turk. But all speculation must be vague and fallacious as to the results of such a war as is now beginning.

*January 3rd, 1854.*—I returned from Bowood on Saturday, having had no conversation whatever on politics with Lord Lansdowne—and of course I sought none. News came there that the Turks had accepted the proposal of

the Allied Powers to enter into a negotiation, and we are now waiting to see what the Emperor of Russia will be disposed to do; but almost everybody thinks he will refuse to treat, and certainly he will never admit, as the preliminary condition of negotiation, that no former treaties shall be revived. The Cabinet meets to-day for the purpose, I conclude, of resuming the consideration of the Reform Bill. The only thing Lord Lansdowne did say to me was, that he had had several conversations with John Russell when he was at Bowood, and that he thought he had made an impression on him; he evidently expected that Lord John would make concessions in his Bill which might satisfy, or partly so, him and Palmerston.

*January 5th.*—I dined on Tuesday with the Chancellor, Lord Cranworth: an array of lawyers, the Chancellor of Ireland (a coarse, vulgar-looking man, with twitchings in his face), Lord Campbell, Alderson, Coleridge, and the Solicitor-General (Bethell); besides these Aberdeen, Graham, and one or two more men.

I sat next to Graham and had much talk. He said the Cabinet that morning had gone off easily, and he thought matters would proceed quietly now. Palmerston is quite at his ease and just as if nothing had happened, which was exactly like him. Graham thinks the Emperor of Russia is determined on war, and will not consent to negotiate; he said he had been as anxious as any man to maintain peace, but if we were driven to go to war, he was for waging it with the utmost vigour, and inflicting as much injury as we could on Russia, and that we might strike very severe blows. It was commonly supposed Sebastopol was unassailable by sea, but he was not satisfied of that, as they are not in possession of sufficient information to be at all sure about it, but that he did not know what a powerful fleet with the aid of steam could not accomplish. He was inclined to believe that such a fleet might force the entrance to the place and destroy the Russian fleets, but that it would probably cost many ships to effect such an operation. In discussing the probability of Russia and Turkey being brought to terms



we agreed that the conditions accepted by the Turks should prove a sufficient basis. When I asked him whether this would not satisfy even Palmerston, and whether he would not be desirous of peace if it could be so brought about, he said he thought not, that Palmerston's politics were always personal, and that nothing would satisfy him now but to *humiliate* the Emperor.

Yesterday afternoon I saw Clarendon at the Foreign Office. He said the Cabinet went off smoothly enough, and Palmerston did not appear dissatisfied; confirmed what Graham said of his easy manner—no awkwardness or reserve. Aberdeen had written to him in answer to his letter recalling his resignation, saying he wondered he should have thought the matter of the Reform Bill *final*; and John Russell, when it was all over, called on him. The alterations in the Reform Bill were principally these: to extend somewhat the disfranchisement and to give more of the seats to the counties (which was what both Lord Lansdowne and Palmerston wished), and to reduce the county franchise from 20 to 10, taking Locke King's plan, the town franchise to be 6*l.*, with three years' rating, as originally proposed. This is intended to admit the working classes; as Clarendon said, the *principle* of the last Reform Bill having been to *exclude* them, and this to *admit* them. It seems now that Lansdowne and Palmerston will not dissent from this plan, though they do not like it. The various propositions were put to the vote *seriatim* in the Cabinet and carried *nem. diss.*, so that, instead of everything having been conceded to Palmerston (as the lying newspapers proclaimed), nothing has been; and he has, on the contrary, knocked under.

Clarendon showed me the Note submitted to the Turkish Government with the proposals as the basis of negotiations, to which we have not yet received a formal answer; but from a confused telegraphic message they think the Turks have accepted them. These terms will then have to go to St. Petersburg. But meanwhile the notification to the Emperor of the orders to our fleets was to reach St. Petersburg this day, and Clarendon thinks it exceedingly likely this will

produce an immediate declaration of war on his part. His warlike preparations are enormous, and it is said that the Church has granted him a loan of four and a half millions to defray them. I told Clarendon what Graham had said to me of Palmerston's disposition. He said he did not know, but it was not unlikely, and quite true about personal motives always influencing his conduct; and that he had always pleased himself with the reflexion that the downfall of Louis Philippe might be traced to the Montpensier marriage, which had really been the remote cause of it. Graham had told me that Stratford was now really anxious for peace, for he began to see the possibility of war bringing about the substitution of French influences at Constantinople in place of Russian, and of the two he infinitely preferred the latter. Clarendon confirmed this.

*January 6th.*—All going on very amicably in the Cabinet, and Pam and Johnny the best friends possible, cutting their jokes on each other, and Palmerston producing all his old objections to the Reform Bill just as if it was discussed for the first time. From what has been settled in regard to the fleets at Constantinople I think we are running an enormous risk of some great catastrophe.<sup>1</sup> It appears that Admiral Hamelin declared it was impossible to enter the Black Sea with safety, and Baraguay d'Hilliers agreed with him. Dundas was of the same opinion, but said he was ready to go if ordered. Stratford was not convinced of the danger as Baraguay d'Hilliers was. Before the opinion of the French Admiral could reach Paris orders were sent out for the fleets to enter, and though some discretion is left to the Admirals, the orders are so precise that it is extremely probable they

<sup>1</sup> [On November 30 the Russian fleet from Sebastopol attacked the Turkish squadron in the harbour of Sinope and destroyed it. It was this violent action on the part of Russia that at once decided the British and French Governments to occupy the Black Sea with their fleets. The Russian ships withdrew within the harbour of Sebastopol, which they never left again. I believe that Admiral Dundas and Admiral Lyons proposed to enter the Black Sea at once and intercept the Russian vessels before they could reach Sebastopol, but this proposal was overruled by the French officers, who were disinclined to act until they received peremptory orders from the Emperor.]

will obey them in spite of the danger, great as it is ; for the Black Sea is so dark they can take no observations, and so deep it cannot be sounded, perpetual fogs (which make the darkness), and no harbour where the fleets can take refuge. If the fleets should meet with any serious disaster, the indignation and clamour here would be prodigious, and the most violent accusations would be levelled at the Government. It would be said that they would not let the fleets go during the summer and safe seasons, when they could have done anything they pleased ; but, having allowed the Sinope affair to take place, and failed to bring about peace, they now send the fleets when they can do no good and prevent no mischief, and only expose them to damage or destruction.

*Broadlands, January 8th.*—I came here on Friday ; nobody is here but the Flahaults and Azeglio ; I walked with Palmerston yesterday and talked of the Turkish question. He thinks the Emperor will not declare war on receiving news of the orders to the fleets, but send some temporising answer. He said that if these orders had been sent four months ago, the whole thing would have been settled, which may or not be true ; he is very confident of the success of our naval operations, and of the damage we may do to Russia ; he has never alluded to Reform or anything connected with it, and is in very good humour.

*January 15th.*—I have never yet noticed the extraordinary run there has been for some weeks past against the Court, more particularly the Prince, which is now exciting general attention, and has undoubtedly produced a considerable effect throughout the country. It began a few weeks ago in the press, particularly in the ‘Daily News’ and the ‘Morning Advertiser,’ but chiefly in the latter, and was immediately taken up by the Tory papers, the ‘Morning Herald’ and the ‘Standard,’ and for some time past they have poured forth article after article, and letter after letter, full of the bitterest abuse and all sorts of lies. The ‘Morning Advertiser’ has sometimes had five or six articles on the same day all attacking and maligning Prince Albert. Many of these are very vague, but the charges against him are

principally to this effect, that he has been in the habit of meddling improperly in public affairs, and has used his influence to promote objects of his own and the interests of his own family at the expense of the interests of this country; that he is German and not English in his sentiments and principles; that he corresponds with foreign princes and with British Ministers abroad without the knowledge of the Government, and that he thwarts the foreign policy of the Ministers when it does not coincide with his own ideas and purposes. He is particularly accused of having exerted his influence over this Government to prevent their taking the course which they ought to have done with regard to Turkey, and of having a strong bias towards Austria and Russia and against France. Then it is said that he is always present when the Queen receives her Ministers, which is unconstitutional, and that all the papers pass through his hands or under his eyes. He is accused of interfering with all the departments of government, more particularly with the Horse Guards, and specifically with the recent transactions and disagreements in that office, which led to the retirement of General Brown, the Adjutant-General. Then he and the Queen are accused of having got up an intrigue with foreign Powers, Austria particularly, for getting Palmerston out of office last year; that she first hampered him in the Foreign Office, by insisting on seeing his despatches before he sent them off, and then that she compelled John Russell to dismiss him on the ground of disrespectful conduct to herself, when the real reason was condescension to the wishes of Austria, with which Power the Prince had intimately connected himself. Charges of this sort, mixed up with smaller collateral ones, have been repeated day after day with the utmost virulence and insolence by both the Radical and the Tory journals. For some time they made very little impression, and the Queen and Prince were not at all disturbed by them; but the long continuance of these savage libels, and the effect which their continual refutation has evidently produced throughout the country, have turned their indifference into extreme annoy-

ance. I must say I never remember anything more atrocious or unjust. Delane went to Aberdeen and told him that immense mischief had been done, and that he ought to know that the effect produced was very great and general, and offered (if it was thought desirable) to take up the cudgels in defence of the Court. Aberdeen consulted the Prince, and they were of opinion that it was better not to put forth any defence, or rebut such charges in the press, but to wait till Parliament meets, and take an opportunity to repel the charges there. One of the papers announced that a Liberal member of Parliament intended to bring the matter forward when Parliament meets, but I do not expect he will make his appearance. At present nobody talks of anything else, and those who come up from distant parts of the country say that the subject is the universal topic of discussion in country towns and on railways. It was currently reported in the Midland and Northern counties, and actually stated in a Scotch paper, that Prince Albert had been committed to the Tower, and there were people found credulous and foolish enough to believe it. It only shows how much malignity there is amongst the masses, which a profligate and impudent mendacity can stir up, when a plausible occasion is found for doing so, and how 'the mean are gratified by insults on the high.' It was only the other day that the Prince was extraordinarily popular, and received wherever he went with the strongest demonstration of public favour, and now it would not be safe for him to present himself anywhere in public, and very serious apprehensions are felt lest the Queen and he should be insulted as they go to open Parliament a fortnight hence. In my long experience I never remember anything like the virulence and profligacy of the press for the last six months, and I rejoice that Parliament is going to meet and fair discussion begin, for nothing else can in the slightest degree check it, and this, it may be hoped, will.

*January 16th.*—The attacks on the Prince go on with redoubled violence, and the most absurd lies are put forth and readily believed. It is very difficult to know what to

do, but the best thing will be a discussion in the House of Commons, if possible in both Houses. It is now said that Sir Robert Peel is going to raise one. Clarendon told me yesterday that he should not be surprised if the Emperor of Russia were to recall Brunnow and not Kisseleff, as he is more particularly incensed against England, knowing very well that we have acted consistently and in a straightforward direction throughout, while the French have been continually vacillating, and have kept up a sort of coquetry with him; for example, Castelbajac congratulated the Emperor on the Sinope affair, and said he did so as a Minister, a soldier, and a Christian. A pretty Government to depend on, and which our stupid and ignorant press is lauding to the skies for its admirable and chivalrous conduct as compared to ours.

*January 21st.*—For some days past the Tory papers have relaxed their violence against the Court, while the Radical ones, especially the ‘Morning Advertiser,’ have redoubled their attacks, and not a day passes without some furious article, and very often five or six articles and letters, all in the same strain. It is not to be denied or concealed that these abominable libels have been greedily swallowed all over the country and a strong impression produced. The press has been infamous, and I have little doubt that there is plenty of libellous matter to be found in some of the articles, if it should be deemed advisable for the Attorney-General to take it up. There can be little doubt that the Tory leaders got alarmed and annoyed at the lengths to which their papers were proceeding, and have taken measures to stop them. The Radical papers nothing can stop, because they find their account in the libels; the sale of the ‘Advertiser’ is enormously increased since it has begun this course, and, finding perfect immunity, it increases every day in audacity and virulence. One of the grounds of attack (in the ‘Morning Herald’ and ‘Standard’ principally) has been the illegality of the Prince being a Privy Councillor. In reply to this I wrote a letter (in my own name) showing what the law and practice are, but incautiously said the

argument had been advanced by a member of the *Carlton Club*, whereas it was in fact a member of the *Conservative*, and I had imagined the two Clubs were the same. This mistake drew down on me various letters, attacking and abusing me, and for several days the 'Morning Herald' has been full of coarse and stupid invectives against me, supplied by correspondents, who, from the details in their letters, must be persons with whom I live in great social intimacy. They are, however, of a very harmless description, and too dull to be effective.

*January 25th.*—I wrote a letter in the 'Times' (signed Juvenal), showing up the lies of the 'Morning Advertiser,' and how utterly unworthy of credit such a paper is. I find Palmerston and Aberdeen have come to an understanding as to what shall be said in the way of explanation, which is a good thing. It is not to be much, and they will tell the same story. One faint ray of hope for peace has dawned. The Emperor on receiving our Note has not recalled Brunnow, but ordered him to ask for explanations, and he is only to withdraw if the answer is of a certain tenor. Clarendon told him he could not give him an answer at the moment, and Seymour had said in the P.S. to his last despatch, 'For God's sake don't give Brunnow any answer for three days.' It is clearly one of two things—the Emperor meditates making peace, or he wants to gain time. The fact is, *he has got the answer*, for our instructions to the Admirals (which were communicated to him) explain our intentions. In a few days more we must receive his reply to the pacific overture.

*January 29th.*—Brunnow has not received his answer, but is to have it on Tuesday, when I imagine he will announce his departure. Kisseleff has not had his either, and there is some disagreement as to the answers between us and the French Government. Clarendon has sent to Paris the answer he proposes to give, but the French wish not to give Kisseleff any answer at all, nor even to tell him what it is, but to send their answer through their Ambassador at Petersburg, to which Clarendon strenuously objects. This

is only for the purpose of delay, the Emperor Napoleon being so reluctant to go to war, and anxious to put off the evil day as long as he can. It is not wonderful, for the accounts of the distress in France, the stagnation of trade, and the financial embarrassments, and the consequent alarm that prevails as well as suffering, make it very natural that the Government should shrink from plunging into a war the duration of which is doubtful, but the expense certain. Colloredo told me the other day that he thought Orloff's mission to Vienna afforded a good prospect of peace, because he was sure Orloff would not have accepted the mission unless he had really expected to bring it to a successful issue, but Clarendon told me last night that Orloff is only empowered to propose the same conditions which the Emperor originally insisted on, and that his real object is to detach Austria and Prussia from the alliance, by any means he can and by offering them any terms they please.

The attacks on the Prince are subsiding, except from the 'Morning Advertiser,' which goes doggedly on in spite of its lies being exposed. John Russell told me the other day that soon after the Queen's marriage she asked Melbourne whether the Prince ought to see all the papers and know everything. Melbourne consulted him about it, and he thinks that he consulted the Cabinet, but is not quite sure of this. However, Melbourne and Lord John (and the whole Cabinet if he did consult them) agreed that it was quite proper she should show him and tell him everything, and that was the beginning of his being mixed up in public affairs. Why he did not then begin to be present at her interviews with her Ministers I do not know, but that practice began when Peel came in, and Lord John said he found it established when he came back, and he saw no objection to it. He told me last night that the Queen had talked to him about the present clamour, which of course annoyed her, and she said, if she had had the Prince to talk to and employ in explaining matters at the time of the Bedchamber quarrel with Peel, that affair would not have happened. Lord John said he thought she must have been advised by



somebody to act as she did, to which she replied with great candour and naïveté, 'No, it was entirely my own foolishness.' This is the first time I have heard of her acknowledging that it was 'foolishness,' and is an avowal creditable to her sense. Lord John said, when Lord Spencer was consulted on the matter he replied, 'It is a bad ground for a *Whig* Government to stand on, but as gentlemen you can't do otherwise.'

*February 1st.*—Parliament met yesterday, a greater crowd than usual to see the procession. The Queen and Prince were very well received, as well as usual, if not better; but all the *enthusiasm* was bestowed on the Turkish Minister, the mob showing their sympathy in his cause by vociferous cheering the whole way. The night went off capitally for the Government in both Houses. In the Lords Derby made a slashing speech, but very imprudent, and played into Aberdeen's hands, who availed himself thereof very well, and made a very good answer, which is better to read than it was to hear. Derby afforded him a good opportunity of vindicating the Prince, which he did very effectively, and then Derby followed him and joined in the vindication, but he clumsily allowed Aberdeen to take the initiative. Clarendon answered Clanricarde, who was hostile, but not very bitter; the former showed how much he suffers from want of practice and facility. I thought he would have failed in the middle, but he recovered himself and went on. Derby was put into a great rage by Aberdeen's speech, and could not resist attacking *me* (whom he saw behind the Throne). He attacked my letter (signed C.), in which I had pitched into the Tories for their attacks on the Prince. I saw his people turn round and look towards me, but I did not care a fig, and was rather pleased to see how what I wrote had galled them, and struck home. In the Commons the Government was still more triumphant. The Opposition were disorganised and feeble; all who spoke on that side took different views, and very little was said. John Russell made a very good speech, and took the bull by the horns about the Prince, entered at once on the subject, and delivered an

energetic vindication of and eulogium on him in his best style. It was excellent, and between his speech and Aberdeen's and all those who chimed in, that abomination may be considered to be destroyed altogether, and we shall probably hear no more of it.

This evening — told me a secret that surprised me much. I asked him casually if he knew for what purpose Prince Napoleon was gone to Brussels, when he told me that he was gone to try and get King Leopold to use his influence here to bring about his marriage with the Princess Mary, the Duke of Cambridge's sister; that for a long time past Palmerston had been strongly urging this match with the Queen, and had written heaps of letters to press it, having been in constant communication about it with Walewski and the Emperor himself. They had made such a point of it that the Queen had thought herself obliged to consult the Princess Mary herself about it, who would not listen to it. The negotiator did not make the proposal more palatable, and he did not recommend himself the more, by suggesting that such a match was very preferable to any little German prince. It is incredible that he should have mixed himself in an affair that he could hardly fail to know must be very disagreeable to the Queen, besides that the Princess is not likely to sacrifice her country and her position for such a speculation, so hazardous and uncertain at best, and involving immediate obligations and necessities at which her pride could not fail to revolt.

*February 2nd.*—The above story, put together with some other things, leads to strange conjectures about Palmerston, which seem to justify the suspicions and convictions of the Court and others about him. I have before alluded to his intimate connexion with Walewski, and the notorious favour with which he is regarded by the Emperor, who considers him as his great *appui* here.

Before proceeding I must, however, refer to another matter, which seems to have no connexion with it. There is always great anxiety on the part of the press to get the Queen's Speech, so as to give a sketch of it the morning of

the day when it is made, and those who do not get it are very jealous of those who do. There has been great bother about it on some former occasions, once particularly, because one of the Derbyites gave it to their paper, the 'Morning Herald,' it having been communicated in strict confidence, and according to recent custom, to the leaders of the party. The other day Aberdeen refused to give it even to the 'Times,' and of course to any other paper, and he begged Palmerston not to send it to the 'Morning Post,' which is notoriously his paper. Nevertheless, the Speech appeared in the 'Times,' and what seemed more extraordinary, in the 'Morning Advertiser,' the paper which has been the fiercest opponent of the Government, and the most persevering and virulent of the assailants of the Prince. How these papers got the Speech nobody knows, but as there were four dinners, at which at least a hundred men must have been present, it is easy to imagine that some one of these may have communicated it. Delane has friends in all parties, and he told me that he had no less than three offers of it, and therefore he had no difficulty. But how did the 'Morning Advertiser' come by it? It is politically opposed to both the Ministry and the Derbyites; but it must have got the Speech from some person of one or the other party, with whom it has some community of interest or object. The run upon the Prince was carried on equally by the 'Morning Herald' and the 'Morning Advertiser' till within ten days of the meeting of Parliament, when the former was stopped; the latter never ceased. I have heard it surmised more than once that these attacks proceeded from Paris, and were paid for by the Emperor Louis Napoleon, but I never could believe it. The other day I met M. Alexandre Thomas at dinner at Marble Hill, and we came to town together. He told me he had no doubt the abuse of the Prince was the work of the Emperor, and paid for by him. It did not make much impression on me at the moment; but now, putting all these things together, I cannot help partaking in the opinion that the whole thing has been got up, managed, and paid for by Louis Napoleon, Walewski, and another person here.

Brunnow received his answer yesterday, with many civilities and regrets, *de part et d'autre*. Orloff as we hear has failed in his mission to cajole the Austrian Government, but *non constat* that Austria will act a firm part against Russia. If she would only announce her intention to do so, the matter would probably be settled; for Russia would, as we believe, certainly come to terms, if she was sure of Austria acting against her, so that, in fact, Austria holds the decision in her own hands, and the greatest service she can do to Russia herself would be to compel her to surrender, as she may still do with an appearance of credit and dignity.

*February 9th.*—Nobody now thinks of anything but of the coming war and its vigorous prosecution. The national blood is up, and those who most earnestly deprecated war are all for hitting as hard as we can now that it is forced upon us. The publication of the Blue Books has relieved the Government from a vast amount of prejudice and suspicion. The public judgement of their management of the Eastern Question is generally very favourable, and impartial people applaud their persevering efforts to avert war, and are satisfied that everything was done that the national honour or dignity required. I have read through the thick volumes, and am satisfied that there is on the whole no case to be made against the Government, though there are some things that might perhaps have been better done; but what is there of any sort, or at any time, of which as much may not be said when we have been made wiser by experience and events? These Books are very creditable in the great ability they display. As Lord Ellenborough said in the House of Lords, the case had been most ably conducted, both by Government and its agents. Clarendon's despatches are exceedingly good, and in one respect greatly superior to Palmerston's when he was at the Foreign Office: they are very measured and dignified, and he never descends to the scolding, and the taunts, and sarcasms in which the other delighted. Palmerston always wrote as if his object was to gain a victory in a war of words, and have the best of an argument; Clarendon, on the contrary, keeps steadily in view a great political

object, and never says a word but with a view to attain it. Stratford's despatches are very able, and very well written, but they leave the impression (which we know to be the truth), that he has said and done a great deal more than we are informed of; that he is the real cause of this war, and that he might have prevented it, if he had chosen to do so, I have no doubt whatever. His letters have evidently been studiously composed with reference to the Blue Book, and that he may appear in a popular light. I find he has been all the time in correspondence with Palmerston, who, we may be sure, has incited him to fan the flame, and encourage the Turks to push matters to extremities. I should like to know what Palmerston would have said, when he was at the Foreign Office, if one of his colleagues had corresponded with any one of his Ministers abroad, in a sense differing from that in which he himself instructed him. The wonderful thing is the impunity which he continues to enjoy, and how, daring and unscrupulous as he is, and determined to have his own way, he constantly escapes detection and exposure. The good case which the Government has put forward, and the approach of war, have apparently extinguished or suspended all opposition, and the Session, which everybody expected to be so stormy and dangerous, bids fair to be as easy as possible. Great difference of opinion exists as to the wisdom of committing our Baltic fleet to Charles Napier. It was, however, decided at the Cabinet yesterday that he should have it,<sup>1</sup> and we have got a very powerful squadron ready. The war is certainly very popular, but I don't think its popularity will last long when we begin to pay for it, unless we are encouraged and compensated for our sacrifices by some very flattering successes.

*February 15th.*—Several days ago there was a short discussion in the House of Lords, in which the Government did not cut a good figure. Aberdeen made a declaration in favour of

<sup>1</sup> [There was a question of appointing Lord Dundonald, a far abler man; but he was seventy-nine, and besides he made it a condition that he should be allowed to destroy Cronstadt by some chemical process of his own invention.]

peace, saying 'war was not inevitable,' which produced an explosion against him, and it was so imprudent *in him*, and so calculated to mislead, that Clarendon insisted on his rising again and saying that no negotiations were going on, threatening to do so himself if Aberdeen did not. He complied, but the whole thing produced a bad effect, although there are no negotiations to which we are a party. Austria is making a new attempt with the Emperor, to which she was encouraged by Orloff before he went. We are satisfied with the conduct of Austria, but though she has rejected the Russian overtures, she will not engage to join us against Russia in certain contingencies. If she would do this, it would most probably settle the affair, and make the Emperor agree to reasonable terms.

This morning appears in all the newspapers the autograph letter of the Emperor Napoleon to the Emperor Nicholas, which has been so much talked of. If the Emperor of Russia at once closes with it, he will place us in a great dilemma, but it may produce peace. On Sunday Clarendon told me all about this letter. The Emperor took it into his head to write it, and sent a copy here for the approval of our Government. Clarendon made many objections, particularly to the suggestion of a simultaneous withdrawal of the Russian troops and the Allied fleets, and to the separate negotiation of Turkey, two points we had all along laid great stress upon. Walewski returned the letter with the objections raised by us, and soon after informed Clarendon that the letter had been altered according to our suggestions, and the objectionable parts omitted; but he did not bring him the amended letter. Clarendon wrote to Cowley, and said what had passed, and that he was glad the alterations had been made, but was surprised the letter, as altered, had not been shown to him. Cowley told Drouyn de Lhuys, who said they had sent the letter to Walewski, and he could not think why Clarendon had not seen it, and he wrote to Walewski desiring him to take it to Clarendon. He did so, when, much to his annoyance as well as surprise, he found that they had only made a

few verbal alterations, and left the really objectionable parts nearly the same as before. This may put us in a very awkward position. If the Emperor Nicholas agrees, we must either agree also to what we entirely disapprove, or disavow the French, and perhaps separate from them; and it will be very embarrassing if the Government are asked in Parliament whether they were a party to this letter and its proposals. Clarendon told me this was only one of many instances in which the conduct of the French had been very *louche* and insincere. He thinks this more attributable to Drouyn than to his master, and Walewski has behaved with great loyalty and straightforwardness; but hardly a week has passed that he has not had to complain of something done by the French Government in a separate or clandestine manner, or of some proposal which they ought not to make, and this makes one of the difficulties of the position of which nobody is aware—a fine prospect to be married to such a people on a great question; but what can be expected from the Government of such a Sovereign and such Ministers? It confirms my long settled opinion, that we are always in extreme danger of being thrown over by them. With regard to the whole question (and omitting these details) the Emperor Napoleon has behaved well enough to us; for he has adhered steadily to the joint policy, though it is his interest to maintain peace, and public opinion in France runs as strongly that way as here it runs in the opposite direction.

The day before yesterday John Russell introduced his Reform Bill, having resisted the most urgent representations and entreaties to postpone it. His speech was very tame, and nothing could be more cold than its reception. The few remarks that were made were almost all against it, or particular parts of it, and it has excited no enthusiasm in any quarter. The prevailing impression is that it will not pass if it is persisted in. If any Reform Bill were to be proposed at all, this does not seem to be a very bad measure, and some points in it are good; but nobody wanted any measure, and the few Radicals who do, do not care for the particular

measures Lord John proposes, and ask for other things which he will not hear of, so that he offends and alarms the Conservatives without conciliating the Liberals, and he disgusts and provokes his own adherents by his refusal to defer his Bill. Palmerston and his clique are sure to abuse it, and to employ all the underhand means they can to stir up opposition to it.

*February 20th.*—John Russell answered the questions put in the House of Commons about the Emperor Napoleon's letter very dexterously, telling the truth, but in a way not offensive to the Emperor. He also made an excellent speech on the debate on the Blue Books, brought on by Layard in a bitter speech very personal against Clarendon. The House of Commons as well as the country are so excessively warlike that they are ready to give any number of men and any amount of money, and seem only afraid the Government may not ask enough. I expect we shall have had quite enough of it before we have done with this question, and that our successes and the effect produced on Russia will not be commensurate with the prevailing ardour and expectation here. The most serious of all difficulties seems to be rapidly coming, the insurrection of the Greek population; and this is a matter which has already caused a good deal of difference of opinion and debate in the Cabinet, one half wanting to assist in putting down the Greeks, the other half opposing this scheme. The danger of attacking the Greeks is, that we should thereby throw them at once into the arms of Russia, whereas the true policy is to persuade them if possible to be quiet, and induce them to look up to us for protection and future support. It is an element in the question of great importance, and very difficult to deal with. It is disgusting to hear everybody and to see all writers vying with each other in laudation of Stratford Canning, who has been the principal cause of the war. They all think that, if he had been sincere in his desire for peace, and for an accommodation with Russia, he might have accomplished it, but on the contrary he was bent on bringing on war. He said as much to Lord Bath, who was at Constantinople.



Lord Bath told him he had witnessed the fleets sailing into the Black Sea, when he replied, ' You have brought some good news, for that is *war*. The Emperor of Russia chose to make it a personal quarrel with me, and now I am revenged.' This Lord Bath wrote to Lady Ashburton, who told Clarendon. I asked John Russell yesterday why he sent Stratford back to Constantinople. He said when he sent him the quarrel was between France and Russia, and only about the Holy Places ; they knew nothing there of Menschikoff's demands, and nobody was so qualified as Stratford to assist in settling the original affairs.

*February 25th.*—Last night Clarendon made a capital speech in the House of Lords, far superior to any he ever made before, and the best that has yet been made in defence of the Ministerial policy. He has got on wonderfully since the Session began, each of his speeches being much better than the preceding one, till at last he has made one of very great merit and power, as all admit. It was spirited, dignified and discreet. I began to fear he would never get over the misfortune of his want of early practice, and never excel as a speaker ; but this speech was so good, that I now hope he will, having acquired confidence and facility, speak up to the level of his ability. The rage for this war gets every day more vehement, and nobody seems to fear anything, but that we may not spend money and men enough in waging it. The few sober people who have courage enough to hint at its being impolitic and uncalled for are almost hooted down, and their warnings and scruples are treated with indignation and contempt. It does now appear as if Austria had made up her mind to act with us, and that we may depend upon her. The French made known to the Austrian Government some time ago that, in the alternative of her taking a hostile part, she must expect to be attacked in Italy, and Clarendon early in the business pointed out to Colloredo all the serious consequences his Government had to apprehend in all parts of her dominions if she abetted Russia. With a war so popular, and supported cordially by Parliament, and a flourishing revenue and trade, Government would look round

on a cloudless horizon, if it were not for the Reform Bill, which is a matter replete with uncertainty, difficulty, and danger. Nobody has an idea whether it will be carried in the House of Commons; almost all the friends of Government want Lord John to withdraw it, and the Cabinet is divided on the subject, Lord John, Graham, and Aberdeen being strongly in favour of pressing it on at all hazards, Palmerston violently against. He has now reproduced all his own objections and arguments against the Bill itself, as well as against forcing it on now, quite justified in the latter, but unjustifiable in the former course. Having once knocked under, and come back to office, consenting to swallow it, however reluctantly, it is too late to cavil at the Bill itself; but he may consistently and properly unite his voice with the voices of all prudent and moderate men, and strenuously resist its being persevered in at this moment against a feeling and opinion which are all but universal. On the whole, I rather expect (but with much doubt) that Lord John will yield to the general sentiment, and consent to postpone it.

*February 27th.*—We are on the very verge of a Ministerial crisis. John Russell will listen to no reason about his Reform Bill, he insists on going on with it, and will have it that his honour and character demand that he should, and he says, ‘When the honour of public men is preserved, the country is safe.’ Clarendon dined here yesterday, and told me he thought Lord John would break up the Government. It is, in fact, a political duel between Lord John and Palmerston. — thinks, and probably he is right, that at the last moment Palmerston will give way, but in the meantime he himself and all his followers and admirers are moving Heaven and earth to defeat the measure, and to set up opposition to it—none more active than Hayter, Secretary to the Treasury, whose borough is one of those to be disfranchised. Everybody thinks Sir Edward Denny’s motion will be carried, and if it is that Lord John will retire. If it were not for the difficulty about leading the House of Commons, this would not signify. I do not see how any arrangement is possible but that Palmerston should take the lead, but I

do not know if this will not lead to other resignations. Clarendon is indignant at the state of things brought about by Lord John's obstinacy. He told me that Graham supported Lord John vehemently, but that Aberdeen took no strong part, and had behaved very well. Having accepted Lord John's Reform measure, and pledged himself to it, he was ready still to abide by that pledge. There never was such a *mess* as it all is. Clarendon is now very hot on this war, which he fancies is to produce great and untempered effects. He says for very many years past Russia has been the great incubus on European improvement, and the real cause of half the calamities that have afflicted the world, and he thinks a great opportunity now presents itself of extinguishing her pernicious influence, and by liberating other countries from it, the march of improvement and better government will of necessity be developed and accelerated, and in this way civilisation itself may be the gainer by this contest. The Emperor Napoleon has earnestly pressed that our contingent should be put under the command of the French Marshal, to which we have altogether objected, and he has acquiesced, though reluctantly. We have agreed on a sort of *mezzo termine*, viz. that, in the event of a battle in which both forces are engaged, they should be under one Commander-in-Chief, who must be the Frenchman. Clarendon lamented that he had got no better Minister at Vienna than Westmorland just now, who though well meaning is nearly useless, as Colloredo is here, who will take nothing on himself. He says Castelbajac at St. Petersburg has really not represented the French Government at all, nor acted in any way in conjunction with Seymour, but been all along a base courtier of the Emperor Nicholas. Clarendon has again and again remonstrated through Cowley with Drouyn de Lhuys on this inconsistency, and Drouyn has always replied that he is quite aware of it, and has been at least as much annoyed at it as we could be, but that the Emperor would never allow him to be recalled. I asked Clarendon whether, now that war really was inevitable, Aberdeen was more reconciled to it, and he said not at all; he

yielded to the necessity, but very sulkily, and in the discussions relating to it in the Cabinet he took no part, and evinced a total indifference, or rather disgust. However, he expressed great admiration of Clarendon's speech, which he said was the best he ever heard. Lord John has sent to his brother to come to town, telling him a crisis is at hand. Granville, who is all with Lord John, personally and politically a Reformer, and highly approving of this Bill, is going to him to-day to see if he can prevail on him to give way to the general opinion, and at all events to put him in possession of what is said and thought on the subject.

*March 6th.*—After a great struggle John Russell was persuaded to put off his Reform Bill, but only till the end of April, so that in a few weeks the same embarrassment will begin again. The satisfaction at its being deferred at all is great and general, and everybody thinks that some expedient will be devised for putting it off again, when the time comes, and so that we shall be rid of it for this year. All the Cabinet was for putting it off, except Graham and Aberdeen. The former has devoted himself to Lord John, and goes heart and soul with him. Why Aberdeen took that view I cannot imagine, unless he wished to bring about a crisis, and to make his escape by favour of it. My own opinion at present is, that on April 27 Lord John will insist on bringing it on, and abide the consequences. The tenour of his speech and still more that of Aberdeen, the same night, lead me to that conclusion. The Radicals with old Hume at the head of them, approved of the course Lord John took, but expressly with the understanding that he really meant and would bring it on at the period to which it was postponed; and as he is sure to be incessantly urged on by his *entourage* to be firm when the time comes, and he will be very reluctant to encounter the indignation and reproaches of his reforming friends and adherents, the chances seem to me to be in favour of the battle taking place. I think his speech on putting it off was not at all good, nor what he ought to have said. He laid himself open to an attack from Disraeli, which was very just, and he

could not answer it. It was quite absurd to ground the postponement on the war and its exigencies, and it was moreover not the real and true reason. He put it off because he was importuned by everybody to do so, because Hayter proved to him that he would infallibly be defeated, and because there was no other way of preventing a break-up of the Government. He might have anticipated Disraeli's philippic by reverting to what he had before said, repeating his own conviction that the war afforded no reason for not going on with the Bill; but that he found so many of his own friends and such a general concurrence of feeling in the House of Commons on the other side, added to great indifference in the country, that he had thought it right to defer to those opinions, and give up his own to them. Such a defence of his conduct as this would have been more effective and more consistent with the truth, but it would have involved something like an acknowledgement of error, from which it is probable that his pride and obstinacy revolted, so he made what I think was a very bad speech. If he does bring it on again in April, I expect he will be defeated, and then retire. In any case his retirement will lead to Palmerston's elevation, as leader of the House of Commons if Lord John goes alone, as Prime Minister if Graham and Aberdeen go with him, and there seems no alternative, unless Lansdowne can be induced to replace Aberdeen, which some think not impossible, though it would only be for a short time.

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## CHAPTER VI.

Dinner to Sir Charles Napier—A Ministerial Indiscretion—Doubts as to the Reform Bill—Discontent of Lord John Russell—The Secret Correspondence with Russia—War declared—Weakness of the Government—Mr. Greville disapproves the War—Divisions in the Cabinet—Withdrawal of the Reform Bill—Blunder of the Government—The Fast Day—Licences to trade in War—Death of the Marquis of Anglesey—Mr. Gladstone's Financial Failures—Dissolution of Parties—Mr. Gladstone's Budget—Lord Cowley's Opinion of the Emperor's Position—The House of Commons supports the War—Disraeli attacks Lord John Russell—A Change of Plans—Lord John Russell's Mismanagement—Attacks on Lord Aberdeen—Popularity of the War—Government Majority in the Lords—Attitude of the German Powers—A Meeting of the Liberal Party—An Appointment cancelled—Expedition to the Crimea—English and French Policy united in Spain—Close of the Session—The Character of Lord Aberdeen's Government—Effect of the Quarrel with Russia—Lord Palmerston's Resignation—Waywardness of the House of Commons.

*London, March 13th, 1854.*—The only event of recent occurrence was the dinner given last week to Sir Charles Napier at the Reform Club, with Lord Palmerston in the chair. Everybody disapproves of the whole proceeding, which is thought to have been unwise and in bad taste. The only Ministers there besides Palmerston were Graham and Molesworth, and the former made an excessively foolish, indiscreet speech, which has been generally censured, and to-night he is to be called to account for it in the House of Commons. It is marvellous that a man of mature age, who has been nearly forty years in public life, should be so rash and ill-judged in his speeches.<sup>1</sup> There seems now to be a

<sup>1</sup> [At this dinner at the Reform Club, Sir James Graham made an intemperate speech in which he said: 'My gallant friend (Napier) says that when he goes into the Baltic he will declare war. I, as First Lord of the Admiralty, give my free consent to do so. I hope the war may be short, and that it may be sharp.' Sir Charles Napier's subsequent performances

better chance of John Russell's again putting off his Reform Bill next month. There are not two opinions, except among the extreme Radicals, of the expediency of his doing so, and his best friends (including his brother) greatly regret that he did not put it off *sine die* instead of to another fixed day.

*March 20th.*—There has been a little episode, not very important, but which being entirely personal caused some noise in the world. About a week ago, or perhaps more, appeared the Petersburg 'Gazette' with a sort of manifesto, complaining bitterly of the conduct of the British Government, which was said to be the more inexcusable as a confidential correspondence had taken place between the two Governments, and we had been all along informed of their views and intentions. The 'Times' published this (as did all the other papers), and with it a peremptory denial of its truth, stating that John Russell, then Foreign Secretary, had sent an indignant refusal to the proposals made to us. Derby took this up in the House of Lords, complaining of State secrets having been imparted to the 'Times,' and insinuating his belief that Aberdeen had communicated them. Aberdeen denied the imputation with some resentment, and said that a flagrant breach of confidence had been certainly committed, and he had reason to believe that the culprit was a man formerly in the Foreign Office as clerk, though now out of it, who had been appointed by Lord Malmesbury. On this Malmesbury flared up, and desired to know his name, which Aberdeen said he did not know. On a subsequent night Malmesbury again took the matter up, and challenged Aberdeen to give the name and produce his proof. Aberdeen said he had received the information in a way which left no doubt on his mind of its truth, and he was willing to leave the matter to the gentleman himself, and if he denied it, he would acknowledge that he was mistaken and had been misinformed. By this time everybody was aware that a young man of the name of Astley was the accused party. He wrote a letter to Malmesbury denying the charge, but his letter in the Baltic did not at all correspond to this heroic language, and did not add to his former reputation.]

was not very distinct. However, Malmesbury read it in the House, and called on Aberdeen to retract the charge, which he immediately and completely did, and there the matter ended; but though the man is thus acquitted, and the Opposition papers abuse Aberdeen (who in fact was very imprudent to mention it), there seems no doubt that he really did babble about this matter, though it is very certain it was not from him the 'Times' got its information.<sup>1</sup> The story told is this: Astley talked of the correspondence to some person in a railway carriage. That person told it to Lady Ashburton, who repeated it to Clarendon. When thus talked of, it might easily get to the 'Times;' and the only wonder is, it did not get into many other papers besides.

Lord John Russell continues in a very perplexed and uncertain state about his Reform Bill, and hesitates whether to bring it on or not next month. On one hand he is urged to do so by his little knot of domestic adherents, by Graham vehemently, and to a certain degree by Aberdeen; on the other he is entreated and argued with by all the rest of his colleagues, by his brother, by Hayter, and by an immense majority of his political friends and supporters. Still he hesitates. He has got a notion, and others tell him so, that his character is concerned in bringing it on, and that he is bound to risk everything to maintain it. Graham is quite inconceivable; always rash at one moment and cowardly at another, he is now, and on this question, in his rashest mood, and he has persuaded himself, and tries to persuade Lord John, that if he perseveres and is beaten (which he cannot disguise from himself is probable, if not certain) he will only have to go out in order to return in triumph as Prime Minister. If a dissolution is proposed, and the Cabinet consent to it, he fancies a new Parliament will give him everything; if the Cabinet will not dissolve, Lord John, Graham and Aberdeen would retire, the Government be broken up, and

<sup>1</sup> [The indiscretion, such as it was, appears to have been that of Lord Aberdeen himself, and Lord Malmesbury quoted with a good deal of wit and *à propos*, in the House of Lords, Sancho Panza's saying, 'that a cask may leak at the top as well as at the bottom.']



Lord John would have Parliament and the country with him in forming another. All this I believe to be pure delusion. By persisting in his course he may, and probably would, break up the Government, but he would destroy himself, he would never be forgiven by his party or by the country at large for breaking up the Government at such a moment as this, and all his visions of success and power would soon be dispersed. Whatever else might happen, he would be excluded from office, probably for ever. His discontent with his present position the more inclines him to take this hazardous step, because he wants a change of some sort.

The Duke of Bedford came to me the other day to tell me Lord John was determined no longer to go on as he now is, and it seems that he is moved principally by pecuniary considerations.<sup>1</sup> He is poor and has a large family. While he is in office he is obliged to incur expenses by giving dinners and parties, and this additional expense is defrayed by the Duke, but in a very unsatisfactory way. Lord John sends him a sort of estimate or account of his extra expenses, and the Duke pays the money. It is not surprising that Lord John dislikes such assistance as this, and though he never complains, he is probably mortified and provoked that his brother does not once for all give him a sum of money or a large annuity. Everybody else is amazed that he does not do this; but though he is much attached to Lord John, admires and is proud of him, his love of money is so great that he cannot bring himself, even for his brother, to do a generous thing on a great scale. His colossal fortune, which goes on increasing every day, and for which he has no use, might well be employed in making his brother easy, and in buying golden opinions for himself; but the passion of avarice and the pleasure of accumulation outweigh all such considerations, and he falls in readily with Lord John's notion of taking an office for the sake of its emoluments. The present idea is to have this matter settled before Easter, to turn out Mr. Strutt from the Duchy of Lancaster, and put Lord

<sup>1</sup> [Lord John at this time had a seat in the Cabinet and led the House of Commons without any office in the Ministry and without any salary.]

John in the place, with an increased salary during his occupation of it. Nothing, however, is settled about it yet.

The publication of the secret correspondence with Russia has excited great interest, and does great credit to the Government, but it increases the public indignation against the Emperor, because it exposes the extreme duplicity of his conduct; and as he must have been aware that such would be the inevitable result of publicity, it is difficult to conceive what induced him to provoke it, unless Walewski's conjecture is the true one. He thinks that the Emperor thought it would make bad blood between us and France, fancying that we had not imparted the correspondence to the French Government, in which he was mistaken, as we had done so.

*March 29th.*—The die is cast, and war was declared yesterday. We are already beginning to taste the fruits of it. Every species of security has rapidly gone down, and everybody's property in stocks, shares, &c., is depreciated already from twenty to thirty per cent. I predict confidently that, before many months are over, people will be as heartily sick of it as they are now hot upon it. Nobody knows where our fleets and armies are going, nor what they mean to attempt, and we are profoundly ignorant of the resources and power of Russia to wage war against us. As the time for action approaches, Austria and Prussia grow more reluctant to engage in it. The latter has proclaimed her neutrality, and unless some events should make a change in her policy, I do not believe the former will ever be induced to *act* with us and against Russia. The Government here are in a very weak unsatisfactory state. They are supported in carrying on war, but in every other respect they are treated with great indifference, and appear to have very little authority or influence either in Parliament or in the country. Nobody seems to have risen in estimation, except perhaps Clarendon, who has done his work well and got credit for it. Palmerston and Graham have positively disgraced themselves by their dinner to Napier, and the foolish speeches they made both there and in the House of

Commons afterwards. I do not know what Palmerston's popularity might turn out to be if it should be tested by some change which brought him forward, but he certainly has greatly lost ground this year by his whole conduct from his resignation down to this time. Gladstone, the great card of the pack, has forfeited by the failure of his financial schemes a good deal of the credit he had obtained. John Russell has offended everybody by his obstinacy about his ill-timed Reform Bill, so that the Government does not stand very high, and is only strong in the weakness of all other parties. They are constantly beaten on small matters in the House of Commons, which produces a bad effect. Up to this moment nobody knows what John Russell means to do about the Reform Bill; if he puts it off again, he ought to do so to-morrow, when the discussion will take place about the declaration of war.

*April 2nd.*—The debates in both Houses were marked by great bitterness on the part of the Opposition, by Derby in one House, and by Disraeli and Layard in the other. The war fever is still sufficiently raging to make it impossible for any man who denounces the war itself to obtain a patient hearing. Nobody ventures to cry out against it but Bright in the House of Commons, and Grey in the House of Lords, but already I see symptoms of disquietude and alarm. Some of those who were most warlike begin to look grave, and to be more alive to the risks, difficulties, and probably dangers of such a contest. I cannot read the remonstrances and warnings of Bright without going very much along with him; and the more I reflect on the nature of the contest, its object, and the degree to which we are committed in it, the more uneasy I feel about it, and the more lively my apprehensions are of our finding ourselves in a very serious dilemma, and being involved in great embarrassments of various sorts. Amongst other misfortunes, one is the discredit into which Gladstone has fallen as a financier. Notwithstanding his extraordinary capacity, most people who are conversant with the subject of finance think he has greatly mismanaged his affairs, and suffered his notions or crotchets

to get the better of his prudence, and consequently that he has prepared for himself as Chancellor of the Exchequer very great difficulties. His Budget last year was so popular, and his wonderful readiness and skill in dealing with everything relating to finance excited so much admiration, that his reputation was prodigious, and he was not only the strength of the Government, but was marked out as the future Prime Minister whenever changes took place. All this *prestige* is very much diminished; and although his failures are in great measure attributable to accidents over which he had no control, many who are not unfriendly to him think he has been rash, obstinate, and injudicious, and no longer feel the same confidence in him which they did a short time ago.

*April 3rd.*—The Duke of Bedford has just been here, as uneasy about the state of affairs and as disgusted and alarmed at the war as I am. He does not know what Lord John will do about the Reform Bill, but fears rather than hopes as to his intentions. Aberdeen had desired that there should be a Cabinet before Easter, and that Lord John should *then* determine what he would do, but Palmerston requested that the final decision should only be made on the 26th, the day before that on which it is to come on. What his object is, they do not know. The Duke in talking to Lord John suggested the certainty of his breaking up the Government by bringing on his measure, and the enormous evil this would be, to which Lord John replied that if he knew what the internal state of the Government was, he would perhaps not think the evil of the dissolution so great. The fact is, that when the Opposition, as is their wont, taunt the Government with their internal disagreement and want of cordiality and union, they are much more right than they themselves are aware of. The Duke told me that the Queen told him the other day that she had herself written to Lord John urging him to give up bringing on his Bill. Not long ago the Queen was in favour of proceeding with it, but circumstances were very different at that time.

*April 15th.*—This has been a week of excitement. It had been settled that on Monday last John Russell should

announce his intention with regard to the Reform Bill. His uncertainty still prevailed, and he got into such a state of mind about it that it made him ill. He could not sleep, and was in a terrible state of vexation and perplexity. Aberdeen then proposed to him to give up the Bill, but to obtain from the Cabinet a unanimous consent to his pledging them to go on with it hereafter at some indefinite time. On Saturday there was a Cabinet, at which he made this proposal, but Palmerston and Lansdowne both refused their consent, and Lansdowne was in conversation with his friends very vehement about it. Graham appears to have been reasonable at this Cabinet, and ready to adopt the course proposed to Lord John. It was eventually settled that he should announce the abandonment of the Bill, and make the best statement he could, not pledging the *whole* Cabinet as he had intended; but before this he urged them to accept his resignation, which they refused, and then Palmerston begged he might resign, which they refused equally. So matters stood on Saturday night, and everybody believed it was settled. On Sunday Lord John's doubts and fears returned, his mind became unsettled again, and he was inclined to withdraw from his agreement and to go on. To the surprise of the whole House of Commons, when Monday came, Lord John only said he would make his statement the next day. Everybody saw something was wrong, and the curiosity and excitement were very great. All Monday and Tuesday mornings were passed in conferences and going backwards and forwards, the Duke of Bedford being called in to work upon Lord John. He did his best, and at last on Tuesday morning he and others finally persuaded Lord John to adhere to what had been determined and withdraw his Bill. This he did in a very good speech, full of an emotion and manifestation of sensibility which succeeded completely with the House, and he was greeted with prodigious cheering and compliments and congratulations on all sides. Nothing could in fact go off better, or in a way more gratifying to him, and the Government appears to have been strengthened by the operation. His emotion was sincere, because he is

no actor, but it was in my opinion totally uncalled for; and as there is but a step between the sublime and the ridiculous, it might just as well have appeared ridiculous; but fortunately for him his audience were disposed to take it *au grand sérieux*. Even his brother, partial as he is to him, takes the same view of this that I do, and has written to me that as Lord John has often been abused when he did not deserve it, so he has now been overpraised.

*April 24th.*—When this Government was formed, its principal merit was supposed to be its great administrative capacity, and the wonderful way in which the business of the country was to be done. It has turned out just the reverse of what was expected, for they commit one blunder after another, and nothing can be more loose, careless, and ignorant than the way in which their business is conducted. All sorts of mistakes and embarrassments are continually occurring in the House of Commons, and I have had occasion to see ample proofs of what I say, in all that has been done and is doing about licences and trade permissions, consequent on the recent declarations and Orders in Council.<sup>1</sup> Now another matter has occurred, discreditable from the carelessness which has been evinced. When it was thought necessary to order a fast day for the war, the Queen set her face against it. She thought it very absurd (as it is) and objected *in toto*. Aberdeen with some difficulty overcame her objections, setting forth that it had been done by George III., and that the religious part of the community would make a clamour if it were not done. So she gave way, but still insisted it should not be a ‘fast,’ so they settled it should be a day of ‘humiliation.’ The Archbishop of

<sup>1</sup> [On the outbreak of the war a Committee of Council was summoned to consider and frame divers Orders with reference to the prohibition of the export of military and naval stores, the detention of Russian ships, and questions of trade in Russian produce. Dr. Lushington, the judge of the Admiralty, was a member of this Committee, besides several Cabinet Ministers. The French Government proposed to revert to the old system of licences to trade with the enemy; but this proposal was not agreed to by Great Britain. The Russian trade was left open, except when stopped by blockade. Licences were issued by the Privy Council for the export of military and naval stores to neutral ports.]

Canterbury fully concurred, and the proclamation was issued accordingly. But the other day the merchants took alarm, and represented that, as the word 'fast' was omitted, the case would not come within the provisions of Masterman's Bill, and that bills of exchange, &c., would be payable on the day itself, and not the day before as provided by that Act, and that all sorts of confusion would arise. The Bank of England took the Solicitor General's opinion, who thought that such would be the law. A great difficulty arose, for time pressed. The Chancellor thought the case would stand, and was for taking the chance, but the Cabinet on Saturday decided that it would be safer to correct the error even thus late. Aberdeen went to the Queen and told her, and this afternoon there is to be a Council to turn the 'day of humiliation' into a 'fast day,' in order that 'merchants' bills may be presented on one day instead of another, and that banking operations may not be deranged. The ridicule this throws on the religious part of the question is obvious, and the effect it ought to have is to discontinue these preposterous observances, which all sensible people regard as a mockery and a delusion. But all this ought to have been provided for, and the law officers ought to have foreseen the consequences and advised accordingly. In Peel's time this never would have happened; but with a nominal Premier, a Home Secretary who will give himself no trouble about the details of his office, and an Attorney General who does nothing, knows nothing of law, and won't attend to anything, it is no wonder that such things and many others occur.

To return to the question of trading licences. When we went to war, the Government, I believe very wisely, resolved to relax belligerent rights and give all possible latitude to trade, with no more restrictions and reservations than were essentially necessary for carrying on the war. But this resolution involved a revolution of the old system and the necessity of completely constructing a new one, and as they long ago knew war was inevitable, they ought to have well considered all this, and framed their regulations before they

issued their orders. But not a bit of this was done, and the consequence was a state of unparalleled confusion and embarrassment, applications from all sides, and hosts of petitions for leave to export goods of different descriptions. The Government at last set to work to deal with these cases, but in a very irregular, unbusinesslike way. Some two or three of them met in Committee at the Council Office, and with the help of Cardwell, President of the Board of Trade but not in the Cabinet, and Dr. Lushington, who has nothing to do with the Government, they have contrived to scramble through the business; but the *laches* and indifference of those who ought to be most concerned, and the loose way of proceeding, have been very striking. Some would not come at all, some came for a short time, different people attended on different days, so that different opinions prevailed, and no regular system was established. The other day, on Cardwell's saying these questions would be taken up as soon as Parliament met and Government called to account, I suggested to — that, such being the case, he ought to get Lord John Russell to attend the Committee. He said he would ask him, 'but John Russell could not bear details; he doubted if he would come, and, if he did, would be of no use, as he would be sure to go to sleep;' and this is the way business of the greatest importance is transacted.

*May 3rd.*—The death of Lord Anglesey, which took place a few days ago, has removed one of the last and the most conspicuous of the comrades of the Duke of Wellington, who all seem to be following their commander very rapidly. I have lived with Lord Anglesey for so many years in such intimacy, and have received from him such constant kindness, that I cannot pass over his death without a brief notice.

A more gallant spirit, a finer gentleman, and a more honourable and kindhearted man never existed. His abilities were not of a very high order, but he had a good fair understanding, excellent intentions, and a character remarkably straightforward and sincere. In his youth he was notoriously vain and arrogant, as most of his family



were, but as he advanced in age, his faults and foibles were diminished or softened, and his virtues and amiable disposition manifested themselves the more. He distinguished himself greatly in the command of the cavalry in Sir John Moore's retreat, but was not employed in the Duke's army during the subsequent years of the Peninsular war. In the Waterloo campaign he again commanded the cavalry, not, as was supposed, entirely to the Duke's satisfaction, who would have preferred Lord Combermere in that post. He lost a leg at the battle of Waterloo; for this wound Lord Anglesey was entitled to a very large pension, of which he never would take a shilling. He was a great friend of George IV., and exposed himself to unpopularity by taking the King's part in the Queen's trial; but their friendship came to an end when Lord Anglesey connected himself with the Whig party, and when he went to Ireland as Lord Lieutenant he deeply offended the King by his open advocacy of the Roman Catholic cause in 1829. The Duke of Wellington, then Minister and about to give up the Catholic question, quarrelled with Lord Anglesey and recalled him. For some years past they had not been on very friendly terms. Lord Anglesey was jealous of the Duke, and used to affect to disparage his capacity both as a general and a statesman, and this political difference completed their mutual estrangement. These hostile feelings did not, however, last long; Lord Anglesey had a generous disposition, and was too fair and true to do permanent injustice to the Duke. I do not know how the reconciliation between them was brought about, but their temporary alienation was succeeded by a firm and lasting friendship, and the most enthusiastic admiration and attachment entertained by Lord Anglesey towards the Duke. For many years before the death of the latter, the two old warriors were the most intimate friends and constant companions, and every vestige of their former differences and antipathies was effaced and had given way to warm sentiments of mutual regard. When the regiment of Guards became vacant, King William sent for Lord Anglesey and announced to him that he was to have

it; he of course expressed his acknowledgements; but early the next morning he went to the King and said to him that he felt it his duty to represent to him that there was a man worthier than himself to have the regiment, that Lord Ludlow had lost his arm at their head, and that he could not bear to accept that to which Lord Ludlow was so justly entitled. This remonstrance, so unselfish and honourable, was accepted, and the regiment was conferred on Lord Ludlow.<sup>1</sup>

*May 7th.*—The failure of Gladstone's Exchequer Bill scheme has been very injurious to the Government, and particularly to him. The prodigious applause and admiration with which he was greeted last year have given way to distrust and apprehension of him as a finance minister, and the repeated failures of his different schemes have in a very short time materially damaged his reputation, and destroyed the prestige of his great abilities. All practical men in the City severely blame him for having exposed himself to the risk of failure, and reproach him with the folly of trying to make too good a bargain, and by so doing exposing himself to the defeat he has sustained. The consequences will not probably be serious, but the Government is weakened by it, and the diminution of public confidence in Gladstone is a public misfortune.

Next in importance to the financial difficulty is the Oxford Bill, with which Government have got into a mess, and they are struggling through the measure with doubtful and small majorities, having been beaten on an important point, and now quite uncertain if they shall be able to carry it. I fell in with Graham yesterday, and spoke to him about these things, when he replied that Gladstone's failure was very unfortunate, but he had no doubt he would make a great speech in his own defence on Monday night. With regard to Oxford, he said it was quite true that they could

<sup>1</sup> [George James, 3rd Earl of Ludlow in the peerage of Ireland, and created a baron of the United Kingdom in 1831, was born December 12, 1758, and died April 16, 1842, when the titles became extinct. He served with distinction in the army, and was colonel of the 38th regiment of foot.]

not depend on carrying the clauses of their bill, but that was because in the present state of the House 'they could not carry a turnpike bill,' they were absolutely without power, and 'it was a state of things that could not go on.'<sup>1</sup> Last night I had a talk with Charles Wood on the same subject, and he said that the truth was, a revolution had silently been effected. Parties were at an end, and the House of Commons was no longer divided into and governed by them; and that the predicament in which this Government is placed would be the same with every other, and business could no longer be conducted in Parliament in the way it used to be. All this is in my opinion quite true, and what has long struck me. Whether the extreme elasticity of our institutions, and the power of adaptation to circumstances which seems to pervade them, will enable us to find remedies and resources, and that the apparent derangement will right itself, remains to be seen. But it is a condition of affairs full of uncertainty, therefore of danger, and which makes me very uneasy whenever I think of it. It is evident that this Government is now backed by no great party, and that it has very few independent adherents on whom it can count. It scrambles on with casual support, and its continuing at all to exist is principally owing to the extreme difficulty of forming any other, and the certainty that no other that could be formed would be stronger or more secure, either more popular or more powerful.

*May 7th.*—It is scarcely a year ago that I was writing enthusiastic panegyrics on Gladstone, and describing him as the great ornament and support of the Government, and as the future Prime Minister. This was after the prodigious success of his first Budget and his able speeches, but a few months seem to have overturned all his power and authority. I hear nothing but complaints of his rashness and passion for experiments; and on all sides, from men, for example,

<sup>1</sup> [Lord John Russell introduced a bill to make further provision for the good government of the University of Oxford and the colleges therein, which passed both Houses, with some amendments, in the course of the session.]

like Tom Baring and Robarts, one a Tory, the other a Whig, that the City and the moneyed men have lost all confidence in him. To-morrow night he is to make his financial statement, and intense curiosity prevails to see how he will provide the ways and means for carrying on the war. Everybody expects that he will make an able speech; but brilliant speeches do not produce very great effect, and more anxiety is felt for the measures he will propose than for the dexterity and ingenuity he may display in proposing them. Parliament is ready to vote without grumbling any money that is asked for, and as yet public opinion has not begun to waver and complain; but we are only yet at the very beginning of this horrible mess, and people are still looking with eager interest to the successes they anticipate, and have not yet begun to feel the cost.

*May 10th.*—Gladstone made a great speech on Monday night. He spoke for nearly four hours, occupying the first half of the time in an elaborate and not unsuccessful defence of his former measures. His speech, which was certainly very able, was well received, and the Budget pronounced an honourable and creditable one. If he had chosen to sacrifice his conscientious convictions to popularity, he might have gained a great amount of the latter by proposing a loan, and no more taxes than would be necessary for the interest of it. I do not yet know whether his defence of his abortive schemes has satisfied the monetary critics. It was certainly very plausible, and will probably be sufficient for the uninformed and the half-informed, who cannot detect any fallacies which may lurk within it. He attacked some of his opponents with great severity, particularly Disraeli and Montague, but I doubt if this was prudent. He flung about his sarcasms upon smaller fry, and this certainly was not discreet. I think his speech has been of service to his financial character, and done a good deal towards the restoration of his credit.

*May 12th.*—Cowley called on me yesterday, when we talked over the war with all its etceteras. He said the Emperor had been most reluctant to go into it, but was now firmly

resolved to pursue it vigorously, and not to desist till he had obtained fair terms of peace; above all things he is bent on going on with us in unbroken amity. Cowley thinks his political position as secure as any position can be in France, and certainly the country seems satisfied with his rule. His social position is unimproved and rather worse; his marriage was a fatal measure; he would have done far better if he could have married the Hohenlohe girl, who was dying to be Empress, and Cowley thinks the Queen was wrong to prevent the match. In that case the Court might have been very different. In the beginning, after his marriage, he attempted to purify it as well as he could, and to get rid of all the disreputable women about it; but by degrees they have all come back again, and now they are more *encanaillées* than ever.

The French Government have given a strong proof of their goodwill to us by recalling Baraguay d'Hilliers from Constantinople, and not sending another ambassador, as they find none can possibly live on good terms with Stratford. Cowley says the war might have been prevented, he thinks, and particularly if Stratford had not been there. The Emperor would have made greater concessions if Stratford had not been at Constantinople, and another ambassador would have striven to preserve peace instead of being, as he was, bent on producing a war.

Edward Mills tells me Gladstone's recent speech has immensely raised him, and that he stands very high in the City, his defence of his measures very able, and produced a great effect; he said he lately met Walpole, who told him he had the highest admiration of Gladstone, and thought he had more power than ever Peel had even at his highest tide.

*May 28th.*—I have been so much occupied with the very dissimilar occupations of preparations for Epsom races in the shape of trials, betting, &c., and the finishing and correction of an article in the 'Edinburgh Review' on King Joseph's Memoirs, that I have had no leisure to think of politics, or to record what has been going on in the political world, nor in truth has much material been furnished either by domestic or foreign transactions. The last fortnight in

Parliament has been going on much in the way in which the present Government always goes on, and Gladstone, whom I met at dinner the other day, repeated to me very much what Graham had said some time before, about their utter inability to carry their measures in the House of Commons. There is, however, one important exception to this rule, and that is one of vital importance. On everything which relates to the war, and on all questions of supply, they can do whatever they please, and have no difficulty, and encounter no opposition. Tom Baring's motion on Monday last exhibited a striking proof of this; he introduced it by an able speech, and he mustered all the support that could be got, and yet he was defeated by above 100. I met Disraeli in the street the next day, when he said, 'Your Government is very strong.' I said, the war which was supposed to be their weakness turns out to be their strength. They can carry everything which appertains to that, and nothing else. And so it is; no sooner do they get a great majority on some important question than they find themselves in a minority, perhaps more than one, on something else. John Russell got beaten on his Oaths Bill the other night, a victory which was hailed with uproarious delight by the Opposition, though leading to nothing, and only mortifying to John Russell personally. These defeats, however, do not fail to be morally injurious to the Government, and to shake their credit. It was an ill advised measure, which drew down upon itself those who are against the Jews and those who are against the Catholics. Palmerston has been showing ill humour in the House of Commons, and has ceased to be so very popular as he used to be there. They have great difficulty in getting on with the University Bill, and Gladstone told me the other night he was very doubtful if they should be able to bring it to a successful end. All the Tories and High Churchmen are against it of course, and the Dissenters regard it with no favour because it does not do for them what they desire; so it is left to the support of the friends of Government and those who sincerely desire a good measure of reform for those bodies.

*June 5th.*—I was at Epsom all last week. In the beginning of it or the week before there was a great passage of arms in the House of Commons between John Russell and Disraeli, not a very creditable exhibition, but which excited greater interest than more important matters. Though Disraeli began the attack, Lord John threw the first stone of offence, which he had better have let alone. In reply to this Disraeli broke out with inconceivable violence and made the most furious assault upon John that he could, saying everything most offensive and provoking. Lord John made a rejoinder, and was followed by Bright, whose speech was very hostile and spiteful, and much more calculated to annoy Lord John than that of Disraeli, though much less vituperative. Disraeli seems inclined to have recourse to his old tactics against Peel, and to endeavour to treat John Russell, and Gladstone when he can, in the same way, hoping probably to re-ingratiate himself with his own side by giving them some of those invectives and sarcasms against their opponents which are so congenial to their tastes. This course will not raise him either in the House or in the country, and he will not find in Lord John a man either so sensitive or so vulnerable as Peel, and he can make out nothing against a man who refuses place, patronage, and emolument, and gives his gratuitous services at a great personal sacrifice because he thinks it his public duty to do so. There is nothing new in the condition of the Government; they are very firmly seated in their places, the House of Commons supporting them by large majorities in all their great measures and those which involve a question of confidence; but having no dependable majority on miscellaneous questions, nor even knowing whether they can carry any measure or not, it is idle to twit them with being a Government on sufferance and Lord John with not 'leading' the House of Commons. A revolution has taken place in the conditions of the political existence of governments in general and their relations with Parliament, and there is at present no likelihood that any government that can be formed will find itself in different circumstances, or that the old practice by which a govern-

ment could command the House of Commons on almost everything will ever be restored. Whether the new system be better or worse than the old may be doubtful, but governments must make up their minds to conform to it for the present at least. In the course of the next few days the division of the Colonial from the War Department will take place. There seems little doubt that Newcastle will elect to take the War Department, and Clarendon told me yesterday he thought he would be the best man for it, warmly praising his energy, industry, and ability, and his popular and conciliatory qualities. Their great object is to prevail on Lord John to take the Colonial Office, which I expect he will eventually do, but not without much reluctance and hesitation. Granville tells me he is in a dissatisfied state of mind, in which he will probably long remain, especially as his *entourage* will always do their best to foment his discontent.

*June 11th.*—Yesterday and the day before the world was made acquainted with the recent arrangements and appointments, which have been received with considerable disapprobation.<sup>1</sup> Nobody can understand what it all means, and why John Russell, if he was to take office, was to insist on so strange an arrangement, and such a departure from the invariable practice of putting a peer in the office of President of the Council. Nothing can be more ungracious than the air of the whole proceeding: he turns out Granville to make room for himself, and turns out Strutt to make room for Granville. It seems that they wanted him to be Colonial Secretary, but this he would not hear of on the score of his health, and as it is now admitted as an axiom that the leader in the House of Commons has enough to do, and cannot efficiently discharge the duties of a laborious department,

<sup>1</sup> [Lord John Russell insisted on taking the office of Lord President of the Council, which has always been held by a peer, and to effect this change Earl Granville was removed from the higher office of Lord President to that of Chancellor of the Duchy. The Right Honourable Edward Strutt, who had been Chancellor of the Duchy with a seat in the Cabinet, was dismissed from office, but he was subsequently raised to the peerage with the title of Lord Belper. This transaction reflected no credit on the author of it, who consulted nothing but his own dignity and convenience.]



it was reasonable enough that Lord John should decline the Colonies; but there seems no sufficient reason for his not taking the Duchy of Lancaster, for the more completely the office is a sinecure, the more consistent his taking it would appear. However, he would be President of the Council or nothing. I have been amazed at his indelicacy and want of consideration towards Granville, who deserved better treatment at his hands. Granville has always been his steady and stout adherent, defending his Reform Bill, holding himself his especial follower in the Coalition Cabinet, and ready to support him or go out with him if necessary. It was therefore particularly odious to insist on foisting himself into Granville's place, and inflicting on him the mortification of going downstairs. Granville behaved very well about it, with great good humour, only anxious to do whatever was best for the general interest, and putting aside every personal consideration and feeling; and his conduct is the more meritorious, because he dislikes the arrangement of all things. Aberdeen behaved very kindly to him, and told him, if he objected to the change, he would not consent to it, and, cost what it might, would tell John Russell he could not and should not have the place. Granville proposed to go out, at least for a time, but Aberdeen said he could not spare him, and nothing could be more flattering than all he expressed of his usefulness in the House of Lords, and of the value of his services. Personally, therefore, he loses nothing; for though he preferred the Council Office to the Duchy, his conduct has raised him in everybody's estimation, and he will play a part even more prominent than he did before.

One reason why Lord John should not have come to the Council Office was the embarrassment he will be sure to find himself in about questions of education, his reputation and his antecedents, as well as his political connexions, making him peculiarly unfit to be at the head of the Education Department; and I am inclined to agree with Vernon Smith, who said to me the other day that it would infallibly end in Lord John's bringing in next year an impracticable Education Bill and withdrawing it. George Grey's coming into

office will be of use to the Government. Newcastle's being War Minister is sure to be attacked, and all the Palmerstonians are indignant that Palmerston is not in that place, which never was offered him, nor was he consulted about the arrangement. I think there is still a considerable opinion that he would make a good War Minister, though everybody is aware he makes a very bad Home one, and the *prestige* about him and his popularity are greatly worn out. They have been obliged to go back to the reign of Henry VIII. to find a precedent for a commoner being President of the Council, when they say there was one, but I don't know who he was.

*June 21st.*—At St. Leonards last week for Ascot races, where I got wet, and have been ever since confined with the gout. The 'Times,' though by way of supporting the Government, went on violently attacking John Russell about the recent changes. Lord John was very well received in the City at his election, and at the opening of the Crystal Palace he was more cheered than anybody. This morning the Duke of Bedford came here and told me he had had a good deal of conversation with his brother about this business, to which he (the Duke) had been a stranger while it was going on. Lord John said that when the Government was formed he had proposed to Aberdeen that he should be President of the Council, but Aberdeen had objected on the score of its being so unusual, therefore he was only going back to his original design. He had an invincible repugnance to taking the Duchy of Lancaster or any inferior office. Both when the Government was formed and now, he would have much preferred to have kept aloof, and to have led in the House of Commons that section of the Whig party which would have followed him, but he found this impossible, and as the Government could not have been formed without him, and could not now go on without him, he was obliged to sacrifice his own inclination. I said I could not conceive why he could not go on as he was till the end of the session, and then settle it, that his pushing out Granville had a very ungracious appearance, and he would

have done much better to take the sinecure office of the Duchy, it being quite absurd to suppose that he could be degraded by holding any office, no matter what. The Duke owned it would have been better to wait till Parliament was up before anything was done, and he regarded the question of the particular office much as I do.

There was a discussion in the House of Lords on Monday night on the war, when Lyndhurst made a grand speech, wonderful at his age—82; he spoke for an hour and a quarter with as much force and clearness as at any time of his life: it was greatly admired. Clarendon spoke well and strongly, and elicited expressions of satisfaction from Derby, after whom Aberdeen rose, and imprudently spoke in the sense of desiring peace, a speech which has been laid hold of, and drawn down upon him a renewal of the violent abuse with which he has been all along assailed. I see nothing in his speech to justify the clamour, but it was very ill judged in him with his antecedents to say what he did, which malignity could so easily lay hold of.

*June 25th.*—There never was such a state of things as that which now exists between the Government, the Party, and the House of Commons. John Russell made such a hash of it last week, and put himself and his Government in such a position, that nothing but the war, and the impossibility which everybody feels there is of making any change of Government in the midst of it, prevents the immediate downfall of this Administration. Last week John Russell opposed the motion for the abolition of Church rates in a flaming High Tory and Church speech. The motion was rejected by a slender majority, but his speech gave great offence to the Liberal party and his own friends. Immediately afterwards came on the motion in the University Bill for admitting Dissenters to the University. This John Russell opposed again, although in his speech he declared he was in favour of the admission of Dissenters, but he objected to the motion on various grounds. The result was that he went into the lobby with Disraeli and the whole body of the Tories, while the whole of the Liberal party and

all his own friends and supporters went against him and defeated him by a majority of 91. He took with him six or seven of his colleagues, and two or three of the underlings. Molesworth, Bernal Osborne, and some more stayed away, and some others voted in the majority. In the majority were found Christopher and a few Tories besides, who, however, only voted with the object and hope of damaging the bill itself and procuring its rejection in the House of Lords. Never was man placed in so deplorable and humiliating a position as John Russell, and nothing can exceed his folly and mismanagement in getting himself into such a scrape. The indignation and resentment of the Liberals are boundless, and I think he has completely put an extinguisher on himself as a statesman and as the leader of a party; they never will forgive him or feel any confidence in him again. There was a capital article on him and his proceedings in the 'Times' yesterday, which was not acrimonious, like some others on him, and was perfectly just and true.

The victorious Liberals managed their affairs very ill. Instead of resting satisfied with a victory which must have been decisive (for after all the House of Commons had affirmed the principle of admitting the Dissenters by so large a majority, neither the House of Lords nor the University would have ventured to oppose it), they imprudently pressed on another division<sup>1</sup> in which they were beaten, though by a small majority, and this of course does away with a good deal of the effect of the first division. Between the recent changes which were universally distasteful, and his extraordinary maladroitness in these questions, Lord John is fallen prodigiously in public favour and opinion, and while he is, or has been till very recently, dreaming of again being Prime Minister, it is evident that he is totally unfit to be the leader of the Government in the House of Commons even in a subordinate post. He communicates with nobody, he has no confidence in or sympathy with any one, he does not impart

<sup>1</sup> It seems it was Mr. Walpole who insisted on the second division, which he did for the express purpose of neutralising the effect of the first, hoping to get a majority, which he did, and it was rather dexterously done.

his intentions or his wishes to his own political followers, and does not ask to be informed of theirs, but he buries himself at Richmond and only comes forth to say and do everything that is most imprudent and unpopular.

The House of Commons is in a state of complete anarchy, and nobody has any hold on it; matters, bad enough through John Russell, are made worse by Aberdeen, whose speech the other night has made a great, but I think unnecessary clamour; and Layard, who is his bitter enemy, took it up in the House of Commons, and has given notice of a motion on it which is equivalent to a vote of censure. Almost at the same moment Aberdeen, with questionable prudence and dignity, gave notice in the Lords that on Monday he should explain the speech he made the other night. Layard's design can hardly be matured, because they never can permit a speech made in one House of Parliament to be made the subject of a motion and debate in the other. It is, however, incontestable that clamour and misrepresentation have succeeded in raising a vast prejudice against Aberdeen, and that he is exceedingly unpopular.

The people are wild about this war, and besides the general confidence that we are to obtain very signal success in our naval and military operations, there is a violent desire to force the Emperor to make a very humiliating peace, and a strong conviction that he will very soon be compelled to do so. This belief is the cause of the great rise which has been taking place in the public securities, and all sorts of stories are rife of the terror and dislike of the war which prevail in Russia, and of the agitation and melancholy in which the Emperor is said to be plunged. But the authentic accounts from St. Petersburg tell a very different tale. They say, and our Consul just arrived from St. Petersburg confirms the statement, that the Emperor is calm and resolute, that his popularity is very great, and the Russians of all classes enthusiastic in his cause, and that they are prepared to a man to sacrifice their properties and their lives in a vigorous prosecution of the war.

*July 9th.*—It is remarkable that the Government are

unquestionably stronger in the House of Lords than in the House of Commons, as has been clearly proved by the result of the Oxford University Bill. Derby endeavoured to alter it, and was completely defeated. There were several divisions, in all of which the Government obtained large majorities, and at last Derby said it was evidently useless to propose any alterations, as the Government could do what they pleased in that House. The session is drawing to a close; that is, though it will last a month longer, all important business is over. The Government will end it much in the same condition as they were in at the beginning of it, only that their weakness and want of popularity have been manifested in a thousand ways during the session. Aberdeen's explanatory speech and the publication of his despatch of 1829 have given rather a turn to the current against him; for though his violent opponents still snarl at him and abuse him, the impartial people begin to think he is not so bad as he has been represented, and the excessive absurdity of the charges with which he has been assailed begins to strike people. There is still, however, a strong prejudice against him, particularly amongst the extreme Liberals, and I saw a long letter from Sir Benjamin Hall to the Duke of Bedford setting forth the discontent of the Liberal party and vehemently urging that the Government should be immediately modified, Aberdeen retire, and Lord John Russell again be Minister, with Palmerston as War Minister—perfectly absurd and impracticable, but showing what the notions are of the ultra-Radicals. The Tories, agreeing in nothing else, concur with the Radicals in hating Aberdeen because he represents the Peel party, and is Minister as the successor of Sir Robert Peel, for whose memory their hatred is as intense as it was for his person when he was alive. The war goes on without any immediate results, and without, as far as can be seen, a probability of the attainment of any signal or important successes. The foolish public here, always extravagant and impatient, clamour for attacks upon Sebastopol and Cronstadt, and are very indignant that these places are not taken, without knowing anything of the feasibility of such opera-

tions. We now begin to believe that Austria is going to side actively with us, but we do not feel certain of it, nor shall we till she actually enters on the campaign.

*July 19th.*—Within a few days everything is changed. In respect to Austria, the intrigues of Russia with Prussia, and the determination of the King to do everything that he can or that he dares to assist his imperial brother-in-law, have had the effect of paralysing the Austrian movements, and suspending the operation of her Treaty with Turkey. She cannot venture to declare war against Russia and to march her army into the Principalities while there is a large Russian force on the borders of Galicia, and the Prussians are in such an ambiguous attitude and disposition, that she can not only not depend upon Prussia to execute their defensive Treaty by protecting her dominions in the event of their being attacked by Russia, but she cannot depend upon not being taken in flank by Prussia as the ally of Russia. Clarendon told me on Sunday that it was impossible to make out what Austria was about, or what she really means to do. There is no doubt about Prussia, and he still inclines to believe that Austria's disposition to act with us is unchanged, but that she is compelled to act a cautious and dilatory part by her uncertainty as to Prussia.

On Monday John Russell convoked his supporters and quasi-supporters to a gathering in Downing Street, when he harangued them on the state of affairs and the difficulties of the Government, intimating the necessity of being better supported if the Government was to go on at all. There are differences of opinion as to the way in which the meeting went off, and whether it was on the whole satisfactory. The principal speakers were Bright, Vernon Smith, and Horsman, the two latter bitter enough against the Government. Bright, rather hostile, spoke well and alluded to Aberdeen in a friendly spirit, as did Hume. The meeting gradually melted away, so that Lord John had no opportunity of making a reply, which was a pity, as he might have answered the objectors. The best proof, however, that on the whole it was successful, was afforded by the fact that

there was neither debate nor division on the War Secretary's estimate moved for by Lord John that night. All went off with the greatest ease. I am in hopes therefore that the Government is somewhat in better plight than it was.

*August 4th.*—I have been out of town for the greater part of the time since the 19th ultimo, at Goodwood, nearly ten days. Nothing very important has occurred in politics. As the session has drawn towards a close, the Government have, on the whole, done rather better in Parliament, that is, the Opposition have been quite incapable of striking any blows or doing them any injury. The points that were expected to be made against them entirely failed, and, with the exception of one personal matter, they have had no difficulties or annoyances to vex them. This matter was the case of —, the *dénouement* of which took place two days ago; after being Gladstone's private secretary for two years, this gentleman was appointed by Newcastle, just before he gave up the Colonies, to be Governor of South Australia. The appointment was criticised, but about ten days ago it was called in question in the House of Commons, and at the same time rumours were rife that he had been gambling in the funds and had lost money; he denied, and authorised his friends to deny the imputation, but some of the Carlton runners got scent of his transactions and followed it up with such perseverance that he became alarmed and thought himself obliged to prevent the shame and odium of detection by confessing the fact. The consequence was that the appointment was cancelled, and the whole matter explained and discussed on Thursday night in the House of Commons, when George Grey made a long statement. The discussion upon it was very creditable to the House, for there was no personal animosity and no coarseness or inhumanity displayed, but, on the contrary, forbearance and good nature towards the individual. Any expectation of being able to wound Gladstone through him has quite failed. He is a clever fellow enough and well educated, but he has been very imprudent, and contrived at once to lose his place of



private secretary, his government, his seat in Parliament, his character, and his money.

At last it does now appear as if Austria was going to join us completely against Russia, and the invasion of the Crimea is about to take place in complete ignorance of the means of resistance and defence possessed by Russia, and whether it will be a nearly impossible or comparatively easy enterprise.

Clarendon, when I saw him last Sunday, expressed great alarm at the state of affairs in Spain, from the weakness of Espartero, the difficulty of any cordial union between the military chiefs, so long rivals, and above all from the republican element which is so rife in Spain, and which may produce effects extending far beyond that country. He said that the French Government were acting in complete harmony and concert with us; the Emperor is much alarmed at the state of Spain, but resolved to go with us in the policy of non-interference, and to take no part but such as we should take also. If he adheres to this wise course, it will cement the alliance between the countries, and bind us to him more than anything that could happen, and it will form a great and happy contrast to the policy of Louis Philippe and the conduct of Palmerston and Guizot.

*August 14th.*—The session closed on Saturday, and, all things considered, the Government wound it up tolerably well. Clanricarde, true to the last to his spiteful opposition, gave Clarendon an opportunity of making a parting speech on foreign affairs, of which he acquitted himself very successfully, and placed himself and the Government in a very good position as respects our diplomacy and the conduct of the war. But though all immediate danger is removed from the Government, and, unless they fall to pieces during the recess by any internal dissensions, they will probably go on unscathed, the state of affairs is very unsatisfactory, and pregnant with future troubles and difficulties. The Government in its relations with the House of Commons throughout the past session has been extraordinary, and I believe unprecedented. From the Revolution to the time of the Reform

Bill, that is during 150 years, the system of Parliamentary government had been consolidating itself and was practically established; the Sovereign nominally, the House of Commons really, appointed the ministers of the Crown, and it was settled as an axiom that when the Government was unable to carry its measures, and was subjected to defeats in the House of Commons, its resignation was indispensable—not indeed that any and every defeat was necessarily fatal, because governments have often been beaten on very important questions without being ruined or materially weakened, but it was supposed that repeated defeats and Government measures repeatedly rejected implied the withdrawal of the confidence and support of Parliament so clearly that in the aggregate such defeats were equivalent to an absolute vote of want of confidence, which is in itself a sentence of political death. In former times the Crown was a power, and the House of Commons was a power, generally blended and acting harmoniously together, but sometimes resolving themselves into their separate elements, and acting independently, perhaps antagonistically, towards each other. In modern times, and more entirely in our own, this separate and independent action ceased, the Crown became identified with the majority of the House of Commons, and no minister, when he could no longer command that majority so as to be certain of carrying out all, or nearly all, his measures of government and legislation, could continue to be minister, and was obliged as a matter of course to surrender office to those who were in possession of, or could count upon, that command. The ministers were taken from the ranks of the Parliamentary majority, and when once appointed it was considered indispensable and certain that the same majority would place confidence in them, accept at their hands all the measures they should concert and propose, and support them against all hostile attacks, the spirit of party and combination suppressing all individual prejudices, crotchets, fancies, and partial or local influences. The Government and the party were bound by a sort of mutual allegiance to each other, and supposed to be, and usually were, animated by the

same spirit and a communion of opinion and interest. Such were the general relations and such the normal state of things, liable to occasional variations and disturbances, bringing about various political changes according to circumstances. But the system was complete, and practically it worked well, and conduced to the prosperity and progress of the country.

When the great measure of Reform in Parliament was introduced in 1831, apart from all question of party struggles there was the still greater question considered by many reflecting people, whether the new Parliamentary and electoral system would be found compatible with the old practice of government by means of party and steady Parliamentary majorities. The Duke of Wellington in particular expressed his apprehension that it would not, and he put the question which has so often been quoted and referred to, 'How is the King's Government to be carried on?' He did not, so far as I remember, develope his thoughts at the time, and argue the matter in detail, but it is very evident that what he anticipated was some such state of things as that at which we now appear to have arrived. For a long time his apprehensions appeared to be groundless, and certainly they were not realised by the course of events. In consequence of political circumstances which I shall not stop to specify and explain, notwithstanding all the changes which were effected, the governments contrived to go on without any insuperable difficulties, and without any striking difference from the way in which governments had been previously conducted. The popularity of the Reform Bill Administration supported them for a few years, and the Tory reaction, together with the great abilities of Sir Robert Peel, supported the Conservative Government for a few years more. Matters went on better or worse, as might be, till the great Conservative schism in 1846, which completely broke up that party, and produced a final separation between the able few and the numerous mediocrity of the party. Ever since that time the House of Commons has been in a state of disorganisation and confusion: the great party ties had been severed. After the repeal of the Corn Laws and the establishment of Free Trade it was difficult to

find any great party principles which could be converted into bonds of union, and every day it became obviously more and more difficult to form any government that could hope to be strong or permanent. John Russell succeeded on the fall of Peel, but the Peelites warmly resented the conduct of the Whigs in Peel's last struggle, and, though they hated Derby and his crew much more, never gave Lord John's Government a cordial support.

Next came the quarrel between Palmerston and Lord John and the fall of the Whig Government. Many people, and Graham especially, were of opinion that a Derby Government *for a time* was an inevitable but indispensable evil, and after one abortive attempt at length a Derby Government was formed. From the beginning nobody thought it could last; the wretched composition of it, its false position, and the mixture of inconsistency and insincerity which characterised it, deprived it of all respect, authority, and influence, and it was the more weak because divided and dissatisfied within, and because all the more honest and truthful of the party were disgusted and ashamed of the part they were playing. Thus feeble and powerless, despised by the public and detested by the Court, the first moment that the different parties and sections of parties combined to overthrow them, their destruction was inevitable, and after enjoying office for one year they fell.

It was easier to turn them out than to find a good and strong government to replace them. It was obvious that neither the Whigs nor the Peelites could form a government, still less Palmerston or the Radicals, and it became a matter of absolute necessity to attempt a coalition, which, whatever objections there might be to coalitions, would at least have the advantage of filling the several offices with able men.

When the Queen had a short time before, in anticipation of the event, consulted the Duke of Bedford as to whom she should send for when Derby resigned, he had advised her to send for Lord Lansdowne and Lord Aberdeen, being himself conscious that Lord John could not again form a government, at least not at that time. She did send for them, and each

of them very sincerely and earnestly endeavoured to persuade the other to accept the post of Prime Minister, and the task of forming a Government. Lansdowne was ill at the time, and while it is very doubtful whether anything would have induced him to come forward, his attack of gout was enough to ensure his peremptory refusal, and nothing remained but that Aberdeen should make the attempt. The task was difficult and unpleasant, for it was impossible not to make many people discontented and mortified, inasmuch as places could not be found for all who had previously been in office, or who aspired to it, and it was no easy matter to decide who should be taken in, and who left out. Aberdeen resolved to make the coalition very comprehensive, and as much as possible to form a government which should represent the Opposition which had turned Derby out, but he put almost all the Peelite leaders into good offices, and the exclusions were principally on the Whig side. For a long time it was very doubtful whether John Russell would enter the Government at all, but Aberdeen was so well aware that he could not do without him that he announced his determination to throw up the Government unless Lord John consented to join. After much hesitation, and a struggle between his family and some malcontent hangers on who wished him to keep aloof, on one side, and the wisest of his political friends and colleagues who urged that it was his duty to come forward on the other, Lord John consented to lead the House of Commons, but without an office. He proposed indeed to take the Presidency of the Council, to which Aberdeen objected, but gave him the choice of every other office. He said that if he could not be President of the Council he would be nothing at all, and so it was settled. Next came the negotiation about Palmerston, who first refused, and afterwards, at the pressing solicitation of Lansdowne, agreed to join. Molesworth came in to represent the Radicals; Monsell and Keogh (not in the Cabinet) represented the Irish, and so the Coalition Government was completed.

Very strongly composed, it never, however, was so strong as it looked. The Ministers, Aberdeen, John Russell, Pal-

merston, having consented to act together, were too sensible, too gentlemanlike and well-bred, not to live in outward good fellowship with each other, but their respective and relative antecedents could not be forgotten. There could be no real cordiality between Palmerston and Aberdeen, or between Palmerston and John Russell, and both the latter all along felt uncomfortable and dissatisfied with their respective positions. Lord John fancied he was degraded, and his flatterers endeavoured to persuade him he was so, by joining a government of which he was not the head, and by serving under Aberdeen. Palmerston could not forget the long and bitter hostility which had been carried on between himself and Aberdeen upon foreign policy, and still less his having been turned out of the Foreign Office by John Russell. The Whigs were dissatisfied that the Peelites, who had no party to bring to the support of the Government, should have so large a share of the offices, and above all the great bulk of the Whig party could not endure that a Peelite should be at the head of the Government, and of all the Peelites they most particularly disliked Aberdeen, so that they yielded a reluctant allegiance, and gave a grudging and capricious support to the coalition.

Nevertheless, the first session of Parliament was pretty well got through, principally owing to Gladstone's successful Budget, the great ability he displayed in the House of Commons, and the efficient way in which the public business was done, while the numerous measures of improvement which were accomplished raised the reputation of the Government, and gave them security if not strength. The session of 1853 closed in quiet, prosperity, and sunshine, but during the recess clouds began to gather round the Government; they were beset with internal and external difficulties. John Russell became more and more discontented, and at last he announced to Aberdeen that he was resolved not to meet Parliament again in his present position, and intimated his intention to be once more Prime Minister or to quit the concern. In the meantime the Turco-Russian quarrel had begun, the hostile correspondence with Russia was in full

activity, the public mind in a high state of excitement, the press bellowed for war and poured forth incessant volleys of abuse against the Government, but more particularly against Aberdeen, who was singled out as the object of attack, and the persevering attempts to render him unpopular produced a certain amount of effect. The Cabinet became divided as to the mode of carrying on the dispute and the negotiations, some being for what were called vigorous measures, that is, for threats and demonstrations of force which could only lead to immediate war, while others were for exhausting every attempt to bring about an accommodation and preserve peace. Something was known or suspected of these divisions, they were published and commented on with enormous exaggerations and the most unscrupulous violations of truth, and the Tory and Radical newspapers vied with each other in the violence of their denunciations of Aberdeen, and, in a less degree, of Clarendon.

When this fury was at its height, the world was startled and astounded by the news of Palmerston's resignation. It is needless to state here the history of that affair, which I have already recorded in ample detail. It was in vain that the 'Times' proclaimed that it was the Reform Bill and not the Eastern Question which was the cause of it. The statement was scouted with the utmost scorn, and the public incredulity was confirmed when the 'Morning Post,' which was notoriously devoted to Palmerston, asserted the direct contrary. Everybody imagined that the Government would go to pieces, that when Parliament met there would be prodigious revelations, and that the Eastern Question with its supposed mismanagement would prove fatal to the Coalition Cabinet. The Derbyites were in raptures, and already counted on Palmerston as their own. Great as had been the public surprise and the exultation of the Carlton Club at Palmerston's resignation, greater still was that surprise and the mortification and disappointment of the Carlton, when a few days afterwards it was announced that Palmerston had changed his mind and was not going to resign. Nobody could comprehend what it all meant, and ample scope was

afforded to every sort of conjecture, and to all the statements and inventions that anybody chose to circulate. But as about the same time the Eastern affair progressed a step or two, and some energetic measures were adopted, the most plausible explanation was, that Palmerston had resigned because enough was not done, that the Government had been frightened into doing what he had before advised, and that, on their adopting his suggestion, he had consented to remain. In process of time the truth began to ooze out, but it never was completely known till Parliament met, and even then many people continued to believe that though the Reform Bill was the pretext, the Eastern Question was the real cause of Palmerston's conduct.

These threatening clouds cleared away. Aberdeen told Lord John nothing should induce him to resign after all the attacks that had been made on him, and he would meet Parliament and defend himself. Lord John gave up his demands, and consented to go on leading the House of Commons. Palmerston agreed to swallow the Reform Bill, and at length Parliament met. Everybody was ravenous for the Blue Books, which as soon as possible were produced. Their production was eminently serviceable to the Government, and though some criticisms were made, and there were some desultory attacks in both Houses, and the press continued to be as scurrilous and abusive as ever, the general impression was extremely favourable. Clarendon's despatches were highly approved of, and all fair and candid observers, including many who had found fault with the Government before, declared that they were perfectly satisfied that our policy had been wise and proper, and the whole of the negotiations very creditable to all who had been concerned in carrying them on. So little did the event correspond with the general expectation, that the Eastern Question, which had been considered to be the weak part of the Government, turned out to be its greatest strength; and the war which eventually broke out has been the principal cause of their being able to maintain themselves in power. It is now the fashion to say that if it were not for the war,



they would have been turned out long ago. It is certainly true that their power in the House of Commons has been limited to all that concerns the war, in respect to which they have had no difficulty to contend with. The estimates have been granted without a semblance of opposition, and they have received hearty and unanimous support in every measure and every demand requisite for carrying on the war, nor, though exposed to some adverse criticism, have they been seriously assailed with regard to their diplomacy or their warlike preparations.

But while this, which is the most essential, has also been their strongest point, on everything else, without exception, they have been almost powerless, and the House of Commons has run riot with an independence and waywardness and a caprice of which it would be impossible to find an example. The Government has had no majority on which it could depend, and it has never brought forward any measure which it could count upon carrying through. Obligated to withdraw many measures altogether, and to submit to the alteration of others till they became totally different from what they originally proposed, their defeats have been innumerable, and nobody seems to have the smallest scruple in putting them in a minority upon any occasion; at the same time it was very evident that the House of Commons was determined that they should continue in office, for whenever any vital question arose, or any vote which could be construed into a question of confidence, and therefore involved the existence of the Government, they were always sure of a majority, and the Derbyite opposition, while they were able to worry and insult them by partial defeats and by exposing their general weakness, found themselves miserably baffled whenever they attempted anything which had a tendency to place the Government in serious embarrassment. The whole conduct of the Session, and the relations of the Government with the House of Commons, presented something certainly very different from what had ever been seen before in the memory of the oldest statesman, implied a total dissolution of party ties and obligations, and exhibited the Queen's Govern-

ment and the House of Commons as resolved into their separate elements, and acting towards each other in independent and often antagonistic capacities. Disraeli was always reproaching the Government with holding office on what he termed the unconstitutional principle of not being supported by a majority of the House of Commons, and of living from hand to mouth; but though this was a plausible topic, he knew very well that no other government could be formed which could exist otherwise, and that the House of Commons, while it buffeted the Government about *au gré de ses caprices*, was quite determined to keep it alive, and not to allow any other to be substituted for it. At present it is difficult to see how this state of things is to be altered, and time alone can show whether great parties will again be formed, and governments be enabled to go on as in times past, powerful in a consistent and continual Parliamentary support, or whether a great change must be submitted to, and governments be content to drag on a precarious existence, taking what they can get from the House of Commons, and endeavouring to strengthen themselves by enlisting public opinion on their side.

With regard to the prospects of this Government, much depends on the progress of the war; for though they have done their part and are not responsible for failure or success, they are sure to be strengthened by success or weakened by failure. But much depends also upon what passes in the Cabinet. John Russell, whose mind is in a state of chronic discontent which was suspended for a time, is again becoming uneasy and restless, and will soon begin making fresh difficulties. Then his Reform Bill, which he gave up so reluctantly, is still in his thoughts, and he will most likely insist upon bringing it forward again, a proposition which is sure to produce dissension in the Cabinet.

## CHAPTER VII.

Difficulties of the Campaign—Prince Albert and the King of Prussia—The Prince goes to France—Military Commanders—Critical Relations of the Ministers—The Crimea—The Emperor Napoleon and Prince Albert—Austria and the Allies—The Landing in the Crimea—The Battle of the Alma—Royal Invitations—The Crimean Expedition—Lord John's Hostility to his Colleagues—False Report from Sebastopol—The Crimean Campaign—Anecdotes of Lord Raglan—The Russian Defence—Trade with the Enemy—Anecdote of Nesselrode—John Bright's Opinion of the War—Defence of Sebastopol—The Balaklava Charge—The Judges at the Nomination of Sheriffs—Lord John takes more moderate Views—The Battle of Inkerman—Impolicy of the War—Inkerman—Spirit of the Nation—Military Enthusiasm—Parliament summoned—Want of Foresight—Accounts of the Battle—Lord Raglan as a General—Sufferings of the Army—Agreement with Austria—Opponents of the War—Meeting of Parliament—The Government attacked—The Foreign Enlistment Bill—Foreign Enlistment Bill passed—Mr. Bright's Speech on the War—Review of the Year.

*August 29th, 1854.*—I have been out of town since the above was written; at Grimston for York races, where Lord Derby was in high force and spirits, carrying everything before him at the races, and not a word was ever uttered on politics. There is no news, but dreadful accounts of the health of both armies and of the prevalence of cholera both abroad and at home. The French particularly, who have lost the most, are said to be completely demoralised and disheartened, and to abhor the war which they always disliked from the beginning. My present impression is that we shall come to grief in this contest; not that we shall be beaten in the field by the Russians, but that between the unhealthy climate, the inaccessibility of the country, and the distance of our resources, Russia will be able to keep us at bay, and baffle our attempts to reduce her to submission.

*September 4th.*—At The Grove for a couple of days, where

I had much talk with Clarendon, and he showed me a great many papers about different matters: a very good letter written by Prince Albert to the King of Prussia, who had written to him a hypocritical letter, asking where the English and French fleets were going to winter, and whether he might depend on them in case he was attacked by Russia in the Baltic, which Clarendon said was a mere artifice to obtain knowledge of our plans, that he might impart them to the Emperor Nicholas, as he well knew he was in no danger of being attacked by Russia. The Prince wrote an excellent answer, giving him no information, and entering into the whole question of Prussian policy without reserve. He starts to-day to Boulogne, invited by a letter from the Emperor himself, beginning 'Mon cher frère,' replied to very well and civilly by Prince Albert who began, 'Sire et mon cher frère.' Clarendon said Aberdeen was as hot as any one upon the Crimean expedition.

They are not at all satisfied with Lord Raglan, whom they think oldfashioned and pedantic, and not suited to the purpose of carrying on active operations. They wanted him to make use of the Turkish light cavalry, Bashi-Bazouks, who under good management might be made very serviceable, but he would have nothing to say to them; and still more they are disgusted with his discouragement of the Indian officers who have repaired to the army, and who are, in fact, the most efficient men there are. They look on General Brown as the best man there, and have great expectations of Cathcart. It is very curious that neither the Government nor the commanders have the slightest information as to the Russian force in the Crimea or the strength of Sebastopol. Some prisoners they took affirmed that there were 150,000 men in the peninsula, but nobody believes that, except Dundas who gives credit to it. They are impatient for the termination of Dundas's period of service, which will be in December, when Lyons will command the fleet.

*September 11th.*—I went to The Grove on Friday, but was brought up on Saturday by gout, and detained in London ever since. We had much talk about a variety of

things. The Prince is exceedingly well satisfied with his visit to the Emperor. The invitation to Windsor appears to have been publicly given in an after dinner speech. Clarendon said a great deal about the Government, its prospects and its difficulties, and of the conduct and dispositions of different men in it, that the Peelites had all behaved admirably, and he has a very high opinion of Newcastle, who is able, laborious, and fair. He does not see so much of Aberdeen as he did last year while the question of peace or war was still pending. He and Aberdeen do not very well agree, and therefore Aberdeen does not come to the Foreign Office as he used to do. I asked him in what they differed, and what it was Aberdeen now wanted or expected. He said that Aberdeen was quite of opinion that a vigorous prosecution of the war afforded the best chance of restoring peace, and that he was as eager as anybody for the expedition of Sebastopol, but he was out of humour with the whole thing, took no interest in anything that was done, and instead of looking into all the departments and animating each as a Prime Minister should do, he kept aloof and did nothing, and constantly raised objections to various matters of detail. In the Cabinet he takes hardly any part, and when differences of opinion arise he makes no effort to reconcile them, as it is his business to do. In short, though a very good and honourable man, he is eminently unfitted for his post, and in fact he feels this himself, has no wish to retain it, but the contrary, and only does so because he knows the whole machine would fall to pieces if he were to resign. John Russell Clarendon thinks a necessity as leader of the House of Commons, but he is disgusted with his perpetual discontent and the bad influence exercised over him by his confidants, and he thinks he has not acted a generous part towards Aberdeen in suffering him to be attacked and vilified as he has been by his (John's) followers and adherents, who endeavour to make a distinction between him and Aberdeen, which is equally unconstitutional on principle and false in fact. The same thing applies to Palmerston, and they have neither of them stood

forward as they ought to have done in Aberdeen's defence, and claimed a joint responsibility with him in every act of the Government. We talked over what could possibly be done if Aberdeen did retire, and I suggested that he (Clarendon) might take his place, and that the rest would be more willing to accept him for the head of the Government than any other man. He expressed the greatest disinclination to this idea, to which he never could consent, but owned his present office was extremely agreeable to him and deeply interesting. Nevertheless, I do not think, if the case occurred and the place was offered to him *consensu omnium*, that his scruples would be insurmountable.

So certain are they of taking Sebastopol that they have already begun to discuss what they shall do with it when they have got it. Palmerston wrote Clarendon a long letter setting forth the various alternatives, and expressing his own opinion that the Crimea should be restored to the Turks. Clarendon is dead against this, and so, he told me, is Stratford. At Boulogne the Emperor and Newcastle agreed that the best course will be to occupy the Crimea and garrison Sebastopol with a large force of English and French, and hold it *en dépôt* till they can settle something definitive; and Clarendon leans to this arrangement, which will at least be a gain of time.

*London, September 19th.*—At The Grove again last week, where as usual I heard a great deal of miscellaneous matters from Clarendon and read a great many despatches from different people. I asked him what the Prince had told him of his visit to Boulogne, and what his opinion was of the Emperor. He said the Prince had talked to him a great deal about it all at Osborne, and this is the substance of what he said as far as I recollect it: The Prince was very well satisfied with his reception; the Emperor took him in his carriage *tête à tête* to the great review, so that they conversed together long and without interruption or witnesses. The Emperor seems to have talked to the Prince with more *abandon* and unreserve than is usual to him. The Prince was exceedingly struck with his extreme apathy

and languor (which corresponds with what Thiers told me of him) and with his ignorance of a variety of matters which it peculiarly behoved him to know. He asked the Prince a great many questions about the English Constitution and its working, relating to which the Prince gave him ample and detailed explanation, and Clarendon said that all that he repeated as being said to the Emperor was as good, sound, and correct as it possibly could be. The Emperor said that he felt all the difficulties of his own position, and enlarged upon them with great freedom, particularly adverting, as one of them, to the absence of any aristocracy in France. The Prince, in reply to this, seems to have given him very judicious advice; for he told him that any attempt to *create* an aristocracy in France resembling that of England must be a failure, the conditions and antecedents of the two countries being so totally dissimilar; that he might confer titles and distinctions to any amount, and so surround himself with adherents whom he had obliged, but that he had better confine himself to that and not attempt to do more. When they parted, the Emperor said he hoped it would not be the last time he should have the pleasure of seeing His Royal Highness, to which the Prince replied that he hoped not, and that he was charged by the Queen to express her hope that he would pay her a visit at Windsor, and give her an opportunity of making the Empress's acquaintance, to which the Emperor responded 'he should be very glad to see the Queen at Paris.' This *insouciant* reception of an invitation which a few months before he would have jumped at is very unaccountable, but it meant something, for it was evidently a *mot d'ordre*, because when the Prince took leave of Marshal Vaillant, he said he hoped he would accompany the Emperor to Windsor, where, though they could show no such military spectacle as the Emperor had shown him, they would do what they could, to which Vaillant replied, 'We hope to see Her Majesty the Queen and Your Royal Highness at Paris.' There seems no disposition at present to give him the Garter which is supposed to be the object of his ambition, and which Walewski is always suggesting.

Clarendon is extremely disgusted at the conduct of Austria and her declaration of neutrality, and he said that the complaints of the doings of the Austrians in the Principalities were not without foundation. Drouyn de Lhuys spoke very openly to Hübner on the subject, and pitched into the Austrian Government without stint or reserve, and Cowley sent a despatch in which all he said was detailed, with the addition that it was Drouyn de Lhuys' intention to embody it in a formal despatch to Bourqueney to be communicated to the Austrian Government.

*September 22nd.*—The army has landed in the Crimea without opposition. It is difficult to conceive that the Russians should have been so utterly wanting in spirit, and so afraid to risk anything, as to let the landing take place without an attempt either by land or sea to obstruct it. They have a great fleet lying idle at Sebastopol, and though, if it had come out, its defeat and perhaps destruction would have been certain, it would have been better to perish thus, *vitam in vulnere ponens*, and inflicting damage on its enemy as it certainly might have done, than to remain ingloriously in harbour and wait to be taken or destroyed, as it infallibly will be when the town itself shall fall. Great indignation is expressed at the prospect of Napier's returning from the Baltic without making any attempt on Cronstadt, or to perform any exploit beyond the Bomarsund affair. He is detested by his officers, and they one and all complain that he has been so little adventurous, and maintain that more might have been done. The justness and correctness of this, time will show.

*October 2nd.*—At The Grove on Saturday, where I generally pick up some scraps of information from Clarendon on one subject or another. On Saturday came the news that Sebastopol had been taken, which we did not believe a word of, but after dinner the same evening we got the telegraphic account of the victory gained on the 20th on the heights above the Alma, and yesterday Raglan's telegraphic despatch was published. It is nervous work for those who have relations and friends in the army to hear of a 'desperate



battle' and severe loss, and to have to wait so many days for the details and casualties. The affair does not seem, so far as we can conjecture, to have been very decisive, when only two guns and a few prisoners were taken. If it had depended on St. Arnaud, the expedition would have put back even after it had sailed; while actually at sea, St. Arnaud, who stated himself to be ill and unable to move, summoned a council of war on board the 'Ville de Paris.' The weather was so rough that it was determined that it would not be safe for Raglan to go, as with his one arm he could not get on board; so Dundas went, and General Brown, and some other officers deputed by Raglan to represent himself, together with the French Admiral. A discussion took place which lasted several hours. St. Arnaud strongly urged that the expedition should be put off till the spring, and he objected to all that was proposed as to the place of landing—in short, threw every obstacle he could in the way of the whole thing. Dundas and all the English officers vehemently protested against any delay and change of plan, and represented the intolerable shame and disgrace of putting back after having actually embarked, and their opposition to the French general's proposal was so vehement that he ended by giving way, rose from his sick bed, and consented to go on. He declared that he only agreed to the place proposed for landing in consequence of the urgent representations of his allies, and this he wrote home to his own Government. He is a very incapable, unfit man, and Clarendon told me that his own army recognised the great superiority of Raglan to him, and that the French were all delighted with the latter.

It seems that there was some misunderstanding as to the invitation given by the Prince to the Emperor at Boulogne, and the latter gives a very different account of what passed from that given by the Prince. The Emperor says that when he took leave of the Prince, he said, 'I have not been able to give you such a reception as I could have wished, but you see I am only occupying an hotel; if you will come to Paris, where I should be delighted to receive the Queen, I could give her and yourself a more fitting reception;' and then, he

says, the Prince invited him to Windsor, which he only seems to have taken as a civility unavoidable under the circumstances. It is impossible to say which account is the true one, but I rather believe that of the Emperor to be correct. Clarendon wrote this to the Queen, whose answer I saw; she said the intention was to make the invitation something between a cordial invitation and a mere civility, which the Emperor might avail himself of or not, according to his convenience. However, Her Majesty says she thinks the matter stands very well as it is, and she desires it may be notified to the Emperor that the most convenient time for his visit, if he comes, will be the middle of November.

The Duke of Cambridge and Prince Napoleon have both been strongly opposed to the Crimean expedition; the latter, they say, does nothing but cry, and is probably a poor creature and a poltroon. I am surprised the Duke should be so backward; however, I hope to hear he has done his duty in the field. The clamour against Dundas in the fleet is prodigious, and the desire for his recall universal, but he will stay out his time now, which will be up in December. It is the same thing against Napier in the Baltic; he will come away as soon as the ice sets in, and next year Lyons will be sent in his place, as the war will then be principally carried on in the north.

I think a storm will before long threaten the Government from the quarter of John Russell, who has been for some time at Minto. He wrote to Clarendon the other day, and alluded to the necessity of having an autumn session, to which Clarendon replied that he was not so fond of Parliament as Lord John was, and deprecated very much any such measure. To this Lord John sent as odious and cantankerous an answer as I ever read, and one singularly illustrative of his character. He said that he was not fonder of Parliament than other people, and his own position in the House of Commons had not been such as to make him the more so, and that it had been rendered more disagreeable by the fact of the two morning papers which professed to support the Government being always personally hostile to him; but, he

went on, if we were fortunate enough to obtain a complete success in the Crimea, he did not see why he should not be at liberty to retire from this, which he thought the very worst government he had ever known. Of course, if there was any failure, he must remain to bear his share of the responsibility of it. Clarendon was immensely disgusted, but wrote back a very temperate answer. He said that it was equally difficult to go on with him and without him, for the Whigs, though often very angry with him, would follow him and would not follow anybody else. He thinks, however, that he is in a state of mind to create all sorts of embarrassments, and particularly that he will propose to bring forward his Reform Bill again, the consequences of which nobody can foresee. He says Palmerston has behaved much better, for though he might complain, having been disappointed in certain objects he had (such as being War Minister), he has made no difficulties, and been very friendly. Clarendon confirmed what I had heard, that Aberdeen is in a state of great dejection and annoyance at the constant and virulent attacks on him in the press; his mind is dejected by the illness of his son, whom he never expects to see again, and this renders him sensitive and fretful, and he is weak enough to read all that is written against him instead of treating it with indifference and avoiding to look at the papers whose columns are day after day full of outrageous and random abuse.

*October 8th.*—The whole of last week the newspapers without exception (but the ‘Morning Chronicle’ particularly), with the ‘Times’ at their head, proclaimed the fall of Sebastopol in flaming and triumphant articles and with colossal type, together with divers victories and all sorts of details, all which were trumpeted over the town and circulated through the country. I never believed one word of it, and entreated Delane to be less positive and more cautious, but he would not hear of it, and the whole world swallowed the news and believed it. Very soon came the truth, and it was shown that the reports were all false. Anybody who was not run away with by an exaggerated enthusiasm

might have seen the probability that reports resting on no good authority would probably turn out untrue, but the press took them all for gospel, and every fool follows the press. When the bubble burst, the rage and fury of the deluded and deluding journals knew no bounds, and the 'Times' was especially sulky and spiteful. In consequence of a trifling error in a telegraphic despatch they fell on the Foreign Office and its clerks with the coarsest abuse, much to the disgust of Clarendon.

*October 20th.*—At Newmarket all last week ; very successful on paper, but won very little money. I am every day more confirmed in my resolution to get rid of my racehorses, but shall do it gradually and as opportunities occur, and then confine myself to breeding. The two objects I now have in view are this, and to get out of my office. I want to be independent, and be able to go where and do what I like for the short remainder of my life. I am aware that 'man never is, but always to be blest,' and therefore when I have shaken off racing and office I may possibly regret both ; but my mind is bent on the experiment, and I fancy I can amuse myself with locomotion, fresh scenes, and dabbling in literature *selon mes petits moyens*. Of politics I am heartily sick, and can take but little interest in either governments or the individuals who compose them ; with the exception of Clarendon I am on intimate and confidential terms with no one.

Ever since the news came of the battle of the Alma, the country has been in a fever of excitement, and the newspapers have teemed with letters and descriptions of the events that occurred. Raglan has gained great credit, and his march on Balaklava is considered a very able and judicious operation. Although they do not utter a word of complaint, and are by way of being fully satisfied with our allies the French, the truth is that the English think they did very little for the success of the day, and Burghersh told some one that their not pressing on was the cause (and not the want of cavalry) why the Russian guns were not taken. The French, nevertheless, have been well disposed to take the credit of the victory to themselves.

Burghersh tells two characteristic anecdotes of Raglan. He was extremely put out at the acclamations of the soldiers when he appeared amongst them after the battle, and said to his staff as he rode along the line, in a melancholy tone, 'I was sure this would happen.' He is a very modest man, and it is not in his nature any more than it was in that of the Duke of Wellington to make himself popular with the soldiers in the way Napoleon used to do, and who was consequently adored by them. The other story is that there were two French officers attached to headquarters, very good fellows, and that the staff were constantly embarrassed by the inveterate habit Raglan had of calling the enemy 'the French.' He could not forget his old Peninsular habits.

In this war the Russians have hitherto exhibited a great inferiority in their conduct to that which they displayed in their campaigns from 1807 to 1812, when they fought the battles of Eylau and Borodino against Napoleon. The position of Alma must have been much stronger than that of Borodino, and yet how much more stoutly the latter was defended than the former. Then their having allowed the allies to land without molestation is inconceivable, and there is no doubt that they might have attacked Raglan with great effect as he emerged from the wood on his march to Balaklava, but all these opportunities they entirely neglected. I expect, however, that they will make a vigorous defence at Sebastopol, and that the place will not be taken without a bloody struggle and great loss of life.

Within the last few days a very important question has arisen, the decision of which is a very difficult matter. It has been found that the commerce of Russia has not been materially diminished, as their great staples (hemp, &c.) have passed regularly through the Prussian ports, being brought there by land, and it is now desired to devise some means of putting an end to this exportation. Clarendon has written to Reeve about it, and Granville has obtained returns of the amount of hemp and linseed imported from Russia in past years and in the present, from which it appears that though there is a diminution it is not a very considerable one. The

effect produced is only the inevitable consequence of the policy that was adopted deliberately and after great consideration at the beginning of the war; and how that policy is to be adhered to, and the consequences complained of prevented, is the problem to be solved. A blockade of the Prussian ports in the Baltic has been suggested—a measure, as it seems to me, very questionable in point of right and political morality, and certain to be attended by the most momentous consequences. Such a measure may not be without precedent, or something resembling precedent; but no Power with anything like self-respect or pride could tamely submit to such an outrage and such an insult, and as it would certainly afford a *casus belli*, Prussia could hardly, without abandoning all claim to be considered a great Power, abstain from declaring war *instantly*; and, whatever may be the sentiments of the Prussian nation and of the Germans generally with regard to Russia, it is by no means unlikely that such an arbitrary and imperious proceeding would enlist the sympathies and the passions of all Germans without exception in opposition to us, and to France if she became a party to it.

*Newmarket.*—Granville told me on Saturday morning that he was much alarmed at the disposition evinced by John Russell, and he expects an explosion sooner or later.

*London, October 30th.*—I returned last night and found a meeting of the Committee of Council settled for to-day, to consider the question of stopping Russian trade. Wilson has drawn up a paper in which he discusses the various modes of accomplishing this object, and recommends that the Queen should forbid all trade with Russia, and prohibit the importation of Russian produce, and require certificates of origin for tallow, hemp, &c. John Russell writes word that he cannot attend the meeting, but is ready, though reluctant, to vote for Wilson's proposal. Granville and Cardwell are both dead against it, after a discussion at the Council Office at which the majority were against the proposal.

*November 4th.*—At The Grove from Wednesday to Saturday; the Walewskis, Lavradios, Granvilles, Azeglio, and Panizzi were there, a pleasant party enough. Walewski told

me a curious thing which he said he knew to be true. We were talking of Nesselrode, and I asked if he knew what his present position was with his Emperor. He said he had been out of favour, but latterly had resumed all his influence and was very well at Court; that although in the beginning of the quarrel he had done his best to moderate the Emperor and to preserve peace, it was nevertheless true that he was perhaps the immediate cause of the war, which had turned upon the acceptance or refusal of the Turkish modifications of the Vienna Note; that when they arrived the Emperor was inclined to accept them, and that Nesselrode dissuaded him from doing so, advising him to adhere to the unaltered Note, not to listen to the modifications, and insisting that, if he did so, the allies would compel the Turks to waive their demands and to accept the Note in its original shape. Walewski also said that the Emperor was exceedingly incensed when the fatal circular, which made the Vienna Note an impossibility, was published. He said it was never intended for publication, and he found great fault with the document itself, insisted on knowing by whom it had been composed, and ordered the author to be brought before him. The man (whose name I forget) was not to be found, and events which pressed on drove it out of His Majesty's mind.

In the 'Times' of yesterday appeared a very able letter of Bright's with his view of the war, and the faults committed by our Government in respect to it, which letter as nearly as possible expresses my own opinion on the subject. I have never agreed with those who fancy that by mere bluster we might have averted the war, but I think by more firmness towards not only Russia but towards Turkey, and still more towards the press and the public excitement here, together with a judicious employment of the resources of diplomacy, we might have prevented it. However, we are in for it, and I not only see no chance of getting soon out of it, but I do not feel the same confidence that everybody else does, that we are certain to carry it to a successful end.

*London, November 13th.*—At Worsley all last week; nothing was thought of but the war, its events and vicissitudes.

The tardiness of intelligence and the perplexity and agitation caused by vague reports and telegraphic messages drive everybody mad ; from excessive confidence, the public, always nose-led by the newspapers, is fallen into a state of alarm and discouragement. There is no end to the mischief which the newspapers and their correspondents have done, are doing, and no doubt will continue to do. There does not seem at this moment more reason to doubt that we shall take Sebastopol than there ever was, but the obstinate defence of the Russians indicates that its capture will not be effected without a tremendous struggle and great sacrifice of life. On the other hand, the Russians, instead of despairing of being able to hold the place, are full of confidence that they will be able to protract their defence, till our losses, and still more the weather, will compel us to raise the siege, and then they expect to compel us to abandon the Crimea altogether, and to make our re-embarkation a dangerous and disastrous operation. It is to be hoped that such a calamitous result is not in store for us, but there is no disguising from ourselves that we have got a much tougher and more difficult job on our hands than we ever contemplated, and that our success is by no means such a certainty as we have all along flattered ourselves that it would be ; for supposing we succeed in entering the place by storm, our work will then be not nearly done. Sebastopol is not invested, and when the Russian garrison finds itself no longer able to hold the place, there is nothing to prevent its evacuating it on the other side and effecting a junction with the main Russian army. We shall then have to reduce the forts on the northern side, to put the place in a state of defence, and commence a fresh campaign against Menschikoff in the centre of the Crimea. All this presents an endless succession of difficulties, demanding large supplies and resources of all sorts which it will be no easy matter to afford. We are now talking of sending every soldier we possess to the scene of action, and expending our military resources to the last drop, leaving everything else at home and abroad to take care of itself, a course which nothing but an extreme



necessity can justify, while at the same time it cannot be denied that having gone so far we cannot stop halfway, and having committed so large a part of our gallant army in this unequal contest, we are bound to make the greatest exertions and sacrifices to prevent their being overwhelmed by any serious disaster. But this very necessity only affords fresh ground for condemning the rashness with which we plunged into such a war and exposed ourselves to such enormous dangers, and incurred such large sacrifices for so inadequate an object.

It is not very easy to ascertain what the feeling is in Russia about the war, but there is reason to believe that the nobles are getting very sick of it, and are very discontented with the Emperor, not so much for having engaged in it as for the manner in which it has been carried on. At St. Petersburg there prevails an intense hostility to us, and great wrath against Austria, and instead of yielding, or any thought of it, the notion is that they mean to redouble their efforts next year, and bring into the field far greater forces than they have yet done. I perceive that the question of the disposal of the Crimea (when we get it) is still undecided. Some fancy that we ought to hold it, as a great advantage to have the power of offering it back to Russia when the question of peace arises. I am more inclined to the other view, of destroying the place, and if possible the harbour, and, after carrying off or destroying all the ships, to abandon the peninsula and leave the Russians to reoccupy it if they please. This would be very consistent with the object with which the war was professedly undertaken, and the Crimea, without Sebastopol and without a fleet, would be no longer formidable to Turkey for many a year to come; but no doubt there would be difficulty in this as in any arrangement, and much difference of opinion, not unlikely to produce dissension, amongst our allies and ourselves. There is good reason to believe that our late naval attack on the forts was a blunder, and that it did no good whatever. If Lyons had been in command, he probably would have declined to make it, and he could have ventured to exercise his own discretion, which

Dundas could not. Then it was very badly arranged, and this was the fault of the French Admiral, who at the last moment insisted on altering the plan of attack, and (contrary to the advice of all his officers) Dundas gave way to him. In this, however, it is not fair to blame the English Admiral, who may have acted wisely; for his position was delicate and difficult, and he had to consider the alliance of the countries and the harmonious action of the two fleets, as well as the particular operation.

*November 14th.*—Yesterday morning we received telegraphic news of another battle, from which we may expect a long list of killed and wounded. The affair of the 25th, in which our light cavalry was cut to pieces, seems to have been the result of mismanagement in some quarter, and the blame must attach either to Lucan, Cardigan, Captain Nolan who was killed, or to Raglan himself. Perhaps nobody is really to blame, but, if any one be, my own impression is that it is Raglan. He *wrote* the order, and it was his business to make it so clear that it could not be mistaken, and to give it conditionally, or with such discretionary powers as should prevent its being vigorously enforced under circumstances which he could not foresee, or of which he might have no cognisance.

It is evidently the plan of the Russians to wear out the allied armies by incessant attacks and a prolonged defence, sacrificing enormous numbers of men which they can afford, but considering that they gain on the whole by the disproportionate, but still considerable, losses they inflict upon us. It is quite on the cards, if they can keep up the spirit of their men, who show great bravery though they cannot stand against our's, that they may *cunctando restituere rem*, and compel us at last to raise the siege, and at St. Petersburg they are very confident of this result. Here, though people are no longer so confident and elated as they were, no human being doubts of our ultimately taking the town.

Yesterday we had rather an amusing scene in the Court of Exchequer at the nomination of sheriffs, which does not often supply anything lively. The Head of Caius College,

Cambridge, and this year Vice-Chancellor, was on the list, and Judge Alderson vehemently protested against his remaining there. A long discussion ensued, in which almost everybody took part, whether his name should be kept on or not, and if he should be struck off the roll. At last Alderson moved he should be struck off, to which somebody moved as an amendment (a course I suggested) that he should be omitted, but not struck off. It was to be put to the vote, when I asked if Alderson himself could vote, whether it was not a meeting of the Privy Council, at which the judges *attended* to give in names for sheriffs, and that Privy Councillors only could vote as to the choice of them. Alderson vehemently denied this view, and asserted that it was no meeting of the Privy Council, the proof of which was that the Chancellor of the Exchequer took precedence of the Lord President, and that the puisne judges had a right to vote. They then desired to see the Act of Richard II., which the Chancellor examined and read out, and afterwards he gave it as his opinion that the judges could vote, and this opinion was acquiesced in by the rest. Ultimately they all agreed, Alderson included, to accept the course I had proposed, and the Doctor's name was omitted from the list, but not struck off the roll.

*November 15th.*—The Duke of Bedford tells me that Lord John is in a better frame of mind than was apprehended not long ago, by no means satisfied with his own situation, and complaining of much that appertains to the Government, but conscious that his position cannot be altered at present, and not at all disposed by any captious conduct to break up or endanger the Government itself. With regard to Reform he is extremely reasonable, feeling the difficulty of his own antecedents in regard to the question; he is ready to conform himself to the necessities of the case, and does not think of urging anything unreasonable and impracticable. He is naturally enough very anxious that the Government should manage their affairs in Parliament better this year than last, and not expose themselves to so many defeats and the mortification of having their measures rejected or spoilt, and

his notion seems to be that they should introduce and announce fewer measures, only such as are urgent and generally desired, and such as they may reasonably expect to carry, and, having taken that course, to stand or fall by them; this is the wisest and most becoming course, and I hope it will be adhered to and succeed. Its success depends very much on Lord John's own conduct, and the way in which he treats the Whig and Liberal party. I hear nothing of the intentions and expectations of the Opposition, but Lyndhurst tells me he considers them extinct as a party and in no condition to get into power. He spoke very disparagingly of Disraeli, and said his want of character was fatal to him, and weighed down all his cleverness.

*November 16th.*—A telegraphic despatch arrived from Raglan with account of the battle of the 5th,<sup>1</sup> from which we learn only that we were entirely successful in repulsing the Russian attack, but that our loss was very great. Another long interval of suspense to be succeeded by woe and mourning; but besides the private misery we have to witness, the aggregate of the news fills me with the most dismal forebodings. Raglan says the Russian force was even greater than at Alma, and vastly superior to his own. Menschikoff says that he is assembling all his forces, and preparing to take the offensive, that their numbers are very superior, and he confidently announces that he shall wear us out, and that our army *cannot escape him*. I do not see how the siege is to be continued by an army itself besieged by a superior force and placed between two fires. The reinforcements cannot possibly arrive in time, and even if they were all there now, they would not be sufficient to redress the balance. I dread some great disaster which would be besides a great disgrace. Whether every exertion possible has been made here to reinforce Raglan, or whether anything more could have been done, I cannot pretend to say; but if matters turn out ill there will be a fine clamour, and principally from those rash and impatient idiots who were so full of misplaced confidence, and who insisted on precipitating

<sup>1</sup> [The battle of Inkerman was fought on November 5.]

our armies on the Crimea, and on any and every part of the Russian territory, without knowing anything of the adequacy of our means for such a contest. To overrate the strength and power of the allies, and to underrate that of Russia on her own territory, has been the fault and folly of the English public, and if they find themselves deceived in their calculations and disappointed in their expectations, their rage and fury will know no bounds, and be lavished on everybody but themselves. In the height of arrogance few exceptions were found to those who imagined it would be quite easy to crumple up Russia, and reduce her to accept such terms as we might choose to impose upon her. All the examples which history furnishes were disregarded, and a general belief prevailed that Russia would be unable to oppose any effectual or prolonged resistance to our forces combined. When the successes of the Turks at the beginning of the war became known, this confidence not unnaturally became confirmed, and boundless was the contempt with which the Russians were treated; and the bare idea of granting peace to the Emperor except on the most ruinous and humiliating terms was scouted. We now see what sort of a fight the Russians can make; and though the superhuman valour and conduct of our troops still inspire confidence and forbid despair, it is evident that we have rashly embarked in a contest which from the nature of it must be an unequal one, and that we are placed in a position of enormous difficulty and danger.

*November 23rd.*—Last week at Savernake and at The Grange; came back on Tuesday; and yesterday morning arrived the despatches with an account of the furious battle of Inkerman, in which, according to Raglan's account, 8,000 English and 6,000 French resisted the attack of 60,000 Russians, and eventually defeated and drove them back with enormous loss, our own loss being very great. The accounts of Raglan and Canrobert do not quite agree as to the numbers engaged, but, admitting that there may be some exaggeration in the estimate of the numbers of the Russians and of their loss, it still remains one of the most wonderful feats of arms that was ever displayed; and, gallantly as our troops have

always behaved, it may be doubted if they ever evinced such constancy and heroism as on this occasion—certainly never greater. My brother lost his youngest and favourite son in this battle—a boy of 18, who had only landed in the Crimea a few weeks before, and who was in a great battle for the first and last time. This is only one of innumerable instances of the same kind, and half England is in mourning. It is dreadful to see the misery and grief in which so many are already plunged, and the universal terror and agitation which beset all who have relations engaged in the war. But the nation is not only as warlike as ever, but if possible more full of ardour and enthusiasm, and thinking of nothing but the most lavish expenditure of men and money to carry on the war; the blood that has been shed appears only to animate the people, and to urge them to fresh exertions. This is so far natural that I, hating the war, feel as strongly as anybody that, now we are in it, and our soldiers placed in great jeopardy and peril, it is indispensable to make every possible exertion to relieve them; and I am therefore anxious for ample reinforcements being sent out to them, that they may not be crushed by overwhelming force.

In reading the various and innumerable narratives of the battle, and the comments of the ‘correspondents,’ it is impossible to avoid coming to some conclusions which may nevertheless be erroneous; and I have always thought that people who are totally ignorant of military matters, and who are living at ease at home, should not venture to criticise operations of which they can be no judges, and the conduct of men who cannot explain that conduct, and who are nobly doing their duty according to their own judgement, which is more likely to be right than any opinions we can form. With this admission of fallibility, it still strikes me that there was a lack of military genius and foresight in the recent operations. It is asserted that our position was open and undefended, that General Evans had recommended that precautions should be taken and defences thrown up, all of which was neglected, and nothing done, and hence the sad slaughter which took place. This was Raglan’s fault, if any fault

there really was. It is admitted that no tactical skill was or could be displayed, and the battle was won by sheer courage and firmness. Then Cathcart seems to have made a false and very rash move which cost his own life and 500 men besides. These are melancholy reflexions, and the facts prove that we have no Wellingtons in our army now.

*November 26th.*—Government have determined to call Parliament together on the 12th of December, though it stands prorogued to the 14th. This is done under the authority of an Act, 37th George III. ch. 120. In the present state of affairs they are quite right, and it is better for them to have fair Parliamentary discussion than clamour and the diatribes of the press out of doors. The ‘Times,’ as usual, has been thundering away about reinforcements, and urging the despatch of troops that do not exist and cannot be created in a moment. I had a great battle with Delane the other day about it, and asked why he did not appeal to the French Government, who have boundless military resources, instead of to our’s who have none at all, and accordingly yesterday there was a very strong article entirely about French reinforcements.

In the course of our talk he did, I must confess, make some strong charges against the Government, and particularly Newcastle. He complained that after the expedition was sent to the Crimea they remained idle, and made no attempt to form an army of reserve or to send continual reinforcements to supply the casualties which everybody knew must occur, and this is true. Again, when he returned from the East<sup>1</sup> he went to Newcastle and urged him to make an immediate provision of wooden houses against the winter, which would in all probability be required, and he suggested that this should be done at Constantinople, where, all the houses being built of wood and the carpenters very skilful, it might easily be done at a comparatively small expense, and whence the conveyance was expeditious and cheap. His advice was not taken; nothing was done, and now that the

<sup>1</sup> [Mr. Delane had gone to the theatre of war in the autumn, and was there with Mr. Kinglake, the brilliant historian of the Crimean War.]

winter is come, and the troops are already exposed to dreadful suffering and privation, the work is begun here, where it will cost four times as much and, when done, will require an enormous time to convey the houses to the Crimea, besides taking up the space that is urgently required for other purposes. I was obliged to confess that this was inexcusable negligence and blundering, and I repeated what had passed to Granville last night, who could make no defence, and only said that Newcastle, with many merits, had the fault of wishing to do everything himself, and therefore much was not done at all; and that the fact was, nobody ever imagined we should be reduced to such straits, and there was a universal belief that all would have been over in the Crimea before this, and that such things would not be required. I am afraid Newcastle, who is totally ignorant of military affairs of every sort, is not equal to his post, and hence the various deficiencies; nor is Sidney Herbert much better—very well both of them in ordinary times, but without the ability or the resource necessary to deal with such an emergency as the present.

I saw a letter yesterday from Charles Windham, a Q.-M.-General on poor Cathcart's staff, with an account of the battle, and he says that if, directly after the march on Balaklava, Sebastopol had been assaulted, it must have been taken. This corresponds with the reports of Russian deserters, who declare that there were only 2,000 men in the place after the battle of Alma. There is always so much difference of opinion and fault finding in such affairs that it is not easy to come to a sound conclusion thereupon.

*November 29th.*—My surviving nephew arrived from the Crimea yesterday morning. He gave me an account of the battle, and denies that General Cathcart ever refused, or was ever offered, the aid of General Bosquet, as has been stated. He says that Cathcart was not in command, and it was not therefore to him that the offer would have been made, and that Cathcart did not go into action till he was sent for by General Pennefather, when he got his Division out, and went on the field. He was killed quite early, about



twenty minutes after he reached the field of battle. My nephew confirms what has been said about the non-fortification of the position, which seems to have been an enormous blunder, against which most of the Generals of Division remonstrated. He says Cathcart was opposed to the expedition to the Crimea, not thinking they were strong enough, and he strongly advised, and in opposition to Raglan, that the place should be attacked immediately after the battle of Alma, while the Russians were still panic struck, and before they had time to fortify the town on the south side. He says he left the army in good health and spirits, but not expecting to take Sebastopol this year. Their sufferings had not been very great, though it was a hard life—plenty to eat, but mostly salt meat. He thinks, though the French behaved very gallantly and their arrival saved the army, that they might have done more than they did; and a body of them that came late on the field actually never stirred and did nothing whatever.

In the evening I met Clarendon at the Travellers', and had a long talk with him about all sorts of things. He has been much disturbed at the 'Times,' especially as to two things—its violent abuse of Austria and its insertion of a letter from the Crimea, reflecting severely on Prince Napoleon. With regard to Austria it is peculiarly annoying, because we are now on the point of concluding a tripartite Treaty which is actually on its way to Vienna, and in a day or two it will be decided whether she signs it or not; and nothing is more calculated to make her hang back than such articles in the 'Times.' Then as to Prince Napoleon, it has annoyed the Emperor and all his family beyond expression, and to such a degree that Drouyn de Lhuys has written an official letter to Walewski about it—a very proper and reasonable letter, but still expressing their vexation, and entreating that such attacks may, if possible, be prevented for the future.

We talked over Lord Raglan and his capacity for command, and we both agreed that he had given no proofs of his fitness for so mighty a task. Clarendon said he was struck

with the badness of his private letters, as he had been from the beginning by those from Varna, showing that he had evidently not a spark of imagination and no originality. We both agreed that it would never do to hint a doubt about his merits or capacity, and at all events that he is probably equal to anybody likely to be opposed to him. His personal bravery is conspicuous, and he exposes himself more than he ought. It is said that one of his aides-de-camp remonstrated with him and received a severe rebuff, Raglan telling him to mind his own business, and if he did not like the fire to go to the rear. Clarendon says there is no chance of taking Sebastopol this year, nor of taking it at all till we have an army strong enough to drive the Russians out of the Crimea. For this, 150,000 men would be required to make it a certainty; but with this force, no Russian army, however numerous, could resist the allies, and then the place would fall. This is a distant prospect. I expressed my wonder at the Russians being able to obtain supplies, and he said they got them from the Don and from Kertch.

*December 5th.*—I was at Middleton on Saturday and returned yesterday. There I saw a letter from Stafford, who is at Constantinople tending the sick and wounded, writing for and reading to them, and doing all the good he can—a very wise and benevolent way of re-establishing his reputation and making his misdeeds at the Admiralty forgotten.<sup>1</sup> He says he had heard so much of the sufferings and privations of the soldiers, and of the bad state of the hospitals, that he resolved to go there and judge for himself of the truth of all that had been written and asserted on the subject; that he did so, and found the very worst accounts exceeded by the reality, and that nothing could be more frightful and appalling than it all was. It had greatly improved, but still was bad enough. The accounts published in the ‘Times,’

<sup>1</sup> [Mr. Augustus Stafford had been Secretary to the Admiralty under Lord Derby's first Administration, where he was supposed not to have done well; but when the accounts arrived of the sufferings and privations of the army in the dreadful winter of 1854–5, Mr. Stafford was one of the first persons to go out and endeavour to relieve the deplorable condition of the troops.]

therefore, turn out to be true, and all the aid that private charity could supply was no more than was needed. I believe there has been no lack of zeal and humanity here, but a great deal of ignorance and inexperience, and, above all, culpable negligence on the part of Lord Stratford, who had *carte blanche* from the Government as to expense, and who, after having done his best to plunge us into this war, might at least have given his time and attention to provide relief for the victims of it; but it seems that from some fit of ill-temper he has chosen to do nothing, and evinced nothing but indifference to the war itself and all its incidents ever since it broke out. This I am assured is the case. His wife has been very active and humane, and done all she could to assist Miss Nightingale in her mission of benevolence and charity. But to return to Stafford's letter. He says that while nothing could exceed the heroism of our soldiers, the incapacity of their chiefs was equally conspicuous, and that the troops had no confidence in their leaders; he adds, it is essential to give them a good general if the war goes on. This, and much more that I have heard, confirms the previous impression on my mind that Raglan is destitute of military genius or skill, and quite unequal to the command of a great army. It does not appear, however, that the enemy are better off than we are in this respect, and we do not know that in England a better general would now be found. The man, Stafford says, in whom the army seem to have the greatest confidence is Sir Colin Campbell. All this is very serious, and does not tend to inspire a great expectation of glorious results. From what Clarendon said to me it is evident that *he* does not think much of Raglan, but it would never do to express any doubt of his ability or of his measures in public. Delane told me yesterday that he had received letters without end in this sense, and that he entertained the same doubts that I did, but should take care not to give utterance to them in the 'Times.' This reserve is the more necessary and even just because, after all, the opinions may not be well founded; and, as it is impossible to change the command, it is very desirable not to weaken the authority

and self-confidence of the General by casting doubts upon his conduct of the war.

*December 11th.*—For the last week the Austrian Treaty has occupied everybody's thoughts, though, as the exact terms of it are not yet known, people do not very well know what to expect from it. The great question that lies behind it is, whether Prussia will follow in the wake of Austria, and the rest of Germany with her. If all Germany joins the Allies it seems absolutely impossible that Russia should offer any effectual resistance to such a combination of forces; and it will then be to be seen what impression can be made on an Empire which, with many political deficiencies, nature has made so strong for defensive purposes, and, if the contest continues, whether the opinions and object of the Allies will not diverge and ultimately break up the alliance.

Bright has published his letter in a penny form (or somebody has done it for him) with *pièces justificatives* extracted from the Blue Books and from other sources, and in my opinion he makes out a capital and unanswerable case. He does not, indeed, prove, nor attempt to prove, that the Emperor of Russia is in the right absolutely, but he makes out that he is in the right as against England and France, and he shows up the conduct of the Western Powers very successfully. But in the present temper of the country, and while the war fever is still raging with undiminished violence, all appeals to truth and reason will be totally unavailing. Those who entertain such opinions either wholly or in part do not dare to avow them, and all are hurried along in the vortex. I do not dare to avow them myself; and even for holding my tongue, and because I do not join in the senseless clamour which everywhere resounds, I am called 'a Russian.' The progress of the contest has changed the nature of public opinion, for now its principal motive is the deep interest taken in the success of our arms and the safety of the band of heroes who have been fighting in the Crimea. This is, of course, right and patriotic, and a feeling which must be common to those who have been against, and those who have been for the war.

*Panshanger, December 14th.*—The debates on Tuesday night were on the whole satisfactory, and not bad for the Government. Derby made a slashing, effective philippic on the text of 'Too late,' asserting that the fault of the Government had been that they had done everything too late. Newcastle answered him, but was dull and feeble, totally unequal to meet Derby in debate. His case was not bad, but he could not handle it with effect. Government did better in the Commons, where Sidney Herbert made a capital speech, and produced a very good case in a very complete and satisfactory manner. He proved that reinforcements had been sent out month after month, and that they had never folded their hands and stood still as Derby charged them with having done. All the rage for the war which is apparent in the country was manifested in both Houses. According to present appearances, there will be very little done on the part of the Opposition against the Government during this short session.

*December 17th.*—These smooth appearances were deceitful, for the Government met with an unexpected and violent opposition to their Foreign Enlistment Bill, and only carried the second reading by a majority of 12. Ellenborough, puffed up with conceit and soured by disappointment and the nullity of his position, commenced a furious attack on this bill in an able speech replete with bitterness and sarcasm. Derby, too happy to join in any mischief, brought the support of his party, and a debate ensued, in which, as usual, the speaking of Ellenborough and Derby gave them the advantage, but the Government got a majority enough for their purpose. The bill itself is very unpopular, nobody can tell why, except that all sorts of misrepresentations were made about it the first night, and people have not yet been undeceived. I doubt if it was worth while to bring in such a bill, but it is certain if they had not done so, and immediately, they would have been furiously reproached by those who oppose them now, and above all accused of being 'too late.' The imprudent speech which John Russell made about Austria the first night elicited a violent attack

on him in the 'Times,' which is sure to have put him in very bad humour. The speech and the attack were equally unjustifiable and mischievous. I have no idea why he said what he did, unless it was for the sake of appearing to fall in with the vulgar prejudice against Austria.

*December 18th.*—The dislike of the Foreign Enlistment Bill is very general, but nobody can give any reason for their opposition to it.<sup>1</sup> It is, however, so great that it is not certain that it can be carried through the House of Commons, and so little is the Government cared for that I doubt many being found who will incur the resentment of their constituents or give an unpopular vote to save them. If they should be beaten, I think they must go out. John Russell is in a bad disposition of mind, as may be gathered from his *entourage*, who are in rabid opposition. Lord John, however, will probably do what he can to make this measure go down, as I find he is himself the author of it; but I much doubt if he would care for the Government being broken up, and he is not unlikely to regard such a catastrophe as the event best calculated to restore him to the post he so much covets. It is certainly possible that Derby, conscious he could not make a Government himself, would offer to support the Whig section of this Cabinet with all the Peelites eliminated from it, and that an attempt might be made to form a Government with Lord John, Palmerston, and perhaps Ellenborough. However, all this is vague speculation, and not worth following out.

*December 20th.*—Government got a majority of 39, better than was expected. Lord John threatened to resign if he was beaten. The debate will not do them much good when it is read, nor serve to render their measure more popular. Everybody thinks the whole affair has been grossly mismanaged, and that, instead of making a mystery of their

<sup>1</sup> [The object of the Foreign Enlistment Bill was to enable the Government to enlist 15,000 foreigners in the British army to be drilled in this country. It was denounced and opposed especially in the House of Lords as a dangerous and unconstitutional measure, but it eventually passed, and a considerable number of Germans were enlisted under it.]

intentions, they ought to have thrown out such intimations of them as would have elicited public opinion; but the truth is, not one of them had the least suspicion that the measure would meet with any resistance or even objection, nor would there have been any if Ellenborough had not started the hare, and then Derby and his party joyfully availed themselves of the opportunity to do mischief, and joined in the cry. When the bill was announced, Derby never dreamt of opposing it. The arguments against the measure seem to me very plausible, except the constitutional one, which is all stuff, and in which none of those who urge it are sincere; on the other hand, the former precedents do not apply in this case. The best argument for it is, that Raglan wants trained men as soon as possible, and complains that they send nothing but boys, who are of little use at first, and who die in great numbers under the hardships and privations the climate and the operations inflict on them. Not only were the Government totally unconscious of the opposition they should encounter, but, when they found the steam was getting up, they neglected to enter into such explanations and make out such a case as might, if well done, have extinguished dissension in the beginning. All this displays a want of prudence and foresight, for in a matter of such importance it is not enough to say that they did not expect any fault to be found with their proposal, and they ought to have employed some means to see what was likely to be thought of it before they committed themselves to it. They ought to have ascertained how it was to be carried into effect, and if they could count upon its success, and to be able to give Parliament some assurance of it, instead of saying they had taken no initiative steps out of affected deference to constitutional scruples, and knew not how they were to get the men they are asking for. It seems the general opinion of their own friends that they have mismanaged their case, and plunged into a difficulty they might have avoided. The best way of avoiding it would have been to raise a regiment or two without applying to Parliament at all, mustered and arrayed them at Malta or at

Heligoland, or wherever they pleased out of England, and sent them off as an experiment to the Crimea. Then, if they had done good service, and Raglan had expressed his satisfaction and asked for more, they might have raised any number and landed them here without cavil or objection; but to have adopted this course they must have seen the necessity of feeling their way, which not one of them did. The great complaint now is the want of organisation and good arrangement in the Crimea and generally at and about the seat of war, the confusion that has taken place in forwarding and distributing supplies, and the want of all expedients for facilitating the service in its various branches. There is much truth in all this, but the responsibility for it rests upon Raglan, who, if he had been of a prompt and energetic character, would have looked to these things, seen what was wanting, and have taken care to provide everything and set the necessary machinery in motion. He had *carte blanche* from the Government as to money and everything else, and, if he had concerted what was necessary with Stratford, and insisted on his exerting himself, I believe none of the complaints would have been made, and none of the deficiencies have been found. This is what the Duke of Wellington would have done, and his despatches are full of proofs that it is what he was always doing.

*December 24th.*—The third reading of the Enlistment Bill carried by 38, after a very fine speech from Bright, consisting of a part of his letter with its illustrations. In my opinion this speech was unanswerable, and no attempt was made to answer it. He was very severe on both Lord John and Palmerston. It is impossible that such reasoning as Bright's should not make *some* impression in the country; but I do not think any reasoning however powerful, or any display of facts however striking, can stem the torrent of public opinion, which still clamours for war and is so burning with hatred against Russia that no peace could be deemed satisfactory, or even tolerable, that did not humble Russia to the dust and strip her of some considerable territory. Yesterday the 'Times' ventured on an article



against Raglan as the cause of the disorder and confusion and consequent privations which prevail in the army. Delane wrote to me about it, and said he was aware he should be bitterly reviled for speaking these truths. I agree entirely with what he said, and see no reason why the saddle should not be put upon the right horse.

*The Grove, December 31st, 1854.*—The last day of one of the most melancholy and disastrous years I ever recollect. Almost everybody is in mourning, and grief and despair overspread the land. At the beginning of the year we sent forth an army amidst a tumult of joyous and triumphant anticipation, and everybody full of confidence and boasting and expecting to force the Emperor Nicholas in the shortest possible time humbly to sue for peace, and the only question was, what terms we should vouchsafe to grant him, and how much of his dominions we should leave him in possession of. Such presumptuous boasting and confidence have been signally humbled, and the end of this year sees us deploring the deaths of friends and relations without number, and our army perishing before the walls of Sebastopol, which we are unable to take, and, after bloody victories and prodigies of valour, the Russian power hardly as yet diminished or impaired. All last week I was at Hatchford with Lord Grey, when we did nothing but talk over the war, its management and mismanagement, Raglan, etc. Grey's criticisms are clever and not unfair, far from favourable to the Government, but detesting Derby, of whom he has the worst opinion, formed from a very ancient date and upon long experience of his character and conduct. Grey's idea is that there has been much mismanagement here and still greater on the spot, and that Raglan is quite incompetent and, as far as we can see, nobody else any better. The opinion about Raglan appears to be rapidly gaining ground, and the Ministers have arrived at the same conclusion.

I came here yesterday to meet Cowley, come over for a few days from Paris, and to have a talk with him and Clarendon. Cowley says that the alliance between the two countries is very hollow, and in fact there is nobody in France

really friendly to us except the Emperor, Persigny, and perhaps Drouyn de Lhuys. The Emperor is bent on pursuing the war with vigour, and is sensible of the importance to himself of the French flag being triumphant. I asked him what they thought of our armies and our generals; he said from the Emperor downwards they had the highest admiration for the wonderful bravery of the troops, but the greatest contempt for the military skill of the commanders, and for all our arrangements and *savoir faire*. He told us the following anecdote as a proof of the blundering way in which our affairs are conducted. Newcastle wrote to him lately to beg he would ask the French Government to give us a model of certain carts their army used in the Crimea, the like of which our people there had applied to him for. The French Minister replied that he could give drawings, but had no model; but at the same time he advised us not to think of having similar ones, as these carts are so ill adapted for the purpose that they had discarded them, and had ordered others and better ones to be made, which were now in course of construction *at Malta*. So that we propose to get these machines without finding out whether they are suitable or not, while the French supply themselves with the proper article *in our own territory*.

I find from Clarendon that he is not only fully alive to Raglan's inefficiency, but has all along suspected it, and now the Government seem to have the same conviction; still they can take no step in the matter, for he has done nothing and omitted nothing so flagrantly as to call for or justify his recall, and if they were to recall him they do not know where to look for a better man to replace him. The war has hitherto failed to elicit any remarkable abilities or special aptitude for war, except in one instance, that of Captain Butler, the defender of Silistria, a young man of remarkable promise who, if he had lived, would probably have done great things and have risen to distinction.

Canrobert writes to his Government that he hopes soon to attempt the assault, but the Emperor and M. Vaillant by no means approve of it, and have sent him orders not actually

prohibiting it, but enjoining caution in such a manner as will most probably effectually deter him from doing anything. They all think that the capture of the place could only be achieved (if at all) at a great cost of life, and that the captors could not hold it for many hours, as they would be pounded from the Northern forts which entirely command the place.

We discussed Austria and what she will do when the Russian answer comes to the last communication of the Conference at Vienna, and what she can do. Even if she recalls her ambassador from St. Petersburg and declares war, Cowley thinks she will never cross bayonets with the Russians or fire a shot unless attacked; and he believes, on what appear good grounds, that if any fighting takes place between the Austrians and the Russians, the former will get beaten, and that the Russian army is much the best of the two. This is the reverse of the general notion, but it seems that the Austrian officers themselves are of that opinion. It is no wonder, therefore, that they have no mind to go to war and to encounter this danger to accommodate us, whom they still cordially hate on many accounts, but especially for the Haynau affair, which still rankles in their hearts and in which they think their uniform was insulted. *A propos* of this, Clarendon told me that the Queen was talking to him very lately about this affair, and told him that she had entreated Palmerston at the time to write some expression of regret to the Austrian Government, but that nothing would induce him to do it, and he never did.

I asked Clarendon what was Palmerston's present tone about the war. He said he was very uneasy about the army and its condition, but just as confident as ever as to the final result of the war, and as lofty in his ideas of the terms of peace we should exact from Russia. He is all for restoring the Crimea to Turkey, and, what is more, he has persuaded the Emperor Napoleon to embrace that opinion. As usual, he never sees any difficulty in anything he wishes to do. I told Cowley and Clarendon what Grey said—viz. that he agreed entirely with Bright's letter, and that the war might

have been avoided by either of the two courses—to have told the Emperor of Russia in the beginning we would make war on him if he persisted, and compelled to understand that we really meant it, or to have forced the Turks to accept the Vienna Note; and, in either case, war would have been avoided, but that, the Cabinet itself being divided, everything was done in a spirit of compromise, and a middle course adopted which led to all the mischief. Cowley answered the first alternative and Clarendon the second. Cowley said that one of the great difficulties of the British Government was to secure concert with the French, and to explain their own conduct without hurting the susceptibility of their allies or divulging what passed between the two Governments. The French were perpetually blowing hot and cold, with a false air of vigour superior to our's at one moment, and at another wanting to do what our Ministers would have been torn to pieces for consenting to. For instance, in spite of us they would send their fleet to the Dardanelles to support the Turks, and afterwards they proposed to send the two fleets to Constantinople to compel the Sultan to sign the Vienna Note. Cowley told me this war in its present shape and with these vast armaments had gone on insensibly and from small beginnings, nobody could well tell how. In the first instance, the Emperor told Cowley he had no intention of sending any land forces to the East, and when we proposed to him to despatch there a small corps of 5,000 English and 10,000 French he positively declined. Soon after Sir John Burgoyne was sent to examine and report on the state of the country, and he gave an opinion that it would be desirable to send such a force to occupy a fortified position at Gallipoli in case of the Russians making a sudden attack with their fleet on Constantinople, in which case our fleets might be in some danger. Cowley took him to the Emperor, to whom he told his story. The Emperor said he thought his reasons good, and this was a definite and tangible object, and he would send the troops. When Raglan was offered the command of the forces we were to send out, he said he would not

go with less than 20,000 men; and when we agreed to send this force, the French said if we sent 20,000 they must send 40,000, and so the expedition began, and it has since swelled to its present magnitude—our's in consequence of the clamour here and pressure from without, and their's to keep pace with our's in relative proportions. With regard to the Vienna Note, Clarendon said Stratford never would have let the Turks sign it, and if they had recalled him the Cabinet here would have been broken up, Palmerston would have gone out, Stratford would have come home frantic and have proclaimed to the whole country that the Turks had been sacrificed and betrayed, and the uproar would have been so great that it would have been impossible to carry out the intention. I think the first answer is more weighty than the last, and that the popular clamour and Palmerston's secession ought to have been encountered at whatever hazard rather than persist in the fatal course which could hardly fail to lead, and did eventually lead, us into this deplorable war.

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## CHAPTER VIII.

Lord John's Views on the Ministry—Gloomy Prospects—Attacks on Lord Raglan—Russian and Prussian Diplomacy—Lord Palmerston more in favour—French View of the British Army—Russian Negotiations—Lord John Russell in Paris—Conference at Vienna—Lord Raglan unmoved—Terms proposed to Russia—Failure of the Duke of Newcastle—Hesitation of Austria and France—Deplorable State of the Armies—Chances of Peace—Meeting of Parliament—Further Negotiations—Lord John Russell resigns—Ministers stay in—The Debate on Roebuck's Motion—Resignation of Lord Aberdeen—Lord John Russell's real Motives—Lord Derby sent for—and fails—Wise Decision of the Queen—Ministerial Negotiations—Lord Palmerston sent for—The Peelites refuse to join—Lord Palmerston forms a Government—Lord Palmerston's Prospects—Lord John Russell sent to Vienna—Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons—General Alarm—Difficulties of Lord Palmerston—The Peelites secede—Lord John accepts the Colonial Office—Sir George Lewis Chancellor of the Exchequer—Death of the Emperor Nicholas of Russia—Lord Palmerston supposed to be a weak Debater—Weakness of the Government—Fresh Arrangements—The Budget—The Press.

*January 2nd, 1855.*—I received yesterday a letter from the Duke of Bedford relating to the views and position of Lord John Russell. He had talked over his position with the Duke, disclaimed any wish to be again Prime Minister, but desired Lord Lansdowne should be in the post; that he liked personally both Aberdeen and Newcastle but thought them unfit for the emergency. He had proposed that Palmerston should be War Minister but was overruled, and now (the Duke asks) what is he to do if a vote of censure on the management of the war is proposed in the House of Commons, thinking as he does that it has been mismanaged? He would willingly break up this Government, which he really thinks a very bad one (what he wrote to Clarendon being his deliberate opinion), if he could see a chance of a better being substituted, and if he thought Derby could carry

on the war more efficiently, which he does not. This letter is a complete reply to the objection Clarendon urged against Palmerston's being War Minister, for if Lord John himself wished it, nobody else could well object. He ought to have insisted on it, and, if he had, it must have been done.

Nothing can wear a gloomier aspect than affairs do at home and abroad—the Government weak, unpopular, dispirited, and divided, the army in the Crimea in a deplorable state, and the prospects of the war far from brilliant, no confidence in the commanding officers there, and no likelihood of finding more competent ones, everybody agreeing that till we have 150,000 men in the Crimea we cannot count on taking Sebastopol, and the difficulty of ever assembling such a force appearing very great. So far as I can collect, the violent articles which the 'Times' emits day after day have excited general resentment and disgust. They overdo everything and, while they are eternally changing their course, the one they follow for the moment they follow with an outrageous violence which shocks everybody. But as those who complain most of the 'Times' still go on reading it, the paper only gets more rampant and insolent, for as long as its circulation is undiminished it does not care what anybody thinks or says of it.

*January 4th.*—I wrote the Duke an answer with my opinion on Lord John's position and obligations, which has elicited another from him this morning. He says that it was a few weeks ago that John made a formal proposal to Aberdeen that Palmerston should replace Newcastle at the War Department. Aberdeen desired time to consider, and then refused. Subsequently the matter was renewed, when Palmerston himself objected, and then it necessarily ended. The Duke thinks that Lord John will not now stir it again, and will make up his mind to go on, and to defend his Government in the House of Commons. He consulted Sir George Grey, Lord Lansdowne, and Panmure, and they all advised him not to resign. It is strange that while this is imparted to me 'very confidentially,' and I had heard nothing of it before, it is currently reported, and stated positively in the 'Morning

Herald,' that Lord John and others, mentioned by name, have insisted on Newcastle's being turned out. That some part of what has occurred has got out is clear, and I incline to think that some of his satellites have set to work, and that, by way of assisting Lord John's object, they have given notice of what was going on to some of the Derbyites. There is a mysterious allusion to some impending event in the 'Press' on Saturday last, which looks very like this.

The 'Times' goes on against Raglan with greater vehemence every day, and will not be restrained by any remonstrances. Evans has put himself in communication with Delane (though certainly having no hand in these attacks) and has sent him an account of his having addressed a letter to Canrobert many days before the battle of Inkerman for the purpose of getting him to assist in taking precautionary measures to resist the attack he was persuaded the Russians would make, and Canrobert's answer, in which he says that his means are curtailed by the necessity of providing for the defence of Balaklava, and of extending his line and making dispositions 'dans l'intérêt de la situation commune,' but that he has ordered Bosquet to move nearer to Evans' division, and to be in readiness if anything should happen. There was a passage omitted in the printed letter of Evans to Raglan in which he alludes to the neglect of the precautionary measures he had recommended.

Gortschakoff has declared the Emperor of Russia will accept the first, second, and fourth articles of the four points, and will consider of the third. This may mean that he really wishes to make peace, or only be done for the sake of Austria, and to give her a pretext for not declaring against him. Clarendon is satisfied with Usedom, but not at all with his proposals. He says the King of Prussia has sent him to try and make a treaty with France and England entirely out of jealousy and mortification at Austria having made one, but he does not propose one similar to the Austrian Treaty, only a *defensive* one. Clarendon says the King in his heart hates Russia and winces under the influence he submits to, that he is indignant at the insults which have been heaped on



him by his Imperial brother-in-law, and the contumely with which he has been treated, but, being physically and politically a coward, he has not energy to shake off the yoke he has suffered to be imposed on him.

*Aldenham, January 6th.*—I came here to-day. I saw Cowley yesterday, who has been to Windsor, and tells me that he finds by conversations he has had with Stockmar that the Queen is much softened towards Palmerston and no longer regards him with the extreme aversion she did. On the other hand, she is very angry with John Russell, and this is, of course, from knowing what he has been doing, and resentment at his embarrassing and probably breaking up the Government. This relaxation in her feelings towards Palmerston is very important at this moment, and presents the chance of an alternative which, if this Government falls, may save her from Derby and his crew, whom she cordially detests. I hear Newcastle is very low, as well he may be, for no man was ever placed in so painful a position, and it is one from which it is impossible for him to extricate himself. When the Government goes to pieces, as I am persuaded it will, the Queen is very likely to send for Palmerston, and he and Ellenborough, as War Minister, might make a Government that would probably stand during the war, and which in present circumstances the House of Commons and the country could not but support. My notion is that Lord John would not take any office, but would support Palmerston, and advise all his friends and followers to do so. I know no reason why Ellenborough should not act with anybody, and many of the present Government might stay in, and certain changes be made which would let in more Whigs, and so conciliate that party, while the Conservatives would abstain from supporting any Government which did not contain Aberdeen and Newcastle. Gladstone might be a difficulty; Clarendon would be none, for he and Palmerston have pulled very well together, and I have no doubt Palmerston would be very happy to keep him. This opens a new prospect, and one very preferable to having Derby and his friends in office again.

I asked Cowley about Canrobert's confidential letters to his Government on the state of our army of which I had heard. He said it was very true, and he had seen several of these letters, in which Canrobert said that nothing could exceed his admiration of the British soldiers, but he was convinced the army would disappear altogether, for their organisation and management were deplorable; and he entreated his Government, if they possibly could, to interpose in the interest of the common cause to procure some amelioration of the organisation, without which nothing could save the army from destruction. The Emperor, Cowley said, never mentioned our troops or commanders to him except in terms of respect and with expressions of his admiration, but he knew that to others he spoke in a very different tone, and said that our army was commanded by an old woman.

*January 12th.*—I returned to town last night. The Emperor of Russia's acceptance of the four points, as interpreted by us, of course excites hopes of peace, but I think few people are sanguine as to the result. It is suspected to be only a dodge to paralyse the action of Austria, but unless there was some secret concert with Austria, which is not likely, I cannot see what Russia is to gain by accepting conditions which she does not really mean to abide by. Such conduct could only deceive the Allies for a short time, and, as there is no question of any suspension of military operations, nothing would be gained in that respect, while as soon as some decisive test of the Emperor's sincerity was applied, his real meaning must be made manifest, and then not only would the *acharnement* of the Western Powers be increased, but it would be quite impossible for Austria not to join the Coalition, and to act verily and indeed against Russia. These reasons would induce me to put faith in the Russian announcement; on the other hand, it is barely credible that the Emperor should consent to the sacrifice of Sebastopol in the present state of the campaign, and with the almost certainty that we cannot take it for many months to come, if at all.

John Russell is gone to Paris, not for any political object, but merely to see one of his wife's sisters; but his journey there and conversations with the Emperor may not be without some consequences. I hear almost daily from the Duke of Bedford on the subject of John's conduct, the conduct of the war, and the state of the Government. For the present he appears to desist from doing anything to make an explosion. The curious thing is that the public, and particularly the Derbyite, newspapers should be so well informed as they are of what is going on. Though the immediate danger of a break up seems to be over, I still think the *animus* Lord John exhibits, the manifold difficulties of the Government, and their undoubted though unjust unpopularity, will before long break them to pieces.

*January 14th.*—I met Clarendon last night and had a talk about affairs at home and abroad. John Russell at Paris is satisfied with his conversation with the Emperor, who agreed that we could make no peace but one which would be glorious for us. Clarendon does not believe the Emperor of Russia really means to sacrifice Sebastopol, and thinks when he sent his acceptance of the four points he was not apprised of what had passed in the Conference, which was merely verbal. Gortschakoff, in a passion, said, 'I suppose you mean to limit our naval force, or to dismantle Sebastopol, or both;' to which they replied, 'Yes'; but nothing was put in writing to this effect. This makes a great difference, but I do not despair. There is a great question about a negotiator, and the Queen and Prince want Clarendon himself to go. He refused point blank; he does not like to leave it to Westmorland alone. I suggested Canning, but he thought Canning had not had experience enough, and that it ought to be a Cabinet Minister, and asked, 'Why not Palmerston?' I objected the difficulty of relying on him, his hatred of Austria, and the terror he would inspire; and I said Granville might do, but that I saw no reason why he should not go himself if he had reason to think it was likely to succeed, though I would not go merely to return *re infectâ*. We then talked of Lord

John and of Newcastle. He said that Newcastle is exceedingly slow, and has a slow mind, but that there is no case whatever for turning him out, and he cannot be blamed for the failures in matters of detail, and as for the great measures the responsibility belongs alike to all. Lord John never is and never will be satisfied without being again Prime Minister, which is impossible. I said the Duke of Bedford assured me that his brother did not *now* want to be Prime Minister. 'What does he want then?—to retire altogether?' 'Yes,' said Clarendon, 'that is his intense selfishness; utterly regardless of the public interests, or of what may happen, he wants to relieve *himself* from the responsibility of a situation which is not so good as he desires, and to run away from his post at a moment of danger and difficulty. If we had some great success—if Sebastopol were taken, for example—we should hear no more of his retirement.' As matters are, however, Clarendon thinks very ill of them abroad and at home. This disposition of Lord John's keeps the Government in constant hot water, and no confidence can be placed in Raglan, while it is impossible to find anybody who would, as far as we can judge, do any better.

The Court are exceedingly annoyed and alarmed at Raglan's failure; the Prince showed Clarendon (or told him of) a letter from Colonel Steele, who said that he had no idea how great a mind Raglan really had, but that he now saw it, for in the midst of distresses and difficulties of every kind in which the army was involved he was perfectly serene and undisturbed, and his health excellent! Steele meant this as a panegyric, and did not see that it really conveyed a severe reproach. The conviction of his incapacity for so great a command gains ground every day; he has failed in those qualities where everybody expected he would have succeeded best, even those who thought nothing of his military genius. But, having learnt what he knows of war under the Duke, he might at least have known how *he* carried on war, and have imitated his attention to minute details and a general supervision of the different services, seeing that all was in order and the merely mechanical parts

properly attended to on which so much of the efficiency as well as of the comfort of the army depended.<sup>1</sup>

*January 19th.*—We are still uncertain as to the real intentions of the Emperor of Russia, and whether he means to accept the terms offered by the Allies; but my own impression is that he will not accept them *in our sense*, and that he never will consent to the sacrifice of Sebastopol till we have taken the place and destroyed the fortifications, thereby rendering its dismantling a *fait accompli*. There is certainly nothing in the present state of our affairs which warrants our lofty pretensions, and the proposal of terms so humiliating to the Emperor. The only possible grounds that can be imagined for his acceptance are, his own knowledge of the state of his own country and of the resources he can command for carrying on the war, and a dispassionate and farsighted calculation of the disposition and of the resources of his opponents. It is not impossible that he may foresee that he must eventually succumb in a contest so unequal and in which the number of his enemies increases every day. He may deem it better to make certain sacrifices now, with the view of being able before long to retrieve his losses, than to expose himself to the chance and great probability of being obliged to make much greater sacrifices hereafter, and such as it will be more difficult for him to repair. The Duke of Bedford tells me that Aberdeen and Clarendon are both hopeless of peace, and that Lord John and Palmerston do not consider it so absolutely hopeless; Aberdeen says the negotiations will not last half an hour.

The accounts from the army are as bad as possible; one-third of it is in the hospitals, and the quays of Balaklava are loaded with enormous stores of every kind, which it was impossible to transport to the camp. Very intelligent people therefore entertain the greatest apprehension of some catastrophe occurring whenever the severity of the winter,

<sup>1</sup> [It may be proper to remark that a different and far more favourable view of Lord Raglan's capacity as a General will be found *infra* at the beginning of Chapter XII. of this Journal, upon the evidence of Sir Edmund Lyons, who was entirely in the confidence of the Commander-in-Chief.]

which has hitherto been comparatively mild, sets in. The best security is in the equally distressed state of the Russians, and in fact nothing but this can account for their having left us alone so long.

The Duke of Bedford and I talked over the state of affairs here, and the political possibilities in the event of this Government falling to pieces or being compelled to resign. We both desire any arrangement rather than another Derby Government, and we agree in thinking that on the whole the best would be for Lord Lansdowne to undertake the formation of a Government, if he can be persuaded to do so, which does not appear wholly impossible. This would satisfy Lord John, who would then remain in his present office, half a dozen of the present Cabinet would go out, some Whigs might replace them, and the thing would undoubtedly go on for a time. It is impossible for Newcastle to continue to conduct the war, with the universal clamour there is against him and the opinion of his own colleagues (at least of such of them as I know the opinions of) that he is unfit for the post. He has two very great faults which are sufficient to disqualify him: he is exceedingly slow, and he knows nothing of the qualifications of other men, or how to provide himself with competent assistants; nor has he any decision or foresight. He chose for his under-secretaries two wholly incompetent men who have been of no use to him in managing and expediting the various details of the service, and he has a rage for doing everything himself, by which means nothing is done, or done so tardily as to be of no use. Then all the subordinate Boards are miserably administered, and the various useless, inefficient, or worn out officers have been suffered to remain at their posts, to the enormous detriment of the service. The genius of Lord Chatham or the energy and will of the Duke of Wellington would have failed with such a general staff here, and with such a Commander-in-Chief as Hardinge, and with the *fainéantise* of Raglan.

*January 20th.*—It is only by degrees one can unravel the truth in political affairs. John Russell told me last night

that Austria has never given in her adhesion to our condition of making the destruction of Sebastopol a *sine quâ non* of peace. She joins us in insisting on the 'faire cesser la prépotence,' but the means of accomplishing this remain to be discussed. This is very different from what I had imagined, and makes it anything but certain that she will join her forces to our's, if the negotiations fail in consequence of our demands. We are now endeavouring to bring the Court of Vienna into an agreement with us as to the conditions to be required, and it is no easy matter to get the Cabinet to agree upon the wording of the communications we make to her. This arises from the necessity of looking to the effect of what will appear in the Blue Books. Blue Books, Parliamentary discussions, and the Press tie up the hands of a Government, fetter its discretion and deliberate policy, and render diplomatic transactions (especially with Governments whose hands are more free) excessively difficult. Granville told me yesterday morning that the course of Russia had been more straightforward than that of England and France, and this morning he reminded me of having said so, and added that we were in a great diplomatic mess, France always finessing and playing a game of her own; and I infer from what he said that, having got all she can out of us, she is now coquetting with Austria, and disposed to defer to her wishes and objects, and to be less *exigeante* towards Russia. This is only of a piece with what Clarendon has often said to me about France and her way of dealing with us; however, if France will only insist on making peace on plausible terms, and with the semblance of its being an honourable and consistent peace, we cannot do otherwise than acquiesce in her determination, and if we only follow the lead she takes the public here must needs be satisfied. This is Granville's own idea, as it is mine, and God grant that affairs may take this turn, and so we may get out of the tremendous scrape we are in, the escape from which will be cheaply purchased by the fall of the Government—a consequence that is almost certain if it does not happen before anything can be done.

Day after day the accounts from the Crimea represent a more deplorable state of things, entirely confirmative of Canrobert's statements to his own Government, and it is difficult to read them and not apprehend some fatal catastrophe. We know nothing of the state of the Russians either within or without Sebastopol, and this ignorance is not one of the least remarkable circumstances in this war, but we must conclude either that their condition is as bad as our's, and that they are unable to attack us, or that their policy is to let the winter do its work, and that they do not think it necessary for them to fight sanguinary battles with very doubtful results when disease is ravaging the allied army and producing effects as advantageous for them as the most complete victories could do, as surely, only more gradually.

*January 22nd.*—Every day one looks with anxiety to see and to hear whether the chances of peace look well or ill, and at present they look very ill. Clarendon seems to set his face against it—that is, he considers it hopeless; and it is not promising that the negotiations should be under the management of one who has no hopes of bringing them to a successful issue, and whose despair of it evidently arises from his determination to exact conditions that there is no chance of obtaining. I hear, too, this morning, that the instructions to Bourqueney are to be as *exigeant* as possible—not very wise pretensions anyhow, but they rather indicate the tone adopted by England than the real intentions of France, for it is one thing to make great demands and another to persist in them. It is, however, idle to speculate on the progress of a negotiation which must be so largely influenced by the operations and events of the war. Parliament meets to-morrow, and I think a very short time will elapse before the fate of the Government is decided by some vote about the conduct of the war. I think the Government themselves desire it, and, conscious of the state of public opinion and of the deplorable state of affairs, and most of them thinking there has been great and fatal mismanagement, they wish the question to be decided, would not be sorry to be driven out by an adverse vote, and consider that it would be a better



and more respectable way of ending than by those internal dissensions, which, like a cancer, are continually undermining them. John Russell sees nothing but difficulties in the formation of another Government of a Whig complexion including a large portion of the present Ministers, and says that he does not think Lord Lansdowne *would*, or that he or Palmerston *could* accomplish it. He means now to stand by his colleagues, to accept his share of responsibility, and defend what has been done.

*January 23rd.*—Parliament meets to-day, and probably no time will be lost in attacking the Government, but it is impossible yet to know whether they will be harassed by a continual succession of skirmishes and bitter comments on details, or whether some grand and decisive assault will be made. The general impression is that the War Department cannot remain in Newcastle's hands, and if he cannot be got rid of without the whole Ministry going to pieces it must so end. I think this is pretty much the opinion of the Ministers themselves; and though I believe they all, or most of them, personally like him, they seem, so far as I can see, to be agreed that he is unequal to his post.

With regard to peace, the prospect looks anything but bright. The negotiations will not begin till we receive positive information as to the meaning of the Emperor of Russia in accepting the four points. Some weeks ago Clarendon wrote a despatch to Westmorland, in which he stated explicitly the meaning we attached to the four points, but this has never been put officially before the Emperor, that we know of. Buol acquiesced, as I understood, in our explanation, but John Russell distinctly told me that Austria had never signified her concurrence in making the demolition of Sebastopol a *sine quâ non* condition. Now, however, some fresh communication has been made by Austria to Russia, and we will not begin the negotiation until Austria shall have signified to us that the Emperor's acceptance is such as will warrant us in negotiating. I am not sufficiently acquainted with all the details to form a conclusive opinion, but, as far as I can see, we have been hanging off from being perfectly

explicit, and have never yet come to a complete understanding with Austria, much less with Russia, and I am afraid of our Ministers committing themselves in Parliament by some declarations and professions of intentions which may make peace impossible and break up the negotiations at once, for as to Russia consenting to dismantle Sebastopol, I look upon it as impossible, and absurd to expect it. I earnestly hope that Bourqueney may be instructed to come to an understanding with Austria, and that, if we insist on terms impossible to obtain, our two Allies may compel us to give way, or leave us to fight the battle alone. The only thing quite certain is that we are in a state of the utmost doubt, danger, and perplexity at home and abroad, all of which is owing to our own egregious folly and unskilfulness, and the universal madness which has pervaded the nation.

*January 24th.*—The Government is at an end, or at least it probably will be before the end of the day. The Duke of Bedford has just been to me to tell me that last night, after returning from the House of Commons, Lord John wrote a letter to Aberdeen to resign his office, and he will not attend the Cabinet to-day. Nobody knows it but Aberdeen himself, and I am not permitted to tell Granville even, but it will be announced to the Cabinet this morning. The immediate cause of Lord John's resignation is Roebuck's motion, of which he gave notice last night, for a Committee to inquire into the conduct of the war; it is intended as a hostile motion, and would have been turned into a vote of censure and want of confidence. Besides this, it seems Hayter had told Lord John that the aspect of the House was bad, and members of the Government party disinclined to attend. Accordingly, he said he could not and would not face the motion; Graham and Sidney Herbert might defend the conduct of the war, but *he* could not. Heaven only knows what will occur. Lord John took no time to consider, but sent his resignation at once, the moment he returned from the House. I told the Duke that I thought he had made himself obnoxious to very just reproach, running away from such a motion, and explaining (as he must do) that he could not defend the conduct of the war. He will

naturally be asked how long he has been dissatisfied with its management, and why he did not retire long ago. The Duke said he was aware of this, but he endeavoured to make out that the case bore some analogy to that of Lord Althorp in 1834, when he resigned in consequence of a motion of O'Connell's. But this was altogether different. Nothing can, in my opinion, justify Lord John, and his conduct will, if I am not mistaken, be generally condemned, and deprive him of the little consideration and influence he had left. It has been vacillating, ungenerous, and cowardly, for after all, in spite of errors and mistakes, the conduct of the war admits of a defence, at least as to many parts of it, and it would have been far better to stand up manfully and abide the result of the battle in Parliament, than to shirk the fight and leave his colleagues to deal with the difficulty as best they may, trying to escape from the consequences of a responsibility which nothing he can say or do can enable him to shake off.

*January 26th.*—Yesterday morning the Cabinet met, and after some discussion they resolved unanimously not to resign, but to encounter Roebuck's motion. Aberdeen went down to Windsor, and there is another Cabinet this morning. I saw John Russell in the afternoon, and told him in very plain terms what I thought of his conduct, and how deeply I regretted that he had not gone on with his colleagues and met this attack with them. He looked astonished and put out, but said, 'I could not. It was impossible for me to oppose a motion which I think ought to be carried.' I argued the point with him, and in the middle of our talk the Duke of Bedford came in. I asked him if he did not think the remaining Ministers were right in the course they have taken, and he said he did. I then said, 'I have been telling John how much I regret that he did not do the same,' when John repeated what he had said before, and then went away. After he was gone the Duke said, 'I am very glad you said what you did to John.' The town was in a great state of excitement yesterday, and everybody speculating on what is to happen, and all making lists of a new Govern-

ment according to their expectations or wishes ; most people place Palmerston at the head. In the House of Lords Derby asked me what it all meant. Clarendon came up while we were talking, and gave Derby to understand that he would probably have to take office again, expressing his own eagerness to quit it. I now hear that Lord John has been leading the Cabinet a weary life for many months past, eternally making difficulties, and keeping them in a constant state of hot water, determined to upset them, and only doubting as to what was a fit opportunity, and at last taking the worst that could be well chosen for his own honour and character. He is not, however, without countenance and support from some of his adherents, or from those who were so impatient for the destruction of this Government that they are satisfied with its being accomplished, no matter how or by whom or under what circumstances ; and as he has been long accustomed

to sit attentive to his own applause

from a little circle in Chesham Place, so he will now be told by the same set that he has acted a very fine and praiseworthy part, although such will not be the verdict of history, nor is it, as far as I can see, of the best and wisest of his own contemporaries. Nobody entertains a doubt of Roebuck's motion being carried by a large majority against the Government.

*January 30th.*—For the last three days I have been so ill with gout that I could not do anything, or follow the course of events. John Russell made a cunning and rather clever speech in explanation of his resignation, George Grey a good one and strong against Lord John. Opinions fluctuated about the division, some, but the minority, fancying Government would have a majority because the proposed Committee is so excessively difficult and in all ways objectionable ; but when it became known that the Derbyites meant to vote in a body for the motion, no one doubted the result, and it became only a question of numbers.<sup>1</sup> Lord

<sup>1</sup> [Mr. Roebuck's Motion for a Committee of Enquiry was carried on the 29th of January by a majority of 157 in a House of 453 members present.]

John seems to have felt no regret at what he has done, and at exciting the resentment and incurring the blame of all his colleagues; and he goes so little into society, and is so constantly patted on the back at home, that the censure of the world produces no effect on him. They tell me he is in high spirits, and appears only to be glad at having at last found the opportunity he has so long desired of destroying the Government. Everybody appears astonished at the largeness of the majority. Gladstone made a very fine speech, and powerful, crushing against Lord John, and he stated what Lord John had never mentioned in his narrative, that he had been expressly asked in December whether he still wished the change to be made which he had urged in November, and he had replied that he did not, that he had given it up. This *suppressio veri* is shocking, and one of the very worst things he ever did.

Aberdeen went down to Windsor this morning to resign. It is thought that the Queen will send for Lansdowne, and ask him if he can make a Government, or will try, and, if he declines, that he will advise her to send for Palmerston; if Palmerston fails, then she can do nothing but take Derby. It seems likely now that we shall have either a Whig or a Derbyite Government, and that the Peelites will be left out altogether. The difficulties are enormous, and though everybody says that at such a crisis and with the necessity of attending to the war, and the war only, no personal prejudices or antipathies should prevent anybody from taking office if their services can be of use, men will not be governed by motives of such pure patriotism; and, whoever may make the Government, I expect there will be many exclusions and many refusals to join. Some say that, if Derby comes in, and with the same or nearly the same men as before, he ought to be kicked out at once, but I do not think so, and, much as I should abhor another such Government, I think in present circumstances it must be allowed the fairest play, and be supported unless and until it commits some flagrant errors.

*January 31st.*—The division was curious: some seventy

or eighty Whigs, ordinary supporters of Government, voted against them, and all the Tories, except about six or seven who voted against the motion; Cobden and Bright stayed away. John Russell's explanation, had he spoken the truth, would have run in these terms: 'I joined the Government with great reluctance, and only at the earnest entreaty of my friends, particularly Lord Lansdowne. From the first I was disgusted at my position, and I resolved, unless Lord Aberdeen made way for me, and I again became Prime Minister, that I would break up the Government. I made various attempts to bring about such a change, and at last, after worrying everybody to death for many months, I accomplished my object, having taken what seemed a plausible pretext for doing it.'

*February 1st.*—Contrary to general expectation, the Queen did not send either for Lansdowne or Palmerston, but at once for Derby. He went directly to Palmerston, who declined to join him. He is trying to form a Government, and I see the Whigs are chuckling over the probability of his failing and being obliged to give it up, when they evidently flatter themselves that it will fall again into the hands of John Russell. Rather than this should occur, I would prefer that Derby should succeed, and, if he can get no foreign aid, that he should reconstitute the wretched Government he had before. My disgust at the conduct of my Whig friends is intense. Although they were to the last degree indignant at the conduct of John Russell, they have, ever since the interregnum began, been dancing attendance on him, evincing every disposition to overlook the enormity of his conduct and to reform the party with a view of carrying him again to the head of affairs and making another pure Whig Government. I confess I thought that nobody could refuse to serve at the present crisis, and, if the Queen sent for Derby, Palmerston, if invited, could not help joining, and taking the War Department; but I was wrong. I see in no quarter, as far as I have been able to observe and judge, any disposition to discard prejudices, antipathies, and personal feelings and interests, and to make every consideration

yield to the obligations which the present emergency imposes. However, the game is not half played out yet. Meanwhile we are exhibiting a pretty spectacle to Europe, and I don't think our example will tempt other nations to adopt the institutions of which we are so proud; for they may well think that liberty of the Press and Parliamentary government, however desirable they may be when regulated by moderation and good sense, would be dearly purchased at the expense of the anarchy and confusion which they are now producing here.

*February 2nd.*—The Queen herself decided to send at once to Derby, and the result proves how wise her decision was, for she is relieved from the annoyance of having him, and he is placed in such a position that he cannot embarrass her new Government when it is formed. Derby went to Palmerston, invited him to join and to bring Gladstone and Sidney Herbert with him. On their declining he gave it up, and Her Majesty then sent for Lord Lansdowne.

Last night the Duke of Newcastle defended himself in the House of Lords against John Russell, and replied to his statements in the House of Commons, and did it very successfully, carrying the House with him. The whole affair, as it is gradually evolved, places John Russell in a disgraceful and odious light, and ought to demolish him as a public man, for he has shown himself to be actuated by motives of pique, personal ambition, and mortified vanity, and to have been insincere, vacillating, uncandid, and untruthful. The Duke's statement was crushing, and appears to me not to admit of a rejoinder. It ought to cover him and his wretched clique with confusion; but they will probably attempt to brazen it out, and doggedly to insist that John was justified in all he did. The discussion last night was very characteristic of Derby. If ever there was an occasion in which seriousness and gravity seemed to be required of a man in his position, it would seem to be that of last night; but his speech was nothing but jeering at the late Cabinet and chaffing Newcastle; it was really indecent, but very smart and funny, if it had not been so unbecoming the occasion.

*February 4th.*—No one can remember such a state as the town has been in for the last two days. No Government, difficulties apparently insurmountable, such confusion, such excitement, such curiosity, everybody moving about craving for news, and rumour with her hundred tongues scattering every variety of statement and conjecture. At last the crisis seems to be drawing to a conclusion. The Queen has behaved with admirable sense of her constitutional obligations. When Aberdeen took down his resignation, she told him she had made up her mind what to do, that she had looked at the list of the division, and found that the majority which had turned out her Government was composed principally of Lord Derby's adherents, and she should therefore send for him. Aberdeen said a few words rather discouraging her; but she said, though Lord Palmerston was evidently the popular man, she thought, according to constitutional practice, Lord Derby was the man she ought to send for. It has been seen how Derby failed; then she sent for Lord Lansdowne, whom she desired to consult different people and see what their opinions and inclinations were, and report them to her. This was on Friday. He did so and made his report, after which, on the same principle which had decided her to send for Derby, she resolved to send for John Russell, his followers having been the next strongest element of the victorious majority. Accordingly, on Friday night or early yesterday morning, she placed the formation of a Government in his hands. He accepted it, and began by applying to Palmerston, offering him any office he chose to take. Palmerston did not refuse, but his acquiescence seems to have been of a hesitating and reluctant kind, and nothing was definitely settled between them. Gladstone and Sidney Herbert, and afterwards Graham, decidedly refused; Clarendon desired to have some hours to consider of it. However, the result of his applications was so unfavourable that last night he considered his attempt virtually at an end, though he had not actually given it up this morning, and some further communication was taking place between him and Clarendon, which was to be decisive. As soon as this is



over, the Queen will play her last card, and have recourse to *the man of the people*!—to Palmerston, whom they are crying out for, and who, they fondly imagine, is to get us out of all our difficulties. From all I hear, I think he will make a Government, because he really wishes and is determined to do it, and many of the most important who would not join John Russell will join him. In the course of to-day I imagine it will all be settled. The impression made by Newcastle's speech against Lord John has been prodigious, far greater and more general than I imagined, and it is confidently affirmed that, if he had taken office and stood again for the City, he would have been beaten. He still shows fight against Newcastle, and intended to have answered him and vindicated himself in the House of Commons yesterday, if he had not been detained so long by the Queen that the hour was up when he got there. He means to return to the charge to-morrow. In the course of all these transactions he urged Lansdowne himself to take the Government, and offered to continue at the Council Office and lead the House of Commons, or to take no office at all, and give him independent support in the House of Commons, or to go to the House of Lords and give him his best assistance there; but Lord Lansdowne declined all these offers.

*February 5th.*—I have often had occasion to remark on the difficulty of avoiding making false or erroneous statements in affairs like those I am treating of, for the reports which we hear from different people generally vary considerably, and sometimes the same thing repeated by the same person varies also; not that there is any intention to misrepresent or mislead, but circumstances apparently trifling are narrated differently according as the narrator has been impressed by, or remembers them, and thus errors creep in and accumulate, and at last it becomes difficult to reconcile statements that have become conflicting by degrees. However, I can only jot down what I hear, and reconcile the accounts afterwards as well as I can. Yesterday afternoon I saw Clarendon, who confirmed his refusal to join Lord John, but with some slight difference as to the details. He said he had spoken very

openly to him, but so gravely and quietly that he could not take offence, and he did not. It was not till he received Clarendon's final refusal that he wrote to the Queen and threw up his commission.

Her Majesty had seen Palmerston the day before, and told him if Lord John failed she should send for him, and accordingly she did so yesterday evening. Palmerston had told Lord John, as soon as he received the commission he should go to him. At present he has only invited Clarendon and Charles Wood (Whigs) to join him. Clarendon of course is ready, but Charles Wood demurs, and insists that unless Lord John will take office in the Government he cannot join, and that the whole thing will be a failure. Lord John is very averse to take office, and the more averse because he must then go to the House of Lords, for of course he cannot remain in the Commons, not leading it. The Duke of Bedford has been here in a grand quandary, seeing all sorts of difficulties, and in fact they spring up on every side. He agrees with Lord John, but was shaken by the arguments of Wood, which are backed up by George Grey and Panmure. I argued vehemently against Wood's view, and strongly advised Lord John's not taking office, and I convinced the Duke, who is gone back to Lord John to talk it all over with him again. On the other hand, the Peelites want the Government to be restored, with Aberdeen again at the head of it, and it is very questionable whether they will join at all, and, if they do, not without much difficulty and negotiation, which will at least consume valuable time. In short, at this moment the formation of a Palmerston Government, which was to be so easy, is a matter of enormous difficulty. The Queen wrote a civil and even kind answer to Lord John's note giving the task up.

*February 6th.*—Great disappointment and dismay yesterday, the Peelites having refused to form part of Palmerston's Government. Graham, Gladstone, and Sidney Herbert all declined unless Aberdeen formed a part of it. Sidney Herbert was very willing to join, but would not separate himself from Gladstone, who was deaf to all entreaties and

remonstrances. It is believed that Graham is the one who has persuaded Gladstone to take this course. Aberdeen is anxious, or pretends to be so, that they should join, and Newcastle certainly is. What Gladstone says is, that unless Aberdeen is in the Cabinet he can have no security that his (Aberdeen's) principles will be acted on, and that he may not be called upon to be a party to measures, relating either to war or peace, of which he disapproves. However, I have only heard second hand what he says in conversation with others. It has been in vain represented to him that there will be an explosion of indignation against them all in the country for refusing their aid at such a crisis, and their conduct will never be forgiven. All this, he says, he is aware of, but his objections stand on too high ground to be shaken. Palmerston means not to be baffled, and, failing the Peelites, to turn to the Whigs and make the best Government he can. His popularity, which is really extraordinary, will carry him through all difficulties for the present. It was supposed that his popularity had been on the wane, but it is evident that, though he no longer stands so high as he did in the House of Commons, and those who know him can easily see he is not the man he was, in the country there is just the same fancy for him and sanguine opinion of him as ever. John Russell made a rejoinder to Newcastle in the House of Commons last night—a plausible speech enough, and it served to set his friends and the Brooks's Whigs crowing again, and saying he had made out a complete case; but I do not see that it made his case a bit better than before. All who are at all behind the scenes are aware of the fallacies and deceptions in which his statements abound, and that they are of a nature that may not be exposed.

*February 7th.*—Yesterday Aberdeen and Newcastle, particularly the latter, renewed their endeavours to prevail on Gladstone to give up his scruples and to join the Government, and at last they succeeded, and in the evening Palmerston was able to announce that he had accomplished his task and the Government was formed. John Russell, on his side, pressed all his Whig friends to unite with Palmerston, and

by these means the difficulties were gradually overcome. Lord Lansdowne would not take the Council Office, but agreed to be the organ of the Government in the House of Lords, though he seems afraid this should be thought to have committed him to more trouble and responsibility than he is inclined to take, and it is only a sort of quasi-leadership that he will own to. I find the Queen did propose to him to form a Government, and under certain conditions he was not unwilling to undertake it, but of course he much prefers the present arrangement. It is admitted on all hands that both Aberdeen and Newcastle have behaved very well, and done all in their power to facilitate Palmerston's arrangements. It is, however, much to be regretted that these Peelites have acted in concert and *as a party*, and I see from the fact a vast deal of embarrassment and opposition to the Government in prospect. Already the Derbyites are sulky and angry to the greatest degree, and the Whigs not a little indignant that so much anxiety has been shown to get Gladstone and his friends, and such a high price paid for them; and the fact of their forming so large and important a part of the Government will secure the fierce hostility of the Derbyites, and make the support of the Whigs very lukewarm. The latter, too, will be influenced by John Russell, who, in spite of his present professions of amity and promises of support, is sure to be very soon a *frondeur*, and then in open and direct opposition. He told Clarendon 'he meant to give his best support to the Government.' Clarendon said, 'You do; well, at what do you think I value your support?' 'What?' he asked. 'Not one sixpence.' 'At first Palmerston will meet with no opposition to signify; if he does, he has only to dissolve, and the country will give him a majority. But opposition will gather about him soon enough; extravagant expectations are raised of the good he is to do and the great acts he is to perform, all which will only lead to disappointment and mortification. If the luck which for many years accompanied him should do so still, and some unexpected success crown his administration, he may thus gain a great position; but it is idle to depend on the chapter of accidents

and, according to all human probability, he is destined to carry on a disastrous war or to make a peace (the wisest thing he can do) which will be humiliating, because so wholly incommensurate with our extravagant expectations and ridiculous pretensions. However, if any man can make such a peace it is Palmerston, and it is much better that Aberdeen should have no concern with the Government, for it would be much more difficult if he was in the Cabinet, and supposed to have any hand in it.<sup>1</sup>

*February 8th.*—Now that all is settled there is a momentary lull, and people are considering what sort of an arrangement it is, and how it is likely to succeed. Many of those who know better what Palmerston really is than the ignorant mob who shout at his heels, and who have humbugged themselves with the delusion that he is another Chatham, entertain grave apprehensions that the thing will prove a failure, and that Palmerston's real capacity will be exposed and his *prestige* destroyed. Some wish for a dissolution while his popularity is still undiminished, fancying it will give him

<sup>1</sup> [The Administration formed by Lord Palmerston was composed as follows :—

First Lord of the Treasury	. . .	Viscount Palmerston
Lord Chancellor	. . .	Lord Cranworth
Lord President	. . .	Earl Granville
Lord Privy Seal	. . .	Duke of Argyll
Home Secretary	. . .	Sir George Grey
Foreign Secretary	. . .	Earl of Clarendon
Colonial Secretary	. . .	Right Hon. Sidney Herbert (and, on his resignation, Lord John Russell)
Secretary at War	. . .	Lord Panmure
Chancellor of the Exchequer	. . .	Mr. Gladstone (and, on his resignation, Sir G. Cornewall Lewis)
Board of Control	. . .	Sir Charles Wood
First Lord of the Admiralty	. . .	Sir James Graham (and, on his resignation, Sir Charles Wood, who was replaced at the Board of Control by Mr. Vernon Smith)
Board of Trade	. . .	Right Hon. E. Cardwell (and, on his resignation, Lord Stanley of Alderley)
Postmaster General	. . .	Viscount Canning
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland	. . .	Earl of Carlisle
Woods and Forests	. . .	Sir Benjamin Hall.]

a sure majority and will protect him against any change of opinion; but, unless the Derbyites give him an opportunity by some vexatious opposition, he can hardly dissolve, and if he did, though he would gain by it for a time, any change of opinion that might take place would be found no less in the House of Commons than in the country.

*February 13th.*—The political wheel turns rapidly round, and strange events occur, none more remarkable than John Russell's career during the last month, and the unexpected positions in which he successively appears. A few weeks ago breaking up his own Government, deeply offending colleagues and friends, and making himself generally odious, then trying to form a Government and finding nobody willing to act with him; he appeared to be in the most painful position of isolation, and everybody expected that his anomalous and unsatisfactory state would render him mischievous, and soon conduct him into a troublesome opposition to the Government. Very differently have matters turned out. He began by evincing a good and friendly spirit, and scarcely is the Government formed, when Clarendon proposes to him to go to Vienna as Plenipotentiary to treat for peace, and John at once accepts the offer, and yesterday morning his mission was publicly announced. It was a happy stroke of Clarendon's in all ways, and it was wise in Lord John to accept it, for it has all the appearance of a patriotic and unselfish act, will cause his recent misdeeds to be forgotten, and replace him in the high situation from which he was fallen. It is a very good thing for him to be thus withdrawn from Parliament for a time. There he is always in danger of saying and doing something foolish or rash, and it will leave his followers in a condition to attach themselves to the Government without abandoning their allegiance to him, which will relieve all parties from embarrassment.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [The Conference of the Great Powers which was to open at Vienna, to which Lord John Russell was sent as British Plenipotentiary, had been convoked for the purpose of negotiating on the basis of the four points which contained the demands of the belligerent Allies and had been accepted as

*February 17th.*—Palmerston presented himself to the House of Commons last night for the first time as Minister, and not apparently with a very brilliant prospect of success. He made a tolerable speech, giving a rather meagre account of the formation of his Government, with the usual promises of vigour. The great point he had to handle was the disposal of Roebuck's Committee, which he is determined, if he can, to get rid of. The success of this, his first great operation, seems very doubtful. One man after another got up and declared he should vote for its going on. Roebuck insists on it; and Disraeli announced his determined opposition to any attempt to quash it. If Palmerston fights the battle and is beaten, he must try what a dissolution will do for him; and I think the success of it would be very doubtful, for, in spite of all the clamour that was raised by his name, and his apparently vast popularity in the country, it looks as if it was of a very shadowy, unsubstantial kind, and would very likely be found wanting at a general election. The temper of the House seems to be anything but good, and unless we are very soon cheered and encouraged by much better accounts from the Crimea, this Government will not fare much better than the last. The 'Times' is going into furious opposition, and Palmerston will soon find the whole press against him except his own paper, the 'Morning Post,' and the 'Morning Chronicle,' neither of which have any circulation or any influence in the country. The whole conduct of the 'Times' is a source of great vexation to me, for I am to the last degree shocked and disgusted at its conduct and

a basis of negotiation by the Emperor of Russia. These points were as follows:—

1. That Russia should abandon all control over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia.
2. That Russia should relinquish her claims to control the mouths of the Danube.
3. That all Treaties calculated to give Russia a preponderance in the Black Sea should be abrogated.
4. That Russia should renounce the claim she made to an exclusive right to protect the Christians in the Ottoman Dominions.

It was on the third of these points that the principal difficulty of the negotiation arose, and that the Conference failed to conclude a peace.]

the enormous mischief that it is endeavouring to do ; and I have for many years had intimate personal relations with its editor, which I do not well know how to let drop, and I am at the same time not satisfied that their unbroken maintenance is consistent with the feelings I entertain, and which ought to be entertained, towards the paper.

*February 19th.*—The Government have determined to knock under about Roebuck's Committee, and they would have done much better to have done so at first. What they are now doing will not strengthen them or avert future attacks ; but the state of the House of Commons is such that nothing but some very unexpected turn can enable them to go on long. Palmerston has no authority there, the House is in complete confusion and disorganisation, and, except the Derbyites, who are still numerous and act together in opposition, in hopes of getting into power, nobody owns any allegiance or even any party ties, or seems to care for any person or any thing. There seems a general feeling of distrust and dissatisfaction, and, except the scattered Radicals and Revolutionists, who wish to upset everything, nobody seems to know what he would be at, or what object he wishes to attain. For the first time in my life I am really and seriously alarmed at the aspect of affairs, and think we are approaching a period of real difficulty and danger. The press, with the 'Times' at its head, is striving to throw everything into confusion, and running a muck against the aristocratic element of society and of the Constitution. The intolerable nonsense and the abominable falsehoods it flings out day after day are none the less dangerous because they are nonsense and falsehoods, and, backed up as they are by all the regular Radical press, they diffuse through the country a mass of inflammatory matter, the effect of which may be more serious and arrive more quickly than anybody imagines. Nothing short of some loud explosion will make the mass of people believe that any serious danger can threaten a Constitution like our's, which has passed through so many trials and given so many proofs of strength and cohesion. But we have never seen such symptoms as are now visible, such a thorough



confusion and political chaos, or the public mind so completely disturbed and dissatisfied and so puzzled how to arrive at any just conclusions as to the past, the present, or the future. People are furious at the untoward events in the Crimea, and cannot make out the real causes thereof, nor who is to blame, and they are provoked that they cannot find victims to wreak their resentment on. The dismissal of Aberdeen and Newcastle seems an inadequate expiation, and they want more vengeance yet, hence the cry for Roebuck's absurd Committee. Then, after clamouring for Palmerston from a vague idea of his vigour, and that he would do some wonderful things, which was founded on nothing but the recollection of his former bullying despatches and blustering speeches, they are beginning to suspect him; and the whole press, as well as the malignants in the House of Commons, tell them that they have gained very little, if anything, by the change, and they are told that it is not this or that Minister who can restore our affairs, but a change in the whole system of government, and the substitution of plebeians and new men for the leaders of parties and members of aristocratic families, of whom all Governments have been for the most part composed. What effect these revolutionary doctrines may have on the opinions of the people at large remains to be seen; but it is evident that the 'Times,' their great propagator, thinks them popular and generally acceptable, or they would not have plunged into that course.

I sat next to Charles Wood at dinner yesterday and had much talk with him on the state of affairs, and found that he takes just the same view that I do, and for the first time he is alarmed also, and so, he told me, is Sir George Grey. He talked much about Raglan, and said that the Government had been placed in the most unfair position possible, it being impossible to throw the blame of anything that had occurred on him, or even to tell the truth, which was that, so far from his making any exertions to repair the evils so loudly complained of, and sending away inefficient men, he never admitted there were any evils at all, or that any of his people were inefficient, or anything but perfect; and he said that Raglan

had never asked for anything the want of which had not been anticipated by the Government here, and in no instance was anything required by him which had not been supplied a month or more before the requisition came. Palmerston, too, said to me that nothing could exceed the helplessness of the military authorities there; that they seemed unable to devise anything for their own assistance, and they exhibited the most striking contrast to the navy, who, on all emergencies, set to work and managed to find resources of all sorts to supply their necessities or extricate themselves from danger.

*February 20th.*—Nothing certainly could be more mortifying than the reception Palmerston met from the House of Commons on the first night when he presented himself as Minister, nothing more ungracious or more disheartening. His entreaty to *postpone* the Committee was received with a sort of scorn and manifestation of hostility and distrust. His position was at once rendered to the last degree painful and difficult. He cannot avert the Committee, he cannot submit to it without deep humiliation; many of his colleagues are supposed to shrink from the disgrace of such a submission and to prefer any alternative to it. Already there is a general impression that this Government cannot last long; nobody thinks they would gain anything by a dissolution, the result of one would be uncertain; but the probability seems to be that the Conservatives would gain and the Radicals likewise, while the Whigs would lose, and Peelites and Moderates would be scattered to the winds. We should most likely see a Parliament still more ungovernable than this, unless a widespread alarm in the country should rally the whole Conservative and anti-revolutionary element to Derby and his party, which would bring them all into office for a time. Palmerston spoke much better last night than the first night, and with a good deal of spirit and force; but he has a very uphill game to play, and must already be aware how fleeting his popularity was, and on what weak foundations it was built.

*February 23rd.*—Graham, Gladstone, and Sidney Herbert

have resigned, greatly to the disgust and indignation of their colleagues, to the surprise of the world at large, and the uproarious delight of the Whigs and Brooks's Club, to whom the Peelites have always been odious. These stupid Whigs were very sorry Palmerston did not leave them out when he formed his Government, and take whomever he could get instead of them; and they are entirely indifferent to the consideration that the greater part of the brains of the Cabinet is gone out with these three, that it is exceedingly difficult to fill their places, and that we exhibit a sad spectacle to all Europe, with our Ministerial dissensions and difficulties and the apparent impossibility of forming anything like a stable Government. The first thing done was to send off for John Russell at Paris, and ask him if he would come back and join the Government. Cardwell was offered the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, which he refused. It is much to be regretted that these Peelites do not now dissolve themselves as *a party* and make up their minds to act independently and according to their several opinions and circumstances. Aberdeen much disapproves of the exodus of the three, and was very anxious Cardwell should accept; but he does not choose to separate himself from the rest.

*February 24th.*—Never was I more surprised than when I heard that John Russell had accepted the Colonial Office and joins the Government, still continuing in the House of Commons, and of course acting under Palmerston. When we think of all he has been doing for the last two years, his discontent at being in a subordinate capacity though still leader of the House of Commons, and the various pranks he has played in consequence thereof, it is inconceivable that he should consent not only to take office under Palmerston, but to serve under him in the House of Commons. But it is impossible not to give him credit for patriotic motives in making such a sacrifice of personal pride and vanity. What his conduct may be if the Government lasts long enough to allow him to come home and take his place in it, may be considered doubtful. Last night the retiring Ministers gave their explanations—Graham in a very good speech; Gladstone

was too diffuse, and Sidney Herbert feeble, but coming after Graham they had nothing new to say. There is much to be said for and much against their conduct. If they had accepted office under Palmerston with the condition that he should try and get rid of the Committee and that they should retire in case he failed, there would have been nothing to say, because without doubt they ought not to hold high offices while a Committee of the House of Commons is sitting in judgement on their conduct; but the whole course of proceeding is so anomalous, and the exigencies of the time are so great and peculiar, that on the whole I think they ought to have stayed in. Palmerston speaks almost every night, and his speeches do not read amiss; but everybody says they are feeble and flat, and nothing at present indicates anything like stability or a long existence to the present Government. The tone of the House of Commons last night was on the whole rather pacific than not. Bright made an admirable speech, the peroration of which was very eloquent.

*February 25th.*—This morning George Lewis came to me very early and told me Palmerston had proposed to him to be Chancellor of the Exchequer; he set forth very fairly all the reasons for and against accepting. We discussed the whole subject, and I asked him whether he felt sufficient confidence in himself to undertake an office of such vast importance, whether he had sufficiently turned his attention to financial matters and had mastered the principles and details of finance. He said he thought he was sufficiently versed therein to undertake it, having given much attention to taxation and its principles, and to political economy generally, though he did not know much about the Funds, but supposed sufficient knowledge about them was easily attainable. Finally I advised him to accept, and he said he should make up his mind to do so. So the Admiralty, Colonial Office, and Exchequer are settled. There is much difficulty and much discussion and difference of opinion about some of the other places. They are very wisely going to take in Laing, but very unwisely will not give a place to Lowe, who, if left out, will contrive to do them some damage. Granville has

moved Heaven and earth to get Lowe an office, but Palmerston and others set their faces against him. Lansdowne has most unreasonably and unwisely insisted on Vernon Smith being taken in, and it is at present intended to make him President of the Board of Control. He is very unpopular and totally useless, and just the man they ought not to take in; while Lowe is just the man they ought, to meet the prevailing sentiment about old connexions and new men.

*March 2nd.*—News just arrived that the Emperor of Russia is dead. John Russell had telegraphed from Berlin that he was given over. This great and unexpected event must have the most important consequences whether for peace or for war. A disputed succession is not impossible, as it has long been reported that the Grand Duke Constantine was disposed to contest the succession with the Csesarewitch, but this will probably turn out to be a fable. It is supposed that the new Emperor has been all along inclined to peace, and that he was in disgrace with his father on that account. If this be true, it renders it still more probable that he will be anxious to put an end to this destructive and dangerous war, and the Allied Powers may be less exacting with him than they were disposed to be with the late Emperor. On the other hand, should the war unhappily continue, the death of Nicholas is likely to damp the ardour of the Russians and to relax their exertions, so that we can hardly fail to profit by it. Clarendon is gone over to Boulogne to confer with the Emperor Napoleon.

There seems something like a lull here for the moment, and less of excitement and violence than there was. Palmerston has not been in office a fortnight, and already he is enormously *baissé*; his speeches night after night are miserable. The truth is, he never had any power as a debater, and he is out of his element as leader in the House of Commons, where he has to answer everybody, to speak on every subject, and to be continually debating more or less. He has made a few great speeches, prepared, and on his own subject of foreign affairs, and every now and then a smart chaffing retort which excited the hilarity of the House, and

that has been all he could do. Then he seems supine and undecided ; he does not fill up the vacant places or seemingly endeavour to do so, and he does not put good men in the places he does fill up, all of which does him harm in general estimation. Clarendon has told Lady Palmerston very frankly that he will soon ruin himself in public opinion if he goes on in this way. Few things are more extraordinary than the notion that was abroad of Palmerston's fitness and efficacy. Never was there a greater delusion, and never one that is so rapidly being dissipated.

*March 10th.*—It is remarkable that, though seven days have elapsed since the news of the death of the Emperor of Russia reached us, and that we heard of it by electric telegraph the very day it happened, we are still without authentic and detailed information of what has since occurred at St. Petersburg ; and of the manifesto of the new Emperor, which is looked for with so much curiosity, we have only a partial extract or imperfect summary, so that we have still no means of judging whether the chances of peace are improved by the accession of Alexander II.

Palmerston's Government does not seem to take root or gain much strength ; every day seems to prove the more clearly that he is unfit for the task he has taken on himself. He inspires neither respect nor confidence, and is totally unable to manage the House of Commons ; his speeches are feeble and bad, and he is not always prudent and conciliatory, but, on the contrary, pettish and almost offensive. He finds great difficulty in filling the vacant offices, and he evinces much want of tact and good management in his endeavours to do so, offering and retracting his offers in a very loose way. For example, he offered Sir Robert Peel the Clerkship of the Ordnance, which he accepted ; and then he found Monsell did not mean to resign it, so he had to withdraw the offer. Then he told him he should be Colonial Under-Secretary if John Russell would consent. John Russell would not consent, and then he offered him a seat at the Admiralty. Sir Robert in some dudgeon demurred, and Palmerston, inferring from his ill humour that he would not

take this place, offered it to Henry Brand, who accepted, desired his writ might be moved for, and went to the railway station to go down to the place he represented. Just as he was starting, a messenger arrived with a letter from Palmerston saying Sir Robert Peel had taken the Admiralty, so he could not have it, and the gentleman had to return home without any office at all. This is a sad way of doing business, and will not make him more popular. Grenville Berkeley (whipper-in) told me he thought Palmerston was doing rather better latterly and that there was a better disposition in the House of Commons; but Jonathan Peel, who is a shrewd, dispassionate observer, and tolerably impartial, though with no good will to the present Government, told me a different story. He says the Government is as weak as possible, Palmerston wretched, and the House of Commons ill disposed and unruly, and he thinks it absolutely impossible that this concern can last many weeks. The Derbyites are quite confident of forcing their way to office, and quite determined to do so; but it is their game to damage the present Government as much as possible, and they will do everything in opposition but what may recoil upon themselves after they have got into office, and no other consideration will restrain them. I regard with the utmost dislike the prospect of their return, because I think their conduct so monstrously unprincipled. I hear Gladstone is very much out of humour, and expect soon to see him and his small band in overt opposition to the Government. Many fancy that it will end in his joining Derby, but so do not I. I am not sure that he would be indisposed if a proper occasion presented itself, but I do not believe any consideration or any circumstances whatever would induce the Derbyites to admit him again into their party. Their indignation—that is, of a great many of them—was unbounded at Derby having offered him office the other day, and at the great meeting at Eglinton's such manifestations of resentment were made on that account as to make it nearly impossible (for in these days nothing is quite impossible) for any future attempt at reconciliation and reunion to be made.

*March 11th.*—A fresh shuffling of the cards is being arranged by which Frederick Peel is to go to the Treasury, *vice* Wilson, Vice President of the Board of Trade; Sir Robert to the War Department, *vice* his brother; and Henry Brand to the Admiralty. Palmerston seemed to consider all the blunders he made about these offices rather a good joke than a mischievous *gaucherie*. ‘Ha, ha!’ he said, ‘a Comedy of Errors.’ George Lewis told me this morning he thinks the temper of the House of Commons more favourable, and, if he can succeed in producing a palatable Budget, that they may get on; he told me the revenue was extremely flourishing and the country very rich, but the expenses are enormous. He means to meet them by a loan, but the question is of what amount, and how much of the additional expense shall be provided by it. He will want ninety millions to cover the whole.

Clarendon was much pleased with his visit to the Emperor, who talked to him very frankly and unreservedly about everything. They lit their cigars and sat and talked with the greatest ease. He said the Emperor spoke to him about the English press, and all he said was sensible and true; that he was aware that a free press was a necessity in England, and as indispensable as the Constitution itself, and that he had hitherto believed that the editors of the principal newspapers had the good of their country at heart, and always acted from conscientious motives; but that he could no longer entertain that opinion. The press during the past months, and the ‘Times’ particularly, had done an incalculable amount of mischief to England and to the alliance between us. The effect produced by their language in Germany was most injurious, and of service only to Russia. When the English papers talked of their own country in the way they did, of its degradation and disgrace, its maladministration, the ruin of its military power, and the loss of all that makes a nation great and powerful, though he (the Emperor) knew what all this meant, and how much or how little of truth there was in such exaggerated statements, yet in France they were generally believed, and it became very



difficult for him to reconcile the nation to an alliance for which he was reproached with making sacrifices and shaping his policy in accordance with our's, when it was evident from our own showing that our alliance was not worth having, and our impotence was so exposed that, whenever peace should put an end to the necessity of the alliance, we should be entirely at their mercy ; and while such was the feeling in France, in Germany it was still stronger, and there the 'Times' had succeeded in creating a universal conviction that we are in the lowest condition of weakness and inefficiency : at all of which he expressed the greatest regret. I was surprised to hear Clarendon say that he did not believe the resources of Russia to carry on the contest to be in any sensible degree exhausted, that her commerce had not suffered at all, and as to her finances she could go on for a good while with her paper money and the gold which, in a certain quantity, she drew from the Ural Mountains.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> [In justice to the conductors of the 'Times' it must be said that although the language of the paper was violent and extremely annoying to the Government and its Allies, yet it was by the power and enterprise of the press that the deplorable state of the army was brought to the knowledge of the public and even of Ministers themselves ; and it was by the 'Times' that the first steps were taken to supply the deficiencies of the Administration. The fund raised by voluntary contributions for this purpose amounted to 25,000*l.* and competent persons were sent out to apply it to the most pressing wants of the army.]

## CHAPTER IX.

The Vienna Conference—Literary Occupations—A Roman Catholic Privy Councillor—Negotiations at Vienna—The Emperor Napoleon in London—The Emperor's brilliant Reception—Russia refuses the Terms offered—The Sebastopol Committee—Debate on the War—Visit to Paris—Resignation of M. Drouyn de Lhuys—The Emperor's Journey to the Crimea—The Repulse at the Redan—Visit to Thiers—A Dinner at the Tuileries—Conversation with the Emperor—M. Guizot on the War—Death of Lord Raglan—A Dinner at Princess Lieven's—The Palace of Versailles—Revelations of Lord John Russell's Mission—Dinner with the Emperor at Villeneuve l'Etang—Lord John Russell's Conduct at Vienna—Excitement in London—Lord John's Resignation—Lord John's Conduct explained—'Whom shall we Hang?'—Prorogation of Parliament.

*March 31st, 1855.*—Three weeks have passed away and I have had nothing to say; nor indeed have I anything now of the least importance, and can only glance at the general aspect of affairs. The Government, on the whole, seems in a somewhat better condition. They say Palmerston speaks better than he did, and his good humour and civility please. At last the offices, except the Under-Secretaryship to the Colonies, are filled up. Lord Elgin and Lord Seymour successively refused the Duchy of Lancaster, and after going a begging for many weeks Lord Harrowby has taken it. Laing and Wilson, and I think somebody else, declined the Vice Presidency of the Board of Trade, and they have got Bouverie.

Within these few days the hopes of peace have waxed faint. The fatal third point is an insurmountable obstacle, and it seems likely that we shall be condemned to fight it out more fiercely than ever, and without Austria, who, as I all along expected, will not join us in forcing hard conditions on Russia. It remains to be seen whether we or Austria

are in fault, assuming the rupture of the negotiations to be inevitable. If Austria recedes from what she had already agreed to, she is; if we require anything more, we are. Drouyn de Lhuys has been here for twenty-four hours, and goes on to Vienna directly to bring things to a conclusion one way or another. Clarendon is pleased with him. The Emperor is to be here in three weeks.

Having no public events nor any secret information to record, I must put down my own private concerns, uninteresting as they are. I am busy on the task of editing a volume of Moore's correspondence left to me by John Russell, and finishing the second article upon King Joseph's Memoirs.<sup>1</sup> These small literary occupations interest and amuse me, and, being quite out of the way of politics, and seeing nobody, except Clarendon at rare intervals, who can or will tell me anything, it is well I can amuse myself with them; and now that I am growing old (for I shall be sixty-one the day after to-morrow) it is my aim to cultivate these pleasures more and more, and make them my refuge against the infirmities which beset me, and the loss of youth. My great fear is lest my eyesight should fail, and I earnestly hope I may die before such a calamity should befall me.

The war goes languidly on, and I hear Raglan and Canrobert are squabbling instead of acting, and that it seems to be more the fault of Canrobert; but the melancholy truth is that there are two incompetent generals in command, who have no skill or enterprise, and are letting the opportunity for attacking the enemy slip away. A divided command and two independent armies are in themselves an immense drawback, but when they begin to disagree it becomes fatal. We have now an enormous force there, and yet they seem incapable of doing anything and of striking any great and serious blow.

*April 1st.*—I went to a Council yesterday and got into a difficulty. Without any previous notice, Mr. Monsell, a Roman Catholic, came to be made a Privy Councillor. I

<sup>1</sup> [Mr. Greville wrote the review of the Memoirs of King Joseph Bonaparte which appeared in two successive articles of the *Edinburgh Review*.]

had never sworn a Roman Catholic and did not know what to do, so I proposed to Monsell to put it off till another day, and meanwhile I would ascertain how he was to be sworn. The difficulty was told to the Queen, and the Prince set about finding what was to be done. He looked out the 10th George IV. (Emancipation Act), and, just as we were summoned into the Queen's presence, Granville brought the volume, put it into my hands, and told me I must administer to Monsell the oath set forth there, in lieu of the oaths of abjuration and supremacy. I was sure it was a mistake; but there was no time to remonstrate, and I was compelled to bring him in and administer the oath. As soon as I got back to my office and looked into the matter I found it was all wrong, and that he had not, in fact, been sworn at all. What he ought to have done was to take this oath in one of the Law Courts, and then to have the Privy Councillor's oath administered to him, and so I sent him word.

Afterwards I met Sidney Herbert, and he told me what he believed to be the cause of Drouyn de Lhuys' coming here, and the actual state of affairs at Vienna. We have proposed the reduction of the fleet; the Russians refuse. The Emperor Napoleon would like, if possible, to obtain some great success in the Crimea, and is not indisposed to continue the war if he can see a reasonable hope of such an achievement; but when he despairs of this his mind inclines to the other alternative, to make peace (which would be popular in France), and he does not care very much about the terms and is not averse to waive the condition as to the fleet. But our Government want to insist on it, or go on with the war, and Sidney Herbert believes they have succeeded in talking over Drouyn de Lhuys and persuading him to join us in this determination, and to carry it off to Vienna. However, he is very likely to be talked over again there, and it remains to be seen whether the Emperor, if he really wishes for peace, will not join with Austria in opposing us, and accepting some other conditions. I always fancied that we had come to a regular unmistakeable agreement with Austria what we should ask of Russia, and that she had

bound herself to join in the war if the terms agreed in were refused, but, according to Sidney Herbert, this has never been done. Clarendon did, indeed, *at last* state distinctly to Austria the terms on which France and England meant to insist, and Austria expressed her concurrence in them as a matter of opinion, and her desire to obtain them, consenting also to unite her efforts to theirs in attempting to obtain them; but she never consented to go to war if they were not conceded, therefore we have no reason to complain of her if the negotiations break off on these grounds, and she refuses to depart from her neutrality. She has all along said, she wished with all her heart we could succeed in taking Sebastopol, but as we had not succeeded, and apparently could not, it was impossible to press very stringent terms on Russia; and she has never held out any expectation to us of joining in the war against Russia, unless Russia refuses such reasonable and not humiliating terms of peace as she herself thinks indispensable for the objects to the attainment of which she has all along been a party. The best chance of peace now is that the Emperor Napoleon may think he is not likely to do any great things in the Crimea and that peace is his best policy, and he is the real arbiter of peace and war. If he prefers following in the wake of England, and to defer to our war policy, peace will ascend to Heaven, and the odious war will be resumed with more fury than ever, and no one can guess how long it will last, nor what will be the end of it.

*April 17th.*—Yesterday I went out ‘with all the gazing town’ to see not the least curious of the many curious events I have lived to witness, the entry of the Emperor and Empress of the French into London. The day was magnificent, the crowd prodigious, the reception not very clamorous, but cordial and respectful. A fine sight for them to see such vast multitudes, so orderly and so prosperous, and without a single soldier except their own escort. The Queen received them with the utmost cordiality, and omitted none of the usual forms practised between Sovereigns. She met the Imperial pair at the entrance to the Castle, embraced the

Emperor and then the Empress when she was presented to her.

*April 20th.*—The visit of the Emperor has been one continued ovation, and the success of it complete. None of the Sovereigns who have been here before have ever been received with such magnificence by the Court or by such curiosity and delight by the people. Wherever and whenever they have appeared, they have been greeted by enormous multitudes and prodigious acclamations. The Queen is exceedingly pleased with both of them; she thinks the Empress very natural, graceful, and attractive, and the Emperor frank, cordial, and true. He has done his best to please her, talked to her a great deal, amused her, and has completely succeeded. Everybody is struck with his mean and diminutive figure and vulgar appearance, but his manners are good and not undignified. He talked a very long time to Lord Derby on Tuesday at Windsor and to Lord Aberdeen on Wednesday. This last was very proper, because he had a great prejudice against Aberdeen, and fancied he was his enemy, which Aberdeen knew. When he was invested with the Garter, he took all sorts of oaths—old feudal oaths—of fidelity and knightly service to the Queen, and he then made her a short speech to the following effect:—‘I have sworn to be faithful to Your Majesty and to serve you to the best of my ability, and my whole future life shall be spent in proving the sincerity with which I have thus sworn, and my resolution to devote myself to your service.’ The fineness of the weather brought out the whole population of London, as usual kept in excellent order by a few policemen, and in perfect good humour. It was a beautiful sight last night when the Royal and Imperial party went to the Opera in state; the streets lit by gas and the houses illuminated and light as day, particularly opposite the Travellers’ Club, where I was. I am glad the success of the visit has been so great, and the contentment of all the parties concerned so complete, but it is well that all will be over tomorrow, for such excitement and enthusiasm could not last much longer, and the

inconvenience of being beset by crowds, and the streets obstructed, is getting tiresome.

I saw Cowley for a moment yesterday. He told me the Russians refused any conditions which imposed loss of territory or limitation of naval forces, and they declined to offer any counter project, though they are ready to discuss anything we propose. He therefore considers the continuance of the war unavoidable, and does not believe Austria will join in it, though Drouyn de Lhuys still writes his own expectation that she will. He said they had never said or done anything which bound them to join, and that their diplomacy had been much more adroit and successful than our's, but that this was principally the fault of the French, who never would consent to take a peremptory course so as to compel them to be explicit. The consequence of this is, that it will be impossible to produce the diplomatic correspondence, and its retention will put Parliament and the press in a fury, and expose the Government to attacks which they will find it very difficult to repel or to silence. They cannot give the reason why, and their enemies and detractors will believe, or at least insist, that they do not dare disclose their own share in the transaction. I asked Clarendon how it was that the French Government in their last paper in the 'Moniteur' said so positively that they had secured the cooperation of Austria if the last conditions were refused by Russia; he replied that he supposed they said so in order to make it the ground of an accusation against Austria when the Conference broke up and she refuses to declare war. Clarendon thinks we shall get the better of Russia, but that it will be by blockading her ports and ruining her commerce, and not by military operations, and that this may take two or three years or more, but is certain in the end.<sup>1</sup>

*May 24th.*—The Sebastopol Committee is finished, and the result proves that it is a very good thing to have had it,

<sup>1</sup> [The failure or suspension of the negotiations for peace at Vienna was formally announced to Parliament on May 21, and the protocols of the Conference laid upon the table.]

for no ill consequences have come of it, and the evidence has benefited instead of injuring both the Government and those who were most bitterly abused, especially Hardinge and Newcastle, about the latter of whom there has been a considerable reaction of opinion. In Parliament nothing has taken place of much consequence. Ellenborough gave battle in the Lords and was signally defeated. Layard had announced a hostile motion in the House of Commons, which he has since given up to Disraeli, who brings forward a regular want of confidence motion tonight, which will decide the fate of the Government. Sir Francis Baring has moved an amendment which the Peelites will not vote for, because it pledges the House to support the war, they having now become furiously pacific; as if they were not unpopular enough already, they are now doing all they can to mar their own efficacy by giving their enemies a plausible case for attacking and abusing them, and by breasting the tide of warlike zeal and passion, which, though very absurd and very mischievous, is too strong and too general to be openly and directly resisted at present. It is quite fit and becoming to reason with it, and to endeavour to bring the public to a more reasonable frame of mind, but great tact, caution, and good management are required in doing this. It is very difficult to make out what Gladstone and his friends (for it would be ridiculous to call them a party) are at, and what they expect or desire in reference to their political future. Palmerston is said to have done better in the House of Commons lately than he did at first, but it is curious to see how completely his popularity has evaporated. All the foolish people whose pet he was, and who clamoured for him with the notion that he was to do every sort of impossible thing, now that they find he can do no more than other men, and that there never was any real difference between him and his colleagues, are furious with him because they so deceived themselves, and want to break the idol they set up.

*May 30th.*—The division last Friday night gave Government a larger majority than anybody expected,<sup>1</sup> and if it did

<sup>1</sup> [Mr. Disraeli's Motion condemning the Government for their mis-



not give them permanent strength it averted immediate danger. Gladstone made a fine speech, but gave great offence to all who are not for peace, and exposed himself to much unpopularity. The discussion is only suspended till Parliament meets again, when the amendments will be debated, and there will no more divisions; but in the meantime the news which has arrived of the successes in the Crimea, and the fair prospect there appears of still greater advantages, must serve to silence the advocates of peace and encourage those who are all for war, and to render a contest popular which is likely to be crowned with brilliant results, and, as many imagine, to give us the means of dictating peace on our own terms. I believe in the prospect of success, but not that it will reduce the Russians to make peace on our terms, particularly as the conditions will infallibly be harder than before. But I do marvel that they did not make peace at Vienna on the terms which were there offered them, when they must have known that all the chances of war were against them. The Emperor of Russia might have taken warning from the history and fate of Napoleon, who constantly refused the terms he could have obtained, and continually insisted on something more than his enemies would give him, and by this obstinacy lost his crown. The most interesting incident which occurred last week was the scene at the end of the debate between Graham and John Russell, who had a fight of considerable asperity; and according to all appearances the Peelites and the Whigs are completely two. When Graham was reconciled to Lord John two or three years ago, he vowed that nothing should separate them again, but '*quam parum stabiles sunt hominum amicitiae*,' and now they appear to be as antagonistic as ever. But, to be sure, Graham could not contemplate or foresee all the tricks which Lord John played during the whole time he was a member of Aberdeen's Government.

Notwithstanding the success of Government in the House of Commons and of the armies in the Crimea, things are in conduct of the war was rejected by 319 to 219. Lord John Russell made a warlike speech in the course of this debate.]

a very unsatisfactory and uncomfortable state here, and nobody knows what will happen. There is no confidence in any party or any men, and everybody has a vague apprehension of coming but undefined evil and danger. The world seems out of joint.

*Paris, June 17th.*—Having resolved to go to Vichy for my health, here I am on the road; I crossed over yesterday morning, a very disagreeable but short passage from Folkestone, good journey by rail, and got here at nine o'clock, being lodged very hospitably at the Embassy. French carriages on the railway are much better than ours, particularly the second class; the country between Boulogne and Paris looks well and thriving. I had some talk with Cowley last night before we went to bed, when he gave me an account of the circumstances of Drouyn de Lhuys' resignation.<sup>1</sup> He also descanted on the difficulties of the Government here and of the maintenance of the alliance, which he attributes up to this time entirely to the good faith and fairness of the Emperor himself, and his determination that nothing shall interrupt the good understanding between the two countries, on which he is above all things bent. The Emperor says it is a great misfortune that there are no men of capacity or character whose services he can command, nor in fact any men, if he could command their services, in whom the public would be disposed to place confidence. Cowley had no very good opinion of Drouyn de Lhuys, and said no reliance could be placed in him; but in some respects he is a loss, because he has a certain capacity and clean hands, he is enormously rich, and guiltless of any speculation or jobbery. When Drouyn announced that he meant to go to Vienna, Lord Cowley urged him to go to England first and come to an understanding with the Cabinet there as to the terms which should be proposed at the Conference. He consented and went, and Cowley

<sup>1</sup> [At the Conference at Vienna M. Drouyn de Lhuys departed from the conditions of peace agreed to between the French and British Governments, and was disposed to accept the more favourable terms which were supported by Austria. This led to his disavowal and resignation on his return to Paris. It turned out that Lord John Russell, the British envoy to the Conference, had taken a similar course.]

urged Clarendon to have the agreement put down in writing that there might be no mistake about it. This was done, and Drouyn went to Vienna. When he took upon himself to make the proposition he did, it was in direct opposition to his agreement with us, but he thought he should bring the Emperor to concur with him and to sanction it. The Emperor seemed at first disposed to do so, and when he saw Cowley intimated as much to him. Cowley submitted that it was quite contrary to the understanding with us, and objected on every ground to the proposal. The Emperor said he really got quite confused in the intricacies and details of this affair, but he would see Drouyn again and speak to him upon it. Cowley requested (a very strange request as he owned) that he might be present at the interview. The Emperor seemed somewhat surprised, but acquiesced. When Cowley came he found Drouyn had been there an hour, and that Marshal Vaillant was also present. They went over the ground again and Drouyn said what he had to say, when Cowley merely said he would not go into the general question and would only ask whether M. Drouyn's proposal was in conformity with what had been settled in London, and he appealed to Marshal Vaillant whether the termination of the war on such terms would be advisable. It was impossible to maintain that the terms were consistent with the joint agreement, and Vaillant declared that if the French army was brought away, and a peace made on conditions which would appear to tarnish the honour of their arms, he would not answer for the consequences. This put an end to the discussion. Drouyn de Lhuys retired, and as soon as he got home sent his resignation to the Emperor, who wrote him back a very goodhumoured answer advising him to recall it, and expressing a wish that he would come and talk the matter over with him, when he had no doubt they should come to a satisfactory understanding. Drouyn persisted, and then the Emperor accepted his resignation and sent for Walewski. I asked Cowley how Walewski was likely to do, and he said wretchedly, and that he was not of a calibre to fill such a post.

He told me all about the intended journey of the Emperor to the Crimea and why it was given up. The Emperor was bent on it, while all the Ministers deprecated it and did all they could to prevent it. They suggested that, if any misfortune occurred while he was there, he could not quit the army; if any success, he would infallibly stay to pursue it, so that his speedy return could not be counted on. This failed to move him. The intention was that Jérôme should be, not Regent, but Chief of the Council of Ministers, and they advised Jérôme only to consent to take this office on condition that he was invested with the same despotic power as the Emperor himself. This His Majesty would not consent to, as the Ministers foresaw, and this was the reason why the expedition was given up.

*Paris, June 23rd.*—I came here to pass through to Vichy, and accordingly on Tuesday last to Vichy I went. I arrived there in the evening, found a detestable apartment without a fireplace; the weather was intolerable, it never ceased raining, and the cold was intense. Finding that it was useless to take the waters or baths in such weather, and being disgusted with the whole thing, I resolved to return to Paris, which I did on Friday, and here I am comfortably established in the Embassy again.

On my arrival I was greeted with the painful intelligence of the repulse sustained by the French and English on the 18th in the attack on the Mamelon and Redan batteries, and of the great losses which both armies had suffered. This failure has cast a great gloom over Paris and London, and the disappointment is greater because we had become so accustomed to success that everybody regarded failure in anything as impossible. Cowley told me that the Emperor was excessively annoyed, and the more because they entirely disapprove of Pélissier's proceedings. Without tying him down or attempting from hence to direct the operations of the campaign, they had given Pélissier the strongest recommendations to abstain from assaults which they had reason to believe would not be decisive and would cost a vast number of lives, and they were very anxious the operations

against the Russians in the field should be pressed instead. There had been some half angry communications between the Government and Pélissier, who had talked of resigning the command. The opinions of the Government had been principally formed from those of General Niel, who had constantly reported his conviction to the above mentioned effect, and had earnestly deprecated these assaults. Then there is reason to apprehend that such unsuccessful attempts may produce bad blood and mutual accusations between the allied forces. Already Pélissier and Raglan have begun to cast the blame of the failure on each other, though apparently the difference has not yet swelled to any serious amount. I have always thought that it would have been better to have no divided command, but to place an English corps under a French commander-in-chief, and a French squadron under an English admiral. This was what the Emperor proposed, and he wrote a letter himself on the subject, which Cowley promised to show me. We have had much conversation about the Emperor, his character and his capacity, and I am puzzled how to understand and to do justice to the latter. Being such as he is represented to be, and having the defects he has, it is difficult to comprehend his having accomplished the great things he has, and raised himself to such a situation and such a height of personal power.

*June 24th.*—Last night I went to Thiers', where I found Mignet, Roger du Nord, and others of his adherents, none of whom I recollected, nor they me. This morning I called on Achille Fould, who told me the Emperor knew I was here and would like me to be presented to him, and it was settled that this should be done. I am nothing loth, for I have a curiosity to see this remarkable man and to converse with him. Madame de Lieven told me this morning that not long before the Revolution of '48 Jérôme Bonaparte had entreated her to exert her influence to get him made a peer.

*June 26th.*—Yesterday morning arrived an invitation to dine at the Tuileries the same evening. I went there, was ushered into a room with eight or ten men in it, none of

whom I knew except Count Bacciochi, whom I had met at Fould's the day before—three in uniform, the rest in plain clothes. A man, whom I suppose to be the *aide de camp de service*, came forward to receive me and invited me to sit down. Presently the same or another man came and said 'Milord' (they all milorded me), 'vous vous mettez à table, s'il vous plaît, à côté de l'Empereur à sa droite.' I was then taken into the next room, which adjoins the cabinet of the Emperor. In a few minutes His Majesty made his appearance; he immediately came up to me, bowed very civilly, and asked me the usual questions of when I came to Paris, etc. In a minute dinner was announced and we went in. As we walked in he said to me, 'L'Impératrice sera bien fâchée de ne vous avoir pas vu.' At dinner, which did not last above twenty-five minutes, he talked (a sort of dropping conversation) on different subjects, and I found him so easy to get on with that I ventured to start topics myself. After dinner we returned to the room we had left, and after coffee, seeing me staring about at the portraits, he said all his family were there, and he told me who they all were and the history of these portraits, which, he said, had made the tour of the world.

After this he asked me to sit down, which I did at a round table by his side, and M. Visconti on the other side of me, and then we had a conversation which lasted at least an hour and a half on every imaginable subject. It was impossible not to be struck with his simplicity, his being so natural and totally without any air or assumption of greatness, though not undignified, but perfectly *comme il faut*, with excellent manners, and easy, pleasant, fluent conversation. I was struck with his air of truth and frankness, and though of course I could not expect in my position and at this first interview with him that he should be particularly expansive, yet he gave me the idea of being not only not reserved but as if, when intimate, he would have a great deal of *abandon*. It was difficult to bring away all the subjects he discussed, and I do not know that he said anything wonderfully striking, but he made a very favourable impression on me, and

made me wish to know more of him, which I am never likely to do.

He talked of the war and its conduct, of the faults committed, and of the characters and talents of the generals engaged, comparing them, much to their disadvantage, with the generals of the Empire. I asked him which were the best, and he said all the African generals were much of the same calibre: Changarnier, Lamoricière, St. Arnaud, Canrobert, Péliissier—very little difference between them. The war they waged in Africa was of a peculiar character, and did not render them more capable of conducting great strategical operations in Europe. He talked of Thiers and Odilon Barrot, and described scenes with the latter in Council when Barrot was his Minister; of the ‘Times’ and its influence; of Spain; in short, of a vast variety of subjects; of the Exhibition here, and with some appearance of disappointment that the people will not go to it. His simplicity and absence of all *faste* were remarkable; thus, I asked him what he thought of the Hango affair, when he said it was not so bad as had been reported. ‘I have had an account of it from Admiral Penaud to-day; should you like to see it?’ I said ‘Yes,’ when he got up, went into his cabinet, and came back with the letter in his hand; and a little while after, when we were talking of the siege of Sebastopol, he asked if I had ever seen a very good engineer’s map of the whole thing; and when I said I had not, he said, ‘Then I will show you one;’ and he again went into his cabinet and brought it out. After this long palaver he took leave of me, shaking hands with much apparent cordiality.

*June 27th.*—Bosquet has written to the Emperor that these assaults on the Russian works are only a useless waste of time. Marshal Vaillant has told Cowley that they agree in this, but they must either recall their general or let him go on in his own way, and if they interfere, the blame of any disaster will inevitably fall on them, no matter what might be the cause. I dined with Flahaut yesterday; in the morning rode round all the boulevards, a grand promenade by which Paris is well seen; and I met Guizot at Madame de Lieven’s, who

talked of the war and asked how it was ever to end. ‘People go to war,’ he said, ‘to make conquests or to make peace; you profess not to intend the first, how do you propose to effect the second? By reducing Russia to accept your terms—can you do so? will she yield? If not, what then?—you may wound her, but you can’t strike her in a vital part; and the more barbarous she is, the more she will consent to suffer and the less she will be disposed to yield.’ He gave me an account (in short) of the bother about the Academy and the Emperor’s interference. They do not mean to give way, but they think he will; if he does not, he will have to dissolve them.

*Paris, July 5th.*—One of my attacks of gout came on this day week and disabled me from going anywhere, doing anything, and still more from writing anything. In the meanwhile we received the news of Lord Raglan’s death.<sup>1</sup> Though they do not care about it here, there has been a very decent display of sympathy and regret, and the Emperor wrote to Cowley with his own hand a very proper letter. There is good reason to believe that the fatal termination of Lord Raglan’s illness was in some (perhaps in great) measure produced by vexation and disappointment at the failure of the 18th, and annoyance at the many embarrassments of his position. It is certain that for a considerable time great disunion and poignant differences existed between him and the French generals. Canrobert wrote home a very unhandsome letter, in which he gave as one of his reasons for resigning the impossibility of going on with Raglan. I believe Raglan complained of Canrobert with much better reason. On the 18th Pélissier changed the plan of attack that had been agreed on between them; and, besides all the mistakes that occurred in the French operations, there seems to have been a want of continual and active concert between the two commanders-in-chief during the operations. Raglan proposed a general attack on the town when the assaults failed, which Pélissier refused to agree to. There is a fair probability this would have succeeded, as an English force did get into a part of the town, stayed there some time, and got away un-

<sup>1</sup> [Lord Raglan died in the Crimea on June 28.]



observed. There is now a bad feeling, a disposition to recrimination, between the two armies which may have very bad effects, and it is awful to think our army is under an untried man of whom nothing is known, and who is not likely to have more weight with, and receive more consideration from, the French generals than his predecessor. However desirable unity of command may be, in the present temper of the troops and after all that has occurred it would be impossible. General Torrens, who is here, speaks in high terms of Raglan, especially of his magnanimity in bearing all the blame which has been thrown upon him and never saying one word in his own vindication, which might have entirely exonerated him but have done some injury to the cause. Torrens thinks that in all or almost all in which he has appeared most obnoxious to censure he could have triumphantly excused himself, and have proved that the causes were attributable to others and not to himself. His must have been a painful as it was an ungrateful service, and it was a melancholy and untimely end.

*Paris, July 6th.*—I went yesterday to the Exhibition in the morning; then to Notre Dame and the Luxembourg Gardens and drove about Paris; dined *en trio* with Madame de Lieven and Guizot, when there was of course nothing but political talk. Guizot thinks there has been not only a series of diplomatic blunders, but a wonderful want of *invention*, not to strike out some means of adjusting this quarrel, in which I agree with him. This morning Labouchere and I went to Versailles. Fould had given me a letter to the Director of the Museum there, M. Soulié, whom we found very intelligent, well informed, and obliging. We told him our object was to avoid the *giro regolare* of the endless rooms fitted up with bad pictures by Louis Philippe, and to see the apartments full of historical associations from the time of Louis XIV. down to the Revolution. We were completely gratified, and he took us over everything we wished to see, being admirably qualified as a cicerone by his familiarity with the localities and the history belonging to them. We saw all the apartments in which Louis XIV. lived, and what remains

of those of Madame de Maintenon. The Palace has been so tumbled about at different times, and such alterations made in it, that it is not always easy to ascertain correctly where the rooms of certain personages were, but our guide proved to our complete satisfaction that certain rooms he showed us were those which really did belong to Madame de Maintenon. We saw too in minute detail the apartments of Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, and the passages through which she fled to escape from the irruption of the mob on the 5th of October. The whole thing was as interesting as possible.

*Paris, July 9th.*—I meant to have left Paris last night, but, an invitation arriving to dine with the Emperor at St. Cloud today, I put off going till tomorrow. I went yesterday to Versailles to see the *grandes eaux* and was disappointed, and dined there with the Ashburtons. This morning telegraphic news came of a Russian sortie last night; no details of course. Yesterday we were thrown into consternation by the intelligence from London of the revelations of John Russell in the House of Commons and the discussion thereupon. Le Marchant wrote to Labouchere and told him the effect was as bad as possible, and the whole case very deplorable. My own opinion is that nobody could have acted more indiscreetly and unjustifiably than John Russell has done, and he has sacrificed his character and authority in a way which he will find it difficult to get over. But I am disposed to agree with him that the terms proposed by Austria, if they could have been brought to maturity and carried out, were quite sufficient to make peace upon, and that the negotiations ought to have continued in order to endeavour to bring about this result. The effect of this public announcement to the whole world, that the English Minister at the Congress as well as the French one was willing to accept the terms proposed by Austria, will not fail to make a great sensation, and produce a considerable effect both in Germany and in France. In England it is doubtful whether it will have any other result than to damage John Russell himself, and increase the vulgar prejudice against public men. My own idea is that it will render the war

still more unpopular in France, and the English alliance likewise, because it will encourage the prevailing notion that the war is carried on for English interests and in deference to the wishes of England. Though John Russell declared that the resolution of the Emperor to part with Drouyn de Lhuys and reject the Austrian proposal had been made before the intention of the English Cabinet was known, this will not be believed, or at all events everybody will be convinced that he knew what the sentiments of England were, and that he really acted in conformity with them, as was beyond all doubt the case.

*July 10th.*—I dined at Villeneuve l'Étang. We went to the Palace of St. Cloud in Cowley's carriage, where we found an equerry and one of the Emperor's carriages, which took us to Villeneuve. A small house, pretty and comfortable enough, and a small party, all English—Duke and Duchess of Hamilton, Lord Hertford, Lord and Lady Ashburton, General Torrens and his *aide de camp*, Cowley and myself, the Duc de Bassano, Comte de Montebello, the *aide de camp de service*, and M. Valabrègue, *écuyer*, that was the whole party. The Emperor sat between the two ladies, taking the Duchess in to dinner. It lasted about three quarters of an hour, and as soon as it was over His Majesty took us all out to walk about the place, see the dairy and a beautiful Bretonne cow he ordered to be brought out, and then to scull on the lake, or *étang*, which gives its name to the place. There were a number of little boats for one person to scull and one to sit, and one larger for two each; the Emperor got into one with the Duchess, and all the rest of the people as they liked, and we passed about half an hour on the water. On landing, ices, etc., were brought, and the carriages came to the door at nine o'clock, a *char à banc* with four *percherons* and postillions exactly like the old French postboy, and several other open carriages and pair. The two ladies got into the centre of the *char à banc*, Cowley, Hertford, and I were invited to get up before, and the Emperor himself got up behind with somebody else, I did not see who. We then set off and drove for some time through the woods and drives of Ville-

neuve and St. Cloud, and at last, at about ten o'clock, we were set down at the Palace. There we all alighted, and, after walking about a little, the Emperor showing us the part which Marie Antoinette had built and telling some anecdotes connected with Louis XVIII. and Louis Philippe, and the Château, he shook hands with all of us very cordially and dismissed us. His Majesty got into the *char à banc* and returned to Villeneuve, and we drove back to Paris. When we were walking about the court of the Château (it was quite dark) the sentinel challenged us—'Qui va là?' when the Emperor called out in a loud voice, 'L'Empereur.'

Of course, in this company there was nothing but general conversation, and I had no opportunity of having any with His Majesty; but he was extremely civil, offering me his cigars, which I declined, and expressing anxiety that I should not catch cold. He made the same impression on me as before as to his extreme simplicity and the easiness of his intercourse; but I was struck with his appearance being so very *mesquin*, more than I thought at first.

Lady Ashburton told me she had received a letter from Ellice, telling her that the affair in the House of Commons had produced the most serious effect, and that it would probably end in the retirement of John Russell, and eventually to a change of Government. He had got a story, which I utterly disbelieve, that Milner Gibson had been instigated by John Russell himself to give him this opportunity of saying what he did, which was certainly more than he need have said.<sup>1</sup> Lord John seems for some time past to have

<sup>1</sup> [On July 6, Lord John Russell declared in the House of Commons, in answer to a question put by Mr. Milner Gibson, that he was personally convinced that the terms proposed at Vienna by the Austrian Government gave a fair prospect of the termination of hostilities, but that on his return to England the Government declined to accept them. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French envoy, had also been in favour of these terms. This declaration appeared to be wholly inconsistent with the warlike speech which Lord John had made, on his return, on May 24. Sir E. B. Lytton then gave notice of a motion condemning the conduct of the Ministers charged with negotiating at Vienna; but Lord John Russell anticipated the inevitable vote of censure by resigning office, and he was succeeded in the Colonial Department by Sir William Molesworth. This transaction was held to

been bereft of his senses, and to commit nothing but blunders one after another. What has been passing in his mind, and what his real objects are or have been, it would puzzle anybody to say. If he had personal views and wanted to regain the station and power which he had lost, never did any man take such false steps and pursue so erroneous a course to obtain his ends. He had in some measure retrieved the character and consideration which he forfeited by his conduct at the beginning of this year; but I do not see how he is ever to get over this, nor how his followers can any longer have any confidence in him, and I do not believe the country at large ever will. As to his opinion on the terms of peace, I agree with it, and think it would have been wiser to close with Buol's proposal, and to continue to negotiate; but this makes no difference as to his conduct in the affair, for which there is no excuse. He never ought to have committed himself at Vienna; his instructions were clear and precise and quite inconsistent with Buol's proposition. He might have engaged to bring it before his Government, but should, especially as he was a Cabinet Minister, have abstained from expressing any opinion of his own upon it. He appears at Vienna to have been easily talked over, and to have been exceedingly wanting in diplomatic finesse and penetration; but all I have picked up here in conversation proves to me that there have been errors innumerable and the greatest mistakes in the conduct of these affairs throughout, and the exigencies of the alliance and the necessity of concerting everything to the most minute particular with both Cabinets have produced results not less unfortunate in diplomacy than in war. The affair before Sebastopol the night before last turns out to have been of no importance, only a demonstration against the English lines.

*London, July 13th.*—I left Paris on Tuesday night at 7.30, got to Calais at three; low water and steamer three miles out at sea; went out in a boat in a torrent of rain

reflect deep discredit on Lord John Russell's conduct, and justifies the severe language applied to him in the text, but this was somewhat mitigated by Mr. Greville in a subsequent passage.]

which had lasted the whole journey and all day. Train was just gone when we got to Dover, but we arrived in town about eleven. I found a precious state of affairs, all confusion and consternation, Bulwer having given notice of a motion of want of confidence on account of John Russell, whose affair has brought himself and the Government to the very brink and almost to the certainty of ruin. There is as much excitement against Palmerston's Government, all on account of Lord John, as there was a few months ago against Aberdeen. I found Brooks's in a state of insurrection, and even the Attorney-General (Cockburn) told me that the Liberal party were resolved to go no further with John Russell, and that nothing but his resignation could save the Government, even if that could; that they might be reconciled to him hereafter, but as long as the war lasted they repudiated him. Meanwhile he has not resigned. There was a long Cabinet the day before yesterday in which they discussed the state of affairs, and what measures could be taken. Lord John offered to resign, but they would not hear of it, and came to a resolution to stand or fall together. I saw Clarendon yesterday, who was fully aware of the imminence of the danger and of the probability of their being out on Monday; he said Lord John's whole conduct was inconceivable, and he knew not to what to attribute his strange speech, in which he had made for himself a much worse case than the circumstances really warrant and given to the world impressions which are not correct; for in point of fact he did not urge Buol's proposal upon the Cabinet, but when he laid it before them and found it not acceptable, he at once yielded to all the arguments against it, and instead of making any attempt to get peace made on those terms, he joined with all his colleagues in their conviction of the necessity of carrying on the war vigorously; and this conviction induced him to make the warlike speech with which he is now reproached as being inconsistent with the opinions he was entertaining (as it is said) at the time he made it. Yesterday he attempted to make something of an explanation, but he only floundered further into the mire, and was laughed

at. Everybody thinks he made his case worse rather than better, but he really seems to have lost his head. His whole conduct at Vienna and here has exhibited nothing but a series of blunders and faults, and he has so contrived it, that no explanations he can possibly make will extenuate them, or place him in a tolerable light in the eyes of the public. In the morning yesterday I had occasion to call on Disraeli about some business, when he talked over the state of affairs very freely and gave me to understand that he intended and expected to turn out the Government and to come in with his party, but he owned that their materials for forming a tolerable Government were very scanty, that he would not attempt their old Government over again, but, except Lytton Bulwer, of whom he spoke in terms of high praise, he knew not where to find any fresh men worth anything.

*Bath, July 19th.*—I came here on Saturday night. In the course of Friday morning I met Drumlanrig, who told me the subordinate place men had caused John Russell to be informed that if he did not resign they should, and vote for Bulwer's motion on Monday. This produced his resignation, but under circumstances as mortifying as possibly could be, and which must have made him deeply regret that he did not resign at first, although he is not to be blamed for having yielded to the wishes of his colleagues, and I am satisfied he did so from the best motives. It was no sooner known that he had resigned than the excitement began to subside, and everybody thought that Bulwer would withdraw his motion, and at all events nobody doubted that it would come to nothing. The motion was withdrawn but the debate took place, and such a debate!—it was impossible to read it without indignation and disgust. Bulwer's speech was a tissue of foul abuse with the grossest and most wilful misrepresentations and endeavours to draw inferences he knew to be false and fallacious, with the hope and purpose of damaging the characters of the Ministers. In these times, when the great evil is the bad opinion which the public has been led to entertain of public men, Bulwer endeavours, for a mere party purpose, to aggravate that hostile

feeling and to make the world believe that, in a great party and a Cabinet composed of men whose characters have never been impugned, there is neither truth, sincerity, nor good faith, and by producing such an impression to bring the aristocracy into greater disrepute. Disraeli, of course, spoke in the same tone, Palmerston was very bad, and his speech was quite unbecoming his position. John Russell's defence was not calculated to relieve him from the weight of obloquy and unpopularity he had brought on himself, and the whole thing was unsatisfactory, except that it denoted the end of the contest and the disappointment of the Opposition, whose hopes had been so highly raised.

After much consideration of John Russell's conduct, I think it is not obnoxious to the severe censure with which it has been visited, and though he has committed errors, they are venial ones and admit of a fair explanation. Had not Buol's publication revealed to the world what had passed between them confidentially, nothing of it would have been known, and he would have been left to the enjoyment of the popularity he had gained by his anti-Russian speech. The statement about him in Buol's Circular naturally led to questions, and then it was necessary to tell everything and lay bare the arcana of Cabinets and Conferences; and when he endeavoured to explain his own conduct it became, amidst all the complexities of the case itself, its endless variety of details and confusion of dates, next to impossible to unravel it satisfactorily, and quite impossible to protect himself from the imputations which an unscrupulous and malignant assailant could easily contrive to bring against him; and in this great difficulty he displayed no tact and ingenuity in extricating himself from the dilemma in which he was placed; on the contrary, he went blundering on, exposing himself to many charges, all plausible and some true, of inconsistency, inaccuracy, and insincerity, and he made in his speeches a case against himself which left very little for his enemies to do. It might be strange in any other man, but is perhaps only consistent in him, that he is now more indignant with the friends who refused to follow and support him on this



occasion than either ashamed or angry with himself for having blundered into such a scrape. He writes, meanwhile, to his brother, who has sent me his letter, in these terms:—‘I have endeavoured to stand by and support Palmerston, too much so, I fear, for my own credit, but had I resigned on my return from Vienna, I should have been abused as wishing to trip him up and get his place: in short, the situation was one of those where only errors were possible. I have acted according to my own conscience; let that suffice.’ False reasoning and wounded pride are both apparent in this letter, but he is quite right when he says that ‘only errors had become possible.’ There is no course he could have taken that would not have exposed him to bitter attacks and reproaches, and these unavoidable errors were not confined to himself.

The first thing that strikes me is that the Cabinet ought to have accepted his resignation when he first tendered it; but there were no doubt difficulties and objections to that course, and their reluctance to let him throw himself overboard was not unnatural and was generous. The defence which his conduct really admits of may be (to state it very briefly) thus set forth. I put it loosely, and as it strikes me, taking a general view of the case; to make it more accurate and complete, the dates and the documents should be before me, which they are not. He went to Paris with instructions precisely corresponding with what was verbally arranged in London between Drouyn de Lhuys and the Cabinet, and they were conjointly to propose the conditions which the two Governments had agreed to require from Russia; but still they were not the bearers of an *Ultimatum*, they did not go to give law to Russia, or as judges to pronounce sentence upon her. They went to confer and to negotiate, to endeavour to obtain the precise terms which would be entirely satisfactory to their two Governments, and failing in this to see what they could obtain. If they were instructed to insist on the limitation, just as they proposed it at the Conference, and to accept nothing else, nothing either short of it or varying from it, then the very idea

of a Conference and a negotiation was a mockery and a delusion. It was a mockery to invite the Russian plenipotentiary to make proposals, and the conduct of the Allies was disingenuous and deceitful. Certainly Austria never contemplated, still less would she have been a party to, such a course of proceeding; and her notion was, and, of course, that of Russia also, that there should be a *bond fide* negotiation, and an attempt to bring about an understanding by the only way in which an understanding ever can be brought about—mutual concessions. We proposed the limitation scheme, and Austria backed us up in it cordially, sincerely, and forcibly, at least to all appearance. Russia rejected it on the ground of its incompatibility with her honour and dignity. Then Russia made proposals, which the Allies, Austria included, rejected as insufficient. John Russell and Drouyn de Lhuys appear to have fought vigorously in the spirit of their instructions, but when they found there was no chance of the Russians consenting to the limitation, they both became anxious to try some other plan, by which peace might possibly be obtained, and they each suggested something. At last, when the Conference was virtually at an end, as a last hope and chance Buol produced his scheme. John Russell had already committed himself to an approval of the principle of it, by the plan he had himself suggested, and, when he found that both his French and Turkish colleagues were willing to accept it, it is not surprising that he should have told Buol privately and confidentially that he acquiesced in it, and would urge it on his Government. As it has turned out, this was a great indiscretion for which he has been severely punished. As he had every reason to believe that Buol's plan would not be acceptable to his own Government, what he ought to have done was to give notice to Clarendon that such a proposal had been made, and to beg it might be considered before any final resolution was taken, and to tell Buol that he had done so; to promise that he would submit to the Cabinet all the arguments that had been used in its favour, but to abstain from any expression of his own opinion, and shelter himself from the necessity of

giving any by the tenour of his own instructions. When he found the French Minister for Foreign Affairs consenting, he might very well suppose that the French Government would not reject the proposal, and that he should not be justified in putting a peremptory veto on what France was disposed to accept as sufficient. Besides, although he has never put forward such an argument in any of his speeches, he may have thought, as I do, that 'counterpoise' and 'limitation' were the same thing in principle, and the only difference between them one of mode and degree. Buol's counterpoise involved limitation, our limitation was to establish a counterpoise; therefore, even in the spirit of the instructions and arguments of the French and English Governments, their plan of limitation having failed, Buol's plan of counterpoise was entitled to consideration,<sup>1</sup> and the only question ought to have been whether it would have been effectual for the purpose common to all, and whether it would be an honourable mode of terminating the war.

John Russell's fault was committing himself to Buol as approving his plan before he knew how it would be viewed at home; but I see neither impossibility nor inconsistency in his having regarded it favourably at Vienna, and being biassed by all the arguments in its favour which there beset him on all sides, and when he returned to England and found the opinions of all his colleagues adverse to it, and heard their reasons for being so, that he should have been convinced by them, have subscribed to the general decision, and joined cordially with them in the vigorous prosecution of the war. Having come finally to this conclusion, his warlike speech was not unnatural, and he made it probably very much to prove to his own colleagues that he was in earnest with them. There was no necessity for his proclaiming what had passed at Vienna, as nothing had happened in consequence, and the question was not what impression had been made on his

<sup>1</sup> [The proposal submitted to the Conference by Count Buol was that each of the Powers should have the right to maintain a limited naval power in the Black Sea. The whole discussion turned upon suppression of the naval supremacy of Russia in the Black Sea and the manner in which it was to be effected.]

mind there in the course of the negotiations, but what was the opinion and what the resolution at which he finally arrived when all was over. But he has repeatedly in the course of his career contrived to do a vast deal of mischief by a very few words, and so it was in this instance. When he was driven to *confess* that he had endorsed Buol's proposal, and said that he was still of the same opinion, his opponents were able with every appearance of truth to say that he had intended to conceal what he had done at Vienna, and to deceive the country, both as to his past conduct and his present opinions; and as it was obvious from his own avowal that he still was of the same opinion as at Vienna, his war speech was hypocritical and insincere, and he was unfit to be in a Cabinet pledged to carry on the war earnestly and vigorously. Against such an attack it was very difficult to make a good defence, and I doubt whether the most lucid and circumstantial statement and the most natural explanation of his own motives and sentiments at different periods of the transaction would have received a patient hearing and dispassionate consideration. The House of Commons and the public were in that frame of mind that will not listen, and cannot be fair and just, and he became, and could hardly avoid becoming, the victim of his own want of caution and prudent reserve and the excessive complication of the circumstances and details of the case.

*London, July 28th.*—I returned from Bath yesterday; went to Newmarket in the evening and returned this morning. There is nothing new at home and abroad; to all outward appearance the siege standing still, but they say it is going on in a safe and judicious manner calculated to bring about success. General Simpson wants to resign, but no man fit to succeed him can be found.<sup>1</sup> I have read the pamphlet 'Whom shall we Hang?' and think it makes a very good case for the late Government, especially Newcastle, but it is so long

<sup>1</sup> [Upon the death of Lord Raglan General Simpson, an officer of whom little was known, succeeded, as senior in rank, to the command of the army. He retained the command but a short time, General Codrington having been appointed by the Government to succeed him.]

that few people will read it; and though it may convince and satisfy some one here and there, it will not suffice to stem the torrent which is so swollen by ignorance and malice. At Brooks's this afternoon I met Fitzroy, who said a great deal to me about the condition of the Government, of the state and disposition of the House of Commons, and Palmerston's management there, and his conduct as a leader.

*London, August 14th.*—Since my last date I have been to Goodwood, and since then here, having had nothing to note beyond what has appeared in all the newspapers. Parliament was prorogued yesterday, after a session of average duration, but marked by a great many incidents of a disagreeable character, and exhibiting a downward tendency as regards the future tranquillity and prosperity of the country. The last few days were marked by an angry contest provoked by Lord Grey in the Lords, not altogether without cause: the Limited Liability Bill came up so late that, according to the Standing Order, it could not be considered. Government moved the suspension of the Order, which was carried, but there was no time to discuss properly the provisions of the bill, and it was hurried through the House by force, probably in an incomplete form. Grey was very angry, and fought it tooth and nail, declaring his opposition to a Government which had, he insisted, behaved so ill. Mr. Monsell was made a Privy Councillor, the oath having been altered to meet his scruples, in spite of all the remonstrances I could offer against such an unworthy compliance as this appears to me.

## CHAPTER X.

The Queen's Visit to France—Sir George C. Lewis on the War—Inefficiency of Lord Panmure—The Queen and the Emperor—Lord John Russell's Estrangement from his Friends—The Fall of Sebastopol—The Queen on the Orleans Confiscation—The Prince Regent's Letter on the Holy Alliance—Ferment in Italy—The Failure at the Redan—Lord John's Defence—General Windham—Lord John Russell's Retirement—Death of Sir Robert Adair—Adieu to the Turf—Progress of the War—Colonial Office proposed to Lord Stanley—Lord John Russell's Position—Relations with Mr. Disraeli—Mr. Labouchere Colonial Secretary—Negotiations for Peace—The Terms proposed to Russia—The King of Sardinia and M. de Cavour at Windsor—The Demands of the King of Sardinia—Lord Palmerston presses for War—Lord Macaulay's History of England—An Ultimatum to Russia—Death of the Poet Rogers—French Ministers—The Emperor's Diplomacy—Sir George C. Lewis's Aversion to the War—Quarrels of Walewski and Persigny—Austria presents the Terms to Russia—Baron Seebach mediates—The Emperor's Difficulties and Doubts.

*London, August 21st.*—The Queen as usual has had magnificent weather for her Paris visit, and all has gone well there except that unluckily she arrived after her time at Boulogne and still more at Paris, consequently the Emperor was kept waiting at Boulogne, and the whole population of Paris, which turned out and waited for hours under a broiling sun, was disappointed, for they arrived when it was growing dark. However, in spite of this, the scene appears to have been very fine and animated. Clarendon, who is not apt to be enthusiastic, writes so to Palmerston, and tells him that Marshal Magnan said he had known Paris for fifty years, and had never seen such a scene as this, nor even when Napoleon returned from Austerlitz.

George Lewis called on me yesterday. I have hardly seen him during the session, and, having advised him to take his present office, I was glad to be able to congratulate

him on his success. He was very natural about it, and owned that he had every reason to be satisfied with his reception both by the House of Commons and the City. I found that his sentiments about war and peace were identical with my own. He had been all along against the war, and thought it ought to have been prevented, and might have been in the outset, and that peace ought to have been made the other day; but, as he was in no way responsible for the war, he had nothing to do but to submit to the *fait accompli* and to do his best to raise the necessary supplies in the most advantageous manner. It is evident that, if there could have been a potential peace party in the Cabinet, he would have been one of them, but as it is he kept his real sentiments to himself and subscribed to the decision of the majority. We talked of the session and its incidents. He said history recorded nothing like the profusion with which the present House of Commons was inclined to spend money. It was impossible to ask for too much; their only fear seemed to be lest the war should not be conducted with sufficient vigour, and to accomplish this they were ready to vote any amount of money. Lewis thinks the rage for war as violent as ever, and the zeal of the country not at all diminished, he sees no symptoms of it. The wealth and resources which the crisis has developed are most curious; thus, he reduced the interest on Exchequer Bills not long ago—an operation he believes never before attempted in time of war. War has had little or no effect on trade, which is steady and flourishing; but he thinks, unless some great successes infuse fresh animation into the public mind, that before long they will begin to tire of the contest, and to reflect that it is being carried on at an enormous cost for no rational object whatever, and merely from motives of pride and vanity and a false notion of honour. Charles Villiers thinks differently, and that there is already a manifest change of opinion, and that opposition to the war has already begun. I wish I could see some symptoms of it, but, though there may be some, I think they are slight. Lewis thinks John Russell has completely done for himself by his last speech. He was recovering from the

effects of his first; there was a reaction in his favour; his friends were anxious to be reconciled to him and to renew their support and confidence, when he played into the hands of his enemies and made his own position worse than it was before.

Lewis told me that he was much struck with the mediocrity of Panmure, who was one of the dullest men he ever knew, and that he was by far the least able man in the Cabinet, and as bad as possible as Minister of War—prejudiced, slow, and *routinier*. It is evident that Newcastle was a much abler man, and if he had happened to have come after Panmure, he would have been as much belauded as he has been abused.

*September 5th.*—A complete stagnation in every way; no news whatever since the battle of the Tchernaya,<sup>1</sup> and nobody has the least idea, Ministers included, of the state and progress of the war. I asked Granville, who is just come from Paris, if he knew anything, and he said he did not, and that the Emperor, whom he had seen a day or two ago, complained of being equally in the dark. His Majesty, Granville said, was very low about the war, and complained that none of the expeditions and diversions had been undertaken which might have advanced the cause more rapidly. Péliissier seems to be very much *déconsidéré* and thought worth very little as a general.

I saw Clarendon one day last week for a short time, but had no opportunity of hearing the details of his sojourn at Paris. He said the Queen was delighted with everything and especially with the Emperor himself, who, with perfect knowledge of women, had taken the surest way to ingratiate himself with her. This it seems he began when he was in England, and followed it up at Paris. After his visit the Queen talked it all over with Clarendon, and said, 'It is very odd; but the Emperor knows everything I have done and where I have been ever since I was twelve years old; he even recollects

<sup>1</sup> [The battle of the Tchernaya was fought on the 16th August, when General Liprandi attacked the French and Sardinian armies in their lines, with a large force, but was repulsed with great loss.]



how I was dressed, and a thousand little details it is extraordinary he should be acquainted with.' She has never before been on such a social footing with anybody, and he has approached her with the familiarity of their equal positions, and with all the experience and knowledge of womankind he has acquired during his long life, passed in the world and in mixing with every sort of society. She seemed to have played her part throughout with great propriety and success. Old Jérôme did not choose to make his appearance till just at the last moment, because he insisted on being treated as a king, and having the title of *Majesté* given him—a pretension Clarendon would not hear of her yielding to.

*September 7th.*—I had a long visit from the Duke of Bedford this morning, who came to talk to me about his brother John, his position and prospects. He has seen John and heard from him in great detail all his case, and he has likewise seen Clarendon and heard his and the Government's case. He tells me that he has never in his life suffered more pain than at hearing these cases and witnessing the bitter feelings which exist and the charges which are mutually made, especially between Clarendon and Lord John. The latter thinks he has been very ill-used by most of his former colleagues, but especially by Clarendon, whose conduct he thinks both unjust and ungrateful. Clarendon wrote to him while he was at Vienna in such a tone and language that Lord John had determined to resign his embassy and return home, and had actually written a letter to Clarendon for the purpose, but he gave up doing so partly because he felt that it would make a prodigious noise all over Europe and partly because, having consulted his brother-in-law, George Elliot, he prudently advised him against such a step; but he felt deeply, and resented what he thought bad conduct towards himself. I read to the Duke all that I had written about John in the preceding pages, against which he had nothing to say. He asked his brother how he came to speak so ill *for himself* in the House of Commons, and he replied that he was embarrassed by the impossibility of saying everything that he knew, especially the fact, which I have mentioned,

of the way in which the Emperor Napoleon determined to throw over Drouyn de Lhuys and to reject the Vienna proposals. This was told to John by Baudin; and one of the things he complains of is that the Cabinet never was informed of what had passed, and its members were allowed to suppose, like the public, that the Emperor's rejection had been spontaneous, instead of having been suggested and urged upon him by us. John bitterly feels his own position, his estrangement from his old friends, and, above all, the unkindness and ingratitude he thinks they have been guilty of towards him. He is now intent upon his own vindication, and is preparing to compose it with a view of giving it to the world, though he does not know, and it is difficult to determine, in what shape. He seems less dissatisfied with his old enemy Palmerston than with any of the others, and says he thinks Palmerston is the best man there is at present to be Prime Minister. After Clarendon he most reproaches Charles Wood.

*September 17th.*—Went to The Grove with Clarendon last Saturday sennight; on Monday to Doncaster, where I had no time to write anything but bets in my betting-book, all of which I lost. On the Saturday we heard from General Simpson by telegraph that the assault was to take place that day. We were kept in suspense all Sunday, but on Monday morning read in the 'Times' that the Malakoff was taken, but we had no idea then that the city with all its vast defences would fall immediately after, but I heard it the same night at the Huntingdon station.<sup>1</sup>

I heard a great deal from Clarendon about the royal visit to Paris, and details connected with it, and we talked over the quarrel with John Russell, at which he expressed great regret, though not without bitterness. Clarendon said nothing could exceed the delight of the Queen at her visit

<sup>1</sup> [The final bombardment of Sebastopol commenced on the morning of September 5th, and continued without intermission until the 8th, when the Russians blew up their magazines and in the night evacuated the southern portion of the city. The intelligence of the fall of Sebastopol reached England on the afternoon of Monday, September 10, and was received with great enthusiasm throughout the country.]

to Paris, at her reception, at all she saw; and that she was charmed with the Emperor. They became so intimate, and she on such friendly terms with him, that she talked to him with the utmost frankness, and even discussed with him the most delicate of all subjects, the confiscation of the Orleans' property, telling him her opinion upon it. He did not avoid the subject, and gave her the reasons why he thought himself obliged to take that course; that he knew all this wealth was employed in fomenting intrigues against his Government, which was so new that it was necessary to take all precautions to avert such dangers. She replied that, even if this were so, he might have contented himself with sequestrating the property and restoring it when he was satisfied that all danger on that score was at an end. I asked Clarendon what he thought of the Emperor himself, and he said that he liked him, and he was very pleasing, but he was struck with his being so indolent and so excessively ignorant. The Prince of Wales was put by the Queen under Clarendon's charge, who was desired to tell him what to do in public, when to bow to the people, and whom to speak to. He said that the Princess Royal was charming, with excellent manners, and full of intelligence. Both the children were delighted with their *séjour*, and very sorry to come away. When the visit was drawing to a close, the Prince said to the Empress that he and his sister were both very reluctant to leave Paris, and asked her if she could not get leave for them to stay there a little longer. The Empress said she was afraid this would not be possible, as the Queen and the Prince would not be able to do without them; to which the boy replied, 'Not do without us! don't fancy that, for there are six more of us at home, and they don't want us.' The Emperor himself proposed to the Queen to go to the Chapel consecrated to the memory of the Duke of Orleans upon the spot where he met with his fatal accident and expired. It is creditable to her that she talks without *gêne* or scruple to the Emperor about the Orleans family, making no secret of her continued intimacy with them, and with equal frankness to them of her relations with him. She wrote to the

Queen Marie Amélie an account of her going to the Chapel and of the Emperor taking her there, and received a very amiable reply. The first thing she did on her return was to receive the Duc and Duchesse de Montpensier.

Clarendon told me a few things besides of no great importance, and which I am not sure that I recollect: about Spain, he said that matters were going on better there and the Government had contrived to get money—the Spaniards were very anxious to take part in the war, but he had discouraged it entirely. As to Naples, that we were calling the Neapolitan Government to account for their recent impertinence to us, but that Palmerston and he had disagreed as to what should be done, Palmerston, according to his old habit, wanting to send ships of war to Naples and to proceed to violence, while he was opposed to having another Pacifico affair on our hands, and proposed to proceed with caution and quietly.

While they were in the yacht, crossing over, Prince Albert had told him that there was not a word of truth in the prevailing report and belief that the young Prince of Prussia and the Princess Royal were *fiancés*, that nothing had ever passed between the parents on the subject, and that the union never would take place unless the children should become attached to each other. There would be no mere political marriage. The Prince showed Clarendon all the correspondence which had taken place between the Emperor of Russia and the Prince Regent about the Holy Alliance, which he said was very curious, and George IV.'s letter declining to be a party to it very good indeed. These documents were left in Lord Liverpool's papers, and fell into the hands of Harcourt, who married his daughter. Harcourt lent them to the Prince to read, but exacting a promise that he would not take a copy of them, and he had since repeatedly pressed the Prince to return them. I told Clarendon they ought not to be returned, or at least that Harcourt ought to be desired to give them to be preserved in the Government Archives, for they can in no way be considered as private property. Lord Liverpool's papers were for the most part destroyed, but

these were preserved. This is all I can recollect of what he told me.

*September 23rd.*—At The Grove from Saturday to Monday; nobody there but Reeve; nothing very particular. Clarendon said Prussia was very anxious to interpose to renew negotiations, but they would not hear of her interference, and if anything was done it could only be by Austria. He showed me a paper sent by Hudson with an account, very brief, of the state of Italy, which is in fermentation though not in open disturbance. The Sicilian malcontents sent to the King of Sardinia an offer of their crown for one of his sons. He replied, 'You have need of a man, and a boy will be of no use to you.' This they took for a refusal, and they are now thinking of a Coburg; in no case will they have a Murat. I forget what the Neapolitan Liberals want, but I doubt if the country will have either the courage or the power to emancipate itself.

*September 28th.*—No fresh news, but a letter from Charles Windham (the hero of the Redan), in which he gives an account of that affair which corresponds very closely with the report of Russell, the 'Times' Commissioner. He gives a poor character of the generals in the Crimea, and says the troops, except some of the old soldiers, behaved by no means well. The whole thing seems to have been grievously mismanaged on our part.<sup>1</sup>

I have had much correspondence with the Duke of Bedford about Lord John and his case, which the Duke says, now that he has heard it all and seen the correspondence, he thinks much better than he had supposed, and that John was meditating the publication of a defence of himself, but could not determine in what shape it should be. I earnestly advised him to dissuade his brother from publishing any-

<sup>1</sup> [The British attack on the Redan failed, whilst the French attack on the Malakoff succeeded, to the extreme annoyance of the British army and public: but in his assault Colonel Charles Windham (as he then was) displayed the most signal bravery, which in some measure redeemed the credit of the British forces. This circumstance gave him an amount of popularity and distinction which his rank in the army and his previous services did not altogether justify.]

thing, as he could not make an effectual defence of his conduct without making revelations that would be held unjustifiable and cause all sorts of ill humour and recriminations, and render his position, both personal and political, worse than it now is. Some communications in a friendly spirit have taken place between Lord John and Clarendon, but I can see that there is still existing a great deal of soreness and a not very cordial feeling between them. I have been reading Lord Grey's speech on the war, which he has published in a pamphlet, and I think it excellent and unanswerable. I long to write something on the subject and to add to Grey's argument on other parts of the case. I do not care about the unpopularity of doing so, and am only deterred from taking so much trouble by feeling that it would be unavailing, and that to attempt to make the public listen to reason and take a dispassionate view of the various questions connected with the war on which they have been so completely bamboozled and misled, would be like Mrs. Partington and her mop.

*October 2nd.*—I have been in correspondence for a long time with Charles Windham, and had a letter from him written a few days after his great exploit at the Redan. I showed his letter to Granville, and he to Palmerston and Clarendon. I was glad to find every disposition to reward his bravery and conduct, and Henry Grenfell told me they had made him a general and were going to give him a division, as Markham and Bentinck are both coming home. This was no more than was reasonable to expect; but great was my astonishment when I was told yesterday morning that they were thinking of making Windham *Commander-in-Chief*, and I was asked to give any of his letters to me, from which extracts might be made to show to the Cabinet to enable them to judge of his character and talents. I offered to get his journal and letters, from his wife and others, which I did; but at the same time I said I thought it a hazardous speculation to raise him *per saltum* from being a colonel and brigadier to the command of a great army. B—— said this was true, but the matter pressed and they did not know

where to find a man. This morning I gave him some papers, and he then told me Simpson had resigned, and it was necessary to come to some immediate decision. Codrington would have been undoubtedly chosen if he had not apparently (for as yet we know very little) failed in what he had to do on the 8th. With regard to Windham what the Cabinet will do I know not. I suggested that it would be better to try him first in his command of a division and go on if possible for some time longer, but Simpson's resignation compels them to come to some immediate decision, and they do not like to appoint another man *pro tempore*. I still incline to the opinion that Windham's extraordinary promotion from so low to so high a rank, and his passing over the heads of such multitudes of officers, will occasion great jealousy, envy, heart-burning, and resentment, besides casting a slur on the whole service in the eyes of the world; for when every general in the service is passed over, and a colonel appointed who has never done any but subordinate work, and shown extraordinary bravery and coolness, but no aptitude for command, because he has had no opportunity of so doing, every general and superior colonel now on service will feel himself insulted and a stigma cast upon him. I am not at all sure Windham may do better than any other man would do, but to justify such an appointment he ought to do far better; and, though he is a sharp fellow enough, I have never seen anything in him which indicates real genius or a superior intellect.

*October 7th.*—At Woburn, where the Duke and I had much conversation about Lord John and his position, and he showed me a great many of John's letters to him about his quarrel with the Government and the conduct of Clarendon to him, which he cannot forgive, though they are again corresponding with ostensible amity. The Duke owns that he does not see how John can take any prominent part in public life, at least for the present, and indeed considers it probable that his career as a statesman is closed; and, what is more, John seems to consider it so himself and to acquiesce in his position, though what his secret aspirations may be none

can tell. He has, however, determined to give up his house in town, which looks like retirement. I strongly advised that John should go to the House of Lords, where he might still act a dignified and useful part; his position in the House of Commons would be very anomalous and disagreeable, and it is not at all certain that he would not lose his seat in the event of an election—very doubtful whether he would be returned again for the City; and the thing most to be deprecated is that he should stand and be defeated for that or any other place. The Duke neither agreed nor dissented, but he owned what I said of John's position was true, though he still thought he would be very reluctant to quit the House of Commons for ever, and retire to the Lords.

On Tuesday last, after a few days' illness, Sir Robert Adair died at the age of 93, having preserved his faculties, and especially his remarkable memory, quite to the last. He was the last survivor of the intimate friends of Fox and of the political characters of his times. He had entertained a warm affection for Fox, and he preserved a boundless veneration for his memory; and the greatest pleasure he had was in talking of Fox and his contemporaries, and pouring forth to willing circles of auditors anecdotes and reminiscences of the political events with which he had been mixed up, or of which he had been cognisant in the course of his long life. This he did in a manner quite remarkable at so advanced an age, and he never had any difficulty in finding listeners to his old stories, which were always full of interesting matter, and related to the most conspicuous characters who flourished during the reigns of George III. and George IV.

*October 29th.*—All last week at Newmarket, and probably very nearly for the last time as an owner of racehorses, for I have now got rid of them all, and am almost off the turf, after being on it more or less for about forty years. I am sorry that I have never kept any memoranda of my turf life, which might have been curious and amusing; for I have known many odd characters, and lived with men of



whom it would have been interesting to preserve some record. Perhaps I may one day rake together my old recollections and trace the changes that have taken place in this racing life since I first knew it and entered into it, but I cannot do so now.

Since I last wrote, the war has proceeded without any great events, but with the same progress and success on the side of the Allies which have marked the contest throughout and have excited my wonder. The most important of these successes has been the defeat of Mouravieff at Kars by the Turks under English officers, which, after what Clarendon told me, was the very last thing I expected. The death of Molesworth has made a difficulty for Palmerston; I knew so little of him that I cannot pretend to say anything about him. That of Lord Wharncliffe touches me more nearly; but this is more matter of private regret than of public concern, as the part he played in life was never important, though very honourable. The appointment of Codrington seems to be well taken, more perhaps because nobody can suggest a better choice than from any peculiar merits of the new Commander-in-Chief.<sup>1</sup>

*London, November 7th.*—The event of the last few days has been the offer of the Colonial Office to Lord Stanley and his refusal to take it. When Palmerston proposed it to him he said that he could not give an answer without consulting his father, which *implied* that he would accept if his father gave his consent. He posted down to Knowsley, from whence he had just come, and entered the room where Derby was playing at billiards, and much to his astonishment saw his son suddenly return. ‘What on earth,’ he cried out, ‘has brought you back so soon? Are you going to be married, or what has happened to you?’ Stanley said he wanted to speak to him, and carried him off. What passed is not known, but of course he advised his son to refuse office. He

<sup>1</sup> [The Right Hon. Sir William Molesworth, Secretary of State for the Colonial Department, died on October 22, 1855, aged 45. John, 2nd Baron Wharncliffe, also died on the 22nd. General Sir William Codrington had been appointed to the command of the British forces in the Crimea, on the resignation of General Simpson.]

wrote to Palmerston in very becoming terms, and, I hear, a very good letter. He had, if not consulted, certainly imparted to Disraeli what passed, for Disraeli told me so. I think he judged wisely in declining, for it would have been an awkward thing to pass at once from the Opposition side of the House to the Treasury Bench, and take high office in a Cabinet without having any political or personal connexion with a single member of it, and to which he has hitherto been opposed generally, although upon many subjects his opinions have much more coincided with theirs than with those of the party to which he still nominally belongs. He is young and can afford to wait, and his position and abilities are certain before long to make him conspicuous and to enable him to play a very considerable part. He is exceedingly ambitious, of an independent turn of mind, very industrious, and has acquired a vast amount of information. Not long ago, Disraeli gave me an account of him and of his curious opinions—exceedingly curious in a man in his condition of life and with his prospects. Last night Lord Strangford (George Smythe) talked to me about him, expressed the highest opinion of his capacity and acquirements, and confirmed what Disraeli had told me of his notions and views even more, for he says that he is a real and sincere democrat, and that he would like if he could to prove his sincerity by divesting himself of his aristocratic character and even of the wealth he is heir to. How far this may be true I know not: if it be true, it may possibly be ascribed in some degree to his own consciousness that the realisation of his ideology is impossible, and at all events time will show whether these extreme theories will not be modified by circumstances and reflexions. Nothing appears to me certain but that he will play a considerable part for good or for evil, but I cannot pretend to guess what it will be. At present he seems to be more allied with Bright than with any other public man; and, as his disposition about the war and its continuance is very much that of Bright, it would have been difficult for him to take office with Palmerston, whose whole political existence, or at least his power, rests on the cry for war and its active and energetic prosecution.

*London, November 12th.*—I saw John Russell on Saturday morning to have a talk with him about the state of affairs and the questions of peace and war. There still exists a great deal of bitterness between him and Clarendon, he thinking that he has been very ill used by Clarendon and others of his former colleagues. He is particularly sore about their allowing so many things to be said to his disadvantage concerning the Vienna negotiations which they know to be untrue, without saying a word to contradict them and cause justice to be done to him, particularly in reference to the matter of Austria having engaged to join if Russia refused her last proposals. George Grey denied that Austria had so engaged, and none of the others ever admitted it, whereas it was perfectly true. Lord John and I do not agree as to the earlier part of the question, because he was originally a party to the war while I was always against it. He was, however, rather against it quite at first, being, as he told me, with Aberdeen, and against Clarendon and Palmerston, who were all along inclined to go to war. He had been at the Mansion House dinner the night before, where he was very ill received, though he would not allow it; he prefers to flatter himself that the signs of his unpopularity were not so strong and marked as everybody else who was present thought them.

I likewise saw Disraeli and had some talk with him. He told me that he had now nothing whatever to do with the 'Press,' and that the series of articles in that paper on the war and in favour of peace were all written by Stanley. He said he had received a letter from Stanley to this effect: 'My dear Disraeli,—I write to you in confidence to tell you that I have been offered and have refused the Colonial Office. As it is due to Lord Palmerston to keep his offer secret, I have told nobody of it but yourself and my father, and I beg you not to mention it to anybody.' On receiving this he said he began to concoct an answer in his mind of rather a sentimental kind, and conveying his approbation of the course he had taken, but before he put pen to paper he got he 'Times' with Stanley's letter to Sir ———, which was

tantamount to a disclosure of the whole thing, on which he wrote instead, 'Dear Stanley,—I thank you for your letter, but I had already received your confidential communication through your letter to Sir ———.'

I have occasion to see Disraeli very often about ——'s affairs, about which he has been wonderfully kind and serviceable, and on these occasions he always enters on some political talk, and in this way we have got into a sort of intimacy such as I never thought could have taken place between us.

*London, November 24th.*—After his failure with Stanley, Palmerston applied to Sidney Herbert, who went to Broadlands, but, finding that he and Palmerston could not agree upon the subject of war and peace (the details of their disagreement I do not know), he declined the offer of the Colonial Office. Palmerston then sent for Labouchere, who accepted.<sup>1</sup> He called on me the day after and told me he had been to Broadlands, that Palmerston had told him everything about the state of affairs and his own views and opinions, and, as he could find nothing therein to object to, he had accepted the office. As Labouchere is certainly moderate, this would indicate more moderation on the part of Palmerston than Sidney Herbert found in him, unless Labouchere and Sidney Herbert take totally dissimilar views of affairs.

After this, a few days ago, I had a long conversation with George Lewis, who told me that France and Austria were endeavouring to bring about peace, and that communications were going on between France and our Government on the subject, and he said, moreover, that Palmerston was by no means so stiff and so bent on continuing the war as was generally supposed. This intelligence appeared to me to explain what I could not understand in his communications with Sidney Herbert and Labouchere; for, if the Emperor has really inti-

<sup>1</sup> [The Right Hon. Henry Labouchere, born in 1798, a highly respected member of the Whig party, who filled many offices in Liberal Governments. He was created Baron Taunton on his retirement from office in 1859, and died in July 1869.]

mated to our Government his determination to try and make peace, Palmerston must needs come down from his very high horse and evince a disposition to go along with our Imperial ally, who has got the whole game in his own hands, and whom we must perforce follow when he is determined to take his own course. Then our warlike propensities may be probably restrained by the alarming prospect of financial difficulties, which Lewis sees looming in the distance. He said to me, 'I am sure I do not know how I shall provide ways and means next year, for the enormously high prices will be a great blow to consumption, and the money market is in a very ticklish state.' I said, 'You will have to trust to a great loan, and ten per cent. income tax;' to which he assented. They have now patched up the Government, by getting Baines to take the Duchy of Lancaster with a seat in the Cabinet—a very respectable man, who cannot speak, and who will be of no use to them. Neither he nor Labouchere will add much to their strength, but they are both very unexceptionable appointments. I think that, in spite of the undiminished violence of the press, the prevailing opinion is that there is the beginning of a change in the public mind, and an incipient desire for peace; and I agree with Disraeli, who thinks that, when once the current has fairly turned, it will run with great rapidity the other way.

*November 27th.*—At length there really does appear to be a prospect of putting an end to this odious war, and my conjectures of a few days ago are assuming the shape of realities. Yesterday morning I met George Lewis in the Park and turned back and walked with him to the door of his office, when he told me the exact state of affairs. I had received a letter from the Duke of Bedford in the morning, who said that Charles Wood, who was at Woburn, had told him the statement in the 'Press' a week ago was so substantially accurate that they must, he thought, have received their information from some French official source. This was in itself confirmatory of all I had already inferred and believed. Lewis's story was this: The Austrians have framed a proposal for peace which they offer to send to Russia, and,

if she refuses it, Austria engages to join the Allies and to declare war. The Emperor Napoleon agrees with Austria, and is resolved not to go on with the war if peace can be arranged on the Austrian terms. This resolution he has communicated to us, and invited us to accede thereto; Walewski's letters are not merely pressing, but even peremptory. It is in fact a second edition of the Vienna Conference and proposals, with this difference, that, while on the last occasion the Emperor knocked under to us and reluctantly agreed to go on with the war, he is now determined to go on with it no longer, and requires that we should defer to his wishes. Our Government are aware that they have no alternative, and that nothing is left for them but to acquiesce with a good grace and make the best case they can for themselves here, the case being that the Emperor is determined to make peace, and that we cannot carry on the war alone. This was the amount of Lewis' information, to which he added the expression of his disgust at the pitiful figure we cut in the affair, being obliged to obey the commands of Louis Napoleon, and, after our insolence, swagger, and bravado, to submit to terms of peace which we have already scornfully rejected; all which humiliation, he justly said, was the consequence of our plunging into war without any reason and in defiance of all prudence and sound policy. Afterwards I saw Charles Villiers and had a talk with him. He told me Clarendon had been sent for on Sunday to Windsor in a great hurry to meet Palmerston there. The Queen had received a letter from the Emperor, brought by the Duke of Cambridge, which no doubt contained in a private and friendly shape to her the communications which Walewski had already made officially to the Government and she wanted to know what answer she should send to it. Charles Villiers told me that Palmerston had already thrown out a feeler to the Cabinet to ascertain if they would be willing to carry on the war without France, but this was unanimously declined. I can hardly imagine that even Palmerston really contemplated such a desperate course.

*November 29th.*—I met Sidney Herbert last night. He

seems to know what is going on and thinks we shall have peace; he only doubts whether the terms will be such as Russia will accept, for he is not convinced, as I am, that Austria has already settled that with Russia. He told me that, when Palmerston offered him office, he had not received the French communication, and was ignorant that it was coming.

*December 4th.*—At The Grange the last four days, where I found everybody in total ignorance of what is passing about peace, except Sidney Herbert, who told me that the plan is *neutralisation*. On coming back yesterday I met Lord Malmesbury just come from Paris; he is supposed to be the person who supplied all its information to the ‘Press’ paper, and I believe it was he. He confirmed the Emperor’s desire for peace, but thought it very doubtful whether Russia would accept the terms of the Allies. He told me likewise that Pélissier has sent word he is in a fix, as he cannot advance or expel the Russians from their positions; and James Macdonald told me the Duke of Cambridge is going again to Paris to represent us at a grand council of war to be held there, to decide on future operations. If it were not that the Allies seem infallible and invincible, and the Russians unable to accomplish anything, offensive or defensive, I should augur very ill from this council of war, for nothing can be worse than to have a set of men at Paris forming plans to be executed by another set in the Crimea who have had no share in the deliberations.

This morning the Duke of Bedford writes me word that Westmorland tells him he has heard from Clarendon the state of affairs, and the answer we have sent to France, and he augurs ill of peace, as he thinks there can be no agreement with Russia on such terms; and the ‘Morning Post,’ which has long been quite silent about war or peace, has this morning an article which is evidently a regular Palmerstonian manifesto, decidedly adverse to any hope of peace, for it is certain that Russia will continue the war, *coûte que coûte*, rather than submit to such conditions as the ‘Morning Post’ says we are to impose on her. I am persuaded

Palmerston and Clarendon will do all they can to prevent peace being made on any moderate terms, and the only hope is that the Emperor Napoleon may take the matter into his own hands and employ a *douce violence* to compel us to give way.

*December 5th.*—I met Charles Villiers last night, who told me a good deal of what is going on, and cleared up some matters. The Austrian proposal transmitted here by the Emperor Napoleon was considered by the Cabinet and sent back with amendments—that is, it was made more stringent. The Emperor consented to send it so amended to Vienna, and it remains to be seen what course Austria will take—whether she will send it in its present shape to Russia or adhere to her own edition, and whether, if she does send it, she will (supposing it to be rejected) join the Allies and declare war. The latter, I think, she will not do, nor be bound to do. Next is the question what the Emperor Napoleon will do if Austria declines to adopt the amended version, or if Russia should reply she would take the original proposal, but not our amendments. The Emperor is certainly very anxious to make peace, and when he is bent upon a thing he generally does it, and my own opinion and hope is that he will refuse to give way to us *now* as he did last May. It is universally admitted that every man in France desires peace ardently. There is, Charles Villiers tells me, great uneasiness amongst Palmerston's adherents, and some idea that, if peace cannot be had on the terms he has insisted on, he will be no party to making it, and if the majority of the Cabinet are for taking the original terms proposed, supposing the Emperor Napoleon again to press their acceptance, that he will resign, throw himself on the popular enthusiasm for the war, and leave his colleagues to make an unpopular peace. If Palmerston was forty instead of seventy he would probably do this; but he has not time to wait for fresh combinations and to speculate on distant chances, so he will probably consent to make peace if he is obliged by France to do so, and trust to fortune to enable him to reconcile Parliament and the country to it. This is rendered more



likely by Disraeli having made a communication to the Government that he and Stanley will be ready to support any peace they may now make.

*December 6th.*—I saw George Lewis yesterday, who told me the state of affairs so far as he recollects it; but it is evident that he takes but a secondary interest in the details of diplomacy, however anxious he may be about the results, and what passed shows the extreme difficulty of keeping clear of mistakes, even when one's information is derived from the best sources. He said he did not think Russia would accept the offered terms, and Clarendon thought not also. The terms which it will be most difficult for her to swallow are the neutralisation of the Black Sea, which as worked out is evidently worse than limitation, for she is to have no fortress and no arsenal there, so that she will, in fact, be quite defenceless, while the other Powers can at any time collect fleets in the Bosphorus and attack her coasts when they please. Then she is to cede half Bessarabia to the Turks, including the fortress of Ismail, the famous conquest of Souvaroff when he wrote to the Empress Catherine, 'L'orgueilleuse Ismailoff est à vos pieds;' and they are not to repair Bomarsund, or erect any fortress on the Aland Isles. The alterations we made in the scheme sent to us were not important, and what surprised me much was, the terms, instead of being tendered by Austria, were concocted at Paris by Walewski and the Emperor—at least so Walewski asserts, but there must I think be some incorrectness in this, for it is impossible to doubt that the Emperor and Austria really concerted them between themselves, though Walewski may have had a hand in the matter in some way. However, the terms are gone or going directly to St. Petersburg. I earnestly hope they may be accepted, be they what they may. Russia is to be asked whether she will take them Yes or No, and, upon the preliminaries being signed, hostilities will cease. I asked if Russia might not accept as a basis, and negotiate as to modification and details, but Lewis professed not to understand how this is, or whether her acceptance generally would or not bind her to *all* the

conditions precisely as they are set forth. He knows nothing in fact of diplomacy and its niceties and operations.

Lord John Russell met Clarendon at Windsor Castle,<sup>1</sup> but refused to hear what Clarendon offered to tell him of the state of the negotiation; he thought he should compromise his own independent action if he did. He says, 'Were peace to be made on the four points newly explained and enlarged, I would do nothing but applaud and support.' The only men Lord John communicated with at Windsor were Cavour and Azeglio. He writes: 'I asked Cavour what was the language of the Emperor of the French; he said it was to this effect: France had made great efforts and sacrifices, she would not continue them for the sake of conquering the Crimea; the alternative was such a peace as can now be had by means of Austria, or an extension of the war for Poland,' etc. The Sardinians, Ministers and King, are openly and warmly for the latter course. I suspect Palmerston would wish the war to glide imperceptibly into a war of nationalities, as it is called, but would not like to profess it openly now. I am convinced such a war might suit Napoleon and the King of Sardinia, but would be very dangerous for us in many ways. Cavour says if peace is made without anything being done for Italy, there will be a revolution there. Clarendon is incredulous.

*London, December 11th.*—I met Clarendon at the Travelers' on Friday evening, and had a talk with him. He did not seem inclined to enter much into the question of peace and war, but he told me that Buol declared most solemnly that he had had no communication with Russia about the terms, and that he had only slight hopes that peace might be made. Of the terms themselves Clarendon did not say a word. He talked a great deal about the King of Sardinia, and gave me an account of his conversations both with the King and Cavour. He thinks well of the King, and that he is intelligent, and he has a very high opinion indeed of

<sup>1</sup> [The King of Sardinia, Victor Emmanuel, arrived in England on the 30th November, accompanied by his Minister, M. de Cavour. Lord Clarendon and Lord John Russell were invited to Windsor to meet the King.]

Cavour, and was especially struck with his knowledge of England, and our Constitution and constitutional history. I was much amused, after all the praises that have been lavished on Sardinia for the noble part she has played and for taking up arms to vindicate a great principle in so *unselfish* a manner, that she has after all a keen view to her own interest, and wants some solid pudding as well as so much empty praise. The King asked Clarendon what the Allies meant to do for him, and whether he might not expect some territorial advantage in return for his services. Clarendon told him this was out of the question, and that, in the state of their relations with Austria, they could hold out no such expectation; and he put it to the King, supposing negotiations for peace were to take place, and he wished his pretensions to be put forward by us, what he would himself suggest that a British Minister could say for him; and the King had the candour to say he did not know what answer to give. Cavour urged the same thing, and said the war had already cost them forty millions of francs, instead of twenty-five which they had borrowed for it and was the original estimate, and they could only go on with it by another loan and fresh taxes, and he did not know how he should propose these to the Chambers without having something advantageous to offer to his own country, some Italian acquisition. They would ask for what object of their's the war was carried on, and what they had to gain for all their sacrifices and exertions. Clarendon said they must be satisfied with the glory they had acquired and the high honour their conduct had conferred on them; but Cavour, while he said he did not repent the part they had taken, thought his countrymen would be very little satisfied to have spent so much money and to continue to spend more without gaining some Italian object. They complained that Austria had, without any right, for a long time occupied a part of the Papal territory, and suggested she should be compelled to retire from it; but Clarendon reminded him that France had done the same, and that this was a very ticklish question to stir.

The King and his people are far better satisfied with their

reception here than in France, where, under much external civility, there was very little cordiality, the Emperor's intimate relations with Austria rendering him little inclined towards the Piedmontese. Here the Queen was wonderfully cordial and attentive; she got up at four in the morning to see him depart. His Majesty appears to be frightful in person, but a great, strong, burly, athletic man, brusque in his manners, unrefined in his conversation, very loose in his conduct, and very eccentric in his habits. When he was at Paris his talk in society amused or terrified everybody, but here he seems to have been more guarded. It was amusing to see all the religious societies hastening with their addresses to him, totally forgetting that he is the most debauched and dissolute fellow in the world; but the fact of his being excommunicated by the Pope and his waging war with the ecclesiastical power in his own country covers every sin against morality, and he is a great hero with the Low Church people and Exeter Hall. My brother-in-law said that he looked at Windsor more like a chief of the Heruli or Longobardi than a modern Italian prince, and the Duchess of Sutherland declared that, of all the Knights of the Garter she had seen, he was the only one who seemed as if he would have the best of it with the Dragon.

My hopes of peace wax fainter. Everybody seems to think there is no chance of Russia accepting our terms, or of her proposing any that the Allies would accept. Lewis told me yesterday evening that he expected nothing, and that Russia had now made known (but in what way he did not say) that she was disposed to treat. Meanwhile Palmerston continues to put articles in the 'Morning Post' full of arrogance and *jactance*, and calculated to raise obstacles to peace. I told Lewis so, and he said it was very foolish, and that he held very different language in the Cabinet, but this is only like what he did in '41, when he used to agree to certain things with his colleagues and then put violent articles in the 'Morning Chronicle' totally at variance with the views and resolutions of the Cabinet. Labouchere told me that he thought the condition of the cession of Ismail

ought never to have entered into the terms proposed to Russia.

*December 14th.*—My hopes of peace, never very sanguine, are now completely dashed, for Lewis told me last night that he thought the terms were at last pretty well agreed upon between England, France, and Austria. I was greatly surprised, for I thought they had been agreed upon long ago and must be by this time on their way to St. Petersburg. I said so; and he replied, ‘Oh no, they are only just on the point of being settled.’ It was quite extraordinary, he said, how eager Palmerston was for pursuing the war. I gathered from him that our Government has been vehemently urging that of France, through Cowley, to be firm in pressing the most stringent terms on Russia, and particularly not to consent to any negotiation, and to compel her to accept or refuse. I said this was not reasonable, and that we had no right to propose the terms as an ultimatum. That, he replied, was exactly what we were doing, that Cowley was very urgent with the Emperor, who appeared to be intimidated by him, and that he was evidently very much in awe of England and afraid of having any difference with us. I said I could not believe that the Emperor would not leave himself a loophole, and if, as was most probable, Russia declined the terms, but offered to negotiate, that he would agree to that course, which, however, Lewis clearly thought he would not do against our inclination. I was greatly surprised to hear this, because I had a strong impression that the Emperor, when he really desired anything very much (as I believe that he did this peace), would obstinately persevere in it; and it seems so obviously his interest to gratify his own people rather than to be led by this country, that I was persuaded he never would consent to this proposal being *un dernier mot*, and thus to ensure the failure of the attempt. Palmerston, who is the most obstinate man alive in pressing any object he has once set his mind upon, was sure to press the French Government with the utmost vehemence and pertinacity as soon as he found there was a chance of making them yield to his will.

*December 17th.*—This morning the two new volumes of Macaulay's History came forth. The circumstances of this publication are, I believe, unprecedented in literary history; 25,000 copies are given out, and the weight of the books is fifty-six tons. The interest and curiosity which it excites are prodigious, and they afford the most complete testimony to his immense popularity and the opinion entertained by the world of his works already published. His profits will be very great, and he will receive them in various shapes. But there is too much reason to apprehend that these may be the last volumes of his history that the world will see, still more that they are the last that will be read by me and people of my standing. Six years have elapsed since the appearance of the first volumes, and these two only advance about ten years. He announced at the outset that he meant to bring down the history of England to a period within the memory of persons still living, but his work has already so much expanded, and of course will do so still more from the accumulation of materials as he advances, that at his present rate of progress he must live much beyond the ordinary duration of human life, and retain all his faculties as long, to have any chance of accomplishing his original design; and he is now in such a precarious state of health that in all human probability he will not live many years. It is melancholy to think that so gifted an intellect should be arrested by premature decay, and such a magnificent undertaking should be overthrown by physical infirmities, and be limited to the proportions of a splendid fragment. He is going to quit Parliament and to reside in the neighbourhood of London.

This morning the 'Morning Post' has published the terms which are offered by the Allies and are now on their way from Vienna to St. Petersburg. They were already pretty well known, but it is the first time that Palmerston (for the article is evidently his own) has announced them so openly and distinctly, and they state *totidem verbis* that it is an Ultimatum which is sent to St. Petersburg. I believe this course to be unprecedented, and it is certainly unfair. If Russia

had applied to the Allies and expressed a desire for peace, if she had asked them on what terms they would consent to terminate the war, it would have been quite fair and reasonable that they should have stated the precise conditions, adding if they pleased that they would consent to no others and to no change whatever in them, though it may be doubted if it would be wise to be thus peremptory. But to send to Russia and propose to her to make peace, and accompany the proposal with an Ultimatum and an announcement that they would listen to no remonstrances or suggestions, much less any alterations, and that she must say Yes or No at once, is a stretch of arrogance and dictation not justified by the events of the war and the relative conditions of the belligerents, or by any usage or precedent that I ever heard of.

Reports are very rife of the distressed state of Russia and of her inability to make head any longer against the Allies, but very little is really known of the condition of the country, of its remaining resources, and of the disposition of the people. Nobody can doubt that the terms are deeply humiliating to the pride of such a Power, which has been long accustomed to stand in so high a position and hold such lofty language; and if she consents to accept the offered terms, it must be that her enormous losses have really incapacitated her for going on with the war, and that her Government is conscious that the next campaign will be still more disastrous to her than the two preceding ones have been. I have very little doubt that Palmerston has hastened to publish these terms in hopes that they may find acceptance with a considerable part of the public here, and that they may the more tightly bind the Emperor Napoleon, and, in the event of Russia sending any conditional acceptance and proposing to treat, that he may be unable to enter into any negotiation whatever. It has surprised me that he should have so completely given way to Palmerston as he has done.

*December 21st.*—The poet Rogers died two days ago at the age of 93. I have known him all my life, and at times lived

in a good deal of intimacy with him, but for some years past he had so great an aversion to me that I kept away from him and never saw anything of him.<sup>1</sup> He was an old man when I first made his acquaintance between thirty and forty years ago, or probably more. He was then very agreeable, though peculiar and eccentric; he was devoured by a morbid vanity, and could not endure any appearance of indifference or slight in society. He was extremely touchy, and always wanted to be flattered, but above all to be listened to, very angry and mortified when he was not the principal object in society, and provoked to death when the uproarious merriment of Sydney Smith or the voluminous talk of Macaulay overwhelmed him and engrossed the company; he had a great friendship nevertheless for Sydney Smith, but he never liked Macaulay. I never pretended, or could pretend, to be a rival to him, but I was not a patient and attentive listener to him, and that was what affronted him and caused his dislike to me as well as to anyone else of whom he had the same reason to complain. His voice was feeble, and it has been said that his bitterness and caustic remarks arose from the necessity of his attracting attention by the pungency of his conversation. He was undoubtedly a very clever and accomplished man, with a great deal of taste and knowledge of the world, in the best of which he had passed his life. He was hospitable, generous, and charitable, with some weaknesses, many merits, and large abilities, and he was the last survivor of the generation to which he belonged.

*The Grove, December 23rd.*—Came here for Christmas. No other guests but the family. We have had some talk about the peace propositions and other odds and ends. Clarendon told me that Walewski and Persigny are bitter enemies, and their estrangement the greater because Walewski is a corrupt jobber and speculator, and Persigny an

<sup>1</sup> [Samuel Rogers, the author of the *Pleasures of Memory* (which was published in 1792), was born at Stoke Newington in 1762. His father was a banker, and he remained a partner in the bank all his life. He died on December 18, 1855.]



honest man. When Drouyn de Lhuys resigned the Foreign Office, much to the Emperor's annoyance and regret, he did not know where to find a man, and he determined to appoint Walewski because he knew not whom else to take. Not choosing to send the offer to him through Drouyn, he employed Cowley, and requested him to telegraph in cypher to Clarendon a request that Cowley would send for Walewski and communicate to him the Emperor's intentions. A curious shift to be reduced to, but throughout the Eastern Question Cowley has acted the part of Foreign Minister to the Emperor almost as much as that of Ambassador.

Lewis this morning recapitulated to me the exact circumstances of the overtures from France about peace. It arrived here on a Saturday; was submitted to the Queen on Sunday, who approved of it; on Monday (or Tuesday) it was read to the Cabinet, when no discussion took place, but Palmerston shortly said, without giving any reasons, that he thought we must agree to the proposal, which was generally concurred in. The next day there was another Cabinet, when they examined in detail all the articles and discussed them. A few alterations were made, none of which were of any importance except the Bomarsund question. The cession of Bessarabia and the neutralisation of the Black Sea both formed part of the original proposal, and the latter was particularly insisted upon, and reasoned out at considerable length by France, for it turns out that the Emperor has never had so much in view the object of *making peace* (not expecting, nor ever having expected, that these proposals would be accepted) as the object of securing the active co-operation of Austria, which he expects to do. Austria engages, if Russia refuses the conditions, to put an end to diplomatic relations between the two Empires, and Napoleon thinks this cannot fail to end in hostilities, and to this extension of the alliance he looks for bringing the war to a conclusion. He thinks, moreover, that, when Austria has declared war, Russia will attack her defenceless frontier, and that as any attack upon Austria will compel the whole of Germany to

assist her and to take part in the war against Russia, this offer will lead to Prussia and the whole of the German States being engaged on the side of the Allies, and that such a confederacy cannot fail to bring the war to a successful issue, because Russia would be absolutely incapable of offering any resistance to it. This is a new view of the policy and motives of France, but I very much doubt if the whole of the Emperor's scheme will be realised. Even though Austria may take up arms, it is probable that Russia will act strictly on the defensive, and will avoid giving any cause to the German States to depart from their neutrality. We both agreed that the conduct of Austria is quite inexplicable, and that Russia will never forgive her for the part she has acted and is acting now.

*The Grove, December 24th.*—George Lewis and I have been walking and talking together all the morning. He is fully as pacific as I am, and entertains exactly the same thoughts that I do, of the egregious folly of the war, of the delusion under which the English nation is labouring, and of the wickedness of the press in practising upon the popular credulity in the way it has done. He seems to like to talk to me on this subject, because he can talk freely to me, which he could hardly do with any of his own colleagues, still less in any other society. This morning he again recurred to the circumstances of the negotiations now going on, and he gave me an account of the transaction which puts the whole thing in a very ridiculous light, which would be very comical if it were not so very tragical. 'Think,' he said, 'that this is a war carried on for the independence of Turkey, and we, the Allies, are bound to Turkey by mutual obligations not to make peace but by common consent and concurrence. Well, we have sent an offer of peace to Russia of which the following are among the terms: We propose that Turkey, who possesses one half of the Black Sea coast, shall have no ships, no ports, and no arsenals in that sea; and then there are conditions about the Christians who are subjects of Turkey, and others about the mouths of the Danube, to which part of the Turkish dominions are contiguous. Now in all these stipulations so

intimately concerning Turkey, for whose independence we are fighting, Turkey is not allowed to have any voice whatever, nor has she ever been allowed to be made acquainted with what is going on, except through the newspapers, where the Turkish Ministers may have read what is passing, like other people. When the French and Austrian terms were discussed in the Cabinet, at the end of the discussion someone modestly asked whether it would not be proper to communicate to Musurus (the Turkish Ambassador in London) what was in agitation and what had been agreed upon, to which Clarendon said he saw no necessity for it whatever; and indeed that Musurus had recently called upon him, when he had abstained from giving him any information whatever of what was going on. Another time, somebody suggesting in the Cabinet that we were bound to Turkey by treaty not to make peace without her consent, Palmerston, who is a great stickler for Turkey, said very quietly that there would be no difficulty on that score; in point of fact, the Turk evidently

‘Stands like a cypher in the great account.’

*The Grove, December 26th.*—Since I have been here Clarendon has resumed all his old habits of communication and confidence with me, has told me everything and shown me everything that is interesting and curious. I wish I could remember it all. Such fragments as have remained in my memory I will jot down here as they recur to me. Here are letters from Seymour at Vienna describing his good reception there, gracious from the Court, and cordially civil from the great society, especially from Metternich who seems to have given the *mot d'ordre*. Metternich talked much to Seymour of his past life and recollections, complimented him for his reports of conversations with the Emperor Nicholas, and said that many years ago the Emperor had talked to him (Metternich) about Turkey in the same strain, and used the same expression about ‘le malade’ and ‘l’homme malade, when Metternich asked him ‘Est-ce que Votre Majesté en parle comme son médecin ou comme son héritier?’ Also

letters from Bloomfield (Berlin) and from Buchanan (Copenhagen) with different opinions as to the probability of Russia accepting or refusing—the former for, the second against; some curious letters from Cowley, full of his indignation against Walewski; the quarrels of Persigny and Walewski; the perplexity of the Emperor, his desire for peace, his hopes that Russia may lend a favourable ear to the proposals; Cowley's suspicions of Walewski, and in a smaller degree of the Emperor himself, especially of His Majesty's communications with Seebach, the Saxon Minister, and not impossibly through him with St. Petersburg.

A curious anecdote showing the strange terms the parties concerned are on: One day Cowley was with Walewski (at the time the question of terms was going on between France and Austria) and the courier from Vienna was announced. Walewski begged Cowley, who took up his hat, not to go away, and said he should see what the courier brought. He opened the despatches and gave them to Cowley to read, begging him not to tell the Emperor he had seen them. In the afternoon Cowley saw the Emperor, who had then got the despatches; the Emperor also gave them to Cowley to read, desiring him not to let Walewski know he had shown them to him!

There has been a dreadful *rixe* between Walewski and Persigny. I have forgotten exactly the particular causes, but the other day Persigny went over to Paris partly to complain of Walewski to the Emperor. He would not go near Walewski, and told the Emperor he should not; the Emperor, however, made them both meet in his Cabinet the next day, when a violent scene took place between them, and Persigny said to Walewski before his face all that he had before said behind his back; and he had afterwards a very long conversation with the Emperor, in which he told him plainly what danger he was in from the corruption and bad character of his *entourage*, that he had never had anything about him but adventurers who were bent on making their own fortunes by every sort of infamous *agiotage* and speculation, by which the Imperial Crown was placed in

imminent danger. 'I myself,' Persigny said, 'am nothing but an adventurer, who have passed through every sort of vicissitude; but at all events people have discovered that I have clean hands and do not bring disgrace on your Government, like so many others, by my profligate dishonesty.' 'Well,' said the Emperor, 'but what am I to do? What remedy is there for such a state of things?' Persigny replied that he had got the remedy in his head, but that the time was not come yet for revealing his ideas on the subject.

As we went to town, we talked over the terms proposed to Prussia. Clarendon said he could not understand the policy of Austria nor what she was driving at. She had entered very heartily into plans of a compulsory and hostile character against Russia, who would never forgive her, especially for proposing the cession of Bessarabia. I said I thought the most objectionable item of their propositions (and I believed the most unprecedented) was the starting by making it an Ultimatum. He replied that it was Austria who tendered the Ultimatum, and that it was not exactly so, the sharp edge having been rounded off by the mode to be adopted, which was as follows: Esterhazy was to communicate the project to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and say he had reason to believe that the Allies would be willing to make peace on those terms; he was then to wait nine days. If in that time the Russian Government replied by a positive negative, he was, as soon as he got this notification, to quit St. Petersburg with all his embassy; if no answer was returned at the end of nine days, he was to signify that his orders were to ask for an answer in ten days, and if at the end thereof the answer was in the negative, or there was no answer, he was to come away, so that there was to be no Ultimatum in the first instance. 'But,' I said, 'what if Russia proposed some middle course and offered to negotiate?' 'His instructions were not to agree to this.' 'Well,' said I, 'but when you abstain from calling this an Ultimatum, it is next to impossible that Russia should not propose to negotiate, and if she does beg that her proposal may be conveyed to the Allies before everything is

closed, it will be very difficult to refuse this; and is it not probable that France and Austria will both vote for entering into *pourparlers*; and, if they do, can you refuse?' He seemed struck with this, and owned that it was very likely to occur, and that, if it did, we should be obliged to enter into negotiation. So probable does this contingency appear, that there has already been much discussion as to who shall go from hence to the Congress, if there is one. I said he had much better go himself. He expressed great dislike to the idea, but said the Queen and Prince wished him to go, and that Cowley urged him also, and was desirous of going with him. I see he has made up his mind to prevent any negotiation if he can, and, if it is unavoidable, to take it in hand.

This afternoon Persigny arrived from Paris and came directly to the Foreign Office. The Emperor had given him an account of his interview with M. de Seebach,<sup>1</sup> who had gone off directly afterwards *via* Berlin to St. Petersburg. The Emperor told him to do all he could to induce the Russian Government to consent to the terms, and to assure them that, if they did not, it would be long enough before they would have any other chance of making peace; that he wished for peace, but that above everything else he was desirous of maintaining unimpaired his alliance and friendship with England; that England had most fairly and in a very friendly spirit entered into his difficulties and his wishes; that she was a constitutional country with a Government responsible to Parliament, and that he was bound in honour to enter in like manner into the obligations and necessities of this Government. They had had some differences of opinion which were entirely reconciled; they were now agreed as one man, and no power on earth should induce him to separate himself from England or to take any other line than that to which he had bound himself in conjunction with her. This announcement, which the Emperor made with great energy, carried consternation to the mind of Seebach, and he re-

<sup>1</sup> [M. de Seebach was the Saxon Minister in Paris, through whom many of these communications passed.]

solved to lose no time in getting to St. Petersburg to make known the Emperor's intentions.

It is thus evident that the Emperor's mind is divided between his anxiety to make peace and his determination to have no difference with England; but his desire for peace must be great when, as Clarendon assures me, it was not without difficulty that he was deterred from ordering his army away from the Crimea. The feeling here towards the Emperor seems to be one of liking and reliance, not unaccompanied with doubt and suspicion. He is not exempt from the influence of his *entourage*, though he is well aware how corrupt that is, and he listens willingly to Cowley and to whatever the English Government and the Queen say to him, but his own people eternally din into his ears that we are urging him on to take a part injurious to his own and to French interests for our own purposes, and because our Government is itself under the influence of a profligate press and a deluded people; and although he knows that those who tell him this are themselves working for their own private interests, he knows also that there is a great deal of truth in what they say. His own position is very strange, insisting upon being his own Minister and directing everything, and at the same time from indolence and ignorance incapable of directing affairs himself, yet having no confidence in those he employs. The consequence is that a great deal is ill done, much not done at all, and a good deal done that he knows nothing about, and he is surrounded with quarrels, jealousies, and struggles for influence and power both between his own Ministers and between them and the foreign diplomatists at his Court.

We have had a good deal of talk about Palmerston. Clarendon says nothing can go on better than he and Palmerston do together. They seldom meet except in the Cabinet, and their communications go on by notes between Downing Street and Piccadilly. Palmerston, much more moderate and reasonable than he used to be, sometimes suggests things or expressions in despatches, which Clarendon always adopts or declines according to his own ideas,

and Palmerston never insists. Palmerston is now on very good terms with the Queen, which is, though he does not know it, greatly attributable to Clarendon's constant endeavours to reconcile her to him, always telling her everything likely to ingratiate Palmerston with her, and showing her any letters or notes of his calculated to please her; but he says it is impossible to conceive the hatred with which he is regarded on the Continent, particularly all over Germany. An agent of his (Clarendon's) who, he says, has supplied him with much useful information, has reported to him that he finds the old feeling of antipathy to Palmerston as strong and as general as ever, and that it is as much on the part of the people as of the Governments, both thinking they have been deceived and thrown over by him.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.





